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The ocean is fundamental to the well- being of our planet and closely connected 
to many aspects of our lives. As is evident from many scientific reports, we are 
facing multiple crises in relation to the health of the ocean and the unsustain-
ability of human activities. For this reason, the World Maritime University – Sa-
sakawa Global Ocean Institute was founded and tasked with addressing some 
of the most pressing issues in ocean affairs and the law of the sea. The Nippon 
Foundation is therefore very pleased to see that the Institute is working very 
closely with the Center of Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia 
School of Law along with other international partners in making a substantive 
contribution to the negotiation of a new treaty on biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdiction through this academic conference and fine volume of conference 
papers. Undoubtedly, this contribution will assist delegations in bringing the 
bbnj negotiations to a successful conclusion. We are also very pleased to see 
the high- level representatives that attended the conference at the World Mar-
itime University from most countries and regions, including land- locked ones, 
and from intergovernmental organisations, business and civil society. The bbnj 
Agreement will require support from all of these entities when adopted. If it at-
tracts universal support, it can make a big difference in how the global commu-
nity addresses the environmental pressures that are exacerbating inequalities 
and threatening food security in some of the world’s poorest countries. These 
issues are so intertwined that it is crucial to build networks, with an interdis-
ciplinary perspective, in order to accelerate cooperation that goes beyond the 
existing frameworks within countries and institutions. In that spirit, the Nip-
pon Foundation has been committed to develop experts from all over the world 
in maritime and ocean affairs over three decades; the joint program with the 
un doalos is one example of our capacity building initiatives. We have been 
delivering training to government officials in the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, in order to reinforce 
the knowledge and capacity necessary for effective national participation in 
the bbnj process and to ensure the effective implementation of the new in-
strument in due course. Crucially in this regard, we are delighted to see a very 
solid focus on capacity- building in the papers presented in this volume. This 
important contribution to scholarship will be welcomed worldwide by all those 
concerned with ocean affairs and international cooperation to ensure peace 
and the sustainable future of our planet for many future generations.
Mr. Mitsuyuki Unno
Executive Director of The Nippon Foundation
 
Preface
The 43rd Annual Conference of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy (colp) 
was held 14 May to 16 May 2019 at the World Maritime University Sasakawa 
Auditorium in Malmö, Sweden. The Conference was co- organized with the 
World Maritime University – Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute (wmu) under 
its Nippon Foundation Program. The subject discussed was the development 
of an internationally legally binding instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) on the topic of the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (bbnj).
This book is based on presentations made at the Malmö Conference by many 
of the most knowledgeable experts on both the on- going bbnj negotiations at 
the United Nations and on the well- established unclos principles and rules. 
The Malmö Conference featured remarks by distinguished diplomats followed 
by six Parts devoted to identifying the major issues at the bbnj negotiations.
The lead off speaker was Ambassador Rena Lee from Singapore who serves 
as the elected President of the bbnj Inter- governmental Conference. She com-
mented on the recently issued Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(ipcc). The report contains a comprehensive assessment on the status of the 
earth’s biodiversity and she felt that the Malmö Conference was important 
and timely as documented in ipcc Report. The second featured speaker was 
Hans Corell (Sweden) the former Under- Secretary- General for Legal Affairs 
and Legal Counsel of the United Nations. With his wide experience with both 
unclos and the bbnj negotiations he was willing and able to offer valuable 
insights on significant Rule of Law issues involved. The third featured speaker 
at the Malmö Conference was Arif Havas Oegroseno the Indonesian Ambas-
sador to Germany and former Deputy Minister of his country’s Coordinating 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs. Ambassador Oegroseno, long a highly respected 
expert on the subject at hand, focused specifically on the topic of managing 
marine genetic resources in the high seas.
Part 1 of the Malmö Conference kicked off on the context for the bbnj ne-
gotiations with the first presentation by J. Ashley Roach now a retired attorney 
who was for many years the most knowledge, able and experienced unclos 
expert in the United States Department of State. He brought the Malmö Con-
ference up to date on the bbnj negotiations previously described by him at 
prior colp events such as its 2018 session in Beijing. Captain (usn retired) 
Roach was followed by Ms. Lisa Eurén Höglund who has been actively engaged 
in the current bbnj negotiations for Sweden. She reflected on area- based 
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management tools, including marine protected areas (mpa), in the bbnj 
negotiations.
Part  2 covered access and benefit sharing with respect to marine genetic 
sharing through a joint presentation by Professors Marcel Jaspers and Abbe 
E.L. Brown from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. Chemistry Professor 
Jaspers mainly looked at useful products while Professor Brown‘s particular 
interest was in intellectual property implications. Associate Professor on In-
tellectual Property Law, London School of Economic and Political Science, 
Siva Thambisetty then delved into normative implications and proposed a “no 
harm” principle to reconcile competing intellectual property positions at the 
bbnj Conference.
Part 3 dealt with environmental impact assessments (eia s), scientific data 
and databases and sensor technology as impacting the bbnj negotiations. Pro-
fessor Larry Mayer, Director of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping at 
the University of New Hampshire, stressed our minimal understanding of the 
geospatial context within which global observations are being made. His coau-
thor, Captain J. Ashley Roach, joined in analyzing the legal issues for achieving 
the goal of collecting the bathymetric data necessary to produce the high res-
olution topographical maps now required for policy- making about the world’s 
oceans. Dr. Robin Warner from the Australian National Centre for Ocean Re-
sources and Security (ancors) next emphasized the opportunity bbnj nego-
tiations offer to improve the lack of legal and institutional frameworks through 
eia s. She pointed out that a developed eia regime is a fundamental prereq-
uisite for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity on our 
planet. Professor Karen N. Scott at University of Canterbury in New Zealand 
next examined the rules relating to marine scientific research as they apply to 
geoengineering in the bbnj context. She suggested that the potential “solution” 
to managing its risks lies in supporting and implementing the existing regime.
Part 4 was focused on capacity building and transfer of technology in the 
bbnj negotiations. Professor Alf Håkon Hoel from the Arctic University of 
Norway in Tromsø discussed the existing global framework for capacity build-
ing and technology and lessons that can be drawn. Then he said that there 
was ample room for improvements under the unclos umbrella. Dr. Harriet 
Harden- Davies from ancors examined the unclos framework for marine 
technology. She proposed that there are challenges as well as opportunities to 
enhance the implementation to build capacity in the bbnj negotiations for the 
conservation and sustainable use of bbnj resources.
Part 5 took up cross- cutting issues in the bbnj negotiations. Professor Ronán 
Long, who holds the Nippon Foundation Chair in Ocean Governance and 
the Law of the Sea at wmu, explored the shortcomings in capacity building 
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in developing countries. He concludes that the bbnj Agreement has the po-
tential to be a game- changer on capacity- building if it establishes a robust 
institutional setting for decision- makers, codifies the requirements for a reg-
ular needs assessment and establishes a mandatory and sustainable funding 
stream. Ted L. McDorman, Law Faculty, University of Victoria, British Colum-
bia tackled the relationship between a bbnj Convention and existing relevant 
instruments and global, regional and sectoral bodies. He identified several ar-
eas where the bbnj Convention could “undermine” existing instruments and 
frameworks. Associate Law Professor Joanna Mossop from Victoria University 
of Wellington, New Zealand and wmu Professor Clive Schofield teamed up to 
address the spatial and functional complexities relating to biodiversity beyond 
national jurisdiction in the bbnj negotiations. Uncertainties include coastal 
baselines, sea level rise, excessive coastal State claims, island disputes and in-
complete delineation of continental shelf limits beyond 200 nautical miles. 
Given horizontal and vertical ecological connectivity issues, they discuss op-
tions to deal with these challenges.
Part 6 was devoted to Arctic environment, security and shipping matters. 
Dr. Nong Hong from the Institute for China- America Studies located in Wash-
ington, DC, reviewed the geo- political landscape of the Arctic today. Apart 
from the traditional Arctic States, she identified the growing interest of China, 
Japan and South Korea. She urges the promotion of cooperation with these 
stakeholders in the years to come. The final presenter was Commander David 
Dubay of the US Coast Guard on duty with the Stockton Center for Interna-
tional Law, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He examined is-
sues relating to the Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement (caofa) that is 
intended to restrict unregulated fishing on the high seas and allow scientists 
time to study whether fish populations can support a commercial fishery.
Acknowledgments
Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Intractable Challeng-
es & Potential Solutions is part of a series of publications on oceans law and 
policy sponsored by the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Vir-
ginia School of Law, in connection with its annual conference. This volume is 
based on presentations made 15– 16 May 2019 at the Center’s 43rd conference 
which was held in Malmö, Sweden. The principal organizers were the Virgin-
ia Center, the World Maritime University – Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute, 
and the Nippon Foundation. Additional sponsors were the Institute for China- 
America Studies, the Centre for International Law at the National University 
of Singapore, the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the US 
Naval War College, the Korea Maritime Institute, and the Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital Infrastructure in Germany.
Local administrative support for the conference was provided by Elnaz Bar-
jandi, Jill Jarnsäter, and the staff of the WMU Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute. 
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marine biological diversity  – areas beyond national jurisdiction  – policy  –  
 intergovernmental conference
The theme for this year’s conference is about Biodiversity Beyond National Ju-
risdiction (bbnj). It is my great privilege and honour to play a role in the inter- 
governmental conference (igc) to develop an international, legally binding 
instrument under unclos for the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. I am very grateful for 
the support shown to me by all delegations. Here I will address our journey to 
the realisation of our objective, and what some of the overarching themes are.
Recently some of you may have come across news reports of the latest re-
port issued by the Intergovernmental Science- Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (ipbes). It is, I believe, the biodiversity equivalent of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or ipcc. The report, which is 
known as the iPbes Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services, is the first of its kind and is a comprehensive assessment of the state 
of the earth’s biodiversity. Although I  have only read the news reports, they 
make for sober reading. Out of eight million species of animals and plants on 
earth, it is estimated that up to one million species are threatened with extinc-
tion over the next few decades. It means that in our lifetime, we could possibly 
see over one million species of plants and animals disappear forever. This is a 
rate of extinction which is higher than the average for the last 10 million years. 
These figures are mind boggling. And this is, I assume, for known species of 
plants and animals. There is so much that we do not know about the areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, in the deep ocean and seabed.
To assist policy makers, the Report identifies the direct drivers of change. 
Top of the list, meaning the biggest driver, is land and sea use changes, fol-
lowed by direct exploitation of organisms. These direct drivers are the result of 
an array of different reasons but this is not the place to discuss these reasons.
4 Lee
The Report however, is not all gloom and doom. There is hope. These are 
projected outcomes and there is still time for us to make a difference. To quote 
the Chair of the iPbes, Sir Robert Watson, “Through ‘transformative change’, 
nature can still be conserved, restored and used sustainably”. But if we want 
to make that difference and develop more sustainable pathways, we must act 
urgently.
What is the relevance of the Report to our work in the igc? The Report 
covers not just terrestrial biodiversity but marine biodiversity as well. The one 
million species threatened with extinction include almost 33% of reef- forming 
corals and more than one third of marine mammals. So this Report under-
scores what we all know – that the work of the igc is urgent. That is part of 
our mandate by the way; resolution 72/ 249 refers to developing the instrument 
“as soon as possible”. Indeed, at the end of the last session of the igc in early 
April, some member states noted that there remained two more of the four 
sessions mandated in 72/ 249. This is not to say that the new instrument is go-
ing to be the “silver bullet” that solves all the ills plaguing the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction; it is not – we are governed by our mandate. But it can 
be part of the transformative change that the iPbes is calling for. And in fact 
some of the “levers” of change described in the Report are what we are working 
on: capacity- building, integrated and cross- sectoral cooperation, precaution-
ary actions, and the rule of law.
So the question is, how do we fulfil the mandate that has been given to us? 
In other words, what is the pathway to realisation of our objective? I take pro-
cess first: over the course of the igc, I have had reason to give a lot of thought 
to process issues because process matters. What I have come to realise is that 
there is no one single pathway, no one single process to realisation. There are 
many possible pathways to realisation. I personally think it is important that 
the process is one that is systematic, that allows participants to follow the work 
and to be heard. Yes, I am keenly aware of the urgency of our work and I val-
ue the advice of those who want to pick up the pace but as I  have said be-
fore: sometimes, we have to go slow to go fast. Opportunities like this igc are 
not around every corner so it is important that we do not squander the oppor-
tunity that is before us; it is important to take the time to get things right. But 
precisely because there are many possible pathways, I hope that those of you 
who participate in the igc will continue to share your ideas with me and with 
your bureau members. At the same time, I want to express my gratitude for the 
flexibility that delegations have shown thus far with regard to the process, and 
I hope that this can be continued, as we may need to adjust our process as the 
situation demands it.
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But while process matters, it is inconsequential without the substance. The 
substance is what drives our process. Once the dust has settled, the substance 
is what remains. And the substance is what will bring about real results, what 
will make a difference. At the start of the igc, I said that my vision was to build 
a fair, balanced and effective instrument.
To me, a fair outcome is one where the various interests and concerns are 
taken into account. This is not to say that we will all get what we want. None-
theless, in our quest for consensus, we must seek to give consideration to dif-
ferent viewpoints, not dismiss them out of turn, and consider how they can 
be accommodated if possible. A balanced outcome speaks to the package that 
we are seeking to build. Many delegations have, in the past, referred to the 
“delicate balance” of rights and duties, of different interests, that are reflected 
in unclos. In building our bbnj package, I hope we can strive to achieve a 
balance as well, both within each of the elements and across the elements of 
the package.
An effective outcome is something I have been and continue to focus on. 
There are a number of aspects to effective outcomes but the two main pillars, 
in the context of the bbnj instrument, are universality and implementability. 
Because we are talking about areas beyond national jurisdiction, it is import-
ant that we bring on board as many people as possible, which means seeking to 
achieve a high rate of ratification of the new instrument. It is equally import-
ant that the outcome is an implementable one. This means is that it should be 
clear how the provisions of the bbnj instrument are to be implemented. The 
twin pillars of an effective outcome are important because the implementa-
tion of what we decide to do by as many people as possible is what will bear 
fruit, what will produce real results, in the areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The search for an implementable outcome is why I have, in the igc process, 
placed an emphasis on processes and people – how will we do what we say 
we want to do and who’s going to do it. For example, it is not enough to say 
we want to apply an area- based management tool. There should be an under-
standing of how are we going to do so; in other words, what the process is, 
and who the actors are. The areas beyond national jurisdiction are not empty. 
There are many players out there, and it would be helpful to know who will 
be doing what, and to work out the place of this bbnj instrument in the uni-
verse of ocean governance. This will help us to avoid what I call the “everybody, 
somebody, nobody” syndrome, where everybody knows somebody has to do it, 
but nobody does it because everybody thinks somebody else is doing it. Or just 
as problematic: everybody knows somebody has to do it, but everybody does it 
because nobody thinks somebody else is doing it.
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One significant hallmark of the igc is the high level of engagement dis-
played by all delegations, and that includes the observer delegations – that was 
very evident at the last session. And I can see that in many respects, delega-
tions are trying to move beyond the “headlines” as it were, to delve into issues 
with greater specificity. Delegations are trying to tease out the elements of the 
benefit- sharing regime for marine genetic resources, to work out the process 
for the application of area- based management tools, to establish what’s in-
volved in an environmental impact assessment, and to consider how capacity 
and technology needs can be met, while harnessing on- going efforts. But there 
is still much ground to cover because these are complex issues. For example, 
we need a better handle on what is the role of intellectual property rights in 
the context of marine genetic resources, how area- based management tools 
will be implemented, who will undertake strategic environment assessments, 
and how to sustain capacity building and technology transfer efforts, and there 
are more of these issues to tackle.
This is why conferences such as this are important. Yesterday, at the recep-
tion, Madam President of the wmu quoted Nelson Mandela who said that 
“[e] ducation is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the 
world”. Conferences such as this one are important in educating people on the 
issues that we are tackling in the igc. I see that the sub- theme of this year’s 
conference is “Intractable challenges and potential solutions”. I am pleased to 
note that even intractable issues have solutions. The ideas that you seed here 
may bear fruit in the igc. The high level of engagement and dedication shown 
by delegations give me the confidence to tell you that given time, if we persist, 
we will fulfil our mandate.
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1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Adopted in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, this treaty with this 
well- known acronym unclos is surely one of the most important treaties in 
the world. At present, there are 168 parties to unclos. Among the UN Member 
States there are 28 that are still not parties. Fifteen of these States are land- 
locked, so they may not be so interested in ratifying or acceding to the treaty.1 
However, the remaining thirteen States are the following: Cambodia, Colom-
bia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, El Salvador, the Islamic Re-
public of Iran, Israel, Libya, Peru, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the United 
Arab Emirates, the United States of America, and Venezuela. The question I al-
ways ask myself is whether the United States of America belongs in this group?
For my part, I have a very determined opinion about the importance of this 
Convention. I was not involved in the negotiations of the same. However, I had 
the honour of chairing the delegation of my country, Sweden, when we nego-
tiated the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea in the 
1980s with the then- Soviet Union, Poland and Finland.
In March 1994, I  became the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. This 
meant that I had the privilege of chairing the final consultations on Part xi of 
 1 These land- locked States are: Afghanistan, Andorra, Bhutan, Burundi, the Central African Re-
public, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Rwanda, San Marino, South Sudan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
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unclos that resulted in an agreement that was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 28 July 1994. During these consultations I had great support from 
Satya Nandan of Fiji.
The unclos entered into force on 16 November 1994, which meant that 
the three organs under the Convention: the International Seabed Authority in 
Kingston, Jamaica, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Ham-
burg, Germany, and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
that works in New York had to be established. This task fell upon the Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (doalos) in the United Nations Of-
fice of Legal Affairs. Consequently, I had to oversee this process— a very re-
warding experience.
The International Seabed Authority (isa) was already established in 1994. 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) was established in 
1996, and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs) held 
its first meeting in New York in June 1997.
Since I retired from the United Nations and public service in 2004, I have 
been able to follow these three organs at a distance only. With respect to un-
clos my main focus since then has been on the polar regions. I had the privi-
lege of chairing the 28th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in 2005. How-
ever, my attention has been on the Arctic in particular. The reason is that there 
are often misunderstandings in the media about the legal regime that applies 
there. It is therefore of great importance to clarify that the legal regime in the 
Arctic is unclos. All the Arctic States except the United States are parties to 
unclos.
There is often talk about disputes among the Arctic States. However, they are 
all aware of the legal regime that applies there, and even if the United States is 
not a party to unclos it respects the rules of the Convention. As a matter of 
fact there is a direct reference to “the law of the sea” in the so- called Ilulissat 
Declaration, adopted by the five Arctic coastal States on 28 May 2008.2 The 
Declaration concerns the applicability of the law of the sea in the Arctic Ocean.
And disputes relating to the Arctic area have so far been settled through ne-
gotiations. At present, there are only two territorial disputes that I am sure will 
be resolved through friendly settlements. One concerns Hans Island in the sea 
between Greenland and Ellesmere Island in Canada. The other concerns the 
delimitation of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone between 
the United States (Alaska) and Canada, where Canada maintains that it should 
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follow the 141st azimuth while the United States maintains that it should fol-
low the equidistance line.
As we know, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall 
make recommendations to States on the outer boundaries of the shelf when 
it extends beyond 200 nautical miles. In the media there is often reference to 
claims in the Arctic Ocean. And there will certainly be competing claims as, 
for example, in the case of Canada, Denmark (because of Greenland) and the 
Russian Federation. The duty of the Commission is to make recommendations 
with respect to how far out in the sea the shelf can be claimed. With respect 
to overlapping claims, these are questions that must be settled between the 
competing States. I have no doubt that the States in question will follow the 
rules that apply. So far, I note that they have made notifications relating to such 
claims in conformity with unclos.
Now, a few words about the three organs of unclos.
a The International Seabed Authority
The International Seabed Authority has a very demanding responsibility 
with respect to the so- called Area or as it is often referred to “the common 
heritage of mankind”. This is the area outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
States. According to article 153 of unclos, activities in the Area shall be car-
ried out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole. 
The article contains rules about the manner in which these activities shall 
be carried out. In article 170 we find rules about the so- called Enterprise, 
which shall be the organ of the Authority which shall carry out activities in 
the Area.
The task of the Authority is indeed demanding. The First Part of the 25th 
Annual Session of the Authority took place from 25 February to 1 March 2019. 
The Authority has issued a summary of this meeting which is very interesting 
reading indeed. The summary also contains a brief analysis of the meeting fo-
cusing on The Economic Model, The Enterprise, Environmental Concerns, and 
Leaving No One behind, and focusing on the concerns of developing countries 
that have less capacity to equitably participate in the work of the Authority. Let 
me quote the last paragraph in the introduction to this summary:
This brief analysis examines the main achievements, dilemmas, and 
questions that surfaced during the Council meeting related to the eco-
nomic model and the relevant payment mechanism, the Enterprise, and 
protection of the marine environment. It further outlines key outstand-




I warmly recommend reading this summary, in case you have not already 
done so.3
b The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
With respect to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea there has been 
an interesting development since the Tribunal was inaugurated in October 
1996. We recognize the presence of two former Judges of the Tribunal: Helmut 
Türk of Austria and Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany. Rüdiger Wolfrum was the 
President of the Tribunal 2005– 2008.
So far, 26 cases have been submitted to the Tribunal. They involve wide- 
ranging subjects, such as maritime delimitation disputes, law of fisheries, the 
exploitation of the Area, the preservation and protection of the marine envi-
ronment, and the arrest and detention of vessels.
The Tribunal also offers capacity- building programmes on the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes under the Convention. So far, a series of thirteen regional 
workshops have been held in different regions of the world to provide experts 
from various States with practical information on dispute- settlement proce-
dures before the Tribunal.
There is also an internship programme. Every year this programme gives 
twenty students from around the world the opportunity to gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the work and functions of the Tribunal. Since 2007 there is also 
a nine- month capacity- building and training programme on dispute settle-
ment under the Convention for the benefit of young governmental officials 
and researchers.
An interesting summary of the work of the Tribunal at present appears in a 
statement by its President, Judge Jin- Hyun Paik, before the UN General Assem-
bly on 11 December 2018. Since we have been addressing the issue of Biodiver-
sity Beyond National Jurisdiction at our Conference, let me quote the following 
from the President’s statement:
Allow me to say a few words about the current negotiations in the inter-
governmental conference on an international legally binding instrument 
under the Convention on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
I wish to draw the attention of the Member States of the United Na-
tions to the importance of incorporating a robust dispute- settlement 
 3 Summary of the Twenty- fifth Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority (First 
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mechanism in the future instrument, as such a mechanism would en-
sure compliance with it. In this regard, consideration could be given to 
the possibility of incorporating Part xv, on dispute settlement, of the 
Convention in the new instrument, following the example of the other 
agreements which have been concluded to implement provisions of the 
Convention. It might also be useful to consider the possibility of request-
ing the Tribunal for an advisory opinion in the new instrument. In this 
connection, you may recall that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction comprises 
“all matters specifically provided for in any [agreement other than the 
Convention] which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal” (article 21 of the 
Statute of the Tribunal).4
c The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
With respect to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf there 
has also been a very interesting development.5 One concern that the Meeting 
of States Parties to the Convention has had to address is the workload of the 
Commission in combination with the question of the ability of States, particu-
larly developing States, to fulfil the requirements of article 4 of annex ii to the 
Convention.6 Without going into detail about these elements, let me just say 
that as of 6 May 2019 the Commission had received 90 submissions containing 
information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
As you are aware, in accordance with article 76, paragraph 8 of the Conven-
tion, the Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on such 
submissions. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis 
of these recommendations shall be final and binding. So far, the Commission 
has adopted 31 recommendations under this provision.7
2 The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
Finally, in addition to the three organs of unclos, reference should be made 
to doalos, which, as I said, is part of the UN Office of Legal Affairs. This is a 
 4 The statement is available at https:// www.itlos.org/ fileadmin/ itlos/ documents/ statements_ 
of_ president/ paik/ 2018_ GA_ 111218_ en.pdf.
 5 See https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ clcs_ new/ clcs_ home.htm.
 6 Reference is made to splos/ 72 https:// undocs.org/ SPLOS/ 72 and to splos/ 183 https:// un-
docs.org/ SPLOS/ 183.












very important entity— a focal point— in the field of the law of the sea and 
ocean affairs. According to the rules, the core functions of doalos consist of:
– Providing to States and intergovernmental organizations a range of legal 
and technical services, such as information, advice and assistance as well 
as conducting research and preparing studies relating to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) and other agreements in the 
field of the law of the sea and ocean affairs;
– Providing substantive servicing to the General Assembly on the law of the 
sea and ocean affairs, including the United Nations Open- ended Informal 
Consultative Process established by the General Assembly in its resolution 
54/ 33 in order to facilitate the annual review by the Assembly of develop-
ments in ocean affairs; the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention and 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf;
– Providing support to the organizations of the United Nations system to facil-
itate consistency with the Convention of the instruments and programmes 
in their respective areas of competence;
– Discharging the responsibilities, other than depositary functions, of the Sec-
retary- General under the unclos and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement;
– Conducting monitoring and research activities and maintaining a compre-
hensive information system and research library on the Convention and on 
the law of the sea and ocean affairs; and
– Providing training and fellowship and technical assistance in the field of the 
law of the sea and ocean affairs.
A visit to the doalos website is recommended.8
3 The Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of 
Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
May I also say a few words about the second session of the Conference that is 
engaged in the subject matter that we have discussed here at the World Mari-
time University, namely the Intergovernmental Conference on an internation-
al legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.9 This session took place from 
 8 Available at http:// legal.un.org/ ola/ div_ doalos.aspx?section=doalos.
 9 See https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ . Reference is also made to the following two press releas-
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25 March to 5 April 2019 under the presidency of Ambassador Rena Lee of 
Singapore, whom we are glad to see is among us here. Congratulations on the 
good result, Ambassador Lee!
Let me just say that the main part of the Conference was held in the format 
of four informal working groups on basically the same topics as has been dis-
cussed by the panels in our Conference, namely:
– Marine genetic resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits;
– Measures such as area- based management tools, including marine 
protected areas;
– Environmental impact assessments; and
– Capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology.
An informal working group on cross- cutting issues facilitated by the President 
was also set up.
An advanced and unedited version of the President’s statement at the clos-
ing of the second session is available on the website of the Conference.10 An-
nexed to the statement are also the oral reports of the facilitators of the five 
informal working groups. I  recommend that you take part of this material 
if you have not already done so. The hope is that the result of the second 
session will enable the preparation of a draft of an instrument to be made 
available for negotiations at the third session of the Conference from 19 to 30 
August 2019.
I am sure that Ambassador Lee in her capacity as President of the session 
will find observations and analyses made at our Conference helpful. Personal-
ly, I noted in particular the discussions about the expressions “under the un-
clos”, “fully consistent with unclos”, “not undermine the existing system”, 
and “no additional bureaucracy”.
4 The Present Geo- Political Situation
Against this background, let us now look at the present geo- political situation. 
As I said at the outset, unclos is certainly one of the most important treaties 
in the world. The development after its entry into force in 1994 has been very 
positive, even if one would hope that one day also the United States of America 
would be a party to it. However, a serious question is if this positive develop-
ment will be affected by the present geo- political situation.
 10 Available at https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ sites/ www.un.org.bbnj/ files/ bbnj_ - _ igc2_ - _ presidents_ 





It is sad to note that gradually in later years the most fundamental rules that 
we inherited from a generation that had experienced two world wars are be-
ing questioned or violated— even by Western democracies. Populism is on the 
rise. The behaviour of authoritarian State actors has entailed that international 
legal obligations have been ignored. The rule of law and fundamental human 
rights are being undermined.
Of particular concern is that the United States has withdrawn from the UN 
Human Rights Council and has left the so- called Paris Agreement— the glob-
al response to the threat of climate change— concluded in 2015.11 The United 
States has also withdrawn from the comprehensive, long- term solution to the 
Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(jcpoa) concluded on 14 July 2015.12 States like Hungary and Poland are acting 
in flagrant violation of fundamental principles of the rule of law. The attack 
by Russia on Ukraine in 2014 is an obvious violation of the UN Charter. More 
examples of violations of international law in other parts of the world could 
be mentioned.
Furthermore, important contributions of science relating to the climate 
are not respected in a manner that one would expect in a civilised world. The 
question is whether this will also affect unclos.
Basically, States parties to unclos have respected the rules of the Conven-
tion, and disputes are being settled through negotiations or through arbitra-
tion or by the use of international dispute settlement mechanisms like itlos 
or the International Court of Justice. The organs of unclos are functioning 
well. This is indeed positive. However, there are exceptions. One of the most 
serious examples is the manner in which China behaves in the South China 
Sea at present. This does not bode well for the future.
Another serious matter is the manner in which refugees that come across 
the Mediterranean are treated. We must also realise that climate change may 
in the future generate a flow of refugees in the world of such proportions that 
makes what we see today but a trickle in comparison.
With respect to the Arctic, the Arctic Council is an important institution. 
Established in Canada in 1996, it now has its secretariat based at Tromsø in 
Northern Norway.13 The Council is the leading intergovernmental forum pro-
moting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, 
 11 Available at https:// unfccc.int/ process- and- meetings/ the- paris- agreement/ the- paris-  
agreement.
 12 See Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its Annexes A and B available at https:// 
undocs.org/ S/ RES/ 2231(2015).
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Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arc-
tic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmen-
tal protection in the Arctic.
The cooperation within the Arctic Council has been very successful over 
the years, and every time all eight Arctic foreign ministers have met, they have 
issued a joint declaration. However, when the 11th ministerial meeting ended 
in Rovaniemi in Finland on 7 May this year, the meeting ended for the first 
time ever without such a declaration. The problem was that the United States 
refused to address the topic of “climate change” in the declaration. This was 
unbelievable. It is commonly known that rising CO2 levels have caused climate 
change that simply have to be addressed. Reference is made to the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc)14 and the 2015 
Paris Agreement that I just mentioned.15
Time does not allow me to go into detail here. However, I have addressed 
this question in another context focusing on Security Council reform and the 
effects that climate change will have on the question of international peace 
and security.16 There I  also make a special reference to the situation in the 
Arctic.
The fact that the United States has left the comprehensive, long- term 
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, the jcpoa that I  just mentioned, is 
very serious indeed and has caused tensions at the international level.17 
I have addressed also this question in another context.18 My conclusion is 
that one could question whether this withdrawal is legal after the endorse-
ment of the agreement by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015). 
Under all circumstances, in my opinion the United States is bound by the 
obligations under this resolution in the same manner as are all UN Member 
States.
One situation of special concern is the manner in which Morocco treats 
Western Sahara. In November 2001, when I served as the UN Legal Counsel, 
the Security Council asked for my opinion on “the legality in the context of in-
ternational law, including relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, and agreements concerning Western 
Sahara of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in 
 14 Available at https:// unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ convkp/ conveng.pdf.
 15 Supra, note 11.
 16 See H. Corell, ‘Security Council Reform— The Council Must Lead by Example’ (2019) 22(1) 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online.
 17 Supra, note 12.












the offering and signing of contracts with foreign companies for the explora-
tion of mineral resources in Western Sahara”. Having examined two contracts, 
concluded in October 2001, for oil- reconnaissance and evaluation activities 
in areas offshore Western Sahara, I came to the conclusion that if further ex-
ploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the inter-
ests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation 
of the principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities 
in Non- Self- Governing Territories.19 Since I left the United Nations I have de-
veloped my thinking in this matter further, in particular since I think that the 
European Union is simply not following international law in the interaction 
with Morocco in this matter.20 It is of utmost importance that this question is 
resolved in accordance with international law.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, let me say that unclos is an extraordinary achievement nego-
tiated under the auspices of the United Nations. The States Parties understand 
that it is important that they bow to this law, even if all of them do not fully 
observe pacta sunt servanda. The geo- political situation is troubling. But let 
us hope that the States Parties to unclos realize how important it is that this 
treaty that governs 70 per cent of the surface of the globe is respected. There is 
so much to gain from a strict observance of unclos.
As a matter of fact, what all this boils down to is respect for the rule of law 
at the national and international levels. Of particular importance is that politi-
cians understand their responsibility for the rule of law. I therefore cannot re-
sist making reference to a publication on the rule of law that is directed to poli-
ticians. It was inspired by a comment by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of 
Germany in a meeting of the InterAction Council of Former Heads of State and 
Government in 2008. The publication is some 45 pages in length and is freely 
available for downloading and printing from the web in 25 languages.21 Please 
 19 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under- Secretary- General for Legal Affairs, the Legal 
Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, available at https:// www.
securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/ cf/ %7B65BFCF9B- 6D27- 4E9C- 8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ 
s_ 2002_ 161.pdf.
 20 See for example ‘The Responsibility of the UN Security Council in the Case of Western 
Sahara’. In: International Judicial Monitor, Winter 2015 Issue, available at http:// www.judi-
cialmonitor.org/ current/ specialcommentary.html.
 21 Rule of Law— A guide for politicians. A  Guide elaborated under the auspices of the 
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google “Rule of Law— A guide for politicians” and you will find it. And please 
spread the message!
During our Conference here several speakers have made references to the 
UN Sustainable Development Goal 14:  “Conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources” and its 10 targets. Rightly so!
However, let me point also to Goal 16: “Promote just, peaceful and inclu-
sive societies”. I am thinking in particular of two of its targets:
3. Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and 
ensure equal justice for all;
and
5. Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.
In my view achieving this goal is a precondition for achieving all the other goals.
Finally, on a very personal note: As a student, I used to sign on ships during 
my summer vacations. During four summers in the 1950s, I acquired 12 months 
of experience as a sailor in the Swedish merchant marine. One thing that I will 
never forget from this time is when I was standing at the helm taking orders 
from a pilot. When— after a few commands for “Starboard!” and “Port!”— the 
pilot determined that the ship was heading in the right direction, the com-
mand would be:  “Steady as she goes!” It struck me that we should apply the 
same thought when we navigate unclos towards the future:  Steady as she 
goes! And the pilot should be Statesmanship!
Sweden, and the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation [now Innovation] of Law 
(HiiL), the Netherlands, available at https:// rwi.lu.se/ 2017/ 03/ rule- law- guide- politicians.
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 chapter 3
Managing High Seas through a Sui Generis
Arif Havas Oegroseno
 Keywords
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One of the most challenging issues in ocean affairs today is managing marine 
genetic resources in the high seas. Discussions on biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdictions is complex and vast, encompassing fundamental questions such 
as the meaning of conservation and management of biodiversity, the meaning 
of marine genetic resources, transfer of technology, benefit sharing, the mean-
ing and implication of a legally binding instrument, and many other rather 
complex matters. I shall not address all of them but offer some of my observa-
tions based on our geographic ocean features as the largest archipelagic State 
in the world.
Indonesia is a country that has direct contact with area of biodiversity be-
yond national jurisdiction in two fronts, namely in the eastern part of Indian 
Ocean and the western part of the Pacific Ocean. I am sure, Indonesia is not 
the only one that has these rather unique geographic features. Many of those 
countries are also represented at this Conference.
In our view, activities in the areas beyond national jurisdiction will have a 
direct impact on areas under our jurisdiction and also vice versa.
Conservation and management of living resources as well as pollution are 
of particular concern, because the marine environment as an ecosystem will 
affect them regardless of legal boundaries established in accordance with un-
clos 1982. Fish have no passports.
Furthermore, Indonesia has delineated its continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles in the northwest of Sumatra based on the recommendation ad-
opted by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of 28 March 
2011, and recently, on 11 April 2019, Indonesia made another submission on 
the Eauripik Rise in the Pacific Ocean, covering an area of more than 196,000 
square kilometers.
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In those areas, significant continental shelf is going to be within Indonesia’s 
national jurisdiction while the water column is under the regime of the high 
seas. We have this experience in a different context with one of our neighbor-
ing countries, Australia. However, an overlap of our continental shelf with the 
water column of bbnj would be a first.
This specific concern has to be addressed because it leaves a gaping ques-
tion with regard to the legal status on the biodiversity and genetic resources 
in those related areas with two different regimes. There must be a clarity in 
this particular situation whereby the biodiversity or genetic resources in the 
water column may have their life cycle starting from the subsoil and seabed or 
the other way around, as well as biodiversity or genetic resources that do have 
uninterrupted and well- connected biological linkage between the seabed and 
the water column in areas where overlap between extended continental shelf 
and bbnj exist.
The possible solution is to assign the water column above the seabed be-
yond 200 nautical miles that have been recommended by the Commission on 
Limits of the Continental Shelf to the coastal countries concerned. This may 
create fewer complications on the management of the biodiversity beyond 
national jurisdiction. The assignment may be followed with transparent mon-
itoring by an international organ. However, some may consider this approach 
unfair because the coastal countries with extended continental shelves gain 
access to the resources in the water column. It is indeed an issue that has not 
been dealt with thoroughly at the intergovernmental conference (igc) discus-
sion in New York.
A specific arrangement, a sui generis, may be considered in this unique over-
lapping situation of extended continental shelf and the water column above it 
which may be included as abnj.
In this geographic situation of direct boundary with abnj, an issue of pollu-
tion or side effects coming from economic activities in the abnj going into the 
Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf of a coastal nation, especially 
small archipelagic and island developing States, must also be taken into con-
sideration. As a matter of fact, many small island developing countries have 
become the epicenter of marine biodiversity in the world.
Again, being directly connected to an abnj has certain complicated fea-
tures, thus the issue of adjacency is critical to be discussed in the coming delib-
erations. The interests of all countries, especially the small island developing 
countries, that are adjacent to abnj require to be taken into account in the 
legally binding instrument on bbnj.
A certain type of guarantee for enviromental protection of adjacent ma-
rine areas from any activity relates to exploration in abnj as well as the 
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establishment of responsibility of any environmental damages indeed needs 
special discussion.
The adjacency factor must be considered thoroughly.
On the issue of what is marine genetic resources itself, what it and what it 
is not, Indonesia has wealth of experience on defining what is marine genetic 
resources in our vast waters stretching from the Indian Ocean to the South 
China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. For us, under our laws, regulations and culture, 
marine genetic resources include all life forms at sea whether they are part of 
an ecosystem such as coral reef systems or mangroves, or highly migratory fish, 
or part of economic activity or not. Furthermore, activities in abnj may also be 
threats to certain species of fish or corals or some other life forms.
Our understanding of oceanic and terrestrial biodiversity is similar; thus 
certain plants and herbs that are both important for our biodiversity but also 
have healing power so that they have economic value, the same as fish that 
have economic value as well as importance for biodiversity in our ocean. In the 
context of sustainable development, it is thus relevant to be able to strike the 
balance between conservation, the environment and economic benefit.
We are of course aware of the discussion on the monetary and non- 
monetary values that are derived from the utilisation of marine genetic re-
sources and how such benefits may be shared.
While not opposing the idea of sharing of monetary benefit, we are also 
aware of the degree of complication in addressing this issue. In our experience 
on anything related to monetary matters, things are going to be very compli-
cated. Sometimes the technicalities will become hindrances and blockages to 
smooth monetary aspects of benefit sharing.
Therefore, it is better for us to focus on non- monetary benefit including a 
limitation of duration of any intellectual property rights derived from marine 
genetic resources in abnj, as well as sharing knowledge such as in the form of 
scholarships or academic exchanges or strengthening the capacity of a partic-
ular party of a country or applying the already proven model under the auspic-
es of International Seabed Authority.
Honored participants, although our planet Earth has more waters than 
lands, we do not have a single organization that deal with ocean. We have 
unga, itlos, isba, doalos, imo, fao, ioc, Regional Fisheries Organizations 
in many regions, and many others. Thus, I believe that the instrument of abnj 
should not be in conflict with the existing mechanisms as well as with other 
already existing international legal instruments on ocean affairs.
Reconciling interests between States with opposite views in ocean affairs is 
not an impossible task. We have seen how our predecessors created the archi-
pelagic sea lane passage to balance the archipelagic States needs, the Exclusive 
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Economic Zone which balances the interests of coastal States with user states 
in global navigation, and also the establishment of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf for delineation of the continental margin be-
yond 200 nautical miles in order to prevent abuse from a coastal State in its 
seabed claim. These are just a few of many balanced results of unclos 1982.
I believe this 43rd colp Annual Conference will meet its objective as an 
avenue to exchange views and ideas as well as pose some crucial questions that 
we should carefully consider in order to form the new instrument on bbnj. 
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Substantive negotiations began in 2019 on an internationally legally binding instru-
ment under the Law of the Sea Convention for the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction with two two- week 
sessions. These negotiations were held pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 
A/ 72/ 249 of 24 December 2017. This chapter brings up to date the intergovernmen-
tal conference previously described in the author’s chapter in the Center for Ocean 
Law and Policy’s book on its annual conference in Beijing in mid- 2018, ‘bbnj: Devel-
opments since Yogyakarta.’ The chapter describes the two substantive sessions held in 
2019: 25 March– 5 April and 19– 30 August 2019.
 Keywords
marine biological diversity – intergovernmental conference – areas beyond national 
jurisdiction – treaty negotiations – marine genetic resources – area- based management 
tools – environmental impact assessment – capacity- building – marine technology
1 Background
The immediate three previous annual conferences of the Center for Oceans 
Law and Policy of the University of Virginia School of Law have included 
examination of various issues involved in the conservation and sustain-
able use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion (bbnj), in 2016 at UN Headquarters in New York,1 in 2017 in Yogyakarta, 
 1 In two chapters by Dire Tladi, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind in the Proposed Imple-
menting Agreement,’ and J. Ashley Roach, ‘Update on the BBNJ Negotiations,’ in Legal Order 
in the World’s Ocean: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton 
Moore and Ronán Long (eds.), (London & Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2018), pp. 72– 90 and 91– 123 
respectively.
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Indonesia,2 and in 2018 in Beijing.3 The final two sessions of the Preparatory 
Committee were held in 2017 and the first two sessions of the Diplomatic Con-
ference were held in 2018. This Chapter describes the two substantive negotiat-
ing sessions of the Intergovernmental Conference (igc- 2 and igc- 3) that were 
held in two two- week periods in the spring and summer of 2019.
2 Introduction
In resolution A/ 69/ 292, 19 June 2015, the General Assembly decided to con-
vene a preparatory committee (PrepCom) of four sessions to develop an in-
ternationally legally binding instrument (ilbi) under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) on conservation and sustain-
able use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(abnj).4 Two sessions were held in 2016 and two in 2017. Thereafter, notwith-
standing the failure to reach consensus on any issue at the PrepCom, on 24 
December 2017, the UN General Assembly by resolution A/ 72/ 249 decided to 
convene a diplomatic conference (DipCon) for the same purpose of at least 
four sessions preceded by an organizational session in New York 16– 18 April 
2018. The first substantive session (igc- 1) was held 4– 17 September 2018. The 
second and third substantive sessions were held for 10 working days each 25 
March– April 2019 and 19– 30 August 2019, and the fourth substantive session 
 2 In four chapters: by Kristine Dalaker Kraabel, ‘The BBNJ PrepCom and Institutional Arrange-
ments:  The Hype about the Hybrid Approach’; by Su Jin Park, ‘The Legal Framework and 
Relevant Issues on the Marine Protected Areas in the Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’; by 
A. Gusman Siswandi, ‘Marine Genetic Resources beyond National Jurisdiction and Sustain-
able Development Goals: The Perspective of Developing Countries’; and by Robin Warner, 
‘Realising Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use in Southern Hemisphere Oceans 
beyond National Jurisdiction: Challenges and Prospects,’ in The Marine Environment and UN 
Sustainable Development Goal 14: Life Below Water, Nordquist, Moore and Long (eds.), (Lon-
don | Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2019), pp. 137– 172, 173– 193, 194– 226 and 111– 136 respectively.
 3 In two chapters:  by Ronán Long and John Brincat, ‘Negotiating a New Marine Biodiversi-
ty Instrument: Reflections on the Preparatory Phase from the Perspective of the European 
Union,’ and the other by this author on ‘BBNJ: Developments since Yogyakarta,’ in Coopera-
tion and Engagement in the Asia- Pacific Region, Nordquist, Moore and Long (eds.) (London | 
Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2020), pp. 443– 468 and 469– 506 respectively.
 4 For a comprehensive first- hand account of the process leading up to the convening of the 
PrepCom see Kristina M. Gjerde, ‘Perspectives on a Developing Regime for Marine Biodiver-
sity Conservation and Sustainable Use beyond National Jurisdiction,’ in Harry N. Schreiber, 
Nilufer Oral and Moon- Sang Kwon (eds.), Ocean Law Debates: The 50- Year Legacy and Emerg-
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in the first half of 2020 on dates to be decided. The resolution is silent on 
future substantive sessions. If needed, that would also require future deci-
sions by unga.5 The parameters set for the PrepCom were repeated for the 
DipCon, as follows.
The work and results of the conference should be fully consistent with the 
provisions of unclos (para. 6). The process and its result should not under-
mine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant glob-
al, regional and sectoral bodies (para. 7). The conference shall be open to all 
States Members of the UN, members of specialized agencies and parties to un-
clos (para. 8). The resolution stressed the need to ensure the widest possible 
and effective participation in the conference (para. 9). Neither participation in 
the negotiations nor their outcome may affect the legal status of non- parties 
to unclos or any other related agreements with regard to those instruments, 
or the legal status of parties to unclos or any other related agreements with 
regard to those instruments (para. 10). For the meetings of the DipCon the par-
ticipation rights of the EU are the same as at the Meetings of States Parties to 
unclos (para. 11). Attendance as observers is permitted by igo s, ngo s and 
UN specialized agencies, organizations, funds and programs (paras. 12– 15). The 
conference is to exhaust every effort in good faith to reach agreement on sub-
stantive matters by consensus (para. 17),6 but failing that by two- thirds major-
ity of representatives present and voting (para. 19).7
 5 As was done for the sessions of unclos iii. In contrast, the resolution convening the fish 
stocks conference, resolution A/ 47/ 192, 22 Dec. 1992, para. 1, limited its duration to less than 
two years (“convene in 1993 … should complete its work before” the 49th session of the Gen-
eral Assembly in November 1995). The fish stocks agreement was adopted 4 August 1995 and 
has not received nearly as many ratifications (90) as the los Convention (168).
 6 There is no agreed UN definition of “consensus”. Two treaties include various formulation of 
such a definition. It is defined in the Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter- American 
Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention between the United States 
of America and the Republic of Costa Rica (“Antigua Convention”), article i(5): “consensus” 
means the adoption of a decision without voting and without the expression of any stated 
objection. “Consensus” is defined in article 20(1) of the 2000 Convention on the Conserva-
tion and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean as “the absence of any formal objection made at the time the decision was taken”.
 7 This is very similar to the “Gentleman’s Agreement” made by the President and endorsed by 
the Conference at its 19th meeting on 27 June 1974, A/ conf.62/ 30/ Rev.3, Rules of Procedure, 
Appendix, p. 17. Rule 37 also called for a cooling off period before the vote was to be taken. 
The multiple sessions of unclos iii were necessary to reach consensus on the package deal. 









Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution A/ 72/ 249, the unga President, after 
open and transparent consultations, nominated Ms. Rena Lee of Singapore as 
President- designate of the conference. On 16 April 2018 she was elected Presi-
dent of the Conference by acclamation. Ambassador Lee is the newly appoint-
ed Ambassador for Oceans and Law of the Sea issues and Special Envoy of the 
Singapore Foreign Minister.
The further proceedings of this organizational session as well as the first 
substantive session (igc- 1) in September 2018 are described in my earlier 
chapter (note 3) and need not be repeated here.
4 Second Substantive Session (igc- 2)
To assist delegation in preparing for igc- 2, the President issued her Aid to Ne-
gotiations in October 2018.8 This extensive compilation of previous proposals 
was organized along the lines of the President’s 2018 Aid to Discussions.9 Its 
principal components were the sections on the four elements of the 2011 “Pack-
age”: marine genetic resources, area- based management tools, environmental 
impact assessments, and capacity building and transfer of marine technology, 
as well as cross- cutting issues. Each of the sections contained major elements 
and components as well as many textual options. The structure and subject 
headings of these sections suggested similar provisions may appear in the zero 
draft of the ilbi.
4.1 Program of Work10
As at igc- 1, after general remarks in plenary, discussion of each of the four 
elements of the package and cross cutting issues were facilitated in informal 
working groups.11 The facilitators presented their reports on the last day of 
igc- 2. The President then gave her concluding remarks.
 8 http:// undocs.org/ A/ CONF.232/ 2019/ 1>. Reissued as A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 1*, 1 December 2018.
 9 A/ conf.232/ 2018/ 3, 25 June 2018.
 10 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 3, 25 March 2019.
 11 Many Delegations posted their interventions to the UN’s PaperSmart website, <http:// 
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4.2 Facilitators Reports
The Facilitators Reports do not provide a comprehensive summary of the ex-
tensive and complex discussions that took place, but rather give an overview of 
the main issues discussed and the general trends observed. They are appended 
to the President’s closing remarks, as a matter of convenience.12 They are set 
out in the following five sub- sections.
4.2.1 Marine Genetic Resources (mgr), Including the Sharing of 
Benefits
Ambassador Janine Elizabeth Coye- Felson (Belize) summarized the work on 
mgr at igc- 2 as follows:13
The discussions proceeded on the basis of the President’s aid to negotia-
tions, more specifically section 3 of Part iii of that document. The informal 
working group addressed section 3 in the following sequence:
– Benefit- sharing (section 3.2.2);
– Intellectual property rights (section 3.2.3);
– Monitoring (section 3.3);
– Scope (section 3.1); and
– Access (section 3.2.1)
Ambassador Felson welcomed the constructive engagement of delegations in 
focused text- based negotiations. On the basis of the President’s Aid to Nego-
tiations, the discussions in the Informal Working Group were very helpful in 
further clarifying the various proposals, and identifying areas where stream-
lining could take place, for example by merging certain options or sub- options 
or moving some paragraphs of a cross- cutting nature to other sections of the 
document. Delegations provided suggestions with respect to options which 
did not necessarily represent their preferred option. Ambassador Felson pro-
vided a brief overview of where matters stood in respect of the main issues 
discussed, in terms of progress achieved and areas which could, in her view, 
benefit from further consideration going forward.
4.2.1.1 Introductory Paragraph
A number of comments were made on the introductory paragraph of section 
3 dealing with the relationship between unclos and this Part of the instru-
ment. There seemed to be convergence towards interpreting and applying the 
Convention and this Part/ the instrument as a single instrument. Preference 
 12 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 5, 18 April 2019, infra note 17.









was expressed to reflect this in a general section applicable to the instrument 
as a whole. Further consideration as to whether the Convention or the instru-
ment would prevail in the event of any inconsistency would be beneficial.
4.2.1.2 Benefit- Sharing (Section 3.2.2)
Ambassador Felson addressed the objectives of benefit- sharing and principles 
and approaches guiding benefit- sharing together, as the issues raised were 
somewhat similar. Preferences were expressed with respect to each of the 
options currently in the text, namely listing or not the objectives and princi-
ples and approaches guiding benefit- sharing in the section on marine genetic 
resources. With respect to the objectives currently listed, there seemed to be 
some convergence towards some objectives, in particular that benefit- sharing 
should contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiver-
sity of areas beyond national jurisdiction and build the capacity of developing 
countries to access and use marine genetic resources. Other objectives will 
benefit from further consideration.
As regards the principles and approaches currently listed in the document, 
different views were expressed regarding the inclusion of the common heritage 
of mankind and the freedom of the high seas. Going forward, the placement 
and content of a list of objectives and of principles and approaches guiding 
benefit- sharing would benefit from further consideration.
On the benefits that might be shared, views were expressed in support 
of each of the two options currently in the text, namely sharing both mon-
etary and non- monetary benefits or sharing non- monetary benefits only. 
There seemed to be some convergence towards including in the instrument 
a non- exhaustive list of benefits which would be reviewed and further de-
veloped at a later stage. Going forward, these issues would benefit from fur-
ther consideration.
Based on the views expressed on the options presented, there were also is-
sues in the section on benefit- sharing modalities that would also benefit from 
further consideration. These included whether benefit- sharing modalities 
should be set out in the instrument or be determined at a later stage by a body 
under the instrument; whether benefits should be shared on a voluntary or 
on a mandatory basis; and who might share benefits and with whom. In this 
regard, the need for the instrument to set out obligations of States, rather than 
of other entities, was noted.
There seemed to be some convergence towards the inclusion in the instru-
ment of a provision regarding the purposes for which benefits might be used, 
and that benefits should be used to contribute to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. The 
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inclusion of other purposes, however, received different levels of support and 
would benefit from further consideration.
On how and when benefits might be shared, various arrangements were 
proposed. Different views were expressed on whether benefit- sharing should 
take place at different stages or not and what types of benefits might be shared 
at those stages; and whether monetary benefits would be paid to a fund estab-
lished under the instrument or not. Further consideration would be beneficial 
on these issues.
With regard to a clearing- house mechanism, views were expressed in sup-
port of each of the two options currently in the text, namely addressing rele-
vant matters of the clearing- house mechanism in the section on marine ge-
netic resources, or not, with suggestions made to address these matters in a 
separate part of the instrument on the clearing- house mechanism. Different 
views were also expressed concerning some of the functions currently listed in 
the text which, going forward, would benefit from further consideration.
4.2.1.3 Intellectual Property Rights (Section 3.2.3)
Views were expressed in support of each of the three options currently in the 
text, namely addressing intellectual property rights in the instrument in a sui 
generis manner, addressing intellectual property rights by requiring consis-
tency with relevant agreements under the auspices of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, or not addressing 
intellectual property rights in the instrument. Going forward, this issue, in 
particular whether to reflect it in the text and, if so, how, would benefit from 
further consideration.
4.2.1.4 Monitoring of the Utilization of Marine Genetic Resources of Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction (Section 3.3)
Views were expressed in support of each of the two options in the text, namely 
setting out a monitoring mechanism in the instrument, or not. Going forward, 
this issue, in particular whether to reflect it in the text and, if so, how, would 
benefit from further consideration.
4.2.1.5 Scope (Section 3.1)
The discussions on scope addressed the geographical, material and temporal 
scope, including the possibility of addressing all these aspects in a single pro-
vision placed in a general section of the instrument.
Geographical scope— views were expressed in support of each of the op-
tions set out in the text, namely referring to marine genetic resources of the 





of the Area, with modifications proposed to some of these options and an 
additional option being introduced. Views differed on whether marine ge-
netic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction should be governed by 
a single regime or by different regimes for those of the high seas and those 
of the Area.
There seemed to be convergence towards the inclusion of a “without prej-
udice” clause relating to the rights and jurisdiction of States under the Con-
vention, with flexibility being expressed concerning the exact formulation and 
placement of such a provision. Views differed on the inclusion of provisions 
addressing compatibility between measures for the conservation and sustain-
able use of marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction and 
those adopted for areas within national jurisdiction; conducting activities with 
respect to resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction that are also found 
in areas within national jurisdiction with due regard to the rights and interests 
of coastal States under the jurisdiction of which such resources are found; as 
well as consultation with adjacent coastal States that have made a submission 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Material scope— there seemed to be convergence towards the position that 
the instrument would not apply to the use of fish as a commodity, but with dif-
ferent views expressed on whether to reflect this explicitly in the instrument 
or not. Similarly, options to include a reference to a threshold amount beyond 
which fish would be considered a commodity, to treat a fish species with value 
for its genetic material as a marine genetic resource regardless of the volume 
of the catch, or not to include text on this issue, all received support. Views 
continued to differ on whether the instrument should apply to marine genetic 
resources collected in situ only, or also to those accessed ex situ and in silico 
and digital sequence data and to derivatives.
Temporal scope— Support was expressed for each of the two options cur-
rently in the text, namely including a non- retroactivity clause or not having 
text at all. The need to clarify whether the instrument would apply to marine 
genetic resources collected in situ before the entry into force of the instrument 
but accessed or utilized ex situ or in silico after entry into force was highlight-
ed, as was the need to consider how a non- retroactivity clause would apply to 
States becoming parties after the entry into force of the instrument.
Given the continued differing views, further consideration on issues related 
to scope would be beneficial.
4.2.1.6 Access (Section 3.2.1)
There seemed to be some convergence towards including a general obliga-
tion to cooperate in the conservation and sustainable use of marine genetic 
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resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, including questions on the 
sharing of benefits, with a suggestion made to place it in a general section of 
the instrument.
On access, support was expressed for each of the three options currently in 
the text, namely that access be governed by the provisions of the Convention, 
that access be undertaken in accordance with the instrument, with provision 
made for access modalities, or not addressing access in the instrument. Views 
were also expressed that access and benefit- sharing should be more closely 
linked in the instrument.
Different views were expressed with regard to the various access modalities 
currently set out in the text, such as whether to address all activities or access 
for certain purposes only; how to address marine scientific research; require-
ments for pre- or post- collection notification, permits and licenses; specific 
terms and conditions for access; additional requirements, including whether 
to undertake environmental impact assessments; whether access to marine ge-
netic resources ex situ should be free and open; whether to address traditional 
knowledge and how; and the need for States to take appropriate and effective 
legislative, administrative and policy measures to ensure that genetic resourc-
es of areas beyond national jurisdiction utilized within their jurisdiction had 
been accessed in accordance with the instrument.
All these issues would benefit from further consideration.
4.2.2 Area- Based Management Tools (abmt s), Including Marine 
Protected Areas (mpa s)
Ms. Alice Revell (New Zealand) summarized the work on abmt s at igc- 2 as 
follows:14
The discussions proceeded on the basis of the President’s Aid to Negotia-
tions, specifically section 4 of Part iii. The Informal Working Group addressed 
section 4 in the following sequence:
– Process in relation to abmt s, including mpa s (section 4.3), including iden-
tification of areas (section 4.3.1) and the designation process (section 4.3.2);
– Relationship to measures under relevant instruments, frameworks and bod-
ies (section 4.2);
– Implementation (section 4.4);
– Monitoring and review (section 4.5); and
– Objectives of abmt s, including mpa s (section 4.1)






First, the comprehensive set of options included in the President’s aid to negoti-
ations provided a very useful guide for our discussions. She welcomed the con-
structive engagement of delegations in clarifying their positions on various op-
tions presented, identifying areas where merging certain options or sub- options 
would be beneficial, indicating which parts of the text may be moved to other 
sections of the document, as well as in identifying issues that may benefit from 
further consideration. She particularly appreciated delegations providing sug-
gestions on options which did not necessarily fully represent their position, but 
that they recognized could form the basis to move forward in the negotiations.
4.2.2.1 Process in Relation to abmt s, Including mpa s (Section 4.3)
As a general observation, discussions highlighted the importance of arriving at 
a common understanding on the different types and functions of abmt s. Such 
an understanding is also needed to inform future consideration of issues relat-
ing to decision- making and institutional arrangements in relation to abmt s, 
including mpa s.
In particular, one common thread throughout the discussions is the question 
of whether different processes are required for different types of abmt s, includ-
ing mpa s, while ensuring that existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks 
and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies are not undermined. Therefore, 
going forward, further consideration of this question would be beneficial, in par-
ticular regarding the scope of the process or processes we wish to set out under 
the instrument and their application to the different types of tools.
4.2.2.2 Identification of Areas (Section 4.3.1)
On the identification of areas, progress was made in refining the elements to 
be reflected in the text of the instrument. There seemed to be convergence 
towards including a requirement that the identification of areas be based on 
the best available scientific information. There also seemed to be some conver-
gence towards the inclusion of relevant traditional knowledge, noting that fur-
ther clarification on the circumstances in which traditional knowledge might 
apply was sought. There also seemed to be a general movement towards the 
inclusion in the instrument of a list of standards and criteria for the identifica-
tion of areas. Views were expressed that such a list should not be exhaustive, 
could draw on other internationally- agreed standards and criteria, and that 
relevant provisions would need to be drafted with sufficient flexibility to per-
mit the standards and criteria to be reviewed and revised in the future. Going 
forward, further consideration of the contents of a list of standards and crite-
ria, as well as the modalities of a process to review it, would be beneficial.
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4.2.2.3 Designation Process (Section 4.3.2)
Regarding the designation process, views were expressed both for and against 
establishing such a process in the instrument. Nonetheless, overall discus-
sions reflected progress in distilling the central elements of a process for the 
development and submission of proposals, and consultation on and assess-
ment of such proposals. In this respect, while preferences were expressed for 
various options set out in the current text regarding the possible stakeholders 
that might submit proposals for abmt s, including mpa s, there seemed to be 
a convergence of views towards proposals being submitted by State parties, 
either individually or collectively. Whether proposals could also be submit-
ted by State parties through relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies or in 
conjunction with other stakeholders, or whether other stakeholders should be 
permitted to submit proposals in their own right, would benefit from further 
consideration.
Content of a proposal— preferences were expressed for the various ele-
ments in the current text and additional elements were suggested and there-
fore further consideration of this issue would be beneficial. There seemed to 
be some convergence towards the inclusion of certain required elements in a 
proposal, while also providing for the possibility that further guidance could 
be set forth in a subsidiary instrument.
Who would receive a proposal— preferences were expressed for each of the 
three options in the text, although there seemed to be convergence towards 
the proposition that, for administrative purposes, a proposal could first be sub-
mitted to the Secretariat.
Consultation on and assessment of a proposal— there was convergence 
that the consultation process set out in the instrument should be inclusive, 
transparent and open to all stakeholders. However, going forward, further con-
sideration could be given to whether a list of stakeholders should be set out 
in the instrument or developed at a later stage. In addition, the possibility of 
identifying certain categories of stakeholders, in particular adjacent coastal 
States, would benefit from further consideration. Further consideration of the 
modalities of the consultation process will also be beneficial.
Scientific assessment— there seemed to be a convergence of views that 
assessment of a proposal needed to take place. However, the modalities for 
such assessment would benefit from further consideration, since views were 
expressed in support of each of the options set out in the text, namely, review 
by a scientific/ technical body set forth under the instrument, a group of ex-
perts selected from a pool of scientific experts set forth under the instrument, 
an ad hoc scientific/ technical body, an existing scientific/ technical body, or 
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one or more independent scientists recognized under the instrument. Possible 
variations on those options were also put forward.
Decision- making— while she observed a general movement towards a body 
under the instrument addressing matters related to abmt s, including mpa s, 
views were expressed in favour of each of the different options reflected in the 
text, while various combinations of those options were also proposed. Further 
consideration of these issues would be beneficial. Such consideration would, 
of course, also be linked to the underlying question referred to earlier regard-
ing the possibility of establishing different processes for different abmt s, in-
cluding mpa s, and their relationship to measures under relevant instruments, 
frameworks and bodies.
4.2.2.4 Relationship to Measures under Relevant Instruments, Frameworks 
and Bodies (Section 4.2)
There was a convergence of views that the instrument must not undermine 
existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, re-
gional and sectoral bodies. The importance of promoting coherence, comple-
mentarity and synergies in measures related to abmt s, including mpa s was 
highlighted.
Further consideration as to how the instrument can best promote such co-
herence, complementarity and synergies would be helpful, since different mo-
dalities have been suggested. These include the establishment of a global over-
arching framework under the instrument; utilizing relevant global, regional 
and sectoral bodies, including establishing new bodies or expanding the man-
dates of existing bodies, as necessary; and/ or identifying mutually supportive 
roles for these different frameworks, while avoiding potential hierarchies.
There seemed to be a convergence of views that cooperation and coordina-
tion between relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, 
regional and sectoral bodies, with regard to abmt s, including mpa s, without 
prejudice to their respective mandates, could be enhanced through the instru-
ment. Whether or not to provide for the establishment of coordination and/ 
or consultation mechanisms in the instrument and, in the latter case, the type 
and functions of such mechanisms, would benefit from further consideration. 
Such consideration would be linked to discussions on the process in relation 
to abmt s, including mpa s.
There seemed to be a convergence of views that the instrument must not 
prejudice the rights of coastal States over all areas under their national jurisdic-
tion, including the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles and 
the exclusive economic zone, and that a provision be included to that effect. 
Whether the provision should be placed in the section on abmt s, including 
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mpa s, or in the relevant cross- cutting sections of the instrument would bene-
fit from further consideration, as would the potential inclusion of a provision 
clarifying that the instrument does not prejudice the rights, jurisdiction, free-
doms and duties of States under the Convention.
With respect to the relationship between measures under the instrument 
and those established by adjacent coastal States, different views were ex-
pressed. Further consideration of issues related to compatibility with, due 
regard for and the need to avoid undermining the effectiveness of measures 
adopted by adjacent coastal States would also be beneficial as well as whether, 
and if so, how consultations with adjacent coastal States would take place.
4.2.2.5 Implementation (Section 4.4)
On the question of who would ultimately be responsible for implementation 
of the measures, options focused on State parties, relevant global, regional or 
sectoral bodies, or both. As this issue is linked to the overall process to be estab-
lished under the instrument, it too would benefit from further consideration.
4.2.2.6 Monitoring and Review (Section 4.5)
Views were expressed in support of each of the options reflected in the text, 
namely specifying that these functions would be performed by a global body, 
by relevant global, regional, or sectoral bodies, by both, or alternatively not 
including any text in the instrument. Going forward, this issue would benefit 
from further consideration bearing in mind the need to distinguish between 
aspects related to the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of measures 
for abmt s, including mpa s, and the monitoring and review of the implemen-
tation of the agreement.
4.2.2.7 Objectives of abmt s, Including mpa s (Section 4.1)
There seemed to be convergence towards the inclusion of a list of objectives 
of abmt s, including mpa s, in the instrument. The content of such a list would 
benefit from further consideration, as would the question of whether it should 
be non- exhaustive and open for further development.
4.2.3 Environmental Impact Assessments (eia s)
Mr. René Lefeber (The Netherlands) summarized the work on eia s at igc- 2 
as follows:15
The informal working group addressed section 5 in the following sequence:








– Environmental impact assessment process (section 5.4);
– Content of environmental impact assessment reports (section 5.5);
– Monitoring, reporting and review (section 5.6);
– Strategic environmental assessments (section 5.7);
– Activities for which an environmental impact assessment is required 
(section 5.3);
– Relationship to environmental impact assessment processes under relevant 
instruments, frameworks and bodies (section 5.2); and
– Obligation to conduct environmental impact assessments (section 5.1).
He was pleased by the constructive engagement and cooperative spirit of 
delegations in clarifying their positions on various options presented in the 
President’s Aid to Negotiations, and commenting on options that did not nec-
essarily fully represent their position. He particularly welcomed the concrete 
proposals made for streamlining the text and for avoiding duplication by mov-
ing parts of the text to other sections of the document.
4.2.3.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Section 5.4)
As a general observation on the discussions on the eia process, he noted that 
the President’s Aid to Negotiations provided a very useful guide for our dis-
cussions. Moreover, it appeared to have captured all of the options and steps 
proposed by delegations.
One common thread throughout the discussions is the need to consider 
whether, and if so, to what extent, the eia process under the instrument will 
be internationalized. Therefore, going forward, further consideration would be 
beneficial on this topic, in particular on whether existing bodies or those po-
tentially created by the instrument will play a role in the eia process and the 
nature of such role.
On how the eia process should be reflected in the instrument, preferenc-
es were expressed for various options. However, there seemed to be general 
movement towards the inclusion in the instrument of certain steps relating to 
the eia process in a streamlined manner.
As regards the steps that could be specifically mentioned in the instru-
ment, there seemed to be convergence towards the inclusion of, for exam-
ple, screening, scoping, and decision- making. Different views were expressed 
on the other steps mentioned in the text and further consideration would 
be helpful to clarify what certain other steps entail and whether these steps 
should be included in the instrument. It was proposed that public notifica-
tion should have its own sub- section in the instrument as there was a view 
that public notification should take place during various stages of the eia 
process.
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Different views were expressed concerning the placement of monitoring in 
this section in addition to the placement in a section on monitoring, reporting 
and review.
Going forward, further consideration regarding the possible streamlining of 
the text, including by combining similar elements and moving some elements 
to other sections, such as the section on the content eia reports, would be 
beneficial with a view to identifying the steps of the eia process to be included 
in the instrument. In addition, further consideration of the level of detail re-
garding specific steps would be useful.
Finally, further consideration on whether any steps to be contained in the 
instrument would be mandatory in nature or indicative, and on how to treat 
unanticipated effects would also be beneficial given the different views ex-
pressed on these matters.
4.2.3.2 Content of Environmental Impact Assessment Reports (Section 5.5)
There seemed to be a convergence of views towards the inclusion of the key or 
essential elements of such reports in the instrument and the development of 
further details regarding the required content at a later stage. However, further 
consideration would be useful to determine which particular combination of 
elements set out in the text should be reflected, as well as on the different op-
tions for the formulation of specific elements. A proposal for the addition of a 
“no text” option for the whole section was also made.
There seemed to be a convergence of views on some of the elements in the 
text to be included in eia reports, while the inclusion of other elements would 
benefit from further consideration. Suggestions were also made for addition-
al elements to be included in eia reports. Further consideration would, for 
example, be beneficial in relation to whether and how social, socioeconomic 
and/ or cultural impacts should be reflected in eia reports. Moreover, further 
consideration would also be beneficial on whether the provision on the con-
tent of eia reports should be mandatory, potentially constituting a minimum 
national or international standard, or only be indicative.
4.2.3.3 Monitoring, Reporting and Review (Section 5.6)
There seemed to be a convergence of views that the instrument should include 
text on the obligation to monitor an activity and report on its impacts.
Different preferences were expressed regarding the level of detail and mo-
dalities of this obligation, including in particular, whether the instrument 
should set out only the duties of States, or also duties of proponents of an ac-
tivity and/ or duties of relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. Going for-




Different views were expressed on whether the text should also contain pro-
visions on review and going forward this issue would also benefit from further 
consideration.
Views were expressed in support of the various elements in the current text 
regarding follow- up to the monitoring process. While there seemed to be some 
convergence that reports resulting from the monitoring should be made pub-
licly available, the modalities and frequency of any reporting obligation would 
benefit from further consideration.
With respect to compliance, divergent views were expressed on whether or 
not to include provisions on compliance and, if so, their placement in this part 
of the instrument, as well as the modalities of any compliance process. Further 
consideration on this issue would therefore be beneficial.
Divergent views were also expressed on whether and to what extent adja-
cent coastal States in particular would be involved in the monitoring, reporting 
and review process. Further consideration would be useful on whether, and, if 
so, where to include any provisions to this effect.
In addition to the options in the current text, further consideration of the 
consequences of monitoring, reporting and review, including whether to pro-
vide for adaptive management, would be useful.
4.2.3.4 Strategic Environmental Assessments (Section 5.7)
Views were expressed both in favour and against the establishment of a pro-
cess for sea s in the instrument. If sea s were to be included in the instrument, 
it was suggested that reference could be made to State parties acting collective-
ly as well as individually, including within regional and sectoral bodies. Howev-
er, concerns were expressed about the lack of clarity on how such assessments 
could be carried out in areas beyond national jurisdiction and by whom.
The connection between sea s and area- based management tools (ambt s) 
was raised, as was the idea to include sea s in the section on measures such as 
abmt s, including mpa s.
Further consideration on the scope, content and implementation of sea s in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, and also on potential linkages with abmt s, 
would be useful.
4.2.3.5 Activities for Which an Environmental Impact Assessment Is 
Required (Section 5.3)
Support was expressed for different options in each of the five subsections pre-
sented in the text— the thresholds and criteria for eia s; list of activities that 
require or do not require an eia; cumulative impacts; transboundary impacts 
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Thresholds and criteria— views were expressed in support of several of the 
options for possible thresholds for determining when an eia would need to be 
conducted and further consideration would be beneficial to further reduce the 
options under consideration, including by continuing to explore the possibili-
ty of refining and merging existing options.
Different views were expressed on whether or not to develop a list of activ-
ities that require or do not require an eia. Different views were also expressed 
on how such a list would be updated and whether it would be included in 
the instrument or in an annex. Further consideration would be beneficial on 
this issue.
Different views were also expressed on whether and, if so, how, to take into 
account cumulative impacts and transboundary impacts in eia s in the instru-
ment. Both of these issues would benefit from further consideration, including 
in relation to their potential placement in the text. Suggestions were made to 
place them in the sections relating to the process for eia s or the content of 
eia reports.
Further consideration would also be useful as to whether a specific provi-
sion for eia s in areas identified as ecologically or biologically significant or 
vulnerable should be included in the instrument.
4.2.3.6 Relationship to Environmental Impact Assessment Processes under 
Relevant Instruments, Frameworks and Bodies (Section 5.2)
There was a convergence of views that the eia process in the instrument 
should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and 
relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. The view was also expressed that 
the eia obligation in the instrument would need to respect and be mutually 
supportive of obligations in other relevant instruments in order to promote 
coherence. Different views, however, were expressed on whether specific pro-
visions to this effect were necessary, and if so, whether they should be included 
in a section on general principles and approaches. This issue would therefore 
benefit from further consideration.
Further consideration would be beneficial on the modalities for operation-
alizing the relationship between any bodies or processes established by the 
instrument and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies since views were 
expressed in support of different elements in each of the options in the text.
4.2.3.7 Obligation to Conduct Environmental Impact Assessments 
(Section 5.1)
There was a convergence of views towards the inclusion of an obligation to 
conduct eia s in the instrument. Views were expressed in support of elements 




the options in the current text, including in particular, on the operationaliza-
tion of the general obligation to conduct an eia set out in unclos, would 
benefit from further consideration.
While the definition of “jurisdiction and control” in the current text received 
some support, views were expressed that this definition may be too restrictive. 
This is an element that would benefit from further consideration.
4.2.4 Capacity- Building and Transfer of Marine Technology (cb- tmt)
Ambassador Ngedikes Olai Uludong (Palau) summarized the work on cb- tmt 
at igc- 2 as follows:16
The informal working group addressed section 6 in the following sequence:
– Types of and modalities for capacity- building and the transfer of marine 
technology (section 6.2)
– Funding (section 6.3)
– Monitoring and review (section 6.4)
– Objectives of capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology 
(section 6.1)
She thanked delegations for being responsive in their interventions, not only 
to each other, but also to the request for focused discussions, as well as their 
flexibility in adapting to the proposed sequence of discussions. On the basis of 
the President’s Aid to Negotiations, which provided a very useful guide for the 
discussions, proposals were made for streamlining some of the text and mov-
ing some text to the sections dealing with cross- cutting issues. This active en-
gagement reflects once again the convergence of views that capacity- building 
and the transfer of marine technology are crucial and central elements to 
achieving the goal to conserve and sustainably use marine biological diversity 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction. She was encouraged by the strides made 
at this session in the discussions.
4.2.4.1 Types and Modalities for Capacity- Building and the Transfer of 
Marine Technology (Section 6.2)
As a general observation, a common thread throughout the discussions was 
the recognition that provisions on types and modalities, including a clear-
ing- house mechanism, should be included in the instrument, but that there 
is a need to achieve some balance in terms of the level of detail.
Types— there seemed to be a general movement towards the inclusion 
in the instrument of a non- exhaustive list of broad categories of types of 
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capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology. There seemed 
to be a convergence of views that the current list in the text could bene-
fit from streamlining, and views were expressed in support of developing 
parts of that list at a later stage or placing it in an annex, particularly if a 
large number of elements listed in the President’s aid to negotiations were 
to be retained. Proposals were also made for merging or deleting some of 
the elements. The need to include clearer references to relevant traditional 
knowledge was also highlighted.
There seemed to be a convergence of views on the need to provide for the 
updating of the list, in order to take into account technological progress and 
innovation, and also to respond and adapt to evolving needs of States and 
regions. Different views were expressed though on who would undertake a 
review and updating of the list. Going forward, further consideration of the 
contents of a list of types of capacity- building and the transfer of marine tech-
nology would be beneficial, as would further consideration of the modalities 
for reviewing and updating the list.
Modalities— Preferences were expressed for aspects of each of the two 
main options in the text, with some proposals to combine them. Progress was 
made in that there seemed to be some convergence of views towards the inclu-
sion of specific modalities in the instrument, bearing in mind relevant existing 
examples, such as the Criteria and Guidelines for the Transfer of Marine Tech-
nology of ioc/ unesco.
With respect to the specific modalities set out in the text, there seemed to 
be a convergence of views that capacity- building and the transfer of marine 
technology should be needs- based and country- driven. However, the mech-
anisms for identifying those needs, including through a needs- assessment, 
would benefit from further consideration since different views were expressed 
on how to take this forward.
There was some convergence of views as well on highlighting in the text the 
duty to cooperate at all levels in support of capacity- building and the transfer 
of marine technology. Divergent views though were expressed as to the terms 
on which capacity- building, and particularly the transfer of marine technology, 
should be carried out, the relationship with intellectual property rights, and the 
intended beneficiaries of capacity- building and the transfer of marine technol-
ogy. Going forward, further consideration of these issues would be useful.
Clearing- house mechanism— there was convergence around the need for a 
clearing- house mechanism. However, views were expressed both in support of 
considering matters relating to a clearing- house mechanism at this point; and 
of leaving such consideration until all of the other parts of the instrument had 
been discussed.
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As regards the functions of a clearing- house mechanism mentioned in the 
text, proposals were made for additions and deletions. Overall, there seemed to 
be a convergence of views towards streamlining the functions of such a mech-
anism in the text, taking into account the need to avoid duplication with exist-
ing mechanisms. Going forward, it would be beneficial to further consider the 
functions of a clearing- house mechanism.
4.2.4.2 Funding (Section 6.3)
There was some convergence towards the inclusion of some provisions regard-
ing funding in the instrument, and on adopting a flexible approach to sources 
of funding. In that regard, views were expressed in support of funding both 
on a voluntary and mandatory basis, or in support of funding on a voluntary 
basis only. There were divergent views expressed on whether a funding mech-
anism or mechanisms needed to be established, and if so, whether this would 
be realized in the instrument, or left to the decision- making body. The need 
to consider existing mechanisms was also underscored. Different views were 
also expressed on whether it would be necessary to categorize who would have 
access to funding. Going forward, further consideration would be useful on all 
aspects of funding for capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology, 
including their placement in the instrument.
4.2.4.3 Monitoring and Review (Section 6.4)
There seemed to be some convergence of views towards the need for capacity- 
building and transfer of marine technology activities to be monitored and re-
viewed. However, divergent views were expressed as to whether this should be 
effected on a voluntary or mandatory basis, and on the nature of the modali-
ties for undertaking such monitoring and review. Going forward, these issues 
would benefit from further consideration.
4.2.4.4 Objectives of Capacity- Building and the Transfer of Marine 
Technology (Section 6.1)
Introductory paragraphs— there seemed to be a convergence of views that the 
instrument would include a general obligation to promote cooperation in rela-
tion to capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology, with proposals 
made to bring the text closer in line with similar provisions in other instru-
ments. Divergent views were expressed though on whether capacity- building 
and the transfer of marine technology should be provided on a mandatory or 
voluntary basis. The manner in which the objectives of capacity- building and 
the transfer of marine technology could be reflected in the instrument, and 
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General objectives and principles— there seemed to be convergence to-
wards the inclusion of streamlined objectives and principles in the instru-
ment. In that regard, while preferences were expressed with respect to each of 
the options in the text, there was some convergence towards merging elements 
from both options. Further consideration of how to frame these obligations 
and principles regarding capacity- building and the transfer of marine technol-
ogy would be beneficial going forward.
Specific objectives— views were expressed both in favour of, and against, 
the inclusion in the instrument of specific objectives for capacity- building and 
the transfer of marine technology. Therefore, further consideration of this is-
sue would be beneficial.
Categories of States and special requirements of developing countries— 
different views were expressed as to whether to include such a provision and, 
if so, what level of detail would be appropriate.
There seemed to be some convergence towards including certain cate-
gories of States, with some movement towards including in the text special 
consideration for the Least Developed Countries and recognition of the spe-
cial circumstances of Small Island Developing States. Proposals were also 
made to streamline the text, including by merging options. Going forward, 
this issue could benefit from further consideration including as regards the 
related question on whether the instrument should provide for “preferen-
tial treatment” with regard to capacity-building and the transfer of marine 
technology. 
4.2.5 Cross- Cutting Issues
Ambassador Lee summarized the work on cross- cutting issues at igc- 2 as 
follows:17
The informal working group addressed the cross- cutting issues in the fol-
lowing sequence:
– Institutional arrangements (Part iv)
– Clearing- house mechanism (Part v)
– Review (Part vi), financial resources and issues, compliance, dispute settle-
ment, responsibility and liability and final clauses
– Use of terms (Part ii.1)
– General principles and approaches (Part iii.1)
– Scope (Part ii.2)
– Objectives (Part ii.3)





– Relationship to the Convention and other instruments and frameworks and 
relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies (Part ii.4)
– International cooperation (Part iii.2)
She thanked delegations for their constructive comments on the President’s 
Aid to Negotiations, including by clarifying their positions and proposals, 
suggesting merging certain options or sub- options, or indicating which 
parts of the text may be moved to other sections of the document. She par-
ticularly appreciated the flexibility of delegations providing suggestions or 
comments on options which did not necessarily fully represent their posi-
tion, but that they recognized could form the basis to move forward in the 
negotiations.
As a general observation, and as was observed by several delegations, she 
noted that cross- cutting issues are intimately linked to the four elements of the 
package and, as such, further consideration of these issues would benefit from 
the developments concerning the other parts of the instrument.
4.2.5.1 Institutional Arrangements (Part iv)
The discussions on institutional arrangements focused on the need for and 
role of the bodies set out in the text, bearing in mind that form might follow 
function or vice versa.
Decision- making body— while preferences for each of the options in the 
text were expressed, there seemed to be a general movement towards the es-
tablishment of a global decision- making body under the instrument, in the 
form of a Conference of the Parties. Views also seemed to converge on certain 
functions listed in the text that such a body would fulfil, such as facilitating 
the exchange of information relevant to the implementation of the instrument 
and promoting cooperation and coordination. Further consideration on these 
and other functions, as well as on the body’s relationship to relevant global, 
regional and sectoral bodies, would be useful.
There also seemed to be general movement towards the need for a scientific 
and/ or technical body or forum. Different views were expressed on the modal-
ities of such a body or forum, including its nature, composition, the periodic-
ity of its meetings and its precise functions. Suggestions were made to rely on 
existing arrangements. These issues would benefit from further consideration 
given the different views expressed, and in the light of developments in the 
other parts of the instrument.
Different views were also expressed on whether the instrument should es-
tablish other subsidiary bodies or whether it would be sufficient to leave this to 
the decision- making body. This issue, as well as the type and functions of such 
subsidiary bodies, would benefit from further consideration. There seemed to 
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be some convergence towards the view that the decision- making body under 
the instrument should have the ability to establish other subsidiary bodies, as 
needed.
Views converged on the need for a secretariat of the instrument. How-
ever, further consideration is needed as to whether the instrument would 
establish a new secretariat, whether the instrument’s decision- making body 
would designate a secretariat from among existing competent international 
organizations, or whether doalos would be designated as the secretari-
at. The functions of the secretariat would also benefit from further consid-
eration, with a preference having been expressed for a streamlined list of 
functions.
4.2.5.2 Clearing- House Mechanism (Part v)
There seemed to be convergence towards the need for a clearing- house. 
However, whether there should be a single, overarching mechanism or 
multiple mechanisms needs further consideration, as would the questions 
whether it should operate on a global level only or also include regional and 
national components, whether it would be web- based or take another form, 
and whether it would build on and link to existing mechanisms.
As to the functions of a clearing- house mechanism set out in the text, views 
converged on its central role in the sharing of information and as a tool for in-
formation exchange. Further consideration would be useful concerning other 
possible functions.
Different views were expressed on whether a clearing- house mechanism 
or mechanisms would be set up by a decision- making body under the in-
strument or would be established by the instrument itself. This would bene-
fit from further consideration, as would whether such mechanism(s) would 
be managed by the secretariat under the instrument or by another entity.
4.2.5.3 Review (Part vi), Financial Resources, Compliance, Dispute 
Settlement, Responsibility and Liability, Final Clauses
Review— there seemed to be convergence on the need to periodically review 
the effectiveness of the instrument in achieving its objectives. Different views 
were expressed, however, regarding the specific modalities for this review, in-
cluding whether such review should be carried out by a Conference of the Par-
ties, a review conference or both.
Financial resources and issues— references were made to the views ex-
pressed during the discussions on capacity- building and the transfer of marine 
technology, and also to a number of instruments that could provide inspira-




Compliance— references were made to the views expressed on this issue 
during the discussions on the substantive elements of the package and some 
additional views were expressed regarding the modalities of any compliance 
process.
Settlement of disputes— the need to settle disputes concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the instrument by peaceful means was underscored. 
However, views differed on whether provisions in the instrument should be 
modelled on the dispute settlement procedures set out in unclos, or in the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, or whether a tailored dispute settle-
ment arrangement would be required.
Responsibility and liability— different views were expressed on the need for 
provisions on responsibility and liability in the instrument.
Final Clauses— views were expressed on provisions that should be included 
in the final clauses. Suggestions were made to draw from the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement, in particular, as a potential source of guidance. Ref-
erences were also made to additional clauses in the Paris Agreement and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Further consideration of these issues will be undertaken in due course, tak-
ing into account negotiations on other parts of the instrument.
4.2.5.4 Use of Terms (Part ii.1)
With regard to use of terms, preferences were expressed for the various terms 
and options set out in the text and possible definitions of certain terms were 
advanced. Suggestions were made to include additional terms. A number of 
considerations were put forward to guide a decision on which terms to define, 
including the scope of the instrument, the need to ensure consistency with 
terms used in existing instruments, and whether the term had an obvious or 
ordinary meaning.
While there seemed to be some convergence towards the need to define 
“area- based management tools”, “marine protected areas” and “marine genetic 
resources”, further consideration of these and other terms in the context of the 
other parts of the instrument would be beneficial.
4.2.5.5 General Principles and Approaches (Part iii.1)
There seemed to be some convergence towards including a streamlined list 
of such principles and approaches in a single general section of the instru-
ment, although the utility of including principles and approaches in each of 
the substantive parts of the instrument was also noted. Suggestions were made 
to include or reformulate specific principles and approaches. These and other 
related issues would benefit from further consideration.
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4.2.5.6 Scope (Part ii.2)
Geographical scope— There seemed to be convergence towards including the 
provisions on geographical scope as contained in the President’s Aid to Negoti-
ations, with suggestions being made to replace the provision on the rights and 
jurisdiction of coastal States with a general “without prejudice” clause, and to 
provide a definition of the term “areas beyond national jurisdiction”.
Material scope— whether to include either of the two provisions provided 
for in the aid to negotiations, namely a general provision setting out the ele-
ments of the package, and a specific provision relating to vessels owned or op-
erated by a State in government non- commercial service, would benefit from 
further consideration.
4.2.5.7 Objectives (Part ii.3)
Views seemed to converge on the inclusion of a provision for the overall, gener-
al objective of the instrument to ensure the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
4.2.5.8 Relationship to the Convention and Other Instruments and 
Frameworks and Relevant Global, Regional and Sectoral Bodies 
(Part ii.4)
There seemed to be some convergence on the inclusion of a provision deal-
ing with the relationship of the instrument to the Convention as set out 
in the text. Further consideration would be beneficial on the formulation 
of the provision addressing the relationship with other instruments and 
frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies, as support 
was expressed for elements of all three options provided in the aid to nego-
tiations. Views were also expressed on whether or not to include a provision 
on the legal status of non- parties to the Convention or any other related 
agreements.
4.2.5.9 International Cooperation (Part iii.2)
There was convergence on including a general provision on this issue in the 
instrument as currently set out in the text, with suggestions made that such 
provision should encourage State parties to not only cooperate between them-
selves, but also with relevant international organizations and also encourage 
cooperation between relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.
4.3 President’s Concluding Remarks at igc- 2
The President delivered her concluding remarks, providing her positive views 







Her remarks have been issued as a conference document in all six official 
languages.18
The President was requested to prepare, as part of the preparations for the 
third session of the Conference, a document with the aim of enabling delega-
tions to negotiate the text of the future instrument. Such a document would 
take into account the negotiations held in the second session of the Confer-
ence, as well as the various proposals that were made. These would be stud-
ied to enable as concise a document as possible to be developed that would 
facilitate further negotiations on the draft treaty. The document would likely 
be structured in a form more akin to a treaty, and containing treaty language.
The President stated that she would make every effort possible to make the 
document available to delegations well in advance of the third session of the 
Conference. However, given the limited time frame before the third session, 
it may not be possible to have the document issued in all official languages of 
the United Nations well in advance of the third session. However, an advance 
and unedited version of the document in English only could be made available 
earlier.
The President also undertook to propose an organization of work in ad-
vance of the third session, taking into account further consultations with the 
Bureau on this issue. Such organization of work may include the convening of 
informal- informal groups and parallel meetings in order to advance text- based 
negotiations in the third session.
5 Preparations for Third Substantive Session (igc- 3)
On 25 June 2019, doalos issued an advance, unedited version (English only) 
of the President’s first draft text of an ilbi (zero draft). That was replaced on 
8 July with the official text of 70 articles and an annex totaling 42 pages.19 The 
President’s introductory note stated that the draft text was prepared by her 
with the assistance of doalos. It is structured “in a form akin to a treaty and 
contains treaty language with provisions addressing each of the four topics” 
identified in the 2011 package and cross- cutting issues (para. 5). It was aimed 
at “streamlining” the options contained in the President’s Aid to Negotiations. 
It also contained new provisions on settlement of disputes, non- parties to the 
agreement, and final provisions prepared with the assistance of the treaty 
 18 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 5, 18 April 2019, available at <https:// undocs.org/ en/ a/ conf.232/ 2019/ 5>.
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section of the Office of Legal Affairs (para. 6) The President’s Note stated the 
draft “is without prejudice to the structure of the future instrument” and with-
out prejudice to the position of any delegation. Further it does not preclude 
consideration of matters not included in the draft (para. 9).
5.1 Omissions and Ambiguities in the Zero Draft
The zero draft had a number of omissions and problematic provisions. While 
the draft resembled somewhat the 1995 fish stocks implementing agreement, 
it lacked a number of its comparable provisions.
Missing are a title for the agreement, definitions of the basic terms used in 
the A/ 72/ 249 convening the diplomatic conference:  “conservation”, “sustain-
able use” and “marine biological diversity”.
Further, the draft definition of “areas beyond national jurisdiction” is simply 
“the high seas and the Area”.20 The draft text does not address the issue of the 
application of the agreement to unresolved continental shelf claims beyond 
200 nautical miles with superjacent waters being the high seas.21 Nor does 
it address in Article 3(1) its non- application to Antarctica (Antarctic Treaty 
and ccamlr) or the Central Arctic Ocean (Fisheries Agreement). Further it 
does not expressly exclude land and maritime disputes as proposed by some 
delegations.
In addition, the definition of the “Convention” refers only to the 1982 trea-
ty and does not include either of the two implementing agreements both of 
which address areas beyond national jurisdiction.22
Further, various formulations of “traditional knowledge” appear throughout 
the text but the term is nowhere defined.
In addition, the draft text has a number of provisions that deviate from 
those in the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement:
– The definition of “States Parties” in Article 1(12) deviates from the definition 
in Article 1 of the Fish Stocks Agreement by omitting paragraph 3 and in Ar-
ticle 56 on non- parties omitting Article 17(3) of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
on fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas.
– Article 55 on procedures for the settlement of disputes regarding experts, 
chambers, advisory opinions and applicable law differ from those in the 
Convention or 1995 Agreement.
 20 Article 1(4).
 21 This issue is partially addressed in Article 15(6) where an area- based management tool 










– Omitted are provisions on provisional measures (fsa article 31), responsi-
bility and liability (fsa article 35), and where amendments may enter into 
force with different members, the relationship with those bound and not 
bound by such an amendment (fsa article 45(7)).
In addition, ambiguities were introduced when proposing inserting “existing” 
in many articles.23 Only one article defines “when”, at time of signature, ratifi-
cation (by whom), entry into force, or later.
The term “long- term”, although only used twice (in the definition of mpa 
(Article 1(10) and the Annex para (e)(ii)), is not defined as to “how long is long- 
term” and thus is ambiguous.
Proposals to address some of these issues were submitted during igc- 3 as 
mentioned below in section 6.5.
6 Third Substantive Session (igc- 3)
6.1 Program of Work
On 25 June 2019, doalos also published on its bbnj website two other doc-
uments. One was the provisional program of work, which indicated that only 
some of the articles in the draft text were scheduled for consideration during 
the five informal working groups and informal- informals.24 igc- 3 was held at 
UN Headquarters in New York 19– 30 August 2019.
At the beginning of the last day of the first week the President proposed 
changes to the program of work for the second week to include more parallel 
sessions and additional informal- informals. As with the first week, the pro-
gram of work identified which articles would be considered at each session. 
The changes were approved and adopted.25
The President encouraged delegations to submit proposals to amend the 
zero draft to doalos who compiled them into conference room papers 
(crp s). A  total of 849 proposals in 33 conference room papers were sub-
mitted during igc- 3. They have been compiled and issued in 813 pages, one 
 23 Articles 4(3), 13(2), (3)(b) & 3(c), 14(1)(a), (b), (d), 15(1)(a), (b)(i), (2 Alt.), (3), (4), 16(4), 
18(2)(a)(iii), (b), (b)(iii), 19(1), (Alt 1 (b)(ii), (c), (d)), (Alt. 2 (c)), (3), 20(5) & (7), 21(Alt. 
3), 23(2), (3 Alt. 1), (4)(Alt. 1), (5)(Alts. 1, 2, 4), 27(2 Alt. 3), 34(2), 40(1 Alt. 3), (2), (2)(b), 
43(1), (2), 44(2), 48(4)(c), 49(3), 50(1 Alt. 2), 51(4)(b), (d), 52(2), and (Alt. 1 5bis(d)). There 
seemed to be general agreement at igc- 3 that the term “existing” should be deleted.
 24 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ L.4, available at <https:// undocs.org/ en/ a/ conf.232/ 2019/ L.4>. The pro-
visional agenda was also issued at the same time. A/ conf.232/ 2019/ L.3, <https:// undocs.
org/ en/ a/ conf.232/ 2019/ L.3>.
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delegation’s proposal(s) per article per page.26 Except for the final provisions, 
there were proposals for changes to all other articles, as well as 11 proposals 
for new articles. As at igc- 2, many delegations’ statements were uploaded to 
PaperSmart.27
As with igc- 2, summaries of each of the 10 sessions and a final compre-
hensive summary of the Third Session has been published in the Earth Nego-
tiations Bulletin (enb), 2 September 2019.28 In addition, the UN issued daily 
coverages of the meetings.29
The final edition of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin for igc- 3 summarized 
the discussions on the zero draft according to the Parts of the draft: General 
Provisions (pages 3– 6), Marine Genetic Resources, including Benefit- Sharing 
Questions (pages 6– 10), Environmental Impact Assessments (pages 10– 15), 
Capacity Building and the Transfer of Marine Technology (pages 15– 16), In-
stitutional Arrangements (pages 16– 18), Financial Resources and Mechanisms 
(pages 18– 19), Implementation and Compliance (page 19), and Settlement of 
Disputes (page 19). The title, preamble, non- parties, good faith and abuse of 
rights, and the final provisions were not discussed in this enb.
6.2 Reports of Facilitators
The reports of the Facilitators were read in Plenary on the last day and the texts 
appended to the President’s closing remarks. Her written report emphasized 
that the Facilitators’ reports do not constitute a summary of discussions nor 
do they reflect the President’s assessment of the discussions. They are set out 
in the following five sub- sections.
6.2.1 Marine Genetic Resources (mgr), Including the Sharing of 
Benefits
Ambassador Janine Elizabeth Coye- Felson (Belize) summarized the work on 
mgr at igc- 3 as follows:30
At the outset, she noted significant progress in moving away from general 
and conceptual discussions in the past towards identifying textual solutions to 
 26 Links to the crp s were posted at <https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ content/ conference_ room_ 
papers> along with the compilation of proposals, A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, at <https:// 
www.un.org/ bbnj/ sites/ www.un.org.bbnj/ files/ master_ crp_ consolidated_ rev2.docx>.
 27 <https:// papersmart.unmeetings.org/ ga/ bbnj- intergovernmental- conference/ third- 
session/ statements/ >.
 28 <http:// enb.iisd.org/ oceans/ bbnj/ igc3/ >.
 29 sea/ 2008, sea/ 2110– 2014, 2116– 2118, 19– 30 August 2019  <https:// www.un.org/ press/ en/ 
highlights/ BBNJ>.














the issues at hand. In particular, she welcomed the constructive engagement of 
delegations with the draft text, with several drafting proposals put forward to 
streamline Part ii with a view to clarifying the steps of the access and benefit- 
sharing process and related obligations. She noted that a number of proposals 
seemed to go in a similar direction, and encouraged delegations to consult with 
each other with a view to consolidating these proposals to the extent possible. 
That being said, going forward, further focused discussions will be required 
on a number of issues on which there is still a divergence of views. Taking the 
issues one by one, her assessment of progress made and areas requiring further 
work were as follows.
6.2.1.1 Objectives
She noted progress with regard to the objectives, as there seemed to be conver-
gence on most of the objectives listed in article 7. Further discussions will be 
required, however, with regard to the wording, order and placement of these 
objectives, and whether or not to include the realization of a just and equitable 
international economic order among the objectives.
6.2.1.2 Application
Concerning application, she noted general convergence on the importance of 
including an article on application addressing the geographical, material and 
temporal scope, although further discussions will be required on whether such 
an article would relate to the provisions of Part ii only or to the agreement as a 
whole and on its formulation.
There seemed to be convergence on defining the geographical scope of ap-
plication as “areas beyond national jurisdiction”. However, further discussions 
will be beneficial on whether to refer to marine genetic resources “of”, “ac-
cessed in”, “originating from” or “collected in” those areas, or to a combination 
of these options.
There seemed to be a general understanding among delegations that the 
material scope of application would not extend to fish and other biological 
resources used as commodities. Further discussion may be required on wheth-
er to reflect this in the agreement and, if so, how. In that regard, progress was 
made in streamlining the text as the option of referring to thresholds did not 
seem to generate any support.
Whether the agreement should apply to marine genetic resources collected 
in situ only, or also to those accessed ex situ and in silico and digital sequence 
data and/ or information, as well as to derivatives, would benefit from further 
discussion. Terminology concerning ways to refer to access to digital informa-
tion will also require further consideration. Views also differed on whether or 
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not marine scientific research should be excluded from the material scope of 
application of the agreement.
There seemed to be convergence on the importance of including language 
on the temporal scope of the agreement. Further discussion will be required, 
however, on whether or not marine genetic resources collected before the en-
try into force of the agreement but accessed ex situ or in silico afterwards would 
fall within the temporal scope of the agreement.
6.2.1.3 Activities
Further discussions will be required on whether to include article 9 in the 
agreement and, if so, whether the activities to be addressed should be limited 
to marine scientific research or also include other activities; whether or not 
such activities should be conducted with due regard for the rights and legiti-
mate interests of coastal States with respect to marine genetic resources found 
in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction; whether or not the prin-
ciple that no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, and the prin-
ciple of non- appropriation, should be stated; whether or not such activities 
should be for the benefit of mankind as a whole; and whether to specify that 
such activities should be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in Part 
ii or in a cross- cutting part of the agreement.
6.2.1.4 Access
With regard to the issue of access to marine genetic resources of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, further discussions will be required concerning the defi-
nition of “access”, as views differed on whether this referred to the collection 
of marine genetic resources in situ or also to access ex situ and in silico. These 
views were linked to different perspectives on whether or not to regulate ac-
cess to marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction and, if 
so, how. In particular, further discussions will be required on the need for noti-
fication, permitting or licensing for in situ access, as well as on whether to set 
out an obligation to ensure that access ex situ is free and open and access to 
in silico information and data is facilitated. While there seemed to be general 
convergence that the prior consent of coastal States concerned would not be 
required for activities that may result in the utilization of marine genetic re-
sources found in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction, further 
discussions will be required on whether coastal States— whether concerned or 




6.2.1.5 Sharing of Benefits
There seemed to be some progress in the discussions on the sharing of ben-
efits, with some convergence on the inclusion of benefit- sharing modalities 
in the agreement as opposed to being determined by a Conference of the 
Parties. There was general support f or the sharing of non- monetary ben-
efits. However, further discussions will be required on the sharing of mon-
etary benefits and on benefit- sharing modalities. Going forward, delega-
tions may wish to focus their discussions on which activities would trigger 
benefit- sharing, whether benefits should be shared on a voluntary or man-
datory basis, what types of benefits might be shared, as well as how and 
when benefits might be shared. While there seemed to be general support 
for the inclusion of a provision addressing the purpose for which benefits 
might be used, further discussions will be needed on some of the purposes 
listed in the draft text.
With regard to both access and the sharing of benefits, she noted progress 
concerning the possible way of addressing traditional knowledge of indige-
nous peoples and local communities in the agreement, and welcomed, in par-
ticular, the efforts made by like- minded delegations to submit a joint proposal 
for a new article addressing that issue specifically.
In general, further discussions will be required on the need to provide for 
the obligation of State Parties to take necessary measures to ensure compli-
ance with the provisions on access and the sharing of benefits, including on 
the most appropriate placement of such a provision.
6.2.1.6 Intellectual Property Rights
Further discussions will be required on whether the agreement should address 
intellectual property rights or not and, if so, how, including whether to address 
intellectual property rights with respect to marine genetic resources of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction in a sui generis manner, or to include a provision 
setting out the need for consistency with the relevant agreements concluded 
under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the 
World Trade Organization.
6.2.1.7 Monitoring
On monitoring, generally, further discussions could clarify how to balance the 
need for transparency in the utilization of marine genetic resources of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction with the need to not create disincentives for 
marine scientific research. Two divergent perspectives were noticeable. One 
perspective emphasized the need for a robust track- and- trace mechanism and 
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activities that would be subject to monitoring, and how monitoring would be 
carried out, including whether it would be through the clearing- house mech-
anism, a scientific and technical body, an obligatory notification system, or a 
combination of those mechanisms. Another perspective questioned the feasi-
bility and desirability of a monitoring mechanism that would include the use 
of identifiers, notifications by databases, repositories and gene banks, and sub-
mission of periodic status reports by proponents of marine scientific research 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
While there seemed to be general support for a requirement that State Par-
ties make available to the clearing- house mechanism information on the leg-
islative, administrative and policy measures adopted in accordance with Part 
ii, further discussions will be required on the need for State Parties to submit 
reports on the utilization of marine genetic resources of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction to a Conference of the Parties and on who should be responsible 
for reviewing such reports. She noted, in this regard, a proposal to establish 
an access and benefit sharing mechanism which would have monitoring func-
tions among others.
6.2.1.8 Use of Terms
Delegations also exchanged views on the use of relevant terms as found in ar-
ticle 1.  While there seemed to be general convergence on the inclusion of a 
definition of the term “marine genetic resources”, further discussions will be 
needed on whether or not the terms “access”, “marine genetic material” and 
“utilization of marine genetic resources ” should be defined in the agreement 
and, if so, how they should be defined. Should the terms be defined, further 
discussions will be required on whether to draw from the definitions in other 
instruments addressing genetic resources or to consider other formulations. 
There seemed to be general convergence that geographical aspects should 
not be included in the terms “marine genetic material” and “marine genetic 
resources”. Further discussions will be required on whether other relevant 
terms, such as “biotechnology” and “derivatives”, should also be defined in the 
agreement.
6.2.2 Area- Based Management Tools (abmt s), Including Marine 
Protected Areas (mpa s)
Ms. Alice Revell (New Zealand) summarized the work on abmt s at igc- 3 as 
follows:31







Progress was made in clarifying the specific steps of the overall process un-
der Part iii in relation to measures such as abmt s, including mpa s. There 
are still divergent views on the central question of the roles in that process 
of the bodies established under the agreement; and/ or of relevant global, 
regional and sectoral bodies. This tension under lies delegations’ views on 
the specific steps of the process in relation to measures such as abmt s, 
including mpa s.
Another overarching question raised in the discussions, which would still 
benefit from further reflection, is whether the process in relation to establish-
ing or designating mpa s should be distinguished from the process for other 
types of abmt s. That is, whether different processes may be required for dif-
ferent types of tools.
Further discussions on the meaning and scope of the terms “abmt” and 
“mpa” would also be beneficial, in order to arrive at a shared understanding of 
those terms, and of how any relevant definitions in article 1 should be framed. 
Discussion on the latter issue might usefully be reserved until such time as the 
substantive provisions of Part iii are further refined.
She then turned to more specific aspects.
6.2.2.2 Objectives
There seemed to be general support for the inclusion of a list of objectives in 
Part iii of the agreement, although the possible role of a scientific and techni-
cal body and of the Conference of the Parties in further elaborating the objec-
tives would benefit from further consideration.
Another aspect which needs further consideration is whether the objectives 
under consideration relate to Part iii as a whole or to the establishment or 
designation of specific abmt s, including mpa s.
There was also general support for streamlining the list of objectives in 
paragraph 1 of article 14. In this regard, focusing on outcome- oriented rather 
than process- oriented objectives, and reflecting some of the objectives under 
the Part on cross- cutting issues were suggested as possible ways in which the 
list could be streamlined.
6.2.2.3 International Cooperation and Coordination and Decision- Making
Discussions on international cooperation and coordination (article 15)  were 
inextricably linked to those on decision- making (article 19). In particular, there 
was progress in refining delegations’ approaches to the two scenarios cap-
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frameworks or relevant global, regional or sectoral bodies; and second where 
there are no such instruments, frameworks or bodies.
A range of text proposals were made on these scenarios, which would ben-
efit from further reflection and discussion. The central question remains the 
extent of any decision- making function for the bodies established under the 
agreement vis- à- vis the relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. These 
provisions are central to the operation of Part iii and will need to remain a fo-
cus for delegations in order to move forward. They are closely linked to delega-
tions’ perception of the risk of the process for decision- making “undermining” 
other bodies.
In addition, discussions advanced on how the relevant legal instruments and 
frameworks and relevant global, regional or sectoral bodies should cooperate 
and coordinate. There was general convergence on the objective of enhancing 
cooperation and coordination with and among relevant legal instruments and 
frame works and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies, without prejudice 
to their respective mandates. Different ideas were put forward as to how the rel-
evant provision— currently reflected in article 15, paragraph 3— might be draft-
ed. It would be beneficial to reflect further on the different possibilities in this 
regard, in particular, on the role that States Parties and the Conference of the 
Parties might play, and whether there would be complementary roles for both.
6.2.2.4 Cross- Cutting Issues
There was general convergence on the need to include text stating that the in-
strument would not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frame-
works, and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies, nor prejudice the rights 
of coastal States over areas under national jurisdiction and/ or the effectiveness 
of any measures adopted by coastal States therein, but it would be useful to 
reflect further on the placement of specific provisions to this effect, whether 
in Part iii and/ or in the “General Provisions”. Such a discussion might usefully 
be deferred until the text of the agreement, in its totality, is further developed.
There also seemed to be support for addressing the modalities of decision- 
making by the Conference of the Parties, and the principle of transparency, in 
the cross- cutting provisions of the agreement.
There was general convergence that the best available science, traditional 
knowledge of indigenous people and local communities, the application of 
the precautionary approach or principle and an ecosystem approach should 
be the basis upon which areas are identified and proposals are formulated. 
Further discussion is needed on whether to refer to these elements in relevant 




Turning then to the individual steps of the process, on the identification of ar-
eas, the option of specifying an indicative list of criteria in an annex and/ or in 
guidelines, rather than detailing such criteria in the text of article 16 received 
strong support.
Going forward, various proposals were put forward regarding the content 
and organization of the indicative list currently contained in article 16, para-
graph 2, including for streamlining and categorizing, which would benefit from 
further discussion.
6.2.2.6 Proposals
There was a convergence of views that proposals in relation to the establish-
ment or designation of abmt s, including mpa s, would only be submitted by 
State Parties, possibly in collaboration with other States, including States enti-
tled to become Parties, and stakeholders. Further discussion will be needed on 
the specific elements to be reflected in proposals, as many different alternatives 
were put forward in this regard, as well as on whether these elements should be 
included in an annex to the agreement and/ or whether they would need to be 
further elaborated in the future by the bodies established under the agreement.
6.2.2.7 Consultation and Assessment
Among delegations supporting a role for the bodies established under the agree-
ment in the identification and/ or establishment of abmt s, including mpa s, there 
was general convergence on providing for an open, inclusive and transparent con-
sultation and assessment process in Part iii, which would include many of the 
elements reflected in article 18. Various constructive proposals were put forward 
to refine and streamline the text, which would benefit from further consideration 
in future discussions. Important questions were also raised about how the text 
balances providing for revision of proposals and possible repetition of the con-
sultation process, respecting the procedures of relevant instruments, frameworks 
and bodies, and providing for an efficient and time- bound consultation process. 
The sequencing of the consultation and assessment process, in particular, the 
appropriate point, or points, in the process when the proposal should be submit-
ted to a scientific and technical body for assessment, and whether a preliminary 
review might be desirable, are also matters requiring further discussion.
6.2.2.8 Implementation
Regarding implementation, there was general convergence on the need to in-
corporate some form of article 20 in the instrument, but different views were 
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be retained. Delegations’ views on this point were informed by their different 
perspectives on institutional arrangements with respect to abmt s, including 
mpa s, and in particular the role that the bodies established under the instru-
ment would play (if any) vis- à- vis relevant instruments and frameworks, and 
relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. As already indicated, this funda-
mental question will need to be a focus of attention going forward.
6.2.2.9 Monitoring and Review
With respect to monitoring and review, views were expressed in support of 
each of the three alternatives reflected in the text of article 21.
Among delegations supporting a role for the bodies under the agreement 
in the establishment or designation of abmt s, including mpa s, there seemed 
to be a general preference to work on the basis of the first alternative, which 
provides for the following three elements:  reporting by State Parties on im-
plementation; monitoring and review by a scientific and technical body; and 
decision- making by the Conference of the Parties with regard to amendments 
and/ or revocation of abmt s.
Some support was also expressed for the second alternative text which pro-
vides that the proponent State should take the lead in monitoring measures 
and that measures would be time- bound and terminate automatically.
Delegations who do not favour a role for the bodies under the agreement 
in the establishment or designation of abmt s, including mpa s, did not favour 
any of the alternatives reflected in article 21 as a whole, but had different mod-
els in mind which incorporated various aspects of those three alternatives.
Going forward, this issue would benefit from further consideration.
6.2.2.10 Drafting Questions
Some general drafting questions will be relevant across all provisions of Part 
iii. A general preference was expressed for removing all references to the term 
“existing” in relation to relevant instruments and frameworks, and relevant 
global, regional and sectoral bodies, and for including a reference to “subre-
gional” bodies. As for the use of “establishing” or “designating” in relation to 
abmt s, including mpa s, a general preference was expressed for using which-
ever term encompassed the whole process.
6.2.3 Environmental Impact Assessments (eia s)
Mr. René Lefeber (The Netherlands) summarized the work on eia s at igc- 3 as 
follows:32








During the course of these two weeks, text- based negotiations helped develop 
a clear understanding of the various options presented for each step in the eia 
process set out in Part iv, as well as how the various provisions fit together. As 
a result, potential opportunities for further streamlining the text which merit 
further consideration have been identified, including removing alternatives 
that no longer enjoy support and merging provisions where appropriate.
Different views continue to be expressed regarding the degree to which the 
eia process should be “internationalized”, for example, by assigning roles to 
the Scientific and Technical Body or the Conference of Parties. Questions re-
main regarding whether additional guidance may be required to facilitate the 
implementation of various provisions on eia s, and how such guidance should 
be developed. Finally, additional focused discussions will be needed to over-
come divergent positions in relation to some of the key operational provisions, 
such as thresholds and criteria and the relationship with eia processes under 
relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and 
sectoral bodies (relevant processes).
Text- based discussions also allowed delegations to begin focusing on ques-
tions regarding consistency in drafting, as well as the risk of using different 
terms interchangeably. For example, delegations identified the need to consid-
er carefully when to use “a State Party” or “State Parties”, “impacts” or “effects”, 
“this Part” or “this Agreement” as well as the consequences of such a choice.
Delegations also discussed the consequences of different options for refer-
ring to particular provisions of the Convention, “obligations under the Con-
vention” and “in accordance with” or “consistent with” the Convention. Fur-
ther discussions on whether and how to incorporate references to “economic, 
social, cultural and health impacts”, “adjacent States”, “small island developing 
States” and “traditional knowledge” throughout Part iv are also needed. The 
incorporation of “subregional” into references to “global, regional and sectoral 
bodies” throughout the text also received some support.
He then turned to more specific aspects.
6.2.3.2 Objectives, Obligation, Thresholds and Criteria
A proposal to include a new article on objectives of eia s, was widely support-
ed in principle, though its content requires further consideration.
There was broad support for a provision on the obligation to conduct eia s 
although further discussion is needed on the specific drafting of the article. 
Support continued to be expressed for both the “impact- oriented” and “activity- 
oriented” approach to determining which activities would be covered. This 
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vital issue, which relates to the scope of Part iv, would benefit from further 
consideration.
In regard to thresholds and criteria for eia s various options continued to 
be supported, including adopting the threshold contained in article 206 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention), and a 
stricter standard which requires eia s for any planned activity with more than 
a minor or transitory effect, or a tiered approach that would require a less ex-
tensive eia process for activities that surpassed a lower threshold, and a full/ 
comprehensive eia for activities that meet the article 206 threshold. Further 
discussions are needed on this important topic, as well as whether to include a 
non- exhaustive list of criteria to guide States in applying the article 206 thresh-
old, and the role, if any, for bodies established under the agreement to further 
elaborate the threshold and criteria.
6.2.3.3 Relationship
There was some discussion on whether there was a need for a provision on the 
relationship between the eia process in the agreement and those under other 
relevant processes, in light of the overarching obligation currently set out in 
article 4. Further discussions are needed on how exactly the eia process under 
the agreement would relate to those under other processes to avoid duplica-
tion, as different options continued to enjoy support. He suggested that rather 
than providing that the Agreement would set minimum global standards for 
the conduct of eia s, as currently proposed, further consideration could be giv-
en to the development of “common standards” through a collaborative process 
with other relevant processes.
6.2.3.4 Cumulative impacts, Transboundary Impacts, and Areas Identified 
as Ecologically or Biologically Significant or Vulnerable
With regard to the type of impacts that should be taken into account in the 
conduct of eia s, there was broad support for references in the text to cumu-
lative impacts and transboundary impacts; however, particularly with respect 
to ‘transboundary impacts’, the need for a separate article was questioned by 
some as well as the terminology.
Furthermore, it was also clear that further discussion on how these impacts 
would be taken into account as well on the level of specificity to be included 
in the text would be beneficial. Questions were also raised regarding the defi-
nition of cumulative impacts, which would also benefit from further consid-
eration. Delegations agreed that the provision on ecologically or biologically 




proposal, reflecting a different approach for addressing areas identified as re-
quiring protection, was introduced to replace the provision in its entirety.
6.2.3.5 Strategic Impact Assessments and List of Activities That Require or 
Do Not Require an eia
Growing support was expressed for the inclusion of a provision on sea s, but 
questions remained about how sea s would be implemented in practice. A pro-
posal to make the preparation of sea s voluntary was put forward. Discussions 
on the definitions of “Environmental Impact Assessment” and “Strategic En-
vironmental Assessments” demonstrated that both terms would benefit from 
further consideration.
Different views were expressed on the need for a list of activities that re-
quire or do not require an environmental impact assessment, with some dele-
gations supporting the inclusion of a list, and others requesting its exclusion.
He encouraged delegations to consider the possibility of an enabling clause 
in the agreement that would permit or direct the Conference of the Parties to 
take up sea s and a negative and/ or positive list of activities at a later stage.
6.2.3.6 Screening, Scoping, Impact Assessment and Evaluation, Mitigation, 
Prevention and Management of Potential Adverse Effects, Public 
Notification and Consultation, Preparation and Content of eia 
Reports, Publication of Assessment Reports, Consideration and 
Review of Assessment Reports
Support was expressed for including a provision addressing screening, but 
there was also some support for addressing the issue through guidelines. 
Among those who favoured a provision, there appeared to be convergence that 
the State should bear responsibility for the screening and that the outcome 
of the screening process should be made publicly available. If a provision is 
included then further discussions are needed regarding whether it should ex-
plicitly address areas that have been identified for their significance or vul-
nerability, and whether a scientific and technical body under the agreement 
should review screening determinations.
There was wide support to include a provision in the agreement establish-
ing scoping as a step in the eia process. The question was raised as to who 
would undertake the scoping exercise, with some delegations suggesting that 
the obligation be on States to “ensure” that scoping is conducted, with others 
expressing support for the scoping procedure to be established as a collective 
effort. This is of course also connected to the broader question of whether or 
not the eia process should be “internationalized”. Different views were also 
expressed regarding the level of detail to be set out in this provision. While 
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support was expressed for the inclusion of the identification of key environ-
mental impacts, different views were expressed on whether to retain the vari-
ous elements in square brackets.
There was general agreement on the inclusion of a provision requiring the 
conduct of impact assessment and evaluation, though further discussion is 
needed on whether it should set out specific rules in this regard or provide that 
States establish relevant procedures, and on whether there would be a role for 
bodies under the agreement.
There was general convergence on including a provision on transparent and 
inclusive public notification and consultation in the eia process, though fur-
ther discussions are necessary on the exact nature and the modalities of such 
a process and on a proposal to change the title of the article.
There was also wide support for a requirement for the publication of re-
ports, consistent with the Convention, either directly, through the clearing- 
house mechanism, the Secretariat or a dedicated registry.
Regarding the provision on the establishment of procedures for mitiga-
tion, prevention and management of potential adverse effects, questions were 
raised about both the intent and drafting of the provision, in particular, wheth-
er it is meant to address a part of the assessment process or the subsequent 
decision process.
Another aspect which would require further discussion is whether there is 
a role for the Scientific and Technical Body to consider and review eia s, or a 
percentage of eia s, possibly with a view to building an information or best 
practice repository.
6.2.3.7 Decision- Making
On decision- making, further consideration is needed regarding whether bod-
ies established under the agreement should play any role in deciding wheth-
er an activity should be allowed to go forward following the eia. There was 
however general support for enhancing transparency in the decision- making 
process, and growing support for decision- making documents being made 
publicly available, but further discussion is required on the modalities for this.
6.2.3.8 Monitoring, Reporting and Review
There appeared to be convergence on the need to include a provision on moni-
toring, and that the responsibility for monitoring should rest with a State Party 
and not the proponent of an activity. Proposals made for simplifying the text, 
aligning it more closely with article 204 of the Convention, and for merging 





While there appeared to be convergence on the inclusion of a provision on 
reporting on the impacts of authorized activities, additional consideration is 
needed regarding the scope of the obligation to report, including its link to 
provisions on monitoring and threshold, as well as article 204 of the Conven-
tion. Moreover, while there was broad support for making any reports publicly 
available, either through a secretariat or the clearing- house mechanism, dif-
ferent views were expressed regarding the potential role of relevant global, re-
gional and sectoral bodies in reporting, and the role of bodies to be established 
under the agreement in receiving reports.
While there was substantial support for including a provision on review, 
divergent views still exist regarding the substance of such a provision. There 
seemed to be convergence towards State Parties bearing responsibility for en-
suring the review of the environmental impacts of an authorized activity, but 
further consideration regarding potential additional steps would be beneficial. 
Divergent views were expressed regarding a possible role in the review process 
for bodies under the agreement.
There was no support expressed for the inclusion of a non- adversarial con-
sultation process in the review provision, although some saw value in its possi-
ble inclusion as part of the dispute settlement or compliance provisions of the 
agreement. However, in the context of the discussion on the environmental 
impact assessment process, this issue was taken up again and it appeared that 
delegations would like to further discuss the role of public notification and 
consultation in respect of monitoring, reporting and review.
6.2.4 Capacity- Building and Transfer of Marine Technology (cb- tmt)
Ambassador Ngedikes Olai Uludong (Palau) summarized the work on cb- tmt 
at igc- 3 as follows:33
6.2.4.1 Overall Progress
She noted that overall, progress was made in the Informal Working Group in 
relation to a number of articles and paragraphs. She heard proposals from 
States which could provide a possible way forward on substantive matters. 
There seemed to be convergence around the inclusion of certain drafting sug-
gestions, such as deleting some of the references to “existing” in relation to 
legal instruments and frameworks, and adding a reference to the “subregion-
al” level in relevant provisions. It was also encouraging to hear proposals for 
streamlining the text and reducing duplication. She encouraged delegations to 
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study the proposals put forward. While there was a constructive exchange of 
views on issues relating to modalities for capacity- building and the transfer of 
marine technology, there still remains work to be done with regard to clarify-
ing and elaborating on the obligations in this respect. There is also a need for 
further consideration and deliberation on the relationship between the future 
agreement and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, includ-
ing to what extent the provisions in the agreement should operationalize rele-
vant articles in the Convention.
In her summary, she highlighted further those areas where she believed 
progress was made, and those areas where further focused discussion would 
be beneficial.
6.2.4.2 Objectives
With regard to the objectives of capacity- building and the transfer of marine 
technology, there was general convergence towards including most of the 
provisions proposed in the draft text. Delegations identified specific areas 
where duplication could be reduced, and the text streamlined. Nevertheless, 
further discussions are required on whether to include a reference to “peace-
ful purposes” in relation to access to, and transfer of, marine technology. 
There is also a need for further deliberations on the relationship between the 
objectives and the obligations under discussion in other parts of the draft 
text, with a view to clarifying those obligations and determining to what ex-
tent capacity- building and the transfer of technology could assist in their 
implementation.
6.2.4.3 Cooperation in Capacity- Building and Transfer of Marine 
Technology
Regarding cooperation, there was general convergence towards including pro-
visions on cooperation in capacity- building and the transfer of marine tech-
nology which would take place at all levels, including through global, regional, 
subregional and sectoral bodies.
From the discussions she suggested that there could be a way forward in 
response to concerns regarding the imposition of obligations on industry and 
the private sector, and encouraged further consideration of this issue. Further 
deliberations are needed on the nature of any obligation to cooperate, such as 
whether there should be a duty to “ensure” or “promote” cooperation, whether 
to include a reference to the Convention, and how the interests of non- State 
parties to the Convention could be taken into account. Further consideration 
is also needed on the various categories of States whose special requirements 




6.2.4.4 Modalities for Capacity- Building and the Transfer of Marine 
Technology
As regards modalities for capacity- building and the transfer of marine tech-
nology, there was general agreement that capacity- building and the transfer 
of marine technology should respond to needs. There was also support for 
streamlining the text. Views were expressed in this respect that there was some 
duplication with regard to the provisions on modalities, and delegations made 
concrete proposals as to how that duplication could be reduced.
However, further deliberations are needed on a number of issues, including 
whether capacity- building is to be provided only on a voluntary or a mandato-
ry and voluntary basis.
Delegations were invited to elaborate on the circumstances in which each 
alternative might apply, and the associated practical implications. Further 
discussions will also be needed on the implications of a requirement not to 
duplicate existing efforts; on the level(s) and/ or mechanisms through which 
needs should be identified and assessed; on who should be able to benefit from 
capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology; and on the role of the 
Conference of the Parties in elaborating modalities for capacity- building and 
transfer of marine technology and the timing for such elaboration. The terms 
and conditions upon which capacity- building and the transfer of marine tech-
nology should be provided also require further detailed consideration.
6.2.4.5 Types of Capacity- Building and Transfer of Marine Technology
There was general convergence on the categories of types of capacity- building 
and transfer of marine technology set out in article 46 of the draft text, and on 
the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary, or other appropriate body, having 
some role with regard to determining such types. However, further consider-
ation needs to be given to whether a list of types should be contained in the 
instrument itself, whether a more detailed list should be included in an annex, 
and/ or whether the list should be developed by the Conference of the Parties 
and, if so, the timeline for the list’s development. A question was also raised 
regarding the process for amending the list.
6.2.4.6 Monitoring and Review
Turning to monitoring and review, the need for some review relating to 
capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology was generally recog-
nized. There also seemed to be some convergence on the aims of such a review. 
However, further consideration is needed as to whether any review should be 
voluntary or mandatory and whether reference should be made to monitoring 
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scope of the review, who would undertake such a review, and whether to pro-
vide for performance measurement. These issues require further consider-
ation. In addition, delegations were invited to consider, going forward, what 
kind of reporting requirements would be needed, if any, and who would pro-
vide such reports. There was some convergence of views that any such report-
ing requirements should not be overly onerous. Delegations were encouraged 
to consider the various proposals put forward and whether progress could be 
made on the basis of those proposals.
6.2.4.7 Clearing- House Mechanism
The discussions on the clearing- house mechanism were divided between the 
cross- cutting Informal Working Group, which considered questions of design 
and modalities, and the Informal Working Group on capacity- building and 
the transfer of marine technology, which considered the functions of such a 
mechanism.
In the preliminary discussions that took place on the clearing- house mech-
anism, there appeared to be some convergence on the desirability of establish-
ing such mechanism.
There was some support for including functions relating to each of the sub-
stantive parts of the agreement, as well as for the Conference of the Parties hav-
ing a role in expanding those functions. Further discussions will be required on 
whether the functions should be specified in the article on the clearing- house 
mechanism or whether they should be placed in the relevant parts of the 
agreement. Further consideration should also be given to the need for and role 
of a network of experts and practitioners, whether the platform should store 
scientific data and information or merely provide links to other sources, and 
whether the mechanism should play an active role in, for instance, collecting 
information, facilitating cooperation and matching capacity- building needs 
with the support available.
6.2.4.8 Definitions
Finally, with regard to definitions, there was general support for reducing du-
plication and ensuring that definitions were consistent, including with regard 
to substantive provisions in the draft text. Further consideration is needed 
on whether specific definitions of capacity- building, marine technology and 
transfer of marine technology are necessary or useful, and whether definition- 
type language could be better placed in the provision on types of capacity- 
building and the transfer of marine technology. Going forward, delegations 
could consider whether consolidating conceptual language across different 





Ambassador Lee summarized the work on cross- cutting issues at igc- 3 as 
follows:34
6.2.5.1 Overall Progress
At the outset, she said that she was very pleased with the readiness of dele-
gations to engage with the text in a constructive manner in order to identify 
textual solutions to the issues before us. She noted that given the nature of the 
issues being discussed, the views expressed were preliminary in nature and 
there will be a need to circle back to these issues, in light of further discussions 
on the substantive elements. The discussions were very helpful in further clar-
ifying the various approaches favoured by delegations and identifying areas 
where further streamlining or focused discussions could take place. A num-
ber of proposals were made during the discussions, which she did not repeat. 
She rather provided a brief overview of where we stand in respect of the main 
issues discussed and in terms of progress achieved and areas that require fur-
ther consideration, taking into account progress in the substantive sections of 
the text.
6.2.5.2 Objective
Concerning the objective of the agreement, there seemed to be general sup-
port for referring to the “general” objective in the title, bearing in mind that 
substantive sections of the agreement may also include their own objectives. 
While support was expressed for this provision, a number of proposals to ad-
just the text will require further discussion, including whether the objective 
should be the “long- term” conservation and sustainable use of marine biolog-
ical diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, noting concerns that this 
could exclude short- term measures. Further discussions will also be required 
on whether international cooperation and coordination should be part of the 
objective, in light of suggestions that references to international cooperation 
and coordination in the agreement could be consolidated. A suggestion was 
also made that the objective could be expanded to include a reference to the 
sharing of benefits.
6.2.5.3 Application
With regard to application, there was general convergence on applying the 
agreement to areas beyond national jurisdiction, while further discussions will 
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be required on the exact formulation of the relevant provision, including pos-
sible language regarding specific activities and non- application to enclosed or 
semi- enclosed seas or maritime areas within 200 nautical miles.
Further discussions will also be required on whether to address sover-
eign immunity, as well as on a proposal to include a new provision on non- 
retroactivity of the agreement.
6.2.5.4 Relationship
Concerning the relationship between the agreement and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and other existing relevant legal instru-
ments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies, there 
was general convergence towards deleting the word “existing”, noting that this 
would apply throughout the agreement.
Support was also expressed for adding a reference to “sub- regional” bodies.
There was general support for the agreement to be interpreted and applied 
in the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention. However, 
further discussions will be needed on whether to also add a requirement for 
consistency with other international law and on whether to specify that noth-
ing in the agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States 
under the Convention. There also seemed to be general support for a provision 
setting out the need to respect coastal States’ rights and jurisdiction, possibly 
as a stand- alone provision. Discussions will be required on whether to specif-
ically refer to the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles and 
the exclusive economic zone.
A number of proposals were made in relation to how to address the need to 
not undermine relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies, which she un-
derstood were aimed at further clarifying how this may work in practice. This 
issue will require further consideration.
While it was generally recognized that the agreement would not affect the 
legal status of non- parties to the Convention, further discussions will be re-
quired on whether or not to include a specific provision in the agreement, in-
cluding its placement. In that regard, she noted some proposals to address this 
issue, including by reflecting this in the preamble.
6.2.5.5 General Principles and Approaches
There seemed to be general convergence towards the inclusion of some gen-
eral principles and/ or approaches of relevance to the agreement as a whole. 
Further discussion will be required concerning the content and placement of 
such principles and/ or approaches, with suggestions to separate them and to 




seemed to be convergence towards not including accountability, flexibility, 
pertinence and effectiveness. A number of suggestions were made to include 
other principles and approaches, including the common heritage of mankind, 
equity, the precautionary principle/ approach, an ecosystem approach, as well 
as other principles and approaches.
6.2.5.6 International Cooperation
With regard to international cooperation, there seemed to be broad support 
to set out the obligation for State Parties to cooperate for the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, with drafting suggestions made to adjust the wording related to 
cooperation among existing instruments, frameworks and bodies. Further 
discussions will be required, however, on whether to highlight specific is-
sues requiring international cooperation, such as marine scientific research 
and the transfer of marine technology, including by reference to specific 
articles of the Convention, and, if so, on the placement of such a provision. 
Views also differed on whether to address cooperation to establish new 
bodies.
6.2.5.7 Institutional Arrangements
6.2.5.7.1 Conference of the Parties
There was general support for the establishment of a Conference of the Parties 
and for it to be convened within one year of entry into force of the agreement. 
Further discussions will be required on the adoption of its rules of procedure 
and decision- making modalities, including on proposals to deal with issues 
concerning decision- making and transparency in stand- alone articles. There 
was also general support for setting out the main functions of the Conference 
of the Parties in the agreement, although further discussion will be required on 
these functions, including its role in reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the provisions of the agreement, in light of developments in the other parts 
of the agreement.
6.2.5.7.2 Scientific and Technical Body/ Network
There seemed to be convergence towards the establishment of a scientific and 
technical body, although she also noted opposition. Support was expressed for 
the possibility for that body to draw on advice from other arrangements, sci-
entists and experts, as well as for including a streamlined list of functions in 
the agreement. Further discussions will be required on the composition of the 
body and the main functions to be set out in the agreement, also in light of 
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6.2.5.7.3 Secretariat
General support was also expressed for a secretariat under the agreement, the 
functions of which would be set out in the agreement. Further discussion would 
be required on the designation of the secretariat and on its functions, noting 
that a preference was expressed to restrict these to administrative and logistical 
functions. The Under- Secretary- General for Legal Affairs and United Nations 
Legal Counsel was requested to provide information, at the next session of the 
Conference, on the resources that would be required for the Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, to serve in this role.
6.2.5.8 Clearing- House Mechanism
The discussions on the clearing- house mechanism were divided between the 
cross- cutting Informal Working Group, which considered questions of design and 
modalities, and the Informal Working Group on capacity- building and the trans-
fer of marine technology, which considered the functions of such a mechanism.
There seemed to be general convergence on the desirability of establish-
ing a clearing- house mechanism, which could be a web- based platform, with 
the specific modalities to be determined by the Conference of the Parties, but 
bearing in mind the need to “future- proof” the mechanism. Further discus-
sions will be required on the possible role of a network of experts and prac-
titioners in the context of both a clearing- house mechanism and a scientific 
and technical body. There was general support for access to a clearinghouse 
mechanism to be facilitated for all States. While support was also expressed 
for recognition of the special circumstances of specific categories of States, 
further discussion will be needed as to the categories so recognized. Further 
discussion will also be required concerning which entity would manage the 
mechanism and whether to reflect a concern for the protection of confidential 
information.
6.2.5.9 Financial Resources
There was general convergence regarding the idea that funding could be 
provided through a range of sources. Further discussions will be required 
on whether funding should be voluntary only or mandatory as well in order 
to support the institutions under the agreement or also to assist developing 
States in the implementation of the agreement.
Further discussions will also be required on whether funding should be 
adequate, accessible, transparent, sustainable and predictable. Delegations 
seemed to converge towards the establishment of a voluntary trust fund. Diver-
gent views were expressed, however, regarding the alternative options to estab-





funding mechanism, with a further view expressed that such matters should 
be decided upon by a Conference of the Parties. Concerning access to funding, 
further discussions will be required on whether developing States should be 
granted preference by international organizations in the allocation of funds 
and technical assistance, as well as the recognition of the special circumstanc-
es of certain categories of States.
6.2.5.10 Implementation and Compliance
Regarding implementation and compliance, further discussions will be re-
quired on whether or not to include provisions on implementation, including 
on whether these should also address compliance, and, if so, how. Views were 
expressed that these issues would need to be considered at a later stage, once 
the substantive obligations in the agreement have been agreed upon. The most 
appropriate placement to address such issues would also need further consid-
eration, with different views expressed that such provisions could be stream-
lined with the substantive obligations or the monitoring and review provisions 
in the respective parts of the agreement. Discussions would also be beneficial 
on how to address possible reporting requirements and ways to ensure that 
these do not become burdensome. A proposal was made to include a separate 
article on transparency.
6.2.5.11 Settlement of Disputes
There was general support for a provision recognizing the obligation to set-
tle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement by 
peaceful means. There was also convergence regarding the inclusion of pro-
visions concerning the procedures for dispute settlement. However, further 
discussions will be required on whether to use the procedure set out in Part 
xv of the Convention. In this regard, suggestions were also made that the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea could serve as the default procedure 
for dispute settlement rather than arbitration, and that the Tribunal could be 
requested to provide advisory opinions. Views were also expressed that the sit-
uation of non- parties to the Convention must be accommodated in order to 
encourage universal participation in the agreement.
6.3 President’s Concluding Remarks
Due to lack of time on the final day the President orally presented a very trun-
cated report outlining the way forward following delegations’ interventions.35 
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She announced that igc- 4 will be held 23 March– 3 April 2020. Responding to 
requests for a revised draft text, she confirmed that she would seek input from 
the Facilitators on the content of the revised text; include discussions at igc- 3, 
including areas of convergence; and circulate the revised text as soon as pos-
sible. On the modalities of work for igc- 4, she indicated support to continue 
the current format, including parallel informal- informals to “step up the pace”, 
and the possibility of convening stocktaking plenary sessions rather than in-
formal working groups, to address more holistically the four elements of the 
2011 package.36
In her written report, the President summarized the events at igc- 3, some 
of which have been noted above in section 6.1. Of particular note in her report, 
the President addressed the following:
In their general statements, delegations noted with appreciation the prepara-
tion of the draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (the Convention) on the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (A/ conf.232/ 
2019/ 6) and commended its timely release. They affirmed that the draft text 
would serve as a valuable tool for addressing substantive matters on the topics 
identified in the package agreed in 2011 and would also provide a solid basis for 
negotiations. Delegations reiterated the importance of the Convention, recalled 
that the agreement should be fully consistent with the Convention, and called 
for an effective, practicable and future- proofed agreement. Several delegations 
called for the agreement to foster cross- sectoral cooperation and coordination 
and recalled that it should not undermine relevant legal instruments and frame-
works and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. It was recalled that nei-
ther participation in the negotiations nor their outcome may affect the legal 
status of non- parties to the Convention or any other related agreements. Some 
delegations underscored the need to respect sovereign rights over the continen-
tal shelf, whether or not delineated or delimited, and over the exclusive econom-
ic zone, even if not yet proclaimed. The need to ensure the universality of the 
agreement was emphasized. It was stressed that the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind was a bedrock for achieving the goal of conserving and sus-
tainably using marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Several delegations recalled that, in accordance with General Assembly res-
olution 72/ 249, the Conference should complete its work by its fourth session, 
in 2020. Other delegations noted the importance of taking the necessary time 
and effort to reach an agreement that would be universally accepted.




Appreciation was expressed for the financial support received under the 
voluntary trust fund for the purpose of assisting developing countries, in par-
ticular the least developed countries, land- locked developing countries and 
small island developing States.
Concern was expressed that a lack of funding might affect the ability of 
smaller delegations to participate actively and effectively in the Conference 
and the need to increase support to the trust fund to facilitate the participation 
of a larger number of delegates from developing countries was underscored.
Looking at the work that had been done both in the run- up to the third 
session and during the session itself, it came as no surprise to her that progress 
was made on the draft text during this session. She was gratified by the num-
ber of proposals submitted by the delegations, and which reflected the careful 
consideration that delegations devoted to the issues.
She can see areas of progress in the development of the draft text. She thinks 
it is possible to eliminate some of the options that have won no support. There 
are also areas in the draft text where the text can be streamlined. However, 
there are also areas where there is much to be done to advance the work. In 
doing so, she encouraged everyone to study the proposals made during this 
session and use the proposals as a catalyst to spark creative solutions that can 
garner consensus in the room. On the whole, it was her belief that we are well- 
placed to make great strides towards the successful conclusion of our work. 
She hoped that intersessionally delegations will not only work within their 
own delegations but also reach out to the other delegations, to find ways for-
ward that everyone can converge around.
Her full report, with the Facilitators’ reports appended, has been uploaded 
on the bbnj website.37
6.4 Comments on Some Proposals
During igc- 3 many proposals were introduced but none were debated. Many 
of the proposals are contradictory; others are inconsistent with the Conven-
tion.38 Perhaps during the intersessional discussions some of the proposals 
will be consolidated and rationalized. A  process for taking decisions on the 
many proposals will need to be provided at igc- 4.
 37 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 10, 13 September 2019, pp.  1– 4. The unedited version was posted 11 
October 2019. The final in all six UN languages was posted 25 October 2019.
 38 For example, one amendment would define the high seas of “areas beyond national 
jurisdiction” as beginning at 200 nm from the baseline, whether or not an eez had been 
claimed. Others would make the compulsory decisions process in Part xv optional, or the 
default mechanism itlos rather than Annex vii arbitration specified in article 287(5). 
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Some of the concerns posed in section 5.1 above were addressed in the pro-
posals. There seemed to be agreement to delete “existing” as many delegations 
proposed and noted by the Facilitators. There was little consensus on other 
proposals.
Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.4 suggest and explain proposals on defining areas be-
yond national jurisdiction, clarifying procedures for the settlement of disputes, 
addressing non- parties to the agreement, and clarifying the draft provision on 
responsibility and liability.
6.4.1 Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
The President’s zero draft defined “areas beyond national jurisdiction” simply 
as “the high seas and the Area”.39 The zero draft did not define either term.
The one proposal would define “areas beyond national jurisdiction” as “the 
High Seas beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured and the Area”.40 A parallel proposal for article 3(1) 
would add “Nothing in this agreement can be interpreted as the geographical 
scope of this agreement applies to the maritime areas within 200 nm from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”.41
The eez must be claimed; if not claimed the high seas begins at the outer 
limit of the territorial sea.42 In this respect the eez differs from the continen-
tal shelf which according to the customary rule in article 77(3) provides “The 
rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupa-
tion, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation”.
Useful definitions could be as follows:
“Beyond areas of national jurisdiction” means those marine areas sea-
ward of the outer limits of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone 
where claimed, and continental shelf as those terms are defined in the 
Convention and whose outer limits are measured from baselines deter-
mined in accordance with the Convention.
“High seas” means all parts of the sea that are not included in the ex-
clusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.43
 39 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6, article 1(4).
 40 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 21/ 813 (Turkey).
 41 Id. at page 44/ 813.
 42 Satya Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, vol. iii (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), para. v.2, p. 491.















“Area” means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction, and its mineral resources.44
In addition, draft article 3(1) on application should be modified to exclude oth-
er treaties that apply beyond the limits of national jurisdiction:
 1. The provisions of this Agreement apply to areas beyond national juris-
diction. With regard to areas beyond national jurisdiction south of 60°S, 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the Antarctic Treaty and 
to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources shall be respected. The rights and responsibilities of the parties to 
the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central 
Arctic Ocean shall be respected.
Such an addition would clarify that this Agreement does not undermine those 
three treaties.
6.4.2 Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes
The procedures for the settlement of disputes in Part ix of the President’s zero 
draft are considerably truncated from those in Part xv of the Convention and 
Part viii of the Fish Stocks Agreement. Article 55(1) of the zero draft incorpo-
rates the provisions of Part xv mutatis mutandis into the ilbi. There was no 
consensus at igc- 3 on those procedures. Some delegations proposed accept-
ing the zero draft article 55 en toto.45 One delegation proposed that those pro-
cedures be voluntary.46 Others proposed they be omitted all together.47 Others 
proposed that the default choice of forum be itlos48 rather than Annex vii 
arbitration as provided in the Convention. Others proposed authorizing it-
los to form a special chamber for hearing disputes under the ilbi.49 Another 
proposed a panel of experts for disputes of a technical nature,50 as appears 
in article 29 of the Fish Stocks Agreement. One group proposed a new article 
excluding maritime disputes.51 The psids proposed that the Conference of the 
Parties be authorized to request that itlos issue advisory opinions on “any 
 44 Convention articles 1(1)(1) and 133.
 45 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 799/ 813 (caricom), 805/ 813 (High Seas Alliance, with addi-
tional provisions).
 46 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 803/ 813 (China).
 47 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, pp. 801/ 83 (Colombia and El Salvador), 803/ 813 (Turkey).
 48 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 802 (South Africa and Algeria).
 49 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, pp. 800/ 813 (psids), 805/ 813 (High Seas Alliance).
 50 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 805/ 813 (High Seas Alliance).
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legal question”52 not just the interpretation or application of the ilbi as limit-
ed by the Convention Part xv.
6.4.3 Non- Parties to This Agreement
Part x article 56 of the President’s zero draft provides “State Parties shall en-
courage non- parties to this Agreement to become parties thereto and to adopt 
laws and regulations consistent with its provisions”.53 This provision is identi-
cal to article 33(1) of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
One proposal would adapt article 33(2) of the Fish Stocks Agreement, which 
reads “State Parties shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and 
international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flag of non- parties 
which undermine the effective implementation of this Agreement”, by adding 
as a second paragraph to article 56 “State Parties shall take measures consistent 
with this Agreement and international law to deter the activities of vessels fly-
ing the flag of non- parties which undermine the effective implementation of 
this Agreement”.54 This seems to be a sensible proposal. However, as discussed 
below Article 56 also omits Article 17(3) of the Fish Stocks Agreement regard-
ing fishing entities’ participation in rfmo s.
6.4.4 Responsibility and Liability
The President’s zero draft contained no provision on responsibility and liabil-
ity. One proposal would add article 56bis, a provision duplicating article 35 of 
the Fish Stocks Agreement: “State Parties are liable in accordance with inter-
national law for damage or loss attributable to them in regard to this Agree-
ment”.55 Article 304 of the Convention provides “The provisions of this Con-
vention regarding responsibility and liability for damage are without prejudice 
to the application of existing rules and the development of further rules re-
garding responsibility and liability under international law”.
As forecast in Article 304, further rules regarding responsibility and liability 
under international law have developed. The differences between responsi-
bility and liability were clarified in the ilc’s Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001,56 the itlos seabed disputes 
 52 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 712/ 813 (psids).
 53 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6, article 56. The article as a whole is in brackets.
 54 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 807/ 813 (High Seas Alliance).
 55 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, p. 807/ 813 (High Seas Alliance).















chamber advisory opinion,57 and the itlos advisory opinion submitted by the 
Sub- Regional Fisheries Commission.58
A clearer provision thus might read as follows:
 1. State Parties and competent international organizations shall be 
responsible for ensuring that activities in marine areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, whether undertaken by them, on their 
behalf, or by persons under their jurisdiction and/ or control, is con-
ducted in accordance with this Agreement.
 2. State Parties and competent international organizations are liable 
in accordance with international law for damage or loss attribut-
able to them, or to those subject to their jurisdiction and/ or control, 
in contravention of this Agreement, and shall provide full repara-
tion or other remedies for the injuries caused in accordance with 
international law.
 3. State Parties and competent international organizations shall be 
responsible and liable for the measures they take in contravention 
of this Agreement in respect of marine activities beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction conducted by other States, their natural or 
juridical persons, or by competent international organizations, and 
shall provide full reparation for the injuries caused or other remedies 
in accordance with international law.59
6.5 Issues Not Addressed in the Proposals
A number of issues raised in section 5.1 above were not addressed in the many 
proposals at igc- 3:  title of the agreement; definitions of conservation, sus-
tainable use, marine biological diversity, regional bodies, sectoral bodies, Con-
vention and the 1994 and 1995 Implementing Agreements, traditional knowl-
edge; provisional measures; and entry into force of amendments. They should 
 57 itlos, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, 
Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, itlos Rep. 2011, p. 10 <https:// www.itlos.org/ fileadmin/ 
itlos/ documents/ cases/ case_ no.21/ advisory_ opinion_ published/ 2015_ 21- advop- E.pdf>.
 58 itlos, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub- Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), Advisory Opinion (2015), paras. 146 & 148, online: <https:// www.itlos.org/ filead-
min/ itlos/ documents/ cases/ case_ no.21/ advisory_ opinion/ C21_ AdvOp_ 02.04.pdf>.
 59 Adapted from article 263 of the Convention, article 35 of the 1995 Agreement, and articles 
28– 31 of the 2001 ilc Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. See further Nicholas Gaskell, ‘Liability and Compensation Regimes: Pollution of the 
High Seas,’ in Beckman, McCreath, Roach and Sun (eds.), High Seas Governance: Gaps and 
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be addressed during igc- 4. Suggest texts are set out in sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.4 
immediately below.
6.5.1 Title
The zero draft does not formally propose a title for the new agreement, al-
though the zero draft is headed:
Draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biolog-
ical diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction
Since the agreement will be “under the Convention”, a suitable title could be 
adapted from the title of the Fish Stocks Agreement:
Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to on the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction
6.5.2 Definitions
The zero draft does not provide definitions for the operative terms in the draft 
agreement, and no proposals were submitted to igc- 3 to clarify the scope of 
the agreement despite several requests.60 The following definitions of those 
terms are suggested.
6.5.2.1 Conservation
“Conservation” means actions to ensure the sustainability of the resources be-
ing exploited.61
6.5.2.2 Sustainable Use
“Sustainable use” means the use of components of marine biological diversity 
in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long- term loss of biological di-
versity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of 
present and future generations.62
 60 Japan (19 August 2019); caricom (on article 16 criteria for identification of areas requir-
ing protection, 21 August 2019).
 61 fao, Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change, Fisheries Circular No. 
853 (fidi/ 853) at 28 note 12 (1993).













6.5.2.3 Marine Biological Diversity
“Marine biological diversity” means the variability among living organisms 
from marine ecosystems and the ecological complexities of which they are 
part, including diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems.63 
“Marine biological diversity” thus includes more than marine genetic resources 
from fish. Focus on mgr limits scope of the negotiations and draft agreement 
to commercial fish species to the exclusion of 95% of deep- sea fish species 
which need to be monitored and protected.64
6.5.2.4 Regional Bodies
“Regional bodies” include regional fishery management organizations 
(rfmo s), regional fisheries management arrangements, regional seas pro-
grams (rsp s) and ospar.
6.5.2.5 Sectoral Bodies
“Sectoral bodies” include the imo, fao, isa, icao, unep, wmo and who, 
many of which may be included in “global bodies”.
6.5.2.6 Convention
The definition of the “Convention” provided in the zero draft refers only to 
the 1982 treaty.65 It does not include either of the two implementing agree-
ments both of which address areas beyond national jurisdiction.66 The 1994 
Part xi Implementing Agreement is in effect an amendment of Part xi of the 
Convention, which is to be “interpreted and applied together as a single in-
strument”, and in the event of any “inconsistency” between them, the 1994 
 63 Adapted from cbd article 2.
 64 Guillermo Ortuño Crespo, Daniel C. Dunn, Matthew Gianni, Kristina Gjerde, Glen Wright 
and Patrick N. Halpin, ‘High- seas fish biodiversity is slipping through the governance net,’ 
Nature Ecology & Evolution, 26 August 2019  <https:// www.nature.com/ articles/ s41559- 
019- 0981- 4> (95% of non- targeted deep seas fish species are not assessed by rmfo s and 
should be covered in the bbnj ilbi). For a summary see Eurasia Review, ‘New UN High- 
Seas Treaty Must Close Gaps In Biodiversity Governance’ <https:// www.eurasiareview.
com/ 02092019- new- un- high- seas- treaty- must- close- gaps- in- biodiversity- governance/ > 
and Eco, September/ October 2019 at 9.
 65 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6, article 1(5).
 66 The International Seabed Authority intervened to suggest adding the 1994 Implementing 
Agreement to paragraph 1 of article 4 of the zero draft during the informal working 
group afternoon session on 28 August 2019. During the same session, South Africa said it 
required more time to reflect on the implications of that proposal. No written proposal 
for amending “Convention” was submitted during igc- 3. The text that follows provides a 
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Agreement prevails. The 1995 Fish Stocks Implementing Agreement expands 
on articles 63 and 64 of the Convention in part with regard to conservation 
of certain fish stocks in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The ilbi is tasked 
with not undermining these agreements which are “existing relevant le-
gal instruments”. Modification of the savings clause, Article 4(1) of the zero 
draft, to include both implementing agreements, would clearly require the 
ilbi to be “interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consis-
tent” not only with the Convention but also the 1994 and 1995 implementing 
agreements.
One possible solution would be to include all three definitions in the zero 
draft of “Convention”, as follows:
“Convention” means the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982, the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implemen-
tation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982, and the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
Alternatively, the two earlier implementing agreements could be separately 
defined and inserted in the text as appropriate.67
6.5.2.7 State Parties
State Parties are defined in article 1(12)(b) of the zero draft to include (i) any 
entity referred to in article 305, paragraph 1 (c), (d) and (e), of the Conven-
tion, and (ii) subject to article 67, to any entity referred to as an “internation-
al organization” in annex ix, article 1, of the Convention that becomes a Party 
to this Agreement, and to that extent “States Parties” refers to those entities. 
While referencing only the 1982 Convention, this subparagraph also follows 
article 1(2) of the Fish Stocks Agreement. If the Fish Stocks Agreement were 
added to the definition of “Convention”, then as noted below paragraph 3 of 
article 1 of the Fish Stocks Agreement should be added to article 1(12)(b) of 
the draft ilbi, which reads “This Agreement [the Fish Stocks Agreement] 
applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the 
high seas”.
 67 Consideration should be given to amending “Convention” where it appears in articles 9(1) 






As noted above, the zero draft presently only includes the 1982 Convention 
and not the two implementing conventions. As also noted above, the zero 
draft does not define “marine biological diversity”. Further, the zero draft 
presently does not address most fishing on the high seas, which it should 
if it is to meet the requirements of resolution A/ 72/ 249. The 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement applies to fishing activities on the high seas and thus 
for the reasons stated above should be added to the zero draft definition of 
“Convention”.
At the second session of the fish stocks conference in 1993 a fao report not-
ed the major problem caused by non- parties engaged in high seas fishing:
45. The treatment of non- contracting parties is an important and real is-
sue that should be addressed in the context of high- seas fisheries man-
agement. Some nations or other entities operating in a fishery may not opt 
to participate in a high seas management body or they may be excluded 
from it (e.g., for political or other reasons). The effectiveness of high seas 
management will therefore be significantly reduced if a major entity in a 
fishery does not participate in determining management decisions and in 
turn is not bound by those decisions.
46. The exclusion of parties from management bodies for political or 
other reasons poses particular difficulties. Taiwan (Province of China) 
is a major international fishing entity. Its high seas fishing capacity is 
extensive and likely to increase, especially in the Indian and South Pa-
cific Oceans. However, due to political non- recognition, Taiwan (Prov-
ince of China) does not participate fully in any fishery management 
bodies.
47. The non- contracting parties problem must be addressed. This 
is because, despite efforts to manage high seas fisheries, attempts to 
achieve sustainable use may be thwarted by unregulated fishing by non- 
contracting parties. Such unregulated activity will erode benefits accru-
ing from measures designed to promote rational exploitation.68
 68 Report of the Technical Consultations on High Seas Fishing and the Papers Presented 
at the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, A/ conf.164/ inf/ 2, 14 May 1993, 
reproduced in United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks:  Selected Documents, compiled and edited by Jean- Pierre Lévy and Gunnar 
G.  Schram 355 (The Hague/ Boston/ London:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1996)  (emphasis added). 
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This problem was addressed in the Fish Stocks Agreement which specifically 
applies to fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas (article 1(3))69 
and provides for their participation in relevant rfmo s/ rfma s (article 17(3)).70
Article 17(3) provides:
States which are members of a subregional or regional fisheries man-
agement organization or participants in a subregional or regional fish-
eries management arrangement shall, individually or jointly, request the 
fishing entities referred to in article 1, paragraph 3, which have fishing 
vessels in the relevant area to cooperate fully with such organization or 
arrangement in implementing the conservation and management mea-
sures it has established, with a view to having such measures applied de 
facto as extensively as possible to fishing activities in the relevant area. 
Such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery 
commensurate with their commitment to comply with conservation and 
management measures in respect of the stocks.
Three later agreements also provide for “entities” or “fishing entities” to par-
ticipate in their work: the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Manage-
ment of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(article 9(2) and Annex i);71 the 2003 Convention for the Strengthening of the 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission established by the 1949 Conven-
tion between the United States of American and the Republic of Costa Rica 
(“the Antigua Convention”) article xxviii (as Chinese Taipei),72 and the 1993 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, as revised by reso-
lution in 2013.73 The bbnj ilbi should similarly so provide both for rfmo s and 
 69 A/ conf.164/ 37, 8 September 1995. This provision was introduced by the Chairman of 
the Conference in his negotiating text issued at the conclusion of the first substantive 
session as document A/ conf.164/ 13*, 23 November 1993, page 16 note 1. The Chairman 
first included this provision in his draft agreement A/ conf.164/ 22, 23 August 1994, at the 
beginning of the fourth session <https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ fish_ stocks_ conference/ 
fish_ stocks_ conference.htm>. This provision was agreed in 1993 as a placeholder between 
the Chairman of the Conference and China, and was retained thereafter in preference to 
more specific reference to Taiwan fishing vessels.
 70 This provision first appeared in article 17(3) of the Chairman’s draft text A/ conf.164/ 22/ 
Rev.1, 11 April 1995, at the beginning of the fifth session.
 71 <https:// www.wcpfc.int/ convention- text>.
 72 <https:// www.iattc.org/ PDFFiles/ IATTC- Instruments/ _ English/ Antigua_ Convention_ 
Jun_ 2003.pdf>.












also for management measures for high seas areas not managed by rfmo s/ 
rfma s.
In summary, the definition of “Convention” should be expanded, the defi-
nition of “fishing entities” should be added to the article defining “States 
Parties” and participation by fishing entities should be added to article 56 
on non- parties by adapting article 17(3) of the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
including management measures for high seas areas not managed by an 
rfmo/ rfma.
6.5.2.9 Traditional Knowledge
The term “traditional knowledge” is used in a dozen articles, while the phrase 
“traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities” is used 
in two articles (16(1) and 17(3)); a third formulation “indigenous peoples and 
local communities with relevant traditional knowledge” is used in article 18(2)
(c); and a fourth phrase “holders of traditional knowledge in local communi-
ties” is used once (in article 52(5)(e) Alt. 1). There should be a consistent formu-
lation, perhaps by adding a definition to article 1.
However, there does not appear to be a recognized definition of “tradition-
al knowledge” at the international level.74 wipo defines the term “traditional 
knowledge” as “knowledge, know- how, skills and practices that are developed, 
sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, 
often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity”.75 The phrase “indige-
nous and local knowledge” is used in the preamble to the Central Arctic Ocean 
fishing agreement.76 The undefined term “traditional knowledge” is used in ar-
ticle 31(1) of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.77 
A  definition of “traditional knowledge” could adopt the wipo definition, as 
follows:
“Traditional knowledge” means knowledge, know- how, skills and practic-
es that are developed, sustained and passed on from generation to gener-
ation within a community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual 
identity.
 74 <https:// www.wipo.int/ tk/ en/ tk/ >.
 75 Id.
 76 <https:// eur- lex.europa.eu/ resource.html?uri=cellar:24702f31- 6e24- 11e8- 9483- 
01aa75ed71a1.0017.02/ DOC_ 2&format=PDF>.
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6.5.3 Provisional Measures
The zero draft does not contain a separate article on provisional measures. 
Rather article 55(1) seeks to incorporate mutatis mutandis all of Part xv into 
the zero draft. Such an approach is insufficient to enable non- parties to the 
Convention that are party to the ilbi to seek provisional measures. Article 31 
of the Fish Stocks Agreement addresses this situation in article 31(3):
A State Party to this Agreement which is not a Party to the Convention 
may declare that, notwithstanding article 290, paragraph 5, of the Con-
vention, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea shall not be 
entitled to prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures without the 
agreement of such State.
Drawing on article 31 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the ilbi should have an 
article on provisional measures, such as the following:
 1. Pending the settlement of a dispute in accordance with this Part, the 
parties to the dispute shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature.
 2. Without prejudice to article 290 of the Convention, the court or tri-
bunal to which the dispute has been submitted under this Part may 
prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate 
under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the par-
ties to the dispute.
 3. A State Party to this Agreement which is not a Party to the Conven-
tion may declare that, notwithstanding article 290, paragraph 5, of 
the Convention,78 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
shall not be entitled to prescribe, modify or revoke provisional mea-
sures without the agreement of such State.
 78 Article 290(5) reads: “Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute 
is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties 
or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional 
measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities 
in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional 
measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal 
which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation 
so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may 






6.5.4 Entry into Force of Amendments
The provision on entry into force of amendments in the zero draft (article 
65)  does not address the situation of a State which becomes a Party to the 
ilbi after the entry into force of amendments. Article 45(7) of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement addresses this situation, as follows:
A State which becomes a Party to this Agreement after the entry into 
force of amendments in accordance with paragraph 5 shall, failing an 
expression of a different intention by that State:
 (a) be considered as a Party to this Agreement as so amended; and
 (b) be considered as a Party to the unamended Agreement in relation 
to any State Party not bound by the amendment.
A similar provision should be added to article 65 of the zero draft as a new 
paragraph 6.
6.6 Submarine Telecommunications Cables
The International Cable Protection Committee (icpc), a private organiza-
tion, obtained consultative observer status with the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ecosoc) in 2018. Accordingly, it participated as 
an observer at igc- 379 and submitted proposals to amend 11 articles of the 
zero draft.80 Perhaps the most important amendments are to obtain rec-
ognition of the concept of “sectoral stakeholder” to be a participant in the 
bbnj process, in addition to the global, regional and sectoral bodies men-
tioned in A/ res/ 72/ 249, paragraph 7,81 as well as in the Conference of Par-
ties. Other amendments addressed cables in the context, inter alia, of envi-
ronmental impact assessments.
6.7 Common Heritage of Mankind
One fundamental difference continuing to divide delegations is the scope 
of the principle of “common heritage of mankind” which article 136 applies 
to Area and its (mineral) resources. The G- 77 argues it should also apply 
to marine genetic resources found in the Area as they were unknown to 
the unclos negotiators to exist. Others argue that the freedom of the seas 
 79 Pursuant to A/ res/ 72/ 249, para. 13.
 80 icpc proposed amendments to articles 14, 15, 17, 23, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 48 and 49, A/ 
conf.232/ 2019/ crp.1, pp. 196, 225, 269, 397, 450, 471, 497, 511, 571, 721 and 735, respectively.
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should apply to them as well as to the high seas as mgr are not expressly 
included in article 136 of the Convention. During igc- 3, Algeria speaking on 
behalf of the African Group, noted that a 2003 study for the cbd provided a 
rationale for extending the concept of common heritage of mankind to the 
living/ genetic resources found in the Area.82 These differences of views will 
be difficult to resolve.
7 Preparations for the Fourth Substantive Session igc- 4
As at the end of October 2019 the following documents have not been post-
ed on the bbnj website:  revised zero draft, agenda and proposed method 
of work.
8 Future Substantive Sessions
igc- 5
At igc- 3 there was talk of a fifth session in 2020 as some delegations felt 
agreement on the ilbi would not be achievable at igc- 4. Resolution A/ 74/ 
249 did not preclude additional sessions, but if needed a new unga decision 
would be required. It is likely before the end of 2019 that the ga will authorize 
an igc- 5 in the latter half of 2020.
 82 ‘Study of the relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with regard to the conservation and sustain-
able use of genetic resources on the deep seabed (decision ii/ 10 of the Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity),’ unep/ cbd/ sbstta/ 8/ inf/ 3/ 
Rev.1, with Annex, 22 February 2003, pp. 32– 33, paras. 128– 129 <http:// www.cbd.int/ doc/ 
meetings/ sbstta/ sbstta- 08/ information/ sbstta- 08- inf- 03- rev1- en.pdf>. The study was lim-
ited to the Area and excluded consideration of the water column. The study erroneously 
asserted that military activities are prohibited by article 141 of the Convention (which 
only mentions “peaceful purposes”). Peaceful purposes only exclude activities contrary to 





© WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004422438_006
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-nd 4.0 license.
 chapter 5
Area- Based Management Tools, Including Marine 




The negotiations on Area- based management tools and Marine Protected Areas 
(mpa s) are well advanced. There are several points most positions have in common, 
such as consultations before a decision on a new mpa, and why the strict division be-
tween the “global approach” and the “regional approach” may be misleading.
This paper is based on a presentation that was presented shortly after the second 
substantive session of negotiations. States were anxiously waiting for the President 
of the conference, Ambassador Rena Lee, to publish the next document to guide the 
negotiations. The aim of the presentation was to illustrate the status of the negotia-
tions on the topic “Area- based management tools, including marine protected areas”, 
by providing some examples of the different ideas proposed during the negotiations.
 Keywords
area- based management tools – marine protected areas – treaty negotiations – marine 
biological diversity – decision- making – conservation
There are today several organizations where States decide area- based manage-
ment tools (abmt s) and marine protected areas (mpa s). Some of these also 
have mandates in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (imo, ospar and 
ccamlr for example). The cooperation within these organizations is opera-
tionalizing the obligation of States to cooperate to protect and preserve the 
marine environment found in several articles of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, including articles 192 and 197. However, the existing organi-
zations are mostly limited in geographical scope (as ospar) or to a specific 
sector (as imo). The sector can be as narrow as one marine animal or stock. 
Large oceans areas are not covered by any management organizations. This is 
Area-Based Management Tools, Including Marine Protected Areas 91
the very reason for the intergovernmental conference – to bridge the gap be-
tween areas and measures to create a comprehensive and coherent system for 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.
After two substantive sessions of the negotiations, the discussions on area 
based management tools, including marine protected areas, were well ad-
vanced compared to other parts of the negotiations. States had presented 
developed positions and proposals. However, a number of issues still needed 
clarification and definition for the negotiations to move forward.
However, some issues would need further consideration and work to move 
negotiations forward from this point. Two of the main issues that would need 
further discussions were:
First  – what do we mean by area- based management tools (abmt s) and 
marine protected areas (mpa s)? Second – how do we characterize the “global 
approach” vs the “regional approach”?
1 What Do We Mean by abmt s and mpa s?
Looking at existing treaties, there are some definitions of mpa and abmt. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd) art 2 defines a Marine Protected 
Area as a “geographically defined marine area which is designated and regulat-
ed and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives”. The cbd sbssta 
defined abmt in 2018 as “a geographically defined area other than a Protected 
Area, which is governed and managed in ways that achieve positive and sus-
tained long- term outcomes for the in situ conservation of biodiversity, with 
associated ecosystem functions and services and, where applicable, cultural, 
spiritual, socioeconomic, and other locally relevant values”.
In the EU, an mpa is defined as an area with a higher level of protection for 
marine biodiversity than the surrounding areas. The EU- position in the negoti-
ations has been based on this definition with some additions. For the negotia-
tions the EU and its member states define an mpa as comprehensive manage-
ment for a specific maritime area, whereas an abmt is decided by a competent 
organisation for a specific sector or activity but without a specific management 
objective (a pssa decided by imo would be an example of an abmt).
Also, national legislation contains different definitions.
The differences in definition and understanding may be a reason for some 
blockages in the negotiation. To overcome these blockages and move negoti-
ations forward, there is a distinct need to reach a common understanding on 
what is what when talking about abmt s and mpa s.
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2 Global Approach vs Regional Approach
At the second substantive session of the negotiations, there was already a con-
vergence forming on several points. All positions presented aimed to create a 
system to guarantee enhanced and strengthened coherence and cooperation 
between existing actors and pointed to a need to fill the gaps in management.
Early during the negotiations negotiatiors talked about two distinct ap-
proaches, the global approach and the regional approach, and these were 
seemingly irreconcilable. However, with the advancement and increased 
detail of positions, this strict division no longer characterizes the status of 
negotiations.
However, by breaking down the positions it can be argued that, rather than 
placing position either in the “global” or the “regional” camp, positions sit on 
a sliding scale, or a spectrum, instead of a clear- cut regional or global division. 
A breakdown of some proposals presented during negotiations illustrates this:
1.
The agreement shall contain criteria for the designation of mpa s;
Proposal by states individually or collectively;
Consultations with all states, relevant organizations and civil society;
Scientific assessment; and
Decision by decision- making body. The decision is made on the basis of 
a management plan and States shall promote necessary measures in 
competent organizations
2.
The agreement shall contain criteria for the designation of mpa s;
Proposal by State or other actor;
Decision shall be made by a regional organization where existing;
Consultation before decision;
Scientific advice; and
Present to cop for discussion and comments.
3.
Coherence by cooperation between States and organisations;
Consultation before designation;
Decision and implementation by regional organization where 
existing; and
Global body where no competent organization.
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By breaking down positions this way, one can identify several common ele-
ments: many positions contain the idea of identifying criteria; all include con-
sultation before decision- making, and all include cooperation. The solution to 
a successful negotiation outcome would therefore be found in the proper bal-
ance between decision- making, coordination and cooperation. An agreement 
that is too heavy risks being too slow and too expensive. If the agreement is too 
general, there will still be no coherence in management, and it would be a long 
time until all ocean areas were covered by effective management structures.
Another central issue in the negotiations is the issue of “not undermining” 
existing organizations. This stems from the importance States place on exist-
ing organizations and their mandates to regulate and manage ocean areas. As 
mentioned in the beginning of this paper, large oceans areas are not covered 
by any management organization. The proposal has been made during the 
negotiations to include a provision in the Agreement to encourage the cre-
ation of regional organizations. The creation of such organisations would like-
ly strengthen the ownership of marine management in ocean areas currently 
without regional management. For such organisations to succeed, capacity 
building is central. It is advisable therefore to consider making the creation 
and operation of regional organisations an objective for capacity building un-
der the Agreement.
Finally, one must not forget the central role played by States as the actors 
within each relevant forum. Organizations cannot be effective and successful 
without the capacity and political will from the States that are their members.
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 chapter 6
Benefit Sharing
Combining Intellectual Property, Trade Secrets, Science and an Ecosystem- 
Focused Approach
Marcel Jaspars and Abbe E. L. Brown
 Abstract
This contribution develops a new approach to benefit sharing in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. It has regard to a breadth of relevant legal regimes, sustain-
ability, the needs of science, analogies with Farmers Rights and the prospect of 
increased involvement of the commercial sector. Proposals are made for the benefit 
sharing regime to cover digital sequences of marine genetic resources; for restric-
tions to be imposed on the rights of ip owners and controllers of trade secrets to 
enable delivery of a balanced approach to benefit sharing; for an open sharing of 
the results of research cruises; for a pragmatic and deliverable approach to tracing 
use of marine genetic resources across present and future development pipelines; 
and for different approaches to be taken to benefit sharing in respect of ecologically 
sustainable technologies and to encourage their pursuit. The proposals are marked 
in italics.
 Keywords
benefit sharing  – intellectual property  – bioprospecting  – ecosystem- focused 
 approach – sustainability – marine genetic resources – areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion – traceability – trade secrets – science – Mare Geneticum
1 Introduction
This interdisciplinary contribution made from law and science develops pro-
posals to deliver a pragmatic means to share the benefit arising from marine 
genetic resources (mgr). Benefit sharing of mgr is one of the issues covered 
by a commitment under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
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(unclos)1 to create an internationally binding legal instrument (ilbi) on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas be-
yond national jurisdiction (abnj).2 This proceeds in the context of mgr’s im-
portance being highlighted at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
meeting in Monaco in 2019, given its potential contribution to industry tran-
sition and nature- based solutions.3 This and other uses of mgr require work 
with unexplored and extreme environments such as the cryosphere, deep 
oceans and thermal vents4 – and all of these can be found within anbj.5
Benefit sharing will be developed here by taking an ecological and ecosys-
tem approach, reflecting the climate change intersection just noted; by includ-
ing genetic sequence information about mgr, as well as physical mgr sam-
ples, which reflects evolving scientific realities; by engaging with intellectual 
property (ip) rights and trade secrets reflecting the contribution these rights 
can make to delivery (and non delivery) of benefit sharing; by engaging more 
deeply with tracing and digital identifers; and by evaluating how widely bene-
fit sharing could and should extend along the research and commercialisation 
pipeline, which reflects the need to reward, incentivise and increase knowledge 
development, information sharing and coordination as well as investment. 
A new means of benefit sharing will be put forward which combines respect 
for sustainability, different relevant laws and scientific reality and workability.
 1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 unts p. 3. For a general discussion of 
marine environmental protection under unclos see J. Harrison, Saving the Oceans through 
Law: The International Legal Framework for the Protection of the Marine Environment, (Ox-
ford, Oxford Univeristy Press, 2017) 17– 63.
 2 Ibid. 296– 9; R. Warner, ‘Oceans of Opportunity and Challenge: Towards a Stronger Gover-
nance Framework for Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in Marine Areas Be-
yond National Jurisdiction’ 3 Asia- Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy (2018) 157 (Warner). 
See also United Nations webpage Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ accessed 2 November 2019 
(UN site). Reference is made below (see n. 24– 7) to specific resolutions made in this process.
 3 ipcc, ‘Special Report on the Ocean and Cyrosphere in a Changing Climate’ (2019) https:// 
www.ipcc.ch/ srocc/ home/ accessed 2 November 2019.
 4 See e.g., Industrial Biotechnology Innovation and Growth Team, ‘Maximising UK Opportu-
nities from Industrial Biotechnology in a Low Carbon Economy: A report to the government 
by the Industrial Biotechnology Innovation and Growth Team’ (ib 2025, May 2009) http:// 
beaconwales.org/ uploads/ resources/ Maximising_ UK_ Opportunities_ from_ Industrial_ Bio-
technology_ in_ a_ Low_ Carbon_ Economy.pdf accessed 2 November 2019.
 5 J. Cone, Fire under the Sea. The Discovery of the Most Extraordinary Environment on Earth – 
volcanic hot springs on the ocean floor (New  York, William Morrow and Co., 1991); Royal 
Society, ‘Future ocean resources: metal- rich minerals and genetics – evidence back’ (2017) 
https:// royalsociety.org/ ~/ media/ policy/ projects/ future- oceans- resources/ future- of- oceans- 











2 The Journey to the Sharing of Benefits from mgr in the abnj
2.1 The Scientific Pathway
unclos, adopted in 1982, did not address mgr, even though deep sea biodi-
versity has been known since the Challenger expeditions explored the north 
and south Atlantic and the Pacific in 1872– 6.6 It has been suggested that un-
clos’s position arose from the fact that the value of deep- sea marine biodiver-
sity was not generally appreciated until the 1990s, with technology not being 
available to exploit the resources;7 and conversely that mgr was deliberately 
not addressed because of uncertainty as to how to balance the interests of the 
commercial sector with enabling all (in particular scientists) to benefit in dif-
ferent ways from the use of these resources.8
Access to deep sea biodiversity is indeed challenging because of the level of 
engineering and financial input (including research vessels, deep sea sampling 
systems and remotely operated vehicles) which is needed to collect mgr.9 Yet 
awareness of the commercial and societal gain which could arise as a result 
grew over time.10 From 1969 onwards, there was work on reef organisms such 
as sponges, seasquirts and soft corals and from the early 1990s scientists in-
vestigated marine bacteria from marine sediments (which are easier and less 
expensive to collect) for microbially- derived compounds to provide novel bio-
active molecules.11 In the early 21st century, there were some successes in use 
of mgr- derived clinical applications of anti- cancer medicines, but industrial 
natural product drug discovery was then de- emphasised as industry pursued, 
 6 The Challenger Society for Marine Science, ‘The History of the Challenger Expedition’ 
https:// www.challenger- society.org.uk/ History_ of_ the_ Challenger_ Expedition accessed 2 
November 2019.
 7 D. Freestone, ‘The UN Process to Develop an International Legally Binding Instrument under 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Issues and Challenges’ 3– 5 in D. Freestone (ed.) Conserv-
ing Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (Leidon, Brill Nijhoff, 2019) (Freestone).
 8 A landmark piece is L. Glowka, ‘The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resouces, Marine Sci-
entific Research, and the Area’ 12(1) Ocean Yearbook Online (1996) 154. See also R. Tiller 
et al., ‘The once and future treaty: Towards a new regime for biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction’ 99 Marine Policy (2019) 239– 242, 1.4; C. Correa, ‘Access to and Benefit 
Sharing of Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction:  Developing a new 
Legally Binding Instrument’ South Centre Research Paper 79 Sept. 2017 (Correa).
 9 A. Jamieson, The Hadal Zone: Life in the Deepest Oceans (Cambridge, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 2015), Part i.
 10 K. ten Kate and S. A. Laird, The Commercial use of biodiversity: access to genetic resources 
and benefit- sharing (London, Earthscan, 1999) (Kate/ Laird) 3.3.3, 9.
 11 See Midwestern University, ‘Clinical Pipeline:  Marine Pharmacology:  Approved Marine 
Drugs’ https:// www.midwestern.edu/ departments/ marinepharmacology/ clinical- pipeline.
















fairly unsuccessfully, more technological paths such as combinatorial chemis-
try and high- throughput screening methods.12 This, and growing understand-
ing of the molecular mechanisms by which bioactive natural products are 
made, means that natural product drug discovery is experiencing a resurgence 
at the time of writing in 2019.13 It has been observed that “sustainable use of 
these novel resources could have significant benefits … The high biodiversity in 
the ocean, including species adapted to a range of extreme environments pro-
vides a substantial resource for development of new chemicals, including anti-
biotics and cancer treatments”.14 Opportunities also lie in delivering bioenergy 
and ecological solutions, cosmetics, household products and nutraceuticals.15
2.2 Legal Pathways
Uncertainty continues about the extent to which these opportunities will come 
about – consider that in 2017, 30,000 relevant molecules had been identified 
and nine related products had been brought to market – however, the pipe-
line appears to be becoming more productive.16 Given this prospect of greater 
commercial interest in mgr, it is timely that the United Nations is addressing 
conservation and sustainable use of mgr, including the sharing of benefits de-
rived from mgr. Industry has met nature before – on land and in ocean areas 
which are within national jurisdiction, leading to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 199217 and then the Nagoya Protocol on fair and equitable sharing of 
 12 See T. Kodadek, ‘The rise, fall and reinvention of combinatorial chemistry’ 55 Chemical 
Communications (2011) 47, 9757– 9763.
 13 S. Pearce, ‘A Resurgence in Natural Product- Based Drug Discovery: Advances in analytical 
technology are making the screening of natural products and their substructures more 
viable’ 13(2) PharmTech (2018) http:// www.pharmtech.com/ resurgence- natural- product- 
based- drug- discovery accessed 2 November 2019.
 14 Royal Society, above n. 5 at 5, and more detailed analysis of mgr 32– 6, with discussions of 
uses from 43.
 15 R Blasiak et  al., ‘The Ocean Genome:  Conservation and the Fair, Equitable and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Genetic Resources’ (High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean 
Economy) https:// oceanpanel.org/ ocean- genome- conservation- and- fair- equitable- and- 
sustainable- use- marine- genetic- resources accessed 2 November 2019 (Blasiak).
 16 Royal Society, 42– 3; see also Correa n 8, 4, 6 referring to Pharmasea project on which Jaspars 
was involved, see http:// www.pharma- sea.eu/ accessed 2 November 2019; D.  Skropeta, 
‘Deep- sea natural products’ 25 Natural Products Reports (2008) 1131– 1166 reviewing 390 
marine natural products from deep water to 2007; E. Heafey ‘Access and Benefit Sharing 
of Marine Genetic Resources from Areas beyond National Jurisdiction:  Intellectual 
Property- - Friend, Not Foe’ 14(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 2014, Article 5 
(Heafey), 495– 6; Correa, 15– 6 referring to 2015 report of National Institute of Genetics 
https:// www.nig.ac.jp/ nig/ pdf/ about_ nig/ youran2014.pdf accessed 2 November 2019.
 17 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 1760 unts p. 39, arts. 1, 15 (in particular (3) and 















benefits.18 Nagoya does not address the needs of mgr in abnj as it takes in the 
main a bilateral approach and under unclos no one can own or transfer re-
sources from the abnj.19 Yet a common theme in these unclos discussions is 
the risk of taking an approach to benefit sharing in abnj which is too radically 
different to Nagoya; this is because it could create extra burdens on capacity, 
given that some forms of mgr (say the larvae from sponges) may be found 
within and outside national jurdsictions or move from one to the other.20
For mgr in abnj, the international policy start came in 2004 when the UN 
General Assembly21 established an Ad Hoc Open- Ended informal Working 
Group (Working Group) to study issues relating to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdic-
tion.22 The Rio+20 meeting in 2012 of the United Nations Conference on Sus-
tainable Development referred to the Working Group and called for the abnj 
to be addressed at unclos.23 In 2015 a United Nations General Assembly res-
olution24 established a Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on 
elements of a text, taking into account reports of the Working Group.25 In 2018, 
the UN General Assembly26 convened an Intergovernmental Conference (igc) 
to consider the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee and to devel-
op the text of an ibli to address ensuring sustainable use of biodiversity, in 
particular “together and as a whole”,27 mgr and access and benefit sharing (the 
 18 See text https:// www.cbd.int/ abs/ text/ accessed 2 November 2019. See in particular art. 
10 and analysis in E.  Morgera, E.  Tsiomani and M.  Buck, (eds.) Unraveling the Nagoya 
Protocol  – A  Commentary on the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit- sharing to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Leiden, Brill, 2014) (Morgera et al.).
 19 Nagoya Protocol, art. 6(1) prior informed consent although note art 10 regarding discus-
sion about a global multilateral benefit- sharing mechanism, 6(3), 7, 8 regarding mutually 
agreed terms; unclos art. 137(2) – there are possibilities in respect of minerals.
 20 M. R. Muller, Genetic Resources as Natural Information: Implications for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and Nagoya Protocol (Abingdon, Earthscan/ Routledge, 2015) (Muller), 
39– 41, 67.
 21 GA59/ 24 para 73.
 22 See https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ biodiversityworkinggroup/ biodiversityworkinggroup.
htm accessed 2 November 2019.
 23 Rio+20 Future We Want Outcome Document https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 
index.php?menu=1298accessed 2 November 2019, para 16.
 24 A/ Res/ 69/ 292 (6 July 2015): Development of an international legally binding institution 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
 25 See webpage of Preparatory Committee https:// www.un.org/ depts/ los/ biodiversity/ prep-
com.htm accessed 2 November 2019.
 26 A/ Res/ 72/ 249.






















focus here), area based management tools including marine protected areas, 
environmental impact assessments, technology transfer and capacity build-
ing.28 The first draft ilbi text was published in June 201929 after negotiations 
at two igc s.30 At the time of writing in late 2019, this draft has been discussed 
by states, igo s and ngo s at IGC3,31 and a further draft is awaited. There will 
be a fourth igc in March- April 2020 and a meeting at the General Assembly to 
adopt the ilbi later in that year.
3 Mare Geneticum and Beyond
This proposal uses as a base a proposal Mare Geneticum, developed in the con-
text of the ilbi by scientists (including one of the authors), lawyers and policy 
makers. It provides a fair means of encouraging and rewarding research and 
development into mgr from abnj, and of sharing the benefits resulting from 
this work.32 Points of particular interest here relate to the sharing of the results 
of all research cruises through the deposition of data in a series of linked pub-
lic databases to enable further scientific activity, capacity building and later 
commercial product development, and to the initial researchers having an ex-
clusivity period – and also the option of a paid extension to it (with amounts 
 28 See analysis in E.  Morgera, ‘Competence or Confidence? The Appropriate forum to 
Address Multi- Purpose High Seas Protected Areas’ 16 Review of European, Comparative 
and Internanational Environmental Law (2007) 1 and Warner, above n. 2, 162– 4.
 29 Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction, ‘Draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction’, 17 May 2019 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6 (June 2019 draft ilbi).
 30 President’s aid to discussions for igc 1 A/ conf.232/ 2018/ 3 and Aid to Negotiations for igc 
2 A/ conf. 232/ 2019/ 1*; E. Mendenhall, E. De Santo, E. Nyman, R. Tiller, ‘A soft treaty, hard 
to reach:  The second inter- governmental conference for biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdiction’ 108 Marine Policy (2019) 103664 for a valuable review of the negotiation pro-
cess at igc 2 – 4.1.1 on mgr noting the “plodd[ing] by delegates” through a detailed “Aid 
to Negotiations” which contained various options; and D. Leary, ‘Agreeing to disagree on 
what we have or have not agreed on: The current state of play of the bbnj negotiations 
on the status of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction’ 99 Marine 
Policy (2019) 21– 29 (Leary).
 31 See resources via “Third substantive session” https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ content/ third- 
substantive- session and reports via Earth Negotiations Bulletin https:// enb.iisd.org/ 
oceans/ bbnj/ igc3/ both accessed 2 November 2019.
 32 T. Vanagt, A.  Broggiato, L.E. Lallier, M Jaspars, G.  Burton and D Muyldermans, ‘Mare 
Geneticum:  Towards an Implementing Agreement for Marine Genetic Resources in 












to be established with reference to the sector) with proceeds from this going 
to a biodiversity fund. Compliance with these information and payment pro-
visions could be through a system of digital identifiers. In addition, Mare Ge-
neticum proposed that the biodiversity fund would support capacity building 
for scientists from developing areas and that there would be prior electronic 
notification of research activity (alongside separate requirements for environ-
mental impact assessments) in advance of the research cruise, with the details 
to be updated afterwards.33 Elements of Mare Geneticum are included in the 
ilbi draft text.34
Mare Geneticum was put forward in the context of provisions in unclos 
regarding the rights to states to engage in marine scientific research,35 and 
that carrying out that marine scientific research is to be subject to the free-
dom of the high seas,36 which could mean that anyone could have access to 
the mgr on a first come first served basis and profit from it without the need 
to share any benefit arising.37 Yet unclos also provides that abnj, (and 
importantly their resources) are the common heritage of mankind.38 These 
two different approaches have given rise to significant debate regarding the 
legal basis for benefit sharing with respect to mgr.39 Mare Geneticum pro-
vides a pragmatic solution. Further, Mare Geneticum is consistent with some 
other proposals for a holistic approach to benefit sharing in relation to mgr 
 33 See June 19 draft ilbi, above n. 29, arts. 22– 39.
 34 See June 19 draft ilbi, above n. 29, arts. 10.1, 11.3 (a), 52.5.
 35 unclos, art. 238 see also art 240(d) referring to the rest of unclos.
 36 Although this is not an unfettered provision, see unclos, art 87(1)(f) and art 87(2) refer-
ring notably to rights in respect of activities in abnj.
 37 Leary, above n. 30, 3.1; Glowka, above n. 8, 155 suggesting that mgr falls under freedom of 
the high seas.
 38 unclos, arts. 133, 136, 137(2), 140.
 39 C. Salpin, ‘The Law of the Sea:  A before and after Nagoya’ (Salpin) in Morgera et  al., 
above n. 18, 153– 6; D. Tladi, ‘Conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction:  towards an implementing agreement’ in R. Rayfuse 
(ed.) Research Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2015)  259, 260– 3; Heafey, above n.16, 508– 9; K.  Marciniak, ‘Marine 
Genetic Resources: do they Form Part of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?’ 
in L.  Martin, C.  Salondia, C.  Hioureas (eds.), Natural Resources and the Law of the 
Sea:  Exploration, Allocation, Exploitation of Natural Resources in areas under National 
Jurisdiction and Beyond (JuristNet, 2017) engaging in particular with treaty interpretation 
under the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties and levels of awareness of scientific 
opportunities, and concluding that mgr in the abnj is subject to freedom of the high seas 

















with a focus on technology transfer and capacity building and data shar-
ing40 and for the generation of a common fund.41 There are also new argu-
ments for benefit sharing to be a theorised, independent concept grounded 
in equity42 and one which delivers “deeper and cosmopolitan international 
cooperation”.43
These proposals for benefit sharing, particularly from the theoretical per-
spective, could empower the taking of new positions to mgr in the ilbi. These 
new positions could draw on other benefit sharing regimes (beyond Nagoya)44 
and also address issues which are arising from evolving attitudes and technol-
ogy.45 An example of such a point is the challenge to Mare Geneticum’s period 
of exclusivity on the basis that it entrenches the first mover advantage of the 
initial researcher, and in the view that there should rather be a sharing with all, 
from the start, of the information and samples gained from research cruises.46 
This would undoubtedly increase the transfer of knowledge and opportunites 
for collaboration between scientists.
 40 H. Harden- Davies and K. Gjerde, ‘Building Scientific and Technological Capacity: A Role 
for Benefit- sharing in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity 
beyond National Jurisdiction’ 33(1) Ocean Yearbook Online (2019) 377 (Harden- Davies and 
Gjerde), 394– 5.
 41 Heafey, above n. 16, 518– 21, building on the initiatives of the Global Commons Trust.
 42 E. Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit 
Sharing’ 27 The European Journal of International Law (2016), 353 (Morgera, Need), 354, 
357, 359, 368, 373, 380– 3; E. Morgera, ‘Fair and equitable benefit- sharing in a new treaty 
on marine biodiversity: A principled approach towards partnership building?’ (benelex 
Working Paper No.16, 2018) (Morgera, Fair and Equitable), pp. 6– 11, 48, 54– 7.
 43 Morgera, Fair and Equitable, above n. 42, 51.
 44 Notably the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
2400 unts p. 303 (Plant Treaty) and steps taken at the World Health Organization in 
relation to the sharing of viruses and pandemic supplies, and/ or the First Global Plan 
of Action for Forest Resources 2014 http:// www.fao.org/ policy- support/ resources/ 
resources- details/ en/ c/ 469497/ accessed 2 November 2019. See Morgera, Fair and 
Equitable, above n.  42, 54; C.  Chiarolla, ‘Intellectual property rights and benefit shar-
ing from marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction:  current dis-
cussions and regulatory options’ 4(3) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (2014) 
171– 194 (Chiarolla), 190; Correa, above n.  8; Harden- Davies and Gjerde, above n.  40; 
A. Bonfanti and S. Trevisanut, ‘TRIPS on the High Seas: Intellectual Property Rights on 
Marine Genetic Resources’ 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2011) (Bonfanti and 
Trevisanut) 215– 220 and 223– 6.
 45 Muller, above n. 20 66, 70; Bonfanti and Trevisanut, above n. 44, 232.
 46 S. Thambisetty, “Marine Genetic Resources beyond National Jurisdiction:  Elements 
of a New Internationally Legally Binding Instrument” LSE Law Policy Briefing 32 2018 















An open approach to sharing with scientists can draw from the Plant Trea-
ty,47 which created an opportunity (but not an obligation)48 for states to cre-
ate Farmers’ Rights. There is also an African Model Law for the protection of 
farmers and regulation of access to biological resources.49 These instruments 
reflect a recognition of an equitable and sustainable base for special treatment 
to be accorded to farmers, in the light of the fact that they have stewarded 
the land over generations as primary custodians.50 Farmers’ Rights have been 
referred to as a possible analogy in the context of rewarding past conduct, in 
proposals for a new specific ip right to protect the needs of investors and bio-
prospectors.51 A different perspective to using Farmers’ Rights is pursued here. 
Scientists can fulfil a similar role to farmers – looking after nature and bringing 
about benefits for all – through their objective analysis of the mgr, and the 
sharing of this information (which will be considered further below). Accord-
ingly, scientists should be accorded rights in the ilbi, and these should move 
beyond the peripheral, optional rights in the Plant Treaty. There should be a 
mandatory benefit sharing52 mechanism regarding the sharing of information, 
payments for and provision of opportunities to participate in cruises. This should 
enable the virtuous cycle of activity to continue with contributions from sci-
entists throughout the world.
 47 See details, above n.  44, and B.  Fedder, Marine Genetic Resources, Access and Benefit 
Sharing: Legal and biological perspectives (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013) (Fedder), 115– 6.
 48 Plant Treaty art. 9; C. Chiarolla, S. Louafi and M. Schloen, ‘An Analysis of the Relationship 
between the Nagoya Protocol and Instruments relating to Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights’ in Morgera et al., above n.18.
 49 Organization of African Unity model law https:// www.wipo.int/ edocs/ lexdocs/ laws/ en/ 
oau/ oau001en.pdf accessed 3 November 2019, art. 4, 8, 12, 14 in particlar art. 15 restricting 
use bio resource and the risks of loss of the ecosystem.
 50 Plant Treaty, arts. 9, 13, 18; African model law art 21– 6; C.  Chiarolla, ‘Right to food and 
intellectual property protection for plant genetic resources’ in C. Geiger (ed.) Research 
Handbook in Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015)  539– 50; 
C. Guneratne, Genetic Resources, Equity and International Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 92– 102; 
T. Adebola, ‘Access and benefit sharing, farmers’ rights and plant breeders rights: reflec-
tions on the African Model Law’ 9(1) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (2019) 
105– 121 (Adebola), 106; Morgera, Need, above n. 42, 378– 9.
 51 Federal Agency for Nature Conservation and iucn, ‘A possible way forward’ (2011) https:// 
www.bfn.de/ fileadmin/ MDB/ documents/ service/ Skript_ 301.pdf accessed 3 November 
2019 39- 42.
 52 Compare June 2019 draft ilbi n29 reflecting uncertainty, art 11.3 (a)(b). See also study 4 
on how domestic measures address benefit sharing prepared pursuant to Conference of 
Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity Decision 14/ 20 exploring some existing 














Such a cycle would accord less reward and arguably a reduced incentive to 
the initial researcher (including investors in them and any related companies). 
Yet in addressing abnj there have been calls for more ambition and a focus on 
nature and the climate.53 From this starting point, and reflecting the points 
made above challenging a exclusivity- based approach, this contribution will 
explore some pathways to bring about a more open and also more sustainable 
approach.
4 The Need to Have Ecosystem and Ecological Perspectives
Conservation and sustainable use, included in the title of the ilbi, have eco-
logical dimensions.54 Ecosystems undergo constant evolution. Populations of 
species (which include mgr) are components of larger ecosystems, and eco-
systems interact with other species and the non- living environment, contrib-
uting to the functioning of that larger ecosystem and its living components.55 
An ecosystem’s resilience – its ability to retain its structure and functions in the 
face of disturbance – can be impaired by human and natural stressors, which 
could render it a simpler ecosystem, less able to support a high diversity of spe-
cies.56 Warning signs currently abound that all ecosystems are under threat. Cli-
mate change is taking place against a backdrop of significant and accelerating 
 53 A.Vaughan, ‘David Attenborough on climate change “We cannot be radical enough” ’ (New 
Scientist 9 July 2019) https:// www.newscientist.com/ article/ 2209126- david- attenborough- 
on- climate- change- we- cannot- be- radical- enough/ and David Attenborough documen-
tary, ‘Climate Change  – the Facts’ (May 2019)  https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ 
m00049b1 https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ entertainment- arts- 47988337 all accessed 29 
October 2019 and Pacific Islands Forum, ‘Forum Calls for Increased Level of Ambitions 
in New bbnj Treaty’ https:// www.forumsec.org/ forum- calls- for- increased- level- of- 
ambitions- in- new- bbnj- treaty/ accessed 2 November 2019.
 54 J. M.  Blair, S.  L. Collins and A.  K. Knapp, ‘Ecosystems as Functional Units in Nature’ 
14 Natural Resources and Environment (2000) 150; F.  S. Chapin iii, P.  A. Matson and 
P. Vitousek, Principles of Terrestrial Ecosystem Ecology (2nd ed, Springer, 2011), 3– 22.
 55 S. A.  Levin, ‘Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems’ Ecosystems 
(198) 431; G. Harris, Seeking Sustainability in an Age of Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 19– 26.
 56 C. Folke, ‘Resilience:  The Emergence of a Perspective for Social- Ecological Systems 
Analyses’16 Global Environmental Change (2006) 253, 257, 557, 570– 1; C.  S. Holling, 
‘Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological and Social Systems’ 4 Ecosystems 
(2001) 390; R.Biggs, G. D. Peterson and J. C. Rocha, ‘The Regime Shifts Database: A frame-












global ecological degradation,57 with biodiversity loss equivalent to an extinc-
tion event58 and other changes in planetary conditions such as ocean acidifica-
tion at unprecedented levels.59 The message of a 2019 report was that “nature 
and its vital contributions to people, which together embody biodiversity and 
ecosystem functions and services, are deteriorating worldwide”.60
Accordingly, any use of mgr needs to interact with simultaneous efforts to 
reduce pressures on ecosystems. There should be a more visible, central place 
for regard to impact on ecosystems when working with mgr in addressing soci-
etal needs or commercial opportunities and in sharing the resulting benefits.61 
The June 2019 draft negotiating text for the IGC3 does display awareness of this 
issue. It includes a suggested provision in the general principles requiring all 
States to ‘[a] pply an approach that builds ecosystem resilience to the adverse 
effects of climate change and ocean acidification and restores ecosystem integ-
rity’.62 Such a provision could support regard to delivering resilience in the ilbi.
The first possible element of an ecological and ecosystem focussed ap-
proach would be for the ilbi to reflect current scientific practice, and its likely 
development, by engaging with mgr in a digital form. This would limit, to an 
extent, the need for physical samples.
5 The Meaning of mgr
The traditional starting point for relevant mgr activity was “in situ” – actually 
finding and working with the physical raw materials in abnj. Samples would 
then be taken to land where more work was done. There is a deep scientific 
 57 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well- being:  Synthesis 
(Washington DC, Island Press, 2005); World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet Report 
2018: Aiming Higher (World Wildlife Fund, 2018).
 58 J Rockström et  al., ‘Planetary Boundaries:  Exploring the Safe Operating Space for 
Humanity’ 14 Ecology and Society (2009) 32.
 59 International Geosphere- Biosphere Programme, Ocean Acidification Summary for 
Policymakers, (2013, Report from the Third Symposium on the Ocean in a High- CO2 
World, Stockholm).
 60 ipbes, ‘Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services’ ipbes/ 7/ 10/ 
Add.1 p. 3 Key message A.
 61 See further on this theme across the bbnj and more widely, V. De Lucia, ‘The Ecosystem 
Approach and the bbnj Negotiations’ (Working Paper 10 July 2019), available at 
ssrn:  https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=3420988 or http:// dx.doi.org/ 10.2139/ ssrn.3420988 
accessed 2 November 2019 and O. Woolley, Ecological Governance. Reappraising Law’s Role 
in Protecting Ecosystem Functionality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014).















cultural norm of samples being stored in respositories, say in oceanograph-
ic institutes or in museums such as the Natural History Museum in London. 
Working with mgr in these repositories can be termed “ex situ”.63 In theory, 
these materials are available for all to visit and use, consistent with the farming 
and stewarding analogy. In reality, lack of human resources, record keeping 
and taxonomic challenges (such as uncertainty as to whether this mgr is a 
species which has already been identified) has meant that not as many bene-
fits are being taken from these mgr as would be desirable.64
Developments in chemistry, bioinformatics and computer science have cre-
ated new opportunities for working with mgr.65 Physical samples can be an-
alysed and the genetic data (e.g., a short and unlikely unique example would 
be attcgtaagc) established from individual organisms, metagenomes es-
tablished from an assemblage of microorganisms such as planktonic species, 
or chemical structures of derivatives identified such as proteins and metabo-
lites.66 This genetic information could then be shared67 in online databases 
such as the National Center for Biotechnology Information (ncbi, operated 
from the United States).68 This would enable wider dissemination without ac-
cess to the physical mgr, and the genetic information could be the subject of 
further research and synthetically used and modified, possibly leading to new 
commercial products – if, as ever, there is sufficient time and money.
In the past, the dna was obtained on shore in a laboratory or on the research 
vessels after physical samples had been preserved. At the time of writing, how-
ever, dna extraction and sequencing devices have been developed which float 
or sit on the seafloor. Examples are the MesoBot and devices using Oxford 
Nanopore sequencing systems.69 Such products can be used to deliver enough 
 63 See discussion in Kate/ Laird, above n.10, 3.6.2.
 64 See M. Rabone et al., ‘Access to Marine Genetic Resoruces (MGR): Raising Awareness of 
Best- Practice Through a New Agreement for Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisidiction 
(BBNJ)’ 12 Frontiers in Marine Science (2019) 520 https:// doi.org/ 10.3389/ fmars.2019.00520 
(Rabone).
 65 Morgera, Fair and Equitable, above n. 42, 67– 71.
 66 See e.  g., M.  E. Watanabe, ‘The Nagoya Protocol:  The Conundrum of Defining Digital 
Sequence Information’ 69(6) BioSciences (2019) 480; T.  E. Berry, B.  J. Saunders, M.  L. 
Coghan, M. Stat, S. Jarman, A. J. Richardson et al., ‘Marine environmental DNA monitor-
ing reveals seasonal patterns in biodiversity and identifies ecosystem responses to anom-
alous climatic events’ 15(2) PLoS Genet (2019) e 1007943.
 67 Rabone, above n. 64.
 68 See website https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ accessed 2 November 2019.
 69 See Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, ‘Mesobot’ https:// www.whoi.edu/ what- 
we- do/ explore/ underwater- vehicles/ auvs/ mesobot/ accessed 2 November 2019, Oxford 















information for scientists to then replicate dna sequences in the laboratory 
and use them as the base for further research and commercial development, 
without the need for the physical sample at all. This process would also involve 
additional significant work, as this in situ analysis would only give unassem-
bled sequence data. The data needs to be assembled to a high degree of accu-
racy to begin the process of annotation to ascribe function to genes and this 
may require laboratory work and access to other annotated gene sequences.
Looking forward, it is likely that there will be more in situ sequencing 
through the advent of next generation sequencing technologies and practic-
es. The use of these technologies in situ, and their implications, will need to 
be considered as part of the environmental impact assessment framework be-
ing developed elsewhere in the ilbi.70 Part of this will be the fact that these 
technologies could remove the need for raw materials to be collected, which 
would in turn reduce the scale of the environmental impact and ecosystem im-
pact.71 Accordingly, the ilbi should cover data representing mgr samples from 
abnj, as well as the physical sample.72 If the ilbi does not, then the careful 
balances sought to be struck in it regarding benefit sharing will not apply to all 
mgr activity.73 Some support for the inclusion of data has been put forward 
at the igc s74 and the issue is included as a possibility in the June 2019 draft 
ilbi, with definitions of mgr as “in silico”, “[digital] [genetic] sequence data 
and [and information]”.75 Engaging with digital information in the ilbi would 
also align with the view that mgr should be seen as natural information (even 
when in its physical form). This is because genes contain information about 
heredity and future possibilities for functionality (even though as noted de-
tailed work is needed to move from this to important research and commercial 
 70 See June 2019 draft ilbi n29, arts. 22– 41.
 71 K. D. Prathapan, R. Pethiyagoda, K. S. Bawa, P. H. Raven, P. D. Rajan et al., Divakaran 
et  al., ‘When the cure kills  – CBD limits biodiversity research:  national laws earning 
biopiracy squelch taxonomy studies’ 360 6395 Science Mag Policy Forum (2018) 1405 
(Prathapan).
 72 See also C.  Lawson and M.  Rourke, ‘Open Access DNA, RNA and Amino Acid 
Sequences: The Consequences and Solutions for the International Regulation of Access 
and Benefit Sharing’ 24 Journal of Law and Medicine (2016) 96 (Lawson and Rourke) 11.
 73 See Thambisetty, above n. 46.
 74 See e.g., Earth News Bulletin 25.3.19 reporting on igc 2: Caricom and Pacific Small Island 
Development States support the inclusion of resources, in situ, ex situ, in silio, digital 
sequence data and deriv, Turkey supports inclusion of digital sequence data.
 75 June 2019 draft ilbi n29, arts 8 (2)(b) regarding application, 10(4) regarding access, 11(3)
(a) and (b) regarding fair and equitable sharing of monetary and non monetary benefit, 
13(3)(a) regarding monitoring, 42(c) (iii) regarding the objectives of capacity building and 
technology transfer and art 51(3)(c) regarding the clearing house. There is also the option 














development), and there are calls for equal protection of the two forms of 
information.76
Existing benefit sharing regimes, notably Nagoya, focus on physical genetic 
resources, so the proposal made here raises the important issue of having dual 
regimes. The question of digital sequence information is, however, currently 
being discussed in multiple forums including at the Convention on Biological 
Diversity negotiations,77 although uncertainty remains as to what definition 
and approaches will be chosen. For now, the discussion of new technology for 
genetic sequencing in situ raises another issue – the approaches taken to ip 
rights and to trade secrets.
6 The Approach to ip and Trade Secrets
6.1 Context
Increased technological development can bring with it more private- sector 
involvement. This can bring with it greater desire for private control of the re-
sults of research. This may seem unusual or heretical to scientists accustomed 
to norms (developed particularly in the context of human genome sequenc-
ing) of sharing data before and after publication.78 Limiting access is, however, 
quite consistent with the values of property, immediate reward, and control, 
which are familiar to the commercial sector. This sector was also noted to have 
a role in developing natural products to address societal needs. Further, in-
volving the commercial sector in the pipeline to develop new products (often 
termed bioprospecting) has led to the increased wider understanding of global 
 76 Muller, above n. 20 at 16, 18, 20– 1, 23.
 77 cbd, ‘Digital sequence information on genetic resources’ https:// www.cbd.int/ dsi- gr/ 
2017– 2018/ and Commission for Plant Genetic Resources For Food and Agriculture, 
‘Digital Sequence Information’ http:// www.fao.org/ cgrfa/ topics/ digital- sequence- 
information/ en/ ; who, ‘Approach to Seasonal Influenza and Genetic Sequence Data 
under the pip Framework’, https:// www.who.int/ influenza/ pip/ 8bAnalysis_ Draft1_ 
17Sep2018_ EN_ hyperlinks.pdf?ua=1. See also study 1 science- based fact finding study on 
the content and scope of digital sequence information prepared pursuant to Conference 
of Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity Decision 14/ 20 https:// www.cbd.int/ 
dsi- gr/ 2019– 2020/ studies/ #tab=1 accessed 30 November 2019.
 78 Bermuda Principles 1996 and Report from Wellcome Trust meeting, ‘Sharing data from 
large- scale Biological Projects: A System of Tripartite Responsibility’ 2003 https:// www.
genome.gov/ Pages/ Research/ WellcomeReport0303.pdf accessed 2 November 2019. 
Lawson and Rourke, above n.  72, 108. See also reflections of this in oecd Guidelines 
for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions 2005 http:// www.oecd.org/ sti/ emerging- tech/ 










biodiversity as a whole.79 This has been invaluable as funding for surveying 
biodiversity in itself is often very hard to obtain.
But even with this private- sector interest, it would be unwise to move to 
the other extreme and create an environment in which the commercial sector 
has too much power. This could have an overly negative impact on other sci-
entific research, and on the benefits this other work could deliver80 and which 
could then be shared.81 Concern as the exercise and impact of private power 
has been seen in relation to human genes in the context of cloning (notably 
regarding the brca gene and expressed sequence tags),82 synthetic biology83 
and, at a more downstream level, access to essential medicines.84
6.2 Relevant Rights
ip rights (notable ones being patents, copyright and trade marks) are held by 
private entities, pursuant to national legislation, in the context of an interna-
tional treaty (trips, 1994 under the wto) which requires that wto members 
have a system of ip rights.85 trips also requires protection of confidential 
 79 See e.g., R. J. Quinn, P. de Almedia Leone, G. Guymer and J.N.A. Hooper, ‘Australian bio-
diversity via its plants and marine organisms. A high- throughput screening approach to 
drug discovery’ 74(4) Pure Appl. Chem. 2002, 519– 526; NatureBank at Griffith University 
https:// www.griffith.edu.au/ institute- drug- discovery/ unique- resources/ naturebank 
accessed 2 November 2019.
 80 Prathapan, above n. 71, 1406.
 81 C. Salpin and V. Germani, ‘Patenting of research results relating to genetic resources from 
areas beyond national jurisdiction: The crossroads of the law of the sea and intellectual 
property law’ 16(1) Review of European community and international environmental law 
(2007) 12– 23 (Salpin and Germani), 16.
 82 G. Matthijs and G- J B. Van Ommen, ‘Gene patents: from discovery to invention. A genet-
icist’s views’ 311 (Matthijs and Van Ommen) and G. Van Overwalle, ‘Of thickets, blocks 
and gaps’ (Overvalle Thickets) 383, 453 both in G. Van Overwalle (ed.) Gene Patents and 
Collaborative Licensing Models:  Patent Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and 
Liability Regimes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009)  (Overwalle); Nicola 
Lucchi, The Impact of Science and Technology on the Rights of the Individual (New York, 
Springer, 2016) (Lucchi) 99– 103, 114– 134, 141– 162.
 83 A. MacLennan, Regulation of Synethic Biology: BioBricks, BioPunks and BioEntrepreneurs 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2018), 251 et seq.
 84 H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO. The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines 
(New  York, Oxford University Press, 2007)   chapters  1 and 4; F.  Abbott, ‘Managing the 
Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines’ 393; and H. Klug, 
‘Comment Access to Essential Medicines – Promoting Human Rights over Free Trade and 
Intellectual Property Claims’ 481 in K. E. Maskus and J. H. Reichman (eds.) International 
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 85 Annex ic of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) 1867 

















information86 and this is delivered in national laws as a mix of legislation and 
case law.87 ip and trade secrets confer private power (with respect to ip rights 
for a limited period) over the results of innovation and creativity and over in-
formation if criteria are met for them to exist. In addition to the mandatory 
legal bases just mentioned, there are longstanding legal, economic and societal 
views in support of ip and trade secrets. Broadly, and reflecting some of the 
points made so far in this chapter, these are that ip rights and trade secrets 
encourage and reward innovation, and investment in it, to develop products 
for the benefit of all – and in the case of ip rights ensure disclosure of it, such 
that ultimately, there can be wider and unrestricted use of the innovation.88 So 
legally, and from an incentive perspective, the existence of ip rights and trade 
secrets, and their power, should not be ignored.
States can and do, however, impose some limits on the power held by ip 
owners and on controllers of secret information. The key issue here is the ex-
tent to which the ilbi can and should impose obligations on states to do this 
to ensure that benefit sharing can come about. ip has long been seen as poten-
tially having some place in the abnj mgr process. In 2007 the UN Secretary- 
General’s report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea engaged with the work of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (wipo) on genetic resources re-
garding access and benefit sharing, disclosure of the origin of genetic resources 
and the links between this and the patent examination process to establish 
novelty – which is a necessary requirement for a patent to be granted – and 
also on the sharing of benefit. ip rights were included in the terms of the Work-
ing Group and information on ip was put before it.89 The “President’s Aid to 
 86 trips, above n. 85, art. 39.
 87 E.g., in England and Wales/ EU Coco v AN Clark [1968] fsr 415, EU Directive 2016/ 943/ 
EU on the protection of indisclosed know know and business information OJ L 157/ 1 16 
June 2016.
 88 Lucchi, above n. 82, 10; Heafey, above n.  16, 502; F M Scherer, ‘The Innovation Lottery’ 
in R. C. Dreyfuss, D.L. Zimmerman and H First Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property. Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (eds.) (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001); K. E. Maskus, ‘The Economics of Global Intellectual Property and Economic 
Development:  A Survey’ in P.  Yu (ed.) Intellectual Property and Information Wealth 
(Westport, Praeger, 2006); C. Greenhalgh and M. Rogers, Innovation, Intellectual Property 
and Economic Growth (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010); Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, ‘Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy’ (2002) http:// www.iprcommission.org/ accessed 30 October 2019.
 89 C. Chiarolla, ‘Intellectual Property Rights Issues’ Paper 6, IUCN Information Papers for 
Intersessional Workshop on Marine Genetic Resources 2– 3 May 2013 (Chiarolla iucn), 37 https:// 
www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ biodiversityworkinggroup/ documents/ IUCN%20Information%20











Discussions” for IGC1 asks whether the relationship between the ilbi and ip 
should be set out and if so how;90 the “President’s Aid to Negotiations” for 
1GC291 and the June 2019 ilbi draft for igc include several options on ip, al-
though they are restricted to patents92 and have a focus on disclosure of origin.
This contribution will not address this issue further, however it raises an im-
portant perspective. There has been some reluctance at the igc to engage with 
patents and disclosure of origin on the basis that patents were dealt with in 
other international fora.93 Yet from the practical side, it has been clear in wipo 
documents (including a 2019 draft from the chair) that it is not proposed that 
the outcomes will engage with resources from beyond national jurisdiction94 
and attempts to discuss the issue within trips have stalled.95 There are also 
more ip issues which should be raised in the ilbi, and failing to engage with 
them could lead to outcomes which are explicitly or implicitly more support-
ive of private sector control of mgr.96 Further, engaging with ip in the ilbi 
would be consistent with an established body of scholarship and policy mak-
ing which seeks to avoid fragmentation of legal regimes.97 Indeed, the draft 
 90 pad A/ conf.232/ 2018/ 3 25 June 2018 3.2.3.
 91 pan 3 December 2018 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 1* 3.2.3 and iucn Commentary on June 2019 
draft ilbi https:// www.iucn.org/ sites/ dev/ files/ iucn_ comments_ on_ bbnj_ draft_ text_ - _ 
august_ 2019.pdf accessed 2 November 2019 (iucn Commentary) p. 18, 19.
 92 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 12.2, 12.3, 12.4 and iucn Commentary, above n. 91, 
p. 19 regarding risks of the ilbi being inconsistent with trips regarding restrictions on 
approval of the grant of ip rights, in igc 3 para 12.4 (c).
 93 See e.g., Earth News Bulletin 25.3.19 from igc 2 Caricom and psids want a sui generis 
approach to ip; G77/ China, African Group, Iran, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Turkey, png, Sri Lanka and Cuba want ip included in the ilbi; Singapore want ip to be 
addressed in in existing mechanisms at wipo and wto; the EU, Canada, US, Switzerland, 
Norway, the Holy See, Japan, Korea, the Russian Federation, and Australia do not support 
ip rights being in the ilbi.
 94 wipo/ grtkf/ ic/ 28/ 4 (2014), art. 4.1(e); wipo/ grtkf/ ic/ 30/ 4 2016, art 3.1(e); wipo/ 
grtkf/ ic/ 34/ 4 2017, art. 4(1)(e); draft report prepared by Chair of wipo igc on ipgrtkf 
30 April 2019.
 95 See wto review of art 27.3 (b)  https:// www.wto.org/ english/ tratop_ e/ trips_ e/ art27_ 
3b_ e.htm accessed 22 November 2019 and proposals for new article 29bis tn/ C/ W/ 59 
of 2011. See also valuable discussion in C. Chiarolla, ‘Intellectual Property from a Global 
Environmental Law Perspective: Key lessons from the implementation of patent disclosure 
requirements for genetic resources and traditional knowledge’ Benelex Working Paper No 
22 (Chiarolla Benelex) exploring whether requiring action is introducing another substan-
tive requirement which is not clearly mandated under trips, or or whether it is more of a 
procedural point therefore raising questions for the Patent Co- operation Treaty.
 96 Salpin and Germani, above n. 81, 12– 3.
 97 L. R.  Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting:  The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Law Making’ 29 Yale Journal of International Law 


















ilbi already includes, as noted, a proposed engagement with climate change – 
which has its own regime.98 So the fact that an issue could be addressed in 
other regimes should not mean that it should not be considered in the ilbi. 
From this starting point, the next section will explore other means by which 
ip rights could impose obstacles to benefit sharing; will identify opportunities 
to resolve this from within ip law; and will suggest how these points could 
be addressed within ilbi. These proposals will be consistent with, and also 
move beyond the suggested, less specific, wording in the draft ilbi, so that it 
is to be applied in a manner which respects the competences of relevant legal 
instruments and does not undermine them,99 and so that it promotes coher-
ence with those instruments, providing they are supportive of and do not run 
counter to the objective of unclos and the ilbi.100
6.3 Patents
Firstly, there is an issue about the extent to which patents could be and are 
being granted over subject matter which is too close to mgr in its original form 
rather than, as is inherent in Mare Geneticum, mgr being the subject of inno-
vation and transformed. Such patents would mean that there was private con-
trol over a fundamental natural resource from the very start. Others could then 
only use this with the consent of the patent owner, and this could reduce the 
innovation of these others in developing new commercial products and engag-
ing in research.101 There is uncertainty about present practices in this respect. 
Analysis of patents identifies references to mgr102 with examples involving 
Kinds of Pluralism: Collision of Transnational Regimes in the Double Fragmentation of 
World Society’ in M. A. Young (ed.) Regime Interaction in International Law: facing frag-
mentation (Cambridge, Cambride University Press, 2012) 24, 41 with relevant challenges 
identified in conflicts between traditional approaches to confidentiality of indigenous 
groups and bringing about free use of information. For benefit sharing and farmers’ rights 
outside the abnj, see C. Benelex, above n. 95, section 6 and Adebola, above n. 50, 112.
 98 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 1771 unts p. 107, which 
arose from the Earth Summit as did the Convention on Biological Diversity.
 99 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 4(3) first part.
 100 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 4(3) second part.
 101 Chiarolla iucn, above n. 89, 40; Chiarolla, above n. 44, 178– 9; Heafy, above n.16, 520– 1.
 102 Chiarolla, above n. 44, 177; P. Oldham, ‘WIPO Patent Landscape report Marine Genetic 
Resources’ (2019) https:// www.wipo.int/ edocs/ pubdocs/ en/ wipo_ pub_ 947_ 6.pdf 
accessed 2 November 2019 looking beyond patents to publications, and funding sources 
and species, though a data mining approach, exploring 391,191 scientific publications and 
461,380 patents, data from Global Biodiversity Information Facility; R Blasiak, J- B. Jouffray, 
C.C.C. Wabnitz, E. Sunstrom and H. Osterblom et al., ‘Corporate Control and global gover-














Green Fluorescent Protein,103 red algae104 and sea cucumbers.105 The mere ex-
istence of such patents does not mean, however, that the right to control covers 
the mgr itself. There is a need for detailed analysis of the substance of patents, 
moving beyond data mining and empirical reviews of the landscape, to estab-
lish the extent to which this is so. Patents over raw mgr should not in theory 
exist, as patents must be new and inventive, without excluding patents capa-
ble of industrial application.106 The June 2019 ilbi draft included the valuable 
proposal that there shall be no patenting except when the mgr modified by 
human intervention results in a product capable of industrial application.107
This contribution develops this point in a new direction: in addition to clar-
ifying when patents could be obtained, the ilbi could limit the power con-
ferred by states. trips provides that states can impose such restrictions on 
the rights of the patent owner, as long as they are limited, do not unreason-
ably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the 
legitimate interest of others (“the three step test”).108 Given this, and the re-
search issue identified above, the ilbi could provide that states should provide 
in their national laws that research must be able to be continued in relation to 
an mgr innovation which is the subject of a patent. It is also suggested that the 
ilbi should provide that states are to impose this limit even if research is done for 
commercial purposes or by a commercial entity. This is because there is diver-
sity across national laws regarding the scope of research exceptions regarding 
commercial activity.109 The approach would also remove uncertainties about 
 103 Jellyfish green fluorescent protein expression in plants WO199602765A1 (1996); B 
Verberue, ‘Patent pooling for gene- based diagnostic testing’ in Overwalle, above n. 82, 18.
 104 Breeding method of high- temperature- resistant stichopus japonicus strain (2016  – 
CN106259067A; CN106259067B – China), which has led to product development by lbd 
Marine Technology, ‘About Agar’ http:// en.libangda.com/ products- and- service/ about- 
agar/ about- agar#bit_ olwy3 accessed 2 November 2019.
 105 Preparation method of marine bacteria- derived kappa- carrageenase gene and recombi-
nase (2016 – CN105950640A; CN105950640B – China) which has led to product devel-
opment, see X. Ru, L. Zhang, ‘Development strategies for the sea cucumber industry in 
China’ 37(1) Journal of Oceanology and Liminology 2019 300- 312.
 106 trips, art. 27(1); Chiarolla iucn, above n. 89, 37– 8.
 107 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 12.3 first sentence.
 108 trips, art. 30.
 109 Monsanto v Stauffer [1985] rpc 515 and Auchinloss v Agricultural & Veterinary Supplies 
[1997] rpc 649 compare German approach Clinical Trials II [1997] njw 3092; see analysis 
in F. Humphries, ‘Shellfish patents kill experimentation: defences for sharing patented 
aquatic general materials in aquaculture’ 37(4) European Intellectual Property Review 














what activities should properly be viewed as commercial. Non commercial ac-
tivity could end up as commercial, in the immediate or longer term;110 those 
who may traditionally be perceived as non commercial actors (say those from 
universities) may be encouraged by their universities or may simply choose to 
set up their own companies to develop products while also seeking collabora-
tion and community.111
trips also provides that states can require sharing of patented innovation 
through a compulsory licence to respond to national emergencies.112 Given the 
discussion so far regarding the place of mgr- related innovation in responding 
to climate change, the ilbi should provide that states must include in their na-
tional laws compulsory licensing of patents with respect to energy transitions or 
ecologically sustainable products. trips requires, however, that this licensing 
is in return for the payment of adequate remuneration.113 Given the complex 
arguments regarding the positive (as well as problematic arguments) regard-
ing the power of ip rights and the need for investment, it is unlikely that in the 
present context this could mean zero. Adequate does not, however, mean the 
same as a full commercial market rate.
The next section will explore the place of other ip and trade secrets in ben-
efit sharing with respect to mgr. This issue is not recognised, or at least not di-
rectly, in igc debate and in official documents generated so far. It is suggested 
that this should be addressed and this point has been made in contributions 
by the authors to the commentary of the International Union on the Conser-
vation of Nature on the June 2019 draft ilbi.114
6.4 Database, Copyright and Trade Secret: Repositories
6.4.1 Problem
This wider ip inclusion argument will be developed here in the context of 
databases and repositories, which were explored above, particularly in the 
context of digital sequences. At present, dna sequence data can be deposited 
at one of 3 global databases – ncbi115 (in the United States, discussed above) 
under the term GenBank, European Bioinformatics Institute (embl  – ebi, 
 110 Correa, above n. 8, 13– 14.
 111 Correa, above n. 8, 15– 6.
 112 trips art. 31, in particular (b). This can also be argued to be necessary when there is 
no alternative e.g., Brigit Verberue, ‘Patent pooling for gene- based diagnostic testing’ in 
Overwalle n. 82, 17, 18, exploring Green Fluorescent Protein (see also n. 103) and also inno-
vation in respect of rice and Huntingdon’s disease.
 113 trips, art. 31(h).
 114 iucn Commentary, above n. 91, p 19.
















Europe)116 and ddbj (Japan).117 Together, these form the International Nucle-
otide Sequence Database Collaboration (insdc) and they share all dna se-
quence data on a daily basis. Each has different tools to interpret and process 
the data, meaning that data downstream from the dna sequence will differ in 
each one of these in terms of format, content and processing. A pragmatic out-
come regarding the future of repositories would be for the existing arrangements 
for collecting and sharing dna to continue and develop, with the ilbi requiring 
an overall metadatabase. Within this, copyright118 (and also related rights, such 
as the database rights which exist in the EU)119 and trade secrets120 can, as will 
be seen, be relevant to the manner of operation of these and other databases 
and to the level of benefit sharing which can occur.
Copyright, database rights and trade secrets do not require a registration 
process to exist. For copyright to exist, there must be a work. An individual 
piece of data would not be enough,121 but there could be copyright in a report 
of a cruise or planned cruise with details of location and findings, as this would 
count as a literary work.122 Further, depending on national laws, copyright 
could exist with respect to a collection of smaller pieces of information which 
is original in the sense of not copied and reflecting skill, labour and judgment 
in its collection;123 in the EU member states a different test now applies, with 
the need for it to result from some intellectual creativity.124 For database rights 
to exist for a set of information, including a collection of dna, there must be 
substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting existing informa-
tion.125 There will be a relevant trade secret if information is not in the public 
 116 See https:// www.ebi.ac.uk/ accessed 2 November 2019.
 117 See https:// www.ddbj.nig.ac.jp/ index- e.html accessed 2 November 2019.
 118 For a wider introduction to copyright, see A  Brown, S Kheria, J Cornwell, M Iljadica, 
Contemporary Intellectual Property:  Law and Policy (5 ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2019) (Brown), 31– 203, 219– 231.
 119 For a wider introduction to database rights, see Brown, above n. 118, 238– 251; ec Directive 
96/ 9/ ec on the legal protection of databases O.J. L 77 11 March 1996 20- 28 (Database 
Directive).
 120 For a wider introduction to trade secrets, see Brown, above n. 118, 697– 725.
 121 Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance [1982] Ch 119 – no copyright in the word “Exxon”.
 122 trips, art. 9 encompassing Berne Convention arts. 1 and 2.
 123 For the traditional position in the UK, see Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 wlr 273, 
Interlego AG v Tyco Industries [1989] ac 217 compare US decision Feist Publications v Rural 
Telephone Service Co 499 US 340 finding no copyright in alphabetical listng of names.
 124 Infopaq International A/ S v Danske Dagblades Forening C- 5/ 08 [2009] ecdr 16.
 125 Database Directive, art. 7; British Horseracing Board v William Hill Organization Ltd Case 




















domain, has value because it is secret and reasonable steps have been taken to 
make sure it is secret.126
Depending on the methods by which information is provided and stored 
on the repositories, the attitudes taken by the information supplier and the 
relevant national law, these three legal bases/ rights could apply to material 
which the ilbi may state is to be in public databases or repositories.127 Finally, 
copyright will also exist128 (and indeed in some cases software patents may be 
granted)129 over the software which actually operates the databases and re-
positories. In terms of impact, copyright confers the possibility of private con-
trol of the reproduction of the work containing the information;130 database 
rights control the extraction or re- utilisation of whole or substantial parts of 
contents of the database;131 trade secrets control the use of the information it-
self;132 and copyright and patents over the database could control the ongoing 
method of operation. These rights could lead, then, to refusals to supply the in-
formation in the first place, to requests that there will be no onward disclosure 
without the making of a payment, or that the database can only continue with 
the payment of a fee.133
There are suggestions that this is already a reality, with arguments regard-
ing the Convention on Biological Diversity that key information is not being 
shared fully as it is the subject of confidentiality claims and that it is therefore 
difficult to assess whether fair and equitable benefit sharing is being deliv-
ered.134 Further, reflection on some existing databases and repositories with 
respect to dna confirms that ip related issues could arise.135 Careful analy-
sis of existing genetic resources databases has explored arrangements which 
 126 trips, art 39(2); Coco v Clark, above n. 87; Trade Secrets Directive, art 2(1).
 127 Chiarolla, iucn, above n. 89, 42; Chiarolla, above n. 44, 184; Lawson and Rourke, above 
n. 72,116.
 128 trips, art 10.
 129 Lawson and Rourke, above n. 72,116. For a wider introduction to this complex issue and 
the different approaches taken across countries, see Brown, above n. 118, 435- 465 and in 
particular Re Bilski 545 F 3d 943 and Alice Corporation v CLS Bank International 572 US 208; 
Symbian v Comptroller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks [2008] ewca Civ 1066; 
G03/ 93 Programs for Computers [2010] epor 36.
 130 See e.g., UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1998, s16(1)- (3).
 131 See e.g., UK Copyright and Rights in Database Regulations 1997 No. 3032 (implementing 
the Database Directive) 12(1).
 132 Coco v Clark, above n. 87; Trade Secrets Directive, arts. 3, 4.
 133 Fedder, above n. 47, 119– 120.
 134 Muller, above n. 20, 33, 39- 41 67.






















database operators have chosen to take to ip and trade secrets136 and has 
identified strong themes of sharing across publicly funded databases. Yet in 
this landscape there is also a place for ip. The terms and conditions of nc-
bi’s GenBank provide that material which is uploaded to GenBank may be the 
subject of ip rights although no restrictions are imposed on further use of in-
formation which is uploaded.137 The combined insdc has a policy of free and 
unrestricted access to the records in their databases.138 Looking more widely, 
the BioBricks Initiative involves standard interchangeable dna parts that have 
defined functions and that can be used in the construction of synthetic biology 
systems. Its goal is for “all genes and vectors that are synthesized and distribut-
ed through the 10k genes project [to] be solidly in the public domain and free 
of third- party rights”.139 Further, BioBricks makes genes available free of charge 
and checks that they are not the subject of sequence- specific patent claims.140 
Yet BioBricks’ terms and conditions provide that if ip rights exist then they are 
to be respected and that if submissions to it are the subject of ip rights, then 
the details of this are to be provided.141
The above discussion reveals some wide embracing of sharing but also 
alongside it instances of models with an embedded respect for ip rights. Fur-
ther, the sharing approach – which is so positive for science – cannot be relied 
upon to continue. Funding arrangements may come to an end,142 government 
 136 C. Lawson, H. Burton and F. Humphries, ‘The important place of information in the evolv-
ing legal and policy framework for the conservation and sustainable use of the world’s 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’ eipr 2018 40(4), 243– 259, 247, 249– 50, 
251, 253, 255– 6 and table 1; Lawson and Rourke, above n. 72, 100– 2, 104, 111– 2; see also study 
3 Combined Study on Digital Sequence Information in Public And Private Databases and 
Traceability prepared pursuant to Conference of Parties of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity Decision 14/ 20 exploring some existing national requirements CBD/ DSI/ 
AHTEG/ 2020/ 1/ 4 31 January 2020.
 137 See webpage ‘GenBank submission types’ https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ genbank/ sub-
mit_ types/ accessed 3 November 2019.
 138 insd ‘Collaboration Policy’ http:// www.insdc.org/ policy.html accessed 3 November 2019 
rules 1– 3.
 139 K. Kendall, S.  Pownall, L.  Kahl, ‘Bionet 10k Genes Project Documentation v1.0’ https:// 
www.reddit.com/ r/ bionet/ comments/ 7bo7gz/ bionet_ 10k_ genes_ project_ documenta-
tion_ v10/ accessed 3 November 2019.
 140 BioBricks Foundation, ‘The Free Genes Project’ https:// biobricks.org/ freegenes/ accessed 
3 November 2019.
 141 Ibid., ‘Explanation’ 1 bullet 3, ‘Submission’ 1 bullet 2.
 142 See e.g., the journey of the Arabidopsis Information Resource  – funded by National 
Science Foundation, then the core staff group set up Phoenix Bioinformatics (not for 
profit) to subscription offering with different levels of access, all made available after 
one year https:// www.arabidopsis.org/ . For an example of a subscription database, see 
















policy may change regarding support of service, or a private provider may pro-
vide software to the database and then choose to take a new approach.
6.4.2 Solution
In the light of this, the ilbi should focus on the sharing and disclosure re-
quirement of the suggested metarepository.143 There has been some engage-
ment with the issue, albeit without a focus on the underpinning legal issues 
just discussed. Calls have been made for databases to be open144 and there are 
references in the June 2019 draft145 for “a clearing house mechanism with a web 
based platform to provide open access to mgr”.146 The draft ilbi also suggests, 
however, that due regard is to be had to the confidentiality of information be-
ing provided to the platform.147
Building on the discussion above, this suggests that information provided 
could be incomplete. Further, there are a variety of positions regarding the 
meaning of “open access”.148 To a lawyer the word may suggest immediately 
available, for no fee – just as seen (up to a point) in relation to BioBricks. This 
approach to open access is used in the context of licensing models149 which 
ip owners have chosen to embrace like cambia Bios,150 Creative Commons151 
and the Eco- Patent Commons (which is now closed).152 These all provide spe-
cific licensing terms or conditions of use (for example, approaches taken to 
commercial use or acknowledgement) and have no licence fee. These frame-
works operate on a voluntary level, however, so in this sense they do not deliver 
a base for a mandatory ilbi approach. It should also be borne in mind that 
 143 See discussion on this issue in Chiarolla, iucn, above n.  89, 41– 2, 43; Chiarolla, above 
n. 44, 181– 3.
 144 Fedder, above n. 47,122– 176; Rabone, above n. 64.
 145 June 2019 draft ilbi n29, art. 51, 51.2, 51.7.
 146 See previous discussion in Leary, above n. 30, 21– 29 and June 2019 draft ilbi n. 29, art. 
11.3 (b).
 147 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 51.7 and iucn Commentary, above n. 91, p 60.
 148 See iucn Commentary, above n. 91, pp. 17, 59.
 149 E. van Zimmeren, ‘Clearinghouse mechanisms in genetic diagnosis’ in Overwalle, above 
n. 82, 71– 9.
 150 See http:// www.copyleftlicense.com/ licenses/ cambia- plant- molecular- enabling- 
technology- bios- license- version- 15/ view.php accessed 3 November 2019; N.  Berthels, 
‘Case 8. cambia’s Biological Open Source Initiative (BiOS)’ in Overwalle, above n. 82.
 151 See https:// creativecommons.org accessed 3 November 2019.
 152 See cef Spotlight, ‘Welcome to the Eco- Patent Commons’ http:// www.corporateecofo-
rum.com/ welcome- to- the- eco- patent- commons/ accessed 29 October 2019. Note debate 
about the value of the patent made available – B. H. Hall and C. Helmers, ‘Innovation 
and diffusion of clean/ green technology:  Can patent commons help?’ 6(1) Journal of 






















“open access” can have a different meaning for scientists. The focus there is 
not on ip and payment, but on ensuring that the database provides the neces-
sary information for scientists and interoperability with other databases, pub-
lications and networks.153 Finally, the term “open access” can have a cultural 
meaning in terms of delivering fairness, equity and community sharing. This 
can be seen in the floss (Free Libre and Open Source) Movement, which is 
deeply opposed to property rights and control.154
Debate, and ultimately clarification, is therefore needed on this point in the 
ilbi. If one wished to require fee- free access, ip and trade secrets issues could 
arise.155 This is because requiring that the control conferred by ip rights and 
trade secrets could not be relied upon, could move beyond the relevant flexi-
bilities within trips.156 trips has no national emergency provision regarding 
copyright and trade secrets. The proposal made above regarding patents could 
be adapted to cover patents over relevant software used by international metare-
positories. A version of the three- step test applies, however, to copyright.157 It 
could be argued again that fee- free access158 was too much of an interference 
with the power of the right and could be a disincentive for the development 
of valuable and needed software. A  solution could be to require mandatory 
sharing with a reasonable payment to be made to the owner of the copyright 
or database right.159 This could also build on arguments that ip rights can be 
seen not as a right to exclude but as a right to payment,160 or as a right to 
distribute and bring about uses of technology.161 To ensure that the payment 
can be made while also maximising the needs of benefit sharing and science, 
 153 Rabone, above n. 64.
 154 See gnu Operating System at https:// www.gnu.org/ philosophy/ floss- and- foss.en.html 
accessed 3 November 2019. A. S. Taubman, ‘Several kinds of ‘should’’ (Taubman) 223 in 
Overwalle, above n. 82.
 155 These issues were raised in iucn Commentary in the context of clearing houses and 
check points, above n. 91, p. 20.
 156 Building on points made in Chiarolla, above n. 44, 175– 8.
 157 See above n. 106, 108, 112– 3 122; trips, art 9, encompassing Berne Convention, art 9(2).
 158 For other possibilities, see E. van Zimmeren, ‘Clearinghouse mechanisms in genetic diag-
nosis’ in Overwalle, above n. 82, 63, 68; Chiarolla, above n. 44, 190– 1.
 159 See also S. Dusollier, ‘The commons as a reverse intellectual property’ in H. Howe and 
J. Griffiths (eds.) Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) (Howe and Griffiths) 265– 6 267, 268 seeing the role of exceptions 
to copyright as creating a functional public domain.
 160 D. L.  Burk, ‘Critical analysis:  property rules, liability rules and molecular futures. 
Bargaining in the shadow of the cathedral’ in Overwalle, above n. 82.
 161 Taubman, above n. 154, at 225, 226– 7, 233, 239; D. Lametti, ‘The concept of the anticom-




















the ilbi could provide that these payments received could be passed on by the 
ip owner to the biodiversity fund to enhance further activity. For those unable 
to pay, the fund could make the payments to the ip owner. This would also be 
consistent with arguments for a more stewardship approach to be taken to 
ip.. It has been argued that the “patent owner- as- steward is not asked to ‘con-
serve’ the subject matter of his property in the same way as the landowner 
is required to conserve the natural world under this model, but there is no 
reason why they should not be expected to take environmental concerns into 
account in exploiting the invention”.162 The relevant environmental concerns 
here would be enabling the sharing of information about mgr and the en-
abling of further research which could, inter alia, contribute to ecologically 
sustainable development.
Trade secrets remain. trips does not engage with defences to trade secrets. 
National laws do have established defences, notably in the United Kingdom, 
that use is in the public interest,163 and this is reflected to an extent in the 
EU Trade Secrets Directive.164 The inherent nature of trade secrets makes it a 
challenge, however, to construct a forward looking regime – defences can op-
erate only in the context of a leak of information. The public interest defences 
could be a base for the ilbi requiring proactively that details are shared of 
information obtained on research cruises, as this would in turn enable further 
scientific research by others. This would also be consistent with obligations 
under unclos for states to take steps to actively promote the transfer of in-
formation and knowledge resulting from marine scientific research.165 The 
issue remains, however, of the level of interference with the incentive to be in-
volved in marine biodiversity research, particularly given the more measured 
suggestions seen to be needed regarding ip rights. The binary nature of trade 
secrets makes it difficult to introduce a solution based on exceptions to the 
right. It is suggested, then, that a period of secrecy can continue for a period 
(say 6– 12 months), similar to the existing Mare Geneticum proposal in respect 
of exclusivity, and then the information must be made available to all. If there 
is disclosure of information within this initial period, there should be a defence 
if information is used to contribute to bringing about ecologically sustainable 
practices.
 162 H. R. Howe, ‘Property, sustainability and patent law’ in Howe and Griffiths, above n. 159, 
299 (quote), 298– 300; Blasiak, above n. 15.
 163 Attorney General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 ac 109 involving diaries of a member of security 
services.
 164 Trade Secrets Directive, art. 5.











The draft ilbi of June 2019 shows some willingness to engage with ip as it has 
an ip clause, albeit with a focus on patents.166 The more minimalist approach 
also remains (as also seen in the Aid prepared for IGC2),167 with the draft having 
suggested clauses providing that implementation of the ilbi is to be in a manner 
consistent with the wipo and the wto, or ensuring that ip rights are supportive 
of and do not run counter to the ibli’ s objectives.168 There is also the prospect 
of the parties choosing not to have an ip provision in the ilbi. Such an approach 
would bring about the fear expressed by some igc delegates that if ip and mgr 
is not addressed in the ilbi, it may not be addressed anywhere.169 The position 
discussed at wipo suggests that this may be so in respect of disclosure of origin. 
ip appears, however, to be moving more into the mainstream. At IGC3 in August 
2019, there was a confidential informal meeting on the place of ip170 and there 
were a growing number of ip experts,171 as well as a side event co- ordinated by the 
authors exploring the possible place of ip.172
The next section moves along the development and benefit sharing pipeline 
and evaluates how the use of mgr could be traced through ip and elsewhere.
7 Tracing
Patents and disclosure of origin are one form of doing this tracing. The fo-
cus here is more on the wider picture. The June 2019 draft ilbi refers to the 
possible assigning of an identifier to mgr collected in situ, ex situ, and dig-
ital sequence information.173 Concerns have been raised that tracing would 
be burdensome and costly and a deterrent to scientific activity.174 This is not 
 166 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art. 12.
 167 pan 3 December 2018 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 1* 3.2.3 Options ii and iii.
 168 June 2019 draft ilbi, above n. 29, art 12.1, 12.2 first section. See iucn Commentary, above 
n. 91, p 18– 19, calling for specific engagement with flexibilities under trips.
 169 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 25 (2019) 25 March 2019 “in corridors”, noting intense talk on 
ip and benefit sharing and frustrations about ip shifting from place to place in a “merry- 
go- round” of intellectual property fora.
 170 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 8/ Rev.1.
 171 Personal view of the authors from their own experience.
 172 See Schedule of side events: https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ sites/ www.un.org.bbnj/ files/ bbnj_ 
igc_ iii_ side_ events_ schedule_ final_ eng.pdf accessed 3 November 2019, 22 August event 2, 
orgnaised by authors with iucn and Deep Ocean Stewardship Initiative.
 173 June 2019 draft ilbi n. 29, art. l1.3(3)(a) and see iucn Commentary, above n. 91, p. 20.
 174 See e.g., Earth Negotiations Bulletin 25 (2019) 25 March 2019  – Caricom wanted a non- 






















necessarily so.175 There is existing technology through Global Positioning Sys-
tem data and use of digital object identifiers that would render tracing the 
journey of mgr along the scientific and commercial supply chain as both pos-
sible and best practice. Repositories can – and importantly already do – have 
an important role including in the allocation of identifiers. Further examples, 
in addition to those mentioned above, are ChemSpider176 and metadatabases 
such as Ocean Biographic Information System (obis).177 Each takes care of a 
different subset of the information and interlinks at different levels: they track 
mgr, taxonomy and publications (and also patents which are related to mgr) 
as part of established practice in sample management and scientific practice 
including through the requirements of funders and of journals.178 Looking for-
ward, evolving technology, such as blockchain and distributed ledgers may en-
able information to be traced more readily.179
So, a full technological solution would be possible to track and trace all 
mgr through the biodiscovery pipeline in its different forms. Yet this full solu-
tion is not yet available to all. There would be a need for existing practice to 
be made available globally, in a capacity building technology transfer effort, 
so that common standards for data can be shared fully. Work is ongoing on 
this already through obis through the Darwin Core Archive.180 Nonetheless, 
it is suggested that the ilbi should require a sample unique identifier and set 
out the functionality requirements which are to be delivered from time to time, 
with the method of this to be monitored through a new central body envisaged in 
the ilbi.181 The ilbi should not require the use of any particular product. The 
suggested functionality would not in fact make it possible to know where any 
mgr sample is at any given time or who is using a genetic sequence. The sam-
ple unique identifier would mean, however, that the sample can be to traced 
 175 Morgera, Fair and Equitable, above n. 42, 68– 76; R. Wynberg and S. A. Laird, ‘Fast Science 
and Sluggish Policy:  The Herculean Task of Regulating Biodiscovery’ 26(1) Cell Press 
Review Trends in Biodiscovery (2018) 1– 3; M.A. Bagley and A. K. Rai, ‘The Nagoya Protocol 
and Synthetic Biology Research: A Look at the Potential Impacts’ Virginia Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014- 05 (2014); Chiarolla, Benelex, above n. 95, section 4; 
Lawson and Rourke, above n. 72, 116, 117.
 176 See http:// www.chemspider.com/ accessed 3 November 2019.
 177 See https:// obis.org/ accessed 3 November 2019.
 178 Lawson, Burton and Humphries, above n. 136; Rabone, above n. 64; see Database Study, 
above n. 136.
 179 Lawson, Burton and Humphries, above n.  136, 247– 8, 259; see Database Study, above 
n. 136.
 180 See obis webpage https:// obis.org/ manual/ dataformat/ accessed 3 November 2019.

















back to its origin, enabling payment into the biodiversity fund to be made from 
product sales or patent royalties.
The tracing and payment frameworks could fund the sharing of informa-
tion and opportunities set out in this contribution, in addition to the payments 
which ip owners may choose to make to the biodiversity fund. This is import-
ant given that the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration 
(insdc), has a combined annual global cost of US$ 50– 60 million.182 The fund 
could also, as noted, make payments to ip owners if the research user is not 
able to do so. From this base, the next section will consider the range of the 
benefit sharing obligations.
8 mgr and Benefit Sharing: Toward Future Proofing183
8.1 Timing of Benefit Sharing
As noted at the start of this contribution, Mare Geneticum raised the prospect 
of a period of exclusivity for the initial researcher, and this was seen to have 
been the subject of some criticism. It has been argued at the igc that the ilbi 
should not condone or require a privatising approach to the samples.184 Fur-
ther, a more open approach to sharing would be aligned with an emerging cul-
tural approach in science and in data curation, and that information should be 
fair (findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable).185 Indeed, the propos-
als made above regarding metadatabases and sharing of information seek to 
deliver this later in the process.
It is suggested here that this mandatory sharing should apply from the 
start, with the requirement of exclusivity for the initial researcher set aside. It 
is suggested that making mgr samples (physical and digital) openly accessible 
from the start will be possible in many cases and if so, this should be done. With 
the physical sample, the collection may be limited depending on the amount 
 182 See Database Study, above n. 136.
 183 iucn Closing Statement for igc 3 and see iucn, ‘Future- proofing protections for the high 
seas’(5 September 2019)  https:// www.iucn.org/ news/ marine- and- polar/ 201909/ future- 
proofing- protections- high- seas accessed 3 November 2019.
 184 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 25 (2018)12 September 2018 at igc 1 arguments by psids.
 185 European Marine Biological Research Infrastructure Cluster (embric), ‘ABS principles 
for preserving, accessing, exploring and sharing marine genetic resources’ (April 2019), 
http:// www.embric.eu/ node/ 1759 accessed 3 November 2019; S. Stall et al., ‘Make all sci-
entific data FAIR’ 570 Nature (6 June 2019) 27– 29; H. Pierce et al., ‘Credit data generators 











which the scientists recovered from the research cruise – and from an ecologi-
cal and ecosystem focussed approach, the samples removed should be as limit-
ed as possible. In such cases, it is proposed that the researchers that instigated the 
collection should be given the first chance to work on the limited physical samples. 
Given the points made in Mare Geneticum, it is hoped that this would include 
researchers from developing nations. When there is ample material collected, in 
a manner which means that it could be used in other projects, it is proposed that 
this should be shared between researchers for multiple non- competing research 
uses. This would reflect a practice used by the Norwegian Marine Biobank, 
MarBank.186 This approach would be efficient and equitable for the environ-
ment and for science. It would make the best use of existing materials, reduce 
the need to repeat collection and generate overlapping collections, and enable 
data to be acquired in parallel on the same sample, thus increasing knowledge 
of biodiversity (Figure 6.1).
 186 See https:// www.imr.no/ marbank/ en accessed 3 November 2019.
 figure 6.1  A simplified schematic showing the steps in the marine biodiscovery process. 
Sampling in situ is the first step, and this can be to collect a whole organism 
(such as a sponges or seacucumber) or a sediment which contains millions 
of microorganisms. A whole organism can be extracted to obtain bioactive 
compounds, or alternatively, pure microbial cultures are isolated from a marine 
sediment. These pure cultures can be grown at a larger scale to obtain bioactive 
compounds. In parallel, many studies now obtain genetic sequence data on 
organisms which allows the identification of what the organism might be able 
to produce. Eliciting the production of such compounds can be difficult as the 
factors needed to do this are not well understood. Extracts and pure compounds 
are subjected to biological screening (e.g., against cancer, infections or 
inflammation) or functional screening (e.g., as enzymes for washing powders or 
cosmeceuticals). Taking products to market can be a long and difficult process, as 







8.2 Scope of Benefit Sharing
A second issue is when in the pipeline the obligations to share benefits that 
build on work with the mgr should end. Should the obligation only cover ba-
sic collection and genetic analysis? Should it encompass all research and de-
velopment building on the mgr to any extent in its different forms? Should 
it extend to commercial activity187 which started with the mgr, modified the 
mgr, and/ or which used products and research which had been based on 
work with the mgr? They may be a long way down a development pipeline 
away from the mgr, yet this phase of commercialisation could be said not to 
have been possible without the mgr.
The challenges of identifying what is commercial has already been seen 
above in respect of research. There is also the question of how far one should 
seek to gain benefit from, or indeed users should seek to recognise and repay, 
what they have gained from mgr – even if they have also added to it through 
significant financial investment, time and expertise. A  later drawing of the 
line would mean that more activities would be subject to the benefit sharing 
regime. This could be objected to on the basis that by this time there would 
already have been a fair and equitable return to all from the earlier use made 
of the mgr and benefit sharing in respect of it.
When there is an ip right, it has been suggested, building on existing theories 
of “bounded openness”, that there should be sharing of financial benefit in re-
spect of the natural information discussed above.188 This draws not on the na-
ture of the activity (such as commercial or non commercial, in or ex situ, phys-
ical or information) but on the fact that the mgr information does and should 
flow freely. This proposal then is that payments could be made, therefore, of 
a fixed royalty from the ip right into a fund, with the amount to depend, with 
echoes of Mare Geneticum, on utilisation levels and the industry involved.189 
Alongside this, again with echoes of Mare Geneticum, this work proposes that 
details are to be shared of where the mgr was found so that the increased in-
formation will create more choice between useable mgr – which would lead in 
turn to more demand and also more cooperation, more complementarity and 
less overlap and so less damage to fragile ecosytems from activity.190
The draft ilbi of June 2019191 explored what activities would be covered by 
utilization of resources. Yet the location in the pipeline of the activities, and how 
 187 June 2019 draft ilbi n. 29, art. 1.15 varying approaches.
 188 Muller, above n. 20, 24, 117.
 189 Muller, above n. 20, 8, 66, 88.
 190 Muller, above n. 20, 73– 4, 77, 79  figure 5.1, 80.













the work on mgr has been the subject of say second or third generation activity, 
has not been explored in the negotiations. ip rights will not always exist, so it is 
proposed that they should not be the base for a solution. Proposals made in the 
context of animal and plant breeding at the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora limited regulation from this perspec-
tive to the first, second, third and fourth generations.192 This genetic perspective 
does not, however, map directly on to product development. The pharmaceutical 
products which are ultimately approved by regulators may have gone through 10 
or so developments beyond the original mgr. It is suggested, therefore, that benefit 
sharing will only apply to the first three generations of a product by each innovator 
which are brought to market drawing on mgr. Issues could of course arise about 
innovators moving from one company to another and of businesses restructuring. 
For now, however, we consider that this provides a useful starting point.
9 Delivering an ip- Based Ecosystem Approach to Benefit Sharing
The final step of this contribution is to draw together, and enhance, the deliv-
ery of an ecosystem and ecological approach to benefit sharing. As noted, there 
could be compulsory licensing of patented inventions to deal with national 
emergencies which could include ecologically sustainable products in exchange 
for an adequate payment which could be paid into the diversity fund; an option 
for reasonable payments made for use of copyright and database works in rela-
tion to repositories to be paid into the diversity fund; and for use of secret in-
formation to pursue ecological goals to be covered by a public interest defence. 
This provision of some ongoing reward for the innovator and ip owner engages 
with one of the incentive strands set out at the start of this chapter. The sharing 
of the information and payments in some cases to the biodiversity fund to sup-
port activity by developing- country scientists engages with the second strand.
Further incentives could be included in the ilbi to encourage choices for 
mgr to be used to develop ecologically sustainable technologies rather than, 
say, other health treatments and cosmetics. “Ecologically sustainable technol-
ogies” could be defined by the central body likely to be established under the 
ilbi or through a new role given to an existing body. This could draw from 
work under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
respect of “environmentally sound technologies”,193 from the European Patent 
 192 cites Resolution Conf. 10.17 (Rev.CoP14) on Animal Hybrids, art. 1(a) and (d).
 193 unfccc 1992 unts vol 1771 p107, art 4(5), Kyoto Protocol 1997 https:// unfccc.int/ 







Office regarding categorisation and “sustainable technologies,”194 and from 
work by several patent agencies (including the UK and Brazil) for fast track 
examination of “environmentally friendly” and “green” innovation.195
One pathway to do this may appear surprising, given the points made above. 
The ilbi could impose fewer requirements to share the innovation or public 
interest defences in respect of these technologies and rely on the fact that, 
based on a traditional incentive and innovation approach to ip, the more pow-
er conferred, the more incentive there would be to choose to innovate in this 
area. Yet even if this approach did encourage more research, the issue would 
remain of the limits on the innovation and activity which the rights would 
impose on the activity of others during the term of the patent or while the 
information was secret. There could be the hope that the instances explored 
across this contribution of patent owners choosing to share their innovation 
could lead to increased use by others of ecologically sustainable technology. 
Yet a key theme across this contribution has been that this approach to sharing 
cannot and should not be relied upon.
A preferable approach, then, which is indeed also rather market based, 
would be for a decreased payment to be made to the biodiversity fund by those 
developing and selling ecologically sustainable solutions. This could encourage 
innovation in this space. It could also be justified on the basis that such inno-
vators are through this innovation choice already paying debts to the ecosys-
tem which were incurred by removing the mgr or going down to the seabed to 
analyse it and establish its digital sequence information.
10 Conclusion
The ilbi negotiations move closer to a solution. The closing remarks of the 
facilitator of the mgr discussions at IGC3 noted key issues to include how the 
Agreement Annex to Decision fccc/ cp/ 2015/ L/ 9/ Rev.1 art 10(1); Technology Mechanism 
https:// unfccc.int/ ttclear/ support/ technology- mechanism.html and Global Environment 
Facility under the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer Webpage https:// 
www.thegef.org/ topics/ technology- transfer and Case Studies https:// www.thegef.org/ 
sites/ default/ files/ publications/ GEF- TechTransfer- lowres_ final_ 2.pdf, https:// unfccc.int/ 
resource/ docs/ publications/ tech_ for_ adaptation_ 06.pdf all accessed 4 November 2019.
 194 Class Y02 and Yo4S  – epo webpage, ‘Sustainable technologies’ https:// www.epo.org/ 
news- issues/ issues/ classification/ classification.html.
 195 ukipo Green Channel https:// www.gov.uk/ guidance/ patents- accelerated- processing; 
A. Dechezlepretre and E. Lane, ‘Fast- tracking green patent applications’ wio Magazine 








definition of mgr engages with digital information, whether benefit sharing 
and its modalities and triggers should be mandatory and whether to address 
ip rights and if so how.196 This contribution has sought to contribute to these 
issues for marine diversity in the abnj.
The prospect of commercial development with mgr, private activity in re-
spect of new technologies and increased argument for regard to the protection 
of ecoystems require a new approach to mgr and benefit sharing. If this is not 
done, then activity will fall outside the ilbi. This will render the ilbi at best in-
complete and at worst undeliverable, with the option to engage more directly 
with ecological approaches being lost. This contribution has developed a new 
ecosystem and ecologically- focused approach building on the intersections 
between law and science, property and openness, commercial products and 
scientific research, physical and digital, the past and the future, and normative 
and workable. It has provided a new contribution which can be of use in the 
ilbi negotiations, in future legal and scientific debates which involve public 
and private perspectives, and in the development of benefit sharing and its 
intersection with sustainability, science and other areas of law.
Proposals have been made regarding definitions of mgr; engagement with 
ip and trade secrets; tracing the place of exclusivity; the timing and funding of 
activities covered by benefit sharing and a market- based system to encourage 
innovation in ecologically sustainable areas. They have avoided fragmentation 
and engaged in intersystemic dialogue. The proposals made here are consis-
tent with existing laws and would ensure that the benefit- sharing goals can be 
delivered, rather than being cast aside through an unquestioning acceptance 
of the power of private rights. The proposals do not change ip law, rather they 
engage with opportunities which exist within ip law for states to introduce 
some permitted exceptions and require sharing.
It is a challenge to “future proof” entirely the ilbi. But the proposals made 
here are an important step towards this, for science and for law.
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by Jack Cameron (graduate of the School of Law University of Aberdeen). We 
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 196 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 25 (2018) 2 September 2019. 
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bbnj negotiating positions on marine genetic resources are best understood in light 
of a number of hidden (intellectual) property heuristics at play – arising from the di-
verging relevance of tangibility and place when it comes to genetic resources and the 
asymmetry in ip norms in multilateral settings. This short paper sets out in outline, 
the normative implications of these heuristics and identifies a ‘no harm’ principle that 
ought to find a place in any new legally binding framework.
 Keywords
biodiversity – areas beyond national jurisdiction – intellectual property – heuristics – 
benefit- sharing  – marine genetic resources  – convention on biological diversity  –   
negotiations – digital sequence information – marine scientific research
Negotiations over biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (bbnj) negotia-
tions up until the second intergovernmental conference (IGC2) and to a lesser 
extent in the third, (IGC3) were awash with the canoe metaphor  – that we 
are all in the same canoe perhaps a Pacific vaka, and needed to find direction 
and destination together. The canoe however, is a red herring, as it evokes the 
image of being together in warm seas with clear blue skies. A competing meta-
phor of an iceberg is more accurate because of the way the bbnj negotiations 
subsume vastly significant, yet hidden, motivations. These hidden heuristics 
are important because they become short cuts for processing information and 
making judgments on negotiating positions. The subject matter of the bbnj 
negotiations are complex, technical and difficult to fathom in their entirety 
for even seasoned negotiators. In this context it is critical that we bring much 
needed attention to the rules of thumb that are being used as a necessary 
132 Thambisetty
aspect of understanding where progress might be made and to highlight textu-
al limitations that threaten an ambitious Treaty.
In this paper I touch on two such heuristics in outline related to the (intel-
lectual) property framework that is emerging in the text- based negotiations 
around marine genetic resources, excluding those related to capacity- building 
and technology transfer although some of these remain relevant. The first arises 
from the use of terms including ‘genetic resources’, ‘access’ and ‘utilization’. The 
second heuristic is the long shadow cast by the skewed nature of intellectual 
property norms in multilateral settings and whether the consequences can and 
should be addressed or ameliorated in the bbnj instrument or outside of it.
1 Use and Non- Use of Terms
In 1997 Laurenschlasger in an influential essay proclaimed ‘Biodiversity is 
dead’ to explain that the term ‘biodiversity’ was meaningless because of the 
ambiguity and breadth of the subject matter it refers to.1 For similar reasons it 
may be time to proclaim the death of ‘genetic resources’. Evolving technologies 
have made this term a weighty anchor to the past hindering clarity and trans-
parency of legal positions.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd) is the ideational precursor 
to any bbnj framework. Here use of the term ‘genetic resources’ is tied to 
the land, to sovereignty and control by possession by State Parties. Genetic 
resources today exist in many different forms, physical and tangible but also 
dissociated, dematerialized and intangible in the form of digitized sequence 
data.2 What a particular negotiating party understands by the term ‘genetic re-
sources’ depends on whether they see the putative international legally bind-
ing instrument (ilbi) as a relatively light touch instrument of environmental 
law dealing with biodiversity that is static, tied to place and tangibility; or an 
instrument of intellectual property law associated with functional informa-
tion – manipulatable, free from geography and place and a function of the sci-
entific and commercial benefits implied.
 1 Laurenschlasger, ‘Biodiversity is Dead’, Wildlife Society Bulletin (1973– 2006) 25(3) (Autumn, 
1997), pp. 679– 685.
 2 See A Kostakis, ‘Change and Subjectivity in International Environmental Law: The Micro- 
Politics of the Transformation of Biodiversity into Genetic Gold’ Transnational Environmen-
tal Law, 3:1 (2014), pp. 127– 147 and M Bagley, ‘De- Materializing Genetic Resources: Synthet-
ic Biology, Intellectual Property and the ABS By- pass’ in C McManis and B Ong, Routledge 
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The chasm between the old way of looking at biodiversity and the new, mal-
leable way of characterizing genetic resources is hinted at in the definition of 
‘utilisation of genetic resources’ in Art 2 of the Nagoya Protocol3 with its refer-
ence to ‘the application of biotechnology’. There is currently a robust process 
underway initiated by the Conference of the Parties (cop) to examine the ter-
minology and implementation of the cbd with reference to digital sequence 
information (dsi), itself a term used as a placeholder;4 other international 
bodies and frameworks are also realizing if not actively exploring, the signifi-
cance of dsi under their own frameworks.5
There is wide divergence in how domestic measures that implement ‘dsi’- 
related measures under the cbd emerge and are applied in practice. The two 
extremes of the spectrum are marked by State Parties who see dsi as associat-
ed with physical and tangible resources such that contractual measures such 
as pic and mat would equally apply to them even though it is not clear how 
digitized sequence information that cannot contemporaneously be associated 
with a physical resource (for instance those stored or accessed ex situ in data-
bases prior to entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol) will be governed. At the 
other end of the spectrum are those who see digitized sequence information 
as liberating the information from awkward and restrictive sovereign property 
rights.
The variance in domestic governance models that result is startling.6 It is in 
this context that the continued use of the term ‘genetic resources’ and replica-
tion of the confusion in 2020 in any bbnj instrument, in so far as it signals disso-
ciation from digitized forms of information would be unhelpful and regressive.
 3 “The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (cbd) is a 
2010 supplementary agreement to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.
 4 Report of the Ad Hoc Technical Working Group on Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Re-
sources, 20 February 2018, UN Doc. cbd/ sbstta/ 22/ inf/ 4 Available here < https:// www.cbd.
int/ doc/ c/ 4f53/ a660/ 20273cadac313787b058a7b6/ dsi- ahteg- 2018- 01- 04- en.pdf> and more re-
cently Bagley, Karger, Mueller, Perron- Welch and Thambisetty, ‘Fact- finding Study on How 
Domestic Measures Address Benefit- sharing Arising from Commercial and Non- commercial 
Use of Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources and Address the Use of Digi-
tal Sequence Information on Genetic Resources for Research and Development’ (October 
2019)  Available here < https:// www.cbd.int/ dsi- gr/ 2019– 2020/ studies/ #tab=2> (Hereafter, 
‘Study 4 on Digital sequence Information on Genetic Resources’).
 5 The fao this year invited submission of views on dsi, Available here < http:// www.fao.org/ 
plant- treaty/ overview/ mypow/ dsi/ en/ >. Also see Welch, Bagley, Kuiken, and Louafi, ‘Poten-
tial Implications of New Synthetic Biology and Genomic Research Trajectories on the Inter-
national Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA or ‘Treaty’)’ 
Emory Legal Studies Research Paper (2017).
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2 Access, Utilization and Benefit- Sharing: An Instrument in 
Three Acts
The zero- draft7 of the bbnj instrument and ensuing negotiations are framed 
by three performative acts with potential legal implications – access, utiliza-
tion and benefit- sharing. The geographical, temporal, material and normative 
scope of the instrument is distributed over these acts as laid out in Table 7.1. 
(see shaded boxes). In each case non- acceptance of dsi as an aspect of marine 
genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction amplifies the complex-
ity and incoherence of any frameworks put in place. In light of Table 7.1 and 
with respect to the state of negotiations in IGC3 it appears that the parties 
cannot agree on the scope of what it is that they are negotiating.
For example if dsi is not included within the scope of marine genetic re-
sources being accessed, the conversion of a physical resource to digitized se-
quence information breaks the legal link between genetic resources accessed 
from areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj) and the sequence information. 
In effect any use of genetic resources accessed prior to the the entry into force 
of the ilbi will not be covered under it in its digitized form. Yet modern day 
utilization of genetic resources with some exceptions,8 can scarcely proceed 
without sequencing and digitization.
The above would be the case unless the ‘utilization’ of genetic resources un-
dertaken after the entry into force of genetic resources accessed prior to the 
entry into force was an explicit trigger for the instrument to apply.9 When it 
comes to the utilization of genetic resources, State Parties to the Nagoya Pro-
tocol who choose not to associate dsi with physical genetic resources in effect 
negate the need to address benefit- sharing through the application of biotech-
nology under the Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd)10 (unless there 
are mutually agreed terms). This has cast a long shadow over any potential 
7  Draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6) Available here < https:// undocs.org/ en/ a/ 
conf.232/ 2019/ 6>.
8  For example, taxonomy or conservation measures.
9  It is critical to note here that utilization of genetic resources accessed prior to entry into 
force will not necessarily amount to retrospective application of the instrument. The rule 
against retroactivity in Art 28 of the Vienna Convention only applies in the absence of a 
different intention that can be established by the parties.
 10 Although this can still happen through compliance measures designed to ensure that pro-
vider country laws that do reference dsi are followed. See discussion of eur 511/ 2014 in 












benefit- sharing in the bbnj negotiations with several negotiating parties such 
as the EU and Japan taking the view that ‘utilization’ of genetic resources need 
not find a place in the text of the ilbi.11 If ‘utilization’ remains undefined, then 
benefit- sharing arising from the utilization of genetic resources cannot possi-
bly be pinned down.
Problems defining benefit- sharing go beyond a mere question of use of 
terms. There is the issue of monetary and non- monetary benefit- sharing, and 
determining commercial and non- commercial contexts.12 The more acute prob-
lem here however is the lack of agreement on the meaning and status of benefit- 
sharing, which in the language of both unga Resolutions that set the stage for 
the negotiations is one of four key questions the instrument must address.13
Benefit- sharing or in some cases ‘fair and equitable benefit- sharing’, as the 
third performative act related to marine genetic resources from abnj appears 
to be used both as short- hand for a principle of international law and as a mere 
modality. There are some indications that benefit- sharing is now of sufficient 
heft and weight that it should be regarded as a principle of international law. 
Equitable benefit- sharing so far has been recognised as ‘a Treaty objective, ob-
ligation and mechanism under biodiversity laws, a component of the human 
right to science, and relevant to international biodiversity law as well’.14 Yet we 
do not have an explicit or principled approach to what it means to ‘share’ and 
when such sharing is ‘fair and equitable’.
Alternatively to view benefit- sharing as a functional modality is to re-
strict its scope to specific, enumerated contexts that inherently limit any 
ambitions for multiple avenues of justice that may flow from a more open- 
textured principle of international law. We see this play out in the context 
of the cbd, where benefit- sharing can be difficult to enforce. The bilateral 
architecture of the Convention means benefit- sharing is essentially a mo-
dality that is subject to international contract law, with all the difficulties 
of performance and enforcement that entails.15 An approach that takes into 
 11 Based on IGC3 negotiations on mgr s.
 12 C von Kries and G Winter, ‘Defining commercial and non- commercial research and devel-
opment under the Nagoya Protocol and in other contexts’, in E Chege Kamau, G Winter, P- 
T. Stoll, (eds.), Research and Development on Genetic Resources: Public Domain Approaches 
in Implementing the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge 2015).
 13 Resolution 69/ 292 (19 June 2015) and Resolution 72/ 249 (24 December 2017).
 14 E Morgera, ‘Fair and Equitable Benefit- Sharing: History, Normative Content and Status in 
International Law’ in ‘Benefit- sharing’ in E Orlando and L Krämer, (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Environmental Law: Principles of Environmental Law (ee 2017).
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account human rights, the achievement of unsdg s, and the status of the 
resources of abnj could see Equitable Benefit- Sharing (ebs) as a principle 
of public international law designed to further equity and open to evolving 
interpretation.
The legal weight of this international legal principle in the making is set to be 
a matter of discussion for some time to come. The bbnj instrument will inevita-
bly act as a bridge between those who see benefit- sharing as merely instrumen-
tal to a subjective vision of the framework and others who see it as a necessary 
requisite for justice and progress for ‘all peoples of the world’.16 In the interests 
of coherence, negotiators must anticipate and reduce the potential for dissonant 
approaches.
3 Intellectual Property Norms
ip norms are often presented in the form of simplistic heuristics, heightened 
by asymmetry in the way they originate and are applied in multilateral settings 
and due to their perceived consequences. This asymmetry has played out for 
instance in the loss of regulatory sovereignty related to domestic innovation 
policies17 and an increasing inability to mediate public policy related to the 
intersection of ip with environmental, social and economic policies derived 
from other multilateral settings.18 It is also hard to ignore critiques of the 
failings of intellectual property frameworks in domestic contexts in leading 
jurisdictions like the United States and in EU law.19 The asymmetry has led 
some academics, including Professors Ruth Okediji and Jerome Reichman, to 
call for a moratorium on the further harmonization of intellectual property at 
 16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Preamble, emphasis added.
 17 See Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under trips, available here 
<https:// www.mpg.de/ 8132986/ Patent- Declaration.pdf>; G Shaffer, ‘How the WTO Shapes 
Regulatory Governance’ University of California, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 
2014– 53.
 18 Braga, Fink and Sepulveda, ‘Intellectual Property and Economic Development’ World 
Bank Discussion Paper 412 (2000).
 19 K Aoki, ‘Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special 
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development)’40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717- 801 (2007); 
A  Jaffe and J Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents:  How our Broken Patent System is 
Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About it (Princeton University Press 
2007); J Bessen and M Muerer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk (Princeton University Press 2009); D Guellec and B V Pottelsberghe 












regional and multilateral levels, a call fueled at least partially by the ‘tentative 
and divergent ideas about how best to treat a daunting array of new technol-
ogies’.20 For the bbnj process the question is whether there is a constructive 
way to acknowledge these developments in the negotiations, and whether not 
doing so is in effect an explicit acceptance of the skewed nature of some of 
these norms.
In the text- based negotiations, there seem to be four different scenarios 
emerging:
(a) The ‘no text’ Option – Intellectual Property Law Is Not Addressed in 
the ilbi with Respect to Marine Genetic Resources
As Table 7.1 tries to convey, not addressing arrangements that govern valuable 
data and technology (see shaded boxes) threatens coherence of the eventual 
instrument. Resolving the ‘value’ that arises from the utilisation of marine ge-
netic resources is best done through a deeper engagement with means of con-
trol over information – predominantly through intellectual property, but also 
through careful management of the public domain and open access measures. 
To negotiate only the latter without addressing the former through ip arrange-
ments cuts away a sizeable chunk of the potential scope of the instrument.
The place and precarity of intellectual property rights over genetic resourc-
es have shadowed the growth of biotechnology right from the start. The cbd 
does not address intellectual property rights over genetic resources, but this 
may be seen as a function of the fact that it predates the trips agreement and 
the efforts to harmonise ip standards globally. Unequivocal sovereign rights 
granted to State Parties over genetic resources in their territories preserved a 
semblance of control over the use and circulation of genetic resources, in a 
world not yet enthralled with global intellectual property rules. Contempora-
neoulsy, the human genome project, accompanied by studies on elsi – ethi-
cal, legal, social issues – was shadowed right from the start by the implications 
of commodifying genes, and the facilitation of it via patents and exclusionary 
licensing terms.21 Subsequent developments in synthetic biology have served 
 20 J H Reichman & R C Dreyfuss, ‘Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on 
Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty’, 57 Duke L.J. 85, 86 (2007); Ruth Okediji, ‘Does 
Intellectual Property Need Human Rights’ 51 NYU J Int’l & Pol 1 (2018).
 21 See D Dickenson, ‘Consent, Commodification, and Benefit- Sharing in Genetic 
Research’, Dev World Bioethics 2004 4(2):109– 24; and Goulding, Marden, Manion, Levy, 
‘Alternative Intellectual Property for Genomics and the Activity of Technology Transfer 
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to heighten concerns over the distributive effects of patents, and the widening 
technology capability gap.22
The ‘no text’ viewpoint is often accompanied by a non- specific sugges-
tion that other institutions and entities are better suited to address the 
question of intellectual property rights over marine genetic resources of 
abnj, despite the fact that the two main contenders, the World Intellectu-
al Property Office (wipo) and the World Trade Organisation (wto), have 
shown no appetite to take on the issue of marine genetic resources in abnj. 
Recent negotiations at the wipo on declarations of origin include text that 
specifically excludes mgr s of abnj.23 The wto also has shown little dispo-
sition towards overextending its legitimacy in unconventional ways,24 and 
it is extremely unlikely that the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (trips) Council will see the abnj origins of these 
marine genetic resources as being reason enough to amend provisions of 
the trips Agreement.
Given that:  1) in most jurisdictions it is possible to patent microrganisms, 
genomic dna25 and gene sequence fragments, and that such patents amount 
to exclusive monopolies over the use and commercial exploitation of genes 
and associated digital sequence information; 2)  there is continuing pressure 
to harmonise intellectual property standards worldwide; 3) abnj has unprec-
edented legal status, the ‘no text’ option under the rubric of Article 12 of the 
zero draft is in effect an endorsement of the status quo. It would be fair to say 
that those endorsing such status quo are the State Parties where individuals 
and corporations benefit most from existing arrangements around the monop-
olisation of genetic resources. The long- standing nature of the problems over 
 22 Welch, Bagley, Kuiken and Louafi, ‘Potential implications of new synthetic biology and 
genomic research trajectories on the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA or ‘Treaty’)’ n 5 above.
 23 wipo/ grtkf/ ic/ 40/ 6 (April 9, 2019) see text under draft Article 5.
 24 A Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism:  Reimagining the Global Economic Order 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Also see M Fakhri, ‘Reconstruing WTO Legitimacy 
Debates’ (2011) 2 Notre Dame J of Int’l & Comp L, 64.
 25 R Cooke- Degan and C Heaney, ‘Patents in Genomics and Human Genetics’ Annu Rev 
Genomics Hum Genet 2010 Sep 22; 11: 383– 425; The US Supreme Court in 2013 recognised 
that genomic dna ought not to be monopolised through patents in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v, Myriad, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); however the position in most juris-
dictions is harmonised to the contrary. See ‘Genetics, Genomics and the Patenting of 










such monopolisation however, makes acquiescing in this way problematic and 
should give all negotiating parties pause for thought.
(b) The ‘tinkering’ Option – Ameliorating Existing Frameworks
If there is some misgiving about how ip will apply, particularly over dsi and 
patent office actions, then it makes sense to find measures that ameliorate 
some of the excesses of the system. A number of negotiating parties have spo-
ken of measures such as declaration of origin or conditions of access that im-
plement a form of ‘track and trace’ so that marine genetic resources accessed 
from abnj can be identified as such through the value chain. When speaking 
of track and trace it is important to acknowledge that it is both scientific and 
legal in character and that the scientific possibility need not be determinative 
of the latter.26 In medical and scientific research, honour systems and codes 
of conduct policed by peers and self- regulatory measures are not uncom-
mon. A similar system could supplement scientific tracing and give content 
to meaningful ‘track and trace’ but only if the ilbi sets out at least a nominal 
basis for it.27
Legal track and trace would need monitoring mechanisms. Under the 
Nagoya Protocol, intellectual property offices are the most commonly used 
checkpoints.28 A  different approach can also be taken by incorporating the 
international patent classification system. This is a system for examiners in 
patent offices or others to categorise, classify and code patent applications ac-
cording to the technical features of their content, enabling technical data to be 
retrieved easily.29 Modifications to the international classification system are 
made all the time, as technology develops or unprecedented innovations come 
up. With some basis in the ilbi to do so, it should be possible to explore a new 
sub- group classification referring to marine genetic resources from abnj. This 
 26 See discussion in S Thambisetty, ‘Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: Elements of a New International Legally Binding Instrument’, LSE Law- Policy 
Briefing Paper No. 32. Available here < https:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3219995>.
 27 For an in- depth analysis see B Kiliç, ‘Patent Disclosure Requirements in Free Trade 
Agreements’, paper commissioned by the Centre for wto Studies for the International 
Conference on trips- cbd linkages, Geneva (Switzerland), 7– 8 June 2018, available 
at: http:// wtocentre.iift.ac.in/ workingpaper/ WorkingPaper49.pdf.
 28 Study 4 on Digital sequence Information on Genetic Resources n 4 above.
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would have the advantage of being embedded in the patent system and be 
non- discriminatory of patent applicants.30
The ideal substantive legal basis in the ilbi would be for declaration of origin to 
be adopted as a non- monetary benefit- sharing measure on the bases that record-
ing provenance is good science and enhanced patent disclosure measures can 
lead to positive information spill overs for everyone and facilitate benefit- sharing. 
Crucially, declaration of origin appears to reflect the direction of travel under the 
cbd and Nagoya Protocol.31 It should also be noted that since none of the coun-
tries that have opted for some form of declaration of origin for patent applications 
have been taken to task at the wto yet, such measures are conceivably compatible 
under the trips Agreement.32 In light of the ease with which some form of decla-
ration of origin may be legally implemented in case of mgr s post entry into force 
of a putative instrument, the onus surely shifts to asking negotiating parties to 
justify the continued demand for non- disclosure of origin.
(c) The ‘no- ipr’ Option: Precluding Intellectual Property
The third option that is emerging is where some negotiating parties want to 
make the ownership structure over marine genetic resources of abnj fair and 
equitable by precluding intellectual property rights (ipr). The normative ba-
sis for this comes from unclos Art 241, particularly as there now seems to 
be growing convergence on the view that marine scientific research (msr) 
includes research on genetic resources.33 It is supplemented by the common 
heritage of mankind principle put forward robustly by the G77 + China group 
as dispositive of the status of marine genetic resources beyond abnj.
This brings us to one of the most simplistic heuristics in the bbnj negotia-
tions – that the common heritage of mankind (chm) and freedoms of the high 
 30 See discussion in C Chiorolla, ‘Intellectual Property from a Global Environmental Law 
Perspective:  Lessons from Patent Disclosure Requirements for Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge’, Transnational Environmental Law, 8:3 (2019), pp. 503– 521.
 31 See references to check points in ‘Study 4 on Digital sequence Information on Genetic 
Resources’ and C Chiorolla, n 30 above on the ‘quasi- extraterritorial application of abs 
standards’ at 512.
 32 C Chiarolla, n 30 above [fn 74].
 33 Based on negotiations at IGC3. Article 241 unclos states that msr ‘shall not constitute 
the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources’. See M 
Ysern (2003), ‘Legal issues raised by profitable biotechnology development through MSR’ 
American Society of International Law (www.asil.org/ insights) p.  2 arguing that claims 












seas (FoHS) are mutually exclusive34 – that you cannot opt for one without 
also denigrating the significance of the other. This is possibly at the heart of 
the recalcitrance to address normative principles in text- based negotiations 
over bbnj, and the disappearance of the chm and FoHS between the first Pres-
ident’s “Aid to the Negotiations” document and the zero- draft text. Following 
conventional negotiating theory, it makes sense to agree on non- controversial 
aspects before tackling the main sources of divergence,35 but the inability to 
resolve the status of these two principles is having a detrimental impact on 
normative coherence as it applies to intellectual property issues.
With respect to the status of marine genetic resources, chm and FoHS do 
not occupy the same space. The former refers to the ethical and legal status of 
the subject area and resource (absence of private property rights being one 
aspect), and the latter is a freedom in relation to an area (beyond national 
jurisdiction) and should not be confused with a non- existent freedom to lay 
claim through property rights to the fruits of exercising that freedom (whether 
through msr or otherwise), including through intellectual property rights. It 
is this necessary distinction that is captured by the restraint in Article 241 of 
unclos.
The right to conduct msr and access and utilise marine genetic resources 
from abnj as a seamless continuum only works if you acknowledge a facilita-
tive normative basis that allows for possession of those resources. If we accept 
that the FoHS applies to msr, then in so far as possession of mgr s resulting 
from msr are concerned two potential possibilities follow – that biodiversity 
 34 See discussion for instance in P Taylor, ‘Common Heritage of Mankind Principle’ in K 
Bosselmann, D Fogel, and J. B. Ruhl, (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Sustainability, Vol. 3: The 
Law and Politics of Sustainability 64– 69. (Berkshire Publishing); and D Tladi ‘State 
Practice and the Making and Remaking of International Law: The Case of the Legal Rules 
Relating to Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, (2014) 1 J of State 
Practice and International L, 97; and Z Chun, ‘Challenges Facing the UN High Seas Treaty’, 
The Maritime Executive (Editorial) 2018- 09- 07 Available here < https:// www.maritime- 
executive.com/ editorials/ challenges- facing- the- un- high- seas- treaty (referring to tradi-
tional ideas around freedom of the high seas, and the halting recognition of biodiversity 
of the high seas).
 35 For general discussion on ordering negotiating priorities see K Monheim, ‘The manage-
ment of multilateral negotiations:  lessons from UN climate negotiations’ February 2015 
Policy Paper, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
Available here <http:// eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 64534/ 1/ Managment- of- multilateral- negotiations_ 
Monheim_ final.pdf> and N Kteily, T Saguy, J Sidanius, and D M Taylor, ‘Negotiating 
Power:  Agenda Ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup 
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beyond national jurisdiction is regarded as being under common ownership, 
or that no ownership rights exist whatsoever.
Purely on the basis of precedent, chm is de facto an unconvincing practi-
cal basis for precluding intellectual property rights. As a principle it is widely 
seen as enabling distributive justice for developing countries and facilitative 
of benefit- sharing. In international law there is no definition of chm as such, 
only an agreement on constituent elements. The UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity both water 
down the principle to ‘common concern of mankind’; and the unesco Dec-
laration on the Human Genome and Human Rights refers to the human ge-
nome as ‘heritage of humanity in a symbolic sense’. These sorts of depictions 
do not prevent the private ownership of genomic data (human, plant or an-
imal) through patents and incorporation in privately owned databases. As a 
principle of international law, it is an ambiguous placeholder that lends itself 
to dilution and multiple interpretations.
The FoHS and uninhibited access works best within the assumption that 
bbnj is ‘owner- less’ but this appears to go against the language of unga Reso-
lutions 72/ 249 and 69/ 292 which set out the need for a ‘comprehensive global 
regime’ to better address conservation and sustainable use of marine biologi-
cal diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. The language is redolent of 
managed ‘common ownership’, rather than a laissez faire, ‘no- ownership’ sce-
nario. In order for the FoHS to be compatible with the wording of the relevant 
unga resolutions in a way that ties that principle to access and utilisation of 
mgr s, the status of these resources in law, and intellectual property rights, we 
need persuasive arguments that I believe have not been put forth yet.
(d) Moderation and Regulatory Sovereignty: Intellectual Property 
Limitations
Limiting intellectual property rights rather than precluding these rights allows 
for the moderation of the scope of these rights. A bbnj instrument could have 
a choice of being either prescriptive or leaving the precise contours of such 
limitations to domesticate regulatory sovereignty. This is for instance reflected 
in the language put forth by the psids group in its position on Article 12 of the 
zero- draft.36
 36 Article 2 bis The access, utilization and commercial exploitation of marine genetic 
resources under this Agreement and protected by intellectual property rights shall be 
subject to limitations that further the objectives of this Agreement and this Part, includ-
ing equitable benefit sharing and capacity building and technology transfer. (Conference 





The architecture of limitations is internal to intellectual property law inter-
nationally and is therefore not likely to damage the coherence of the transna-
tional application of the ilbi. These limitations would apply to the post grant 
exploitation of intellectual property rights such as patents, could be automatic 
(such as ‘fair use’ terms in copyright law), or be an effective means to control 
price, access (through licensing terms), or availability (through measures that 
demand local working of patented inventions for example.) They may apply in 
a time- limited way – for instance granting least developed countries and small 
island developing states, a longer period to apply ip rules taking into account 
their special circumstances. Whether such limitations would be compatible 
with trips is a critical question, but on balance such measures could be seen 
as furthering the objectives of Articles 7 and 8 of trips, consistent with socio- 
economic differences and technological development amongst countries.37 
Such limitations would take into account the disputed normative basis of bbnj 
without needing to resolve it and give weight to Art 241 unclos.
A helpful precedent can be seen in the Marrakesh Treaty38 negotiated at 
wipo, which allows countries to institute a limitation or exception in copy-
right laws to facilitate books to be converted into a format that is accessible to 
people who are visually impaired. This removes barriers faced by persons with 
visual impairments from accessing published works, ending a “book famine” 
for people with such disabilities. Less than 5% of all books ever published in the 
world are available in formats that can be accessed by the visually impaired.39
That process analogous to the one we are contemplating here, was driven by 
the need to achieve ‘equal opportunities including the freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds on an equal basis with others, 
including through all forms of communication of their choice, their enjoyment 
of the right to education and the opportunity to conduct research and to share 
scientific progress and its benefits’.40 There are lessons in the way the world 
came together then for the bbnj instrument now, as some negotiating parties 
try to pre- empt an impending ‘marine technology famine’ by improving access 
to valuable technologies and products that result from msr conducted in abnj.
 37 Article 7, 8.1 and 8.2 of the trips Agreement.
 38 Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (2013).
 39 L Ayoubi, ‘The Marrakesh Treaty: Fixing International Copyright Law for the Benefit of 
the Visually Impaired Persons’, (2015) 13 NZJPIL.
 40 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, Preamble. Available here <http:// www.
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4 No Harm Principle
These four emerging positions are set out within the rubric of Articles 10, 11, 12 
and 13 of the zero- draft treaty. Through this suite of Articles, the ilbi will form 
a link between the normative basis of control over the physical resources and 
the intangible information that is an integral part of marine genetic resources. 
Whichever side of the spectrum – ‘common ownership’ or ‘no ownership’ – the 
dust ultimately settles, I submit that it must be guided by a ‘no harm’ principle 
which must apply across the board.
One of the most detrimental impacts and a very well- hidden heuristic of 
focussing solely on the physicality of marine genetic resources is that they are 
seen as replenishable, inexhaustible and ‘not finite’ as a resource. This is the 
basis of assertions such as Japan’s in open session in IGC2 – that a bucket of 
water in order to conduct genetic sampling is not going to ‘harm’ the marine 
environment. However, if we view marine genetic resources as a combination 
of physical and intangible, then monopoly rights over dematerialised resourc-
es make them finite, exhaustible and liable to monopolistic use. This is where 
the potential ‘harm’ is located – in the information deprivation caused by intel-
lectual property rights that assign exclusive rights to informational, functional 
or contextual content of genetic resources. To ensure that the ilbi does not 
facilitate such impoverishment, it is important for the framework to ensure a 
‘no harm’ principle – that when msr is conducted, ‘enough and as good’ is left 
over for others that come after.41 This is patently incompatible with unrestrict-
ed intellectual property rights over marine genetic resources of the abnj.
To third party observers, it can seem as if the bbnj negotiations are a per-
formance of justice, of process and of reasonableness rather than a meeting of 
minds over outcomes. Whether a balanced textual outcome can result from 
the multilateral negotiating process remains to be seen. What I have tried to 
show in this short paper is the need to bear in mind existing frames of under-
standing out of which the new governance regime will inevitably be fashioned. 
Even if we cannot all agree on ideal outcomes, we should be able to agree on 
the need for coherence and relevance in the text, as a consequence of which 
just outcomes may perhaps, become possible.
 41 This clause in Ch 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise is widely seen as a necessary restriction on 
private acquisition of the natural world (abnj) by application of one’s labour (msr). For 
discussion of this orthodoxy on the principles of first appropriation and challenges to it 
see J Tomasi, ‘The Key to Locke’s Proviso’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 6:3, 
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 chapter 8
The Quest to Completely Map the World’s Oceans 
in Support of Understanding Marine Biodiversity 
and the Regulatory Barriers We Have Created
Larry Mayer and J. Ashley Roach
 Abstract
This paper reviews the current poor state of our knowledge of the bathymetry of the 
seafloor (only approximately 15% has been mapped by modern bathymetric sonars) 
and discusses the efforts being made under the auspices of the Nippon Foundation 
gebco Seabed 2030 program to rectify this situation and to produce a publically avail-
able, complete map of the ocean basins that can be used to support UN Sustainable 
Development Goal 14 by 2030. It will be impossible to achieve the targeted level of 
sustainable development without a comprehensive map of the ocean floor, a fact rec-
ognized by the planners of the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development 
who have identified “mapping the entire ocean floor and its processes” as a proposed 
priority area for the Decade. For this ambitious undertaking that will benefit all man-
kind to be achieved, we will need to ensure that the collection of the data needed to 
produce such maps will not be impeded. There are serious fiscal and technological 
challenges in trying to map the remaining unmapped 85% of the world’s oceans by the 
target date, but these can be overcome by collective efforts and technological innova-
tion. Less obvious are the sometimes arbitrary regulatory barriers to achieving com-
plete mapping of the seafloor that coastal states may present in their interpretation 
of Marine Scientific Research under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The recognition that the collection of bathymetric data in support of such a publicly- 
available global map is not categorized as msr under the context of Part xiii of the 
Law of the Sea Treaty would go a long way to help meet this critical goal.
 Keywords
oceans – mapping – marine biodiversity – regulations – bathymetry – seafloor – marine 
scientific research – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Seabed 2030
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1 Introduction
In concert with its establishment of The Sustainable Development Goals, the 
United Nations has recently proclaimed a Decade of Ocean Science for Sus-
tainable Development (2021– 2030) “to support efforts to reverse the cycle of 
decline in ocean health and gather ocean stakeholders worldwide behind a 
common framework that will ensure ocean science can fully support countries 
in creating improved conditions for sustainable development of the Ocean.”1 
The proclamation of the Decade of Ocean Science is a clear recognition of 
the critical role that the ocean plays in sustaining life, moderating climate and 
contributing to the overall physical and economic well- being of humankind. It 
also recognizes the serious threats to the health of the oceans and that action 
is urgently needed to ensure a sustainable future. In proclaiming the Decade 
of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, on December 5, 2017, General 
Assembly Resolution 72/ 732 provided:
283. Notes that the depth of a significant percentage of the world’s oceans, 
seas and waterways has yet to be measured directly and that bathymetric 
knowledge underpins the safe, sustainable and cost- effective execution 
of almost every human activity in, on or under the sea;
and
285. Encourages Member States to consider contributing to mechanisms 
that encourage the widest possible availability of all bathymetric data, 
so as to support the sustainable development, management and gover-
nance of the marine environment
In making these statements, General Assembly Resolution A/ 72/ 73 recognized 
that a critical first step in establishing the knowledge needed to understand, 
manage and sustain biodiversity and other marine resources is establishing 
the geospatial context of the oceans – i.e., maps that accurately depict depths, 
the distribution of seamounts, ridges, trenches, and the nature of the seafloor 
substrate (e.g., sand, rock, mud, manganese nodules, coral, etc.), all critical as-
pects of understanding critical habitat. This fundamental geospatial context 
also provides insight into the paths of deep- sea currents, controlling the global 
distribution of heat and a key component of climate modeling. Mapping can 
 1 https:// en.unesco.org/ ocean- decade.
 2 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: General Assembly Resolution A/ 72/ 73 adopted 5 December 
2017. Distributed 4 January 2018. Identical texts appear as paragraphs 286 and 288 of the 2018 
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provide insight into the stability of the seafloor and other key processes that 
impact habitat and biodiversity. Knowledge of bathymetry is also an essential 
component for the accurate prediction of where tsunamis will have the great-
est impact and where storm surge will do the greatest damage. Modern map-
ping systems also allow us to image the water column, mapping the distribu-
tion of fish, gas seeps, and hydrothermal vent communities. General Assembly 
Resolution A/ 72/ 73 also recognized, however, that despite many years of effort, 
only a small fraction of the world ocean’s seafloor has been mapped by mod-
ern sonar systems, limiting our ability to explore and understand these critical 
ocean and seafloor processes. As will be outlined below, direct measurements 
of bathymetry using modern mapping techniques is available for only about 
15% of the world’s oceans. Thus, for almost 85% of the world’s ocean’s seafloor, 
no direct depth measurement is available. To state paragraph 285 of G.A. Reso-
lution A/ 72/ 73 in a different way – how can we manage and protect what we do 
not yet know and understand?
This paper will review the current poor state of knowledge of the bathym-
etry of the seafloor and discuss the efforts being made to rectify this situa-
tion and to produce a complete, publicly- available map of the ocean basins 
that can be used to support UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 – “Conserve 
and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable 
Development.” It will be impossible to achieve this sustainable development 
goal without a comprehensive map of the ocean floor, a fact recognized by 
the planners of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development 
who have identified “mapping the entire ocean floor and its processes” as a 
proposed priority area for the Decade. This paper will also discuss the fiscal 
and technological challenges of trying to map 85% of the world’s oceans by a 
target date of 2030, challenges that are formidable but obvious; less obvious, 
however, are the regulatory barriers to achieving complete mapping of the sea-
floor that coastal states may present in their interpretation of Marine Scientific 
Research under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2 Mapping Earth
Our ability to map Earth, and with this mapping understand a variety of Earth 
processes, including biodiversity, has advanced at tremendous pace through 
developments in remote sensing. Satellite- deployed sensors can collect topo-
graphic data and produce digital elevation models (3- D models of topogra-
phy) with sub- meter accuracy depicting landforms (and thus the geospatial 
context) in remarkable detail. Optical, infrared and multi- spectral sensors 
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can instantly map with high resolution, over large areas, the distribution of 
land cover (e.g., forests, agricultural areas, deserts), the nature of the land cov-
er (species of trees, plants, etc.) and even the health of the vegetation. Any 
five- year old using Google Earth, can, with a few keystrokes, zoom into most 
anywhere on earth and see detailed imagery of our planet. The value of this 
ability with respect to understanding earth processes, exploring, navigating, 
planning, building and carrying out a host of other activities is immeasurable. 
Yet our ability to image the earth with this incredible detail is limited to the ap-
proximately 29% of the earth that is terrestrial. If we attempt to use the same 
imaging techniques to map the 71% of the planet that is covered by seawater, 
we will see nothing but a blue surface. This is because the electromagnetic 
waves (e.g., light waves) that are used by satellite remote sensing systems can-
not penetrate far through seawater.
Because light does not propagate very far in the ocean, if we are interest-
ed in mapping the seafloor at the same scale at which we can map the land 
surface, we need to bring our camera and lighting systems very close (within 
a few meters) to the seafloor. Fortunately, we have developed the technology 
to do this using towed camera systems, remotely operated vehicles (rov s) or 
autonomous underwater vehicles (auv s), but imagery collected from such 
systems, particularly in the deep sea, comes at a very slow pace. In deep wa-
ter, it can take several hours for a system to get close to the seafloor and once 
there, these vehicles move at very slow speeds (a few knots or less) and cover 
a very small area (1– 3 square meters) with each image. Given that the area 
of the seafloor is approximately 360 million square kilometers,3 and estimat-
ing the coverage of a typical deep- sea image to be approximately 4 square 
meters, we can estimate that to cover the world ocean with detailed optical 
imagery (i.e., create a Google Ocean at a scale commensurate with Google 
Earth), it would take about 90,000,000,000,000 images. Factoring in the time 
it takes to bring a vehicle down and back from the seafloor and the time it 
takes to capture the images, we are looking at something like 200  million 
years to completely image the seafloor using optical techniques – clearly an 
impossible task.
 3 Costello, M.J., Cheung, A., De Hauwere, N., 2010, “Surface Area and Seabed Area, Volume, 
Depth, Slope and Topographic Variation for the World’s Seas, Oceans and Countries,” Envi-
ronmental Science and Technology, v. 44, no. 23, pp. 8821– 8828.
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3 Tools to Map the Seafloor
Given the limits of optical techniques, other means have had to be developed 
to map the oceans’ depths. For thousands of years, depths were measured by 
lowering a weight at the end of a line and then measuring the length of the line 
(lead- line). While such a technique can provide a reasonably accurate measure-
ment of depth in shallow water (less than about 200m), lead- line measurements 
in deep- water (roughly 200m – 11,000m)4 are very inaccurate (if at all possible) 
and very time- consuming (many hours for a single measurement). Such mea-
surements are also very sparse and, in reality only representative of the single 
point that the lead- line landed on. With the invention of sonar between the First 
and Second World Wars, a new technique of “echo- sounding” was developed 
that allowed a much more rapid and accurate determination of ocean depths. 
Unlike electromagnetic waves, sound waves propagate extremely well in ocean 
water and thus a sound pulse at an appropriate frequency generated by a surface 
vessel can travel to even the deepest depths of the ocean, bounce off the seafloor 
and return to a sonar receiver on the vessel. If the speed of sound in seawater 
is known (it is easily measured), then the travel time of the sound wave from 
the seafloor and back can be converted to an estimate of depth. At the speed at 
which sound travels in seawater (nominally 1500 m/ sec), even measurements in 
the deepest parts of the ocean take only a few seconds to make. With the advent 
of ships’ echo- sounders, (single beam sonars) hydroacoustic measurements of 
ocean depths became much more frequent. Ships transiting the world’s oceans 
standardly ran their echo- sounders in order to support safe navigation.
As the technology to collect bathymetric data evolved, so too did the desire 
to compile these measurements into maps of the seafloor. In 1903, Prince Al-
bert i of Monaco, in collaboration with Professor Julien Thoulet of the Univer-
sity of Nancy created the General Bathymetric Chart of the Ocean (gebco), a 
Monaco- based organization dedicated to the production of publicly available 
charts of the world’s oceans. gebco continues to this day as a project of the 
International Hydrographic Organization (iho) and the Intergovernmental 
 4 For this discussion, “deep” water will be considered depths greater than 200m (typically 
deeper than the edge of the geological continental shelf) to depth of 11,000m – the approxi-
mate depth of the deepest known point in the oceans – the Challenger Deep of the Marian-
as Trench. The depth of the trench as measured by modern multibeam sonar was 10,984m 
+/ - 25m (Gardner, J., Armstrong, J.V., Calder, B.R., and Beaudoin, J., 2014, “So How Deep is 
the Mariana Trench,” Marine Geodesy, 37:1– 13, 2014 Copyright© Taylor & Francis Group, ll-





Oceanographic Commission (ioc) and is still supported by the royal family of 
Monaco. The products of gebco have evolved over the years from charts con-
taining a few sparse lead- line soundings to charts based on single- beam echo- 
sounder data and finally, since 1994, the incorporation of multibeam echo- 
sounder data. As mentioned above, however, the latest release of the gebco 
map (gebco 20195 – now a digital product), despite attempts to compile as 
much data as is available, has modern multibeam echo- sounder data coverage 
for only approximately 15% of the world ocean, meaning that most of the sea-
floor has never been directly mapped at adequate resolution.
4 Where Do Those Beautiful Maps of the World’s Ocean Seafloor 
Come From?
If high- resolution multibeam echo- sounder data exists for only approximately 
15% of the world’s oceans, where then do the beautiful maps we often see of 
the ocean basins come from? (Figure 8.1 –  left).
 5 gebco_ 2019, “Gridded Bathymetry Data” <https:// www.gebco.net/ data_ and_ products/ grid-
ded_ bathymetry_ data/ >.
 figure 8.1  “Bathy- Globe”, an application developed at the Center for Coastal and Ocean 
Mapping that shows the world ocean bathymetry derived from satellite altimetry 
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Maps like those shown in Figure 8.1 (left) are typically derived from com-
piling all available single- and multibeam echo- sounding data (again cover-
ing only about 15% if the world’s seafloor) and then combining that with a 
background that is “predicted” bathymetry from satellite altimetry. Predicted 
bathymetry from satellite altimetry is based on the fact that the sea surface 
will respond to the gravitational attraction of features on the seafloor. If a large 
mountain (seamount) on the seafloor contains excess mass, the gravitation-
al attraction of the feature pushes the sea surface up above its neutral level. 
If there is a deep trench in the seafloor, the absence of mass, also creates a 
change in the gravity signal that results in a depression of the sea surface. Sen-
sitive altimeters that measure the height of the sea surface can then be used to 
provide a rough indication of the depth of the ocean.6 The bathymetry derived 
from this approach has offered an unprecedented global view of the major fea-
tures of the ocean basins (ridges and deep trenches). However, this approach 
can only resolve features that are very large (on the order of 10 – 15 km later-
ally) with a depth accuracy of a few hundred meters or worse.7 And so while 
predicted bathymetry from satellite altimetry offers a beautiful image of the 
major ocean features, the resolution and accuracy it provides is not enough to 
support many needs for seafloor mapping data, including the detail needed for 
understanding benthic habitat and biodiversity, for understanding deep- sea 
hazards, for predicting tsunami and storm surge inundation and many other 
applications (Figure 8.2).
In addition to high- resolution bathymetry, modern multibeam echo- 
sounders are also capable of collecting another type of information that di-
rectly relates to the nature of the seafloor (i.e., the seafloor bottom type). This 
information, called “backscatter,” is a measure of the strength or amplitude 
of the echo returned from the bottom. The backscatter will vary as a function 
of seafloor type (rock, mud, sand, gravel, etc.) and while the interpretation of 
backscatter is complex, it can be used to gain important insight into the nature 
 6 Smith, W. H. F., and D. T. Sandwell, “Global seafloor topography from satellite altimetry and 
ship depth soundings,” Science, v. 277, p. 1957– 1962, 26 Sept. 1997.
 7 When Malaysian Air Flight MH370 was lost over the Indian Ocean, the only maps available 
for the region were based for the most part only on predicted bathymetry from satellite 
altimetry. When multibeam echo- sounders were brought in to map the region they found 
that in some areas the predicted bathymetry was as much as 1000m different from the ac-
tual depths – see: Picard K., Brooke B.P., Harris P.T., Siwabessy P.J.W., Coffin M.F., Tran M., 
Spinoccia M., Sullivan J.  2018, “Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 search data reveal geomor-









of the seafloor, another key parameter in understanding benthic habitat and 
biodiversity. Finally, the latest generation of multibeam echo- sounders also of-
fer the opportunity to directly map targets in the water column. Water- column 
mapping has provided the ability to directly measure the distribution and 
behavior of fish and plankton, has been used to measure natural and man- 
made gas seeps (playing an important role in efforts to control the Deepwater 
Horizon spill), and can even discern fine- scale oceanographic structure in the 
water column.8 (Figure 8.3)
5 How Feasible Is It To Map the Entire Seafloor?
And so we have a suite of hydroacoustic tools that can map the seafloor and 
the water column at the scale needed to support efforts for sustainable devel-
opment of the oceans and to meet the primary objectives outlined in the UN 
Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development. However, as previous-
ly discussed, only about 15% of the world’s oceans have been mapped with 
 figure 8.2  Comparison of predicted bathymetry from satellite altimetry for 200 km x 200 
km area of seafloor (left) with single swath of multibeam sonar data (right) from 
same area. Note detail on seafloor structure provided by multibeam sonar data 
that is not available in the predicted bathymetry.
 8 Mayer, L.A., Li, Yanchao, and Melvin, G., 2002, “3- D visualization for pelagic fisheries assess-
ment and research,” ICES Journal of Marine Science, vol. 59, pp. 216– 225; Weber, T. C., Mayer, 
L., Jerram, K., Beaudoin, J., Rzhanov, Y., and Lovalvo, D. (2014), “Acoustic estimates of meth-
ane gas flux from the seabed in a 6000 km2 region in the Northern Gulf of Mexico,” Geochem. 
Geophys. Geosyst., 15, 1911– 1925, doi:10.1002/ 2014GC005271; Stranne, C., Mayer, L.A., Weber, 
T.C., Ruddick, B.R., Jakobsson, M.J., Jeram, K., Weidner, E., Nilsson, J. and Gardfeldt, K., 2017, 
Acoustic mapping of thermohaline staircases in the Arctic Ocean, Nature Scientific Reports, 
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these tools. Recognizing this poor state of our knowledge of ocean depths and 
the critical role such knowledge plays in understanding and maintaining our 
planet, gebco and the Nippon Foundation have joined forces to establish the 
Nippon Foundation/ gebco Seabed 2030 Project, an international effort with 
the objective of producing the definitive map of the world’s oceans by 2030.9 
The Seabed 2030 Project has established globally distributed regional data as-
sembly and coordination centers (in Sweden, New Zealand, Germany and the 
United States) that are actively identifying existing data that are not currently 
publicly available and working to make these data available. A  Global Data 
Assembly and Coordination Center (in the United Kingdom) is integrating the 
data into a global grid (called the gebco grid) for freely available, worldwide 
distribution.10 At the start of the Seabed 2030 project in late 2017, the gebco 
database contained modern multibeam echo- sounder data from only about 
6% of the deep- sea floor. With the first update of the gebco grid processed 
by Seabed 2030 and made public in early May 2019, the data holdings have 
 figure 8.3  Water column capabilities of multibeam sonar including depiction of rig 
structure on seafloor (upper left), fish aggregations – middle two upper (Atlantic 
herring, upper; and walleye pollock lower) and lower left (Atlantic herring), 
bubbles in breaking waves (upper right), gas seeps (mid right) and eel grass 
(lower right)
  source: from tom weber, ccom unh
 9 <https:// seabed2030.gebco.net/ >.







more than doubled, but as outlined above, still only represent about 15% of the 
seafloor. The effort will continue to identify existing data but there will soon 
be little more of these data available. In the coming years efforts must turn to 
encouraging and facilitating the collection of new data in the many regions of 
the world that have yet to be surveyed.
The complete mapping of the yet unsurveyed regions of the world’s oceans 
is an ambitious task. Modern multibeam echo- sounders capable of mapping 
the deep sea are large and expensive and are typically mounted on large (> 
50m) vessels that are in themselves expensive to operate. It has been estimat-
ed that to map the deep (>200 m) portions of the world’s ocean seafloor us-
ing current day technology would take more than 300 ship years and cost on 
the order of three to five billion dollars.11 While this may seem an implausible 
amount to be directed to the mapping of the world’s oceans, it is on the order 
of the cost of a single Mars mission of which there have been many, including 
missions that have mapped Mars to far better resolution and coverage than our 
own earth. In this context it should not be unthinkable that an international 
effort can be mounted to see our own planet mapped, particularly in light of 
the growing recognition of the critical need to map the entire seafloor in sup-
port of UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.
One approach to fulfilling this goal is to take advantage of the fact that sev-
eral hundred research and commercial vessels are currently equipped with 
modern multibeam echo- sounding equipment but do not necessarily collect 
mapping data when transiting from one work area to another. One of the goals 
of the Seabed 2030 program is to ensure that these vessels do collect data 
during these transits and make these data freely available to the general pub-
lic. Progress has already been made in this area with several commercial enti-
ties agreeing to provide transit data to the Seabed 2030 project.12 Additionally, 
the Seabed 2030 project has been able to place operators on research vessels 
that, in transit, had not planned on collecting mapping data.13 Another aspect 
of bringing the goal of mapping the world’s oceans to reality is to call upon 
technological innovation. The estimate for the cost and level of effort associ-
ated with the complete mapping of the world ocean was made using current 
technology and thus is a conservative approach. New technologies, however, 
may lead to gained efficiencies and lower costs. Leading among these is the 
 11 Mayer – Geoscience –  2018.
 12 For example, the global survey company Fugro has already submitted more than 450,000 
sq. km of transit mapping data to Seabed 2030 and has committed to continue to con-
tinue to do so.
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potential use of autonomous vehicles (including autonomous sailing vessels) 
that can be deployed for many months, surveying the most remote areas of the 
oceans 24 hours per day (without the need to return to port) and transmitting 
data via satellite back to a control center (Figure 8.4). Using such technology, 
the overall cost of mapping the entire deep- sea floor may be reduced and the 
logistical and financial challenges of meeting this ambitious goal lessened.
6 Will Interpretation of the Law of the Sea Convention Stand in the 
Way of Mapping the World Ocean?
While the technical, logistical, and fiscal details of mapping the entire world 
ocean’s seafloor are challenging, they are manageable, and with technological 
innovation may make the ambitious goal of collecting the full geospatial con-
text for the ocean basins feasible. A more difficult barrier to provide this im-
portant information to the global community, however, may lie in how coastal 
states interpret the Marine Scientific Research regime of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. The fundamental problem lies with the interpretation by some 
coastal States that the collection of underway bathymetry, no matter what 
the purpose of the collection, represents Marine Scientific Research (msr). 
Such an interpretation requires that those collecting bathymetric data while 
on passage through either the Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) or the Conti-
nental Shelf (we will refer to the juridical continental shelf as the Extended 





Continental Shelf or ecs to distinguish it from the geological continental 
shelf) receive consent from the coastal state under the provisions of Part 
xiii of the Law of the Sea Convention.14 While article 246 of the Convention 
states that:
3. Coastal States shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for 
marine scientific research projects by other States or competent interna-
tional organizations in their exclusive economic zone or on their conti-
nental shelf to be carried out in accordance with this Convention exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge 
of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind. To this end, 
coastal States shall establish rules and procedures ensuring that such 
consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably.15
The reality of practice is that, as discussed by Long,16 the process for seek-
ing and receiving clearances from most coastal states, even within the EU, is 
cumbersome and time- consuming; globally the problem is far worse. The re-
quest for clearance to do msr can be manageable for a research expedition 
that works in the eez or ecs of one or two coastal States, but consider the 
situation where a vessel is transiting from Japan to Indonesia. In this case, the 
vessel would travel through the eez s (and ecs s) of six or seven coastal states 
(depending on the route taken, see Figure 8.5). If the collection of bathymetric 
data in support of the production of a global map of the seafloor to serve as the 
foundation for long- term management and protection of the oceans is con-
sidered msr, current process and practice would make this task an extremely 
difficult one.
We are thus faced with a serious quandary. On the one hand, the United 
Nations has clearly stated that the complete mapping of the world’s oceans is 
a critical component of achieving UN Sustainable Goal 14 and a primary goal 
 14 The faq section of the Seabed 2030 Project states that “initial efforts will focus on 
mapping the 93% of the ocean deeper than 200 meters, leaving national hydrographic 
agencies to cover waters closer to shore.” <https:// seabed2030.gebco.net/ faq/ #q6>. msr 
in the territorial sea requires the express consent of the coastal State. los Convention 
article 245.
 15 UN Convention on The Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, entered into force Nov. 
10, 1994, 1833 unts 397, Part xiii, Article 246.
 16 Long, Ronán, “Regulating Marine Scientific Research in the European Union:  It Takes 
More than Two to Tango,” in:  Myron Nordquist, J.  Norton Moore, Alfred A.  Soons, and 
Hak- So Kim (eds.), The Law of the Sea Convention: US Accession and Globalization. Leiden/ 
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of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development. On the oth-
er hand, certain interpretations of Part xiii of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea may greatly impede the achievement of this goal. The msr regime of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea is irrefutable; however, there may be an 
approach that fully respects the tenants of Part xiii, but still allows the collec-
tion of data critically needed to improve our ability to manage and sustain our 
oceans.
7 Is the Collection of Underway Bathymetry in Support of a Freely 
Available Map of the World’s Oceans MSR?
The key to the solution of this quandary lies in the absence of a definition 
of msr in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. In not defining msr in the 
Convention, the drafters created an ambiguous situation that has led to a wide 
range of interpretations of the meaning. These ambiguities and their broad 




implications have been addressed in detail by several authors.17 Interpretation 
of what is and is not msr varies broadly amongst coastal States, ranging from 
those that support the concept of full freedom of research to those that very 
strictly enforce coastal State consent with respect to most any data collection 
conducted in their eez and/ or ecs.
In presenting the US perspective on msr, Roach18 has offered powerful ar-
guments that certain types of marine data collection should not be considered 
msr under the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Among the data collection 
types that Roach proposes are not msr are hydrographic surveys. In Defini-
tions for the Law of the Sea,19 hydrographic surveys are defined as:
the science of measuring and depicting those parameters necessary to 
describe the precise nature and configuration of the seabed and coastal 
strip, its geographical relationship to the land mass, and the characteris-
tics and dynamics of the sea. … Hydrographic surveys may be necessary 
to determine the features that constitute baselines or basepoints and 
their geographical position.
In determining that hydrographic surveys are not msr, Roach’s arguments fo-
cus on the distinction between survey activities and msr, citing Article 19(2)
(j) of the Law of the Sea Convention which explicitly distinguishes between 
“research or survey activities” and Article 21(1)(g) which again distinguishes 
between “marine research and hydrographic surveys” in discussing innocent 
passage in the territorial sea. Also, Article 40 distinguishes between “research 
and survey activities” both in its title and in its discussion of “marine scientif-
ic research and hydrographic survey ships” which may not carry out “any re-
search or survey activities in straits without prior coastal state authorization.” 
As Roach points out, the drafters of the Convention thus clearly knew the dis-
tinction between research and surveys and used this distinction to ensure lim-
its on survey activity in some regimes (straits used for international navigation, 
 17 Soons. A, 1989, “Marine Scientific Research Provisions in the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: Issues of Interpretation” in Brown and Churchill (eds.) The UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea: Impact and Implementation (Law of the Sea Institute, William S. Richardson 
School of Law, Honolulu, hi); Roach, J.A., “Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of 
the Sea,” 1996, Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 59– 72.
 18 Roach, J.A., 2015 “Marine Data Collection: U.S. Perspectives” in M. Nordquist, J.N. Moore, 
R. Beckman, and R. Long, (eds.), Freedom of Navigation and Globalization, (Brill- Nijhoff), 
pp. 285– 302.
 19 Walker, G.K. (ed.), Definitions for the Law of the Sea:  Terms Not Defined by the 1982 







The Quest to Completely Map the World’s Oceans 163
territorial seas, and archipelagic sea lanes) but put no such limitations on sur-
vey activity in the eez or ecs.
Thus, there is strong evidence that hydrographic surveys are not msr and 
thus should not be regulated by the msr regime of Part xiii of the Conven-
tion. If we accept this premise, then one of the key barriers to the collection 
of bathymetric data in support of the creation of a publically available map 
of the world’s oceans to support sustainable development will be removed. 
Research or other vessels, whether manned or autonomous, may conduct sur-
veys in transit across broad stretches of the oceans including the eez and ecs 
of coastal States and collect bathymetric data in support of the creation of a 
freely available global map. Additionally, many modern vessels equipped with 
multibeam echo- sounders use these systems as their primary tool for fulfilling 
their solas Chapter Five, Regulation 19, carriage requirements for shipborne 
navigational systems and equipment.
8 It’s Probably Not That Simple
While the solution proposed above would be a simple step towards providing 
the global community with a complete map of the world’s oceans (much like 
we have for the terrestrial parts of the Earth), and one that we hope would be 
widely accepted, experience gleaned from records of the negotiations at un-
clos iii20 and current practice demonstrate that there will inevitably be some 
coastal States that will not easily accept the proposition that hydrographic sur-
veying in their eez or ecs should be without prior consent. Recognizing this 
to be the case, we offer a compromise solution that accepts that hydrographic 
surveying is not msr (and thus does not require consent) but involves prior 
notification of activity through a central database and the ability of a coastal 
state to assert some level of control over the distribution of data collected in 
their eez or ecs should they deem it sensitive. Such an approach would re-
move the long lead times and cumbersome processes (which vary from state 
to state) necessary to receive consent, and would greatly enhance our ability 
to serve the needs of the global community in providing a freely available map 
of the world ocean.
The approach we propose is similar to that developed for the Argo Float 
Program, an international effort that has deployed almost 4,000 free- floating 
 20 unclos iii, Vol. vi, Summary Record of Meetings Third Committee, 30th Meeting, Sept. 
14, 1976, pp. 95– 100 <https:// legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ diplomaticconferences/ 1973_ los/ 






devices that profile the ocean continuously collecting environmental data like 
temperature and salinity.21 The observations made by Argo floats are critical 
components of global ocean and weather forecast models and, like a global 
bathymetric database, are essential to understanding and modeling current 
and future oceanic and climatic conditions. These floats are deployed from 
surface vessels and then drift freely for several years, submerging themselves 
to collect profiles of environmental data and then transmitting the data by sat-
ellite to a data reception center. While most often deployed in regions beyond 
national jurisdiction, they can often drift into the eez or ecs of a coastal state. 
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of unesco (ioc) spent 
several years debating the legal framework for the collection of data from Argo 
floats and eventually adopted guidelines for their operation.22 The guidelines 
basically provide that those deploying Argo floats must coordinate the deploy-
ment of floats through an Argo Information Center (aic – a body specifically 
established by the ioc to coordinate the deployment of floats), which in turn 
will notify, if notification is requested,23 a designated point of contact in the 
coastal State that an Argo float may enter its eez. Guideline 4 states that all 
data collected by the Argo floats will be freely available, though the coastal 
State may restrict the release of data for a limited amount of time if the data 
are of direct significance to the exploration and exploitation of living or non- 
living natural resources. (The legal aspects of the Argo Float Program and a dis-
cussion of the ioc guidelines can be found in Maeos and Montserrat (2010).)24
With respect to bathymetric surveying during transits, a similar mechanism 
can easily be established. In the bathymetric case, the gebco/ Nippon Founda-
tion Seabed 2030 program already offers a structure that can easily implement 
a notification system. As outlined earlier, the gebco/ Nippon Foundation Sea-
bed 2030 program will be the focal point for data collection for the creation of 
the definitive map of the world oceans. Its Global Data Center, hosted at the 
British Oceanographic Data Centre, National Oceanography Centre, South-
ampton, U.K.,25 will serve to distribute data products (gebco grids) but at the 
same time will establish a series of web- based tools that provide information 
on existing bathymetric coverage so that precious ship time is not wasted by 
duplicating tracks where data already exists. It can also easily become the 
 21 http:// www.argo.ucsd.edu/ About_ Argo.html.
 22 ioc Executive Council Resolution ec- xli.4 Annex (2018) <http:// ioc- unesco.org/ index.
php?option=com_ oe&task=viewDocumentRecord&docID=21855>.
 23 It is understood that very few coastal States have requested to be notified.












The Quest to Completely Map the World’s Oceans 165
focal point for dissemination of information on planned bathymetric survey 
transects in support of its global mapping effort. As a project of the iho and 
the ioc, the gebco/ Nippon Foundation Seabed 2030 project can coordinate 
these efforts with the Member States with the point of contact in each Mem-
ber State being their representative to the iho. A website can be provided that 
shows current and planned ship tracks for all bathymetric surveys associated 
with the project and those Member States that specifically request notification 
can be alerted by the Global Data Center of upcoming transits that may be 
in their eez or ecs. The Global Data Center can also arrange for the coastal 
State to review the data before it is included in the global mapping product 
and make arrangements for the management of those data (e.g., only include 
it at reduced resolution) if deemed sensitive to the coastal State.
The importance of the collection of hydrographic survey data has long been 
recognized by the UN and the global community. In 2012, well before the state-
ments made about the need for global ocean mapping to support UN Sustain-
able Goal 14 and the UN Decade of Ocean Science, the UN General Assembly in 
its annual resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea noted:26
Recognizing further that hydrographic surveys and nautical charting are 
critical to the safety of navigation and life at sea, environmental protec-
tion, including the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems, and the 
economics of the global shipping industry, and encouraging further ef-
forts towards electronic charting, which not only provides significantly 
increased benefits for safe navigation and management of ship move-
ment, but also provides data and information that can be used for sus-
tainable fisheries activities and other sectoral uses of the marine envi-
ronment, the delimitation of maritime boundaries and environmental 
protection. …
The same resolution also encourages efforts to build capacity in the area of 
surveying for developing States, as follows:
Encourages intensified efforts to build capacity for developing countries, 
in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing 
 26 unga resolution A/ res/ 67/ 78, Dec. 11, 2012. Similar statements appear in earlier reso-
lutions A/ res/ 66/ 231, A/ res/ 65/ 37A, A/ res/ 64/ 71, A/ res/ 63/ 111, A/ res/ 62/ 215, A/ res/ 
61/ 222, A/ res/ 60/ 30, A/ res/ 59/ 24 and A/ res/ 58/ 240, available through links at <https:// 




States, as well as coastal African States, to improve hydrographic services 
and the production of nautical charts, including electronic charts.
The proposed approach to gathering bathymetric data and making it public-
ly available would serve to provide key bathymetric data and products to all 
developing States. In addition, through the Seabed 2030 Global Data Center, 
developing States would be able to make requests for the collection of tran-
sit bathymetric data in regions of particular relevance to them and then work 
with those collecting the data to include young surveyors on the transits to 
build local capacity. The contribution of local data to a publicly available high- 
resolution bathymetric database can be of tremendous benefit to developing 
States as it can be used by modelers world- wide to generate more accurate 
models of potential tectonic activity and tsunami inundation in their waters.
9 Concluding Statement
The well- being of mankind is inextricably linked to the health of the oceans. 
Our ability to maintain ocean health is dependent on our understanding of the 
complex physical, chemical and biological interactions that take place in the 
vast ocean system. But as we embark on the UN Decade of Ocean Science in 
Support of Sustainable Development and global ocean observation programs 
that try to understand these interactions, we are trying to do so with only a min-
imal understanding of the geospatial context within which our observations 
are made. Imagine trying to predict weather patterns without knowing where 
the mountains and valleys are, or predict where flooding will occur without 
a topographic map. This is the situation we face in the oceans. We have high- 
resolution mapping data for only about 15 percent of the three quarters of our 
planet that is covered by water. Recognizing this situation, an international ef-
fort, Seabed 2030, has been undertaken to attempt to produce a freely available 
comprehensive map of the world ocean by the year 2030. This is an ambitious 
undertaking that will benefit all of mankind; but for this goal to be achieved we 
will need ensure that the collection of the data needed to produce such maps 
will not be impeded. The recognition that the collection of bathymetric data 
in support of such a global map is not msr under the context of Part xiii of 
the Law of the Sea Treaty would go a long way to help meet this critical goal.
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 chapter 9
Mitigating Human Impacts on Marine Biodiversity 
Beyond National Jurisdiction
Potential Benefits of the International Legally Binding Instrument
Robin Warner
 Abstract
Environmental impact assessment (eia) is a critical element in the suite of tools for 
biodiversity conservation, and its application to activities affecting the marine envi-
ronment is endorsed in many international law instruments, policy statements by gov-
ernments and international organisations and the decisions of international tribunals. 
While governance structures will generally exist to facilitate environmental assess-
ment in marine areas within national jurisdiction closer to the shore, these structures 
are still developing for marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj). This chapter 
reviews the existing international law and policy framework for eia in abnj highlight-
ing key gaps in legal and institutional coverage at global, regional and sectoral levels. It 
explores the complex challenges involved in implementing eia in abnj and the steps 
that have been taken within particular sectors to develop a more comprehensive and 
robust legal framework for eia in these extensive areas of the ocean. Finally, it discuss-
es the options for incorporating eia provisions in the internationally legally binding 
instrument for conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in abnj cur-
rently being negotiated in the United Nations.
 Keywords
Marine biodiversity  – areas beyond national jurisdiction  – environmental impact 
assessment  – conservation  – marine environment  – international law  – United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Convention on Biological Diversity
1 Introduction
Assessing the impact of human activities on the marine environment in-
troduces additional challenges to those confronted on land. Many of these 
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differences stem from the three- dimensional nature of the marine environ-
ment with its great depths, pressure and lack of light beneath the photic zone. 
Others relate to the slow growth rates of many marine organisms leading to 
delays in recovery from impacts and the extensive interconnections between 
marine ecosystems compounding the adverse effects of the initial impact. In 
addition to these physical challenges, there are practical challenges in assess-
ing the impacts of activities which occur in remote locations far from land 
with scant logistical support.
Notwithstanding these significant challenges, global and regional organiza-
tions and national governments have devised some governance structures to 
underpin the measurement of human impacts on the marine environment. 
These encompass legally binding instruments at global and regional levels and 
national legislation supplemented by non- binding guidelines and other policy 
documents. In addition, customs of practice have developed for environmen-
tal assessment in different marine sectors.
2 International Law Framework for Environmental Assessment1 
in abnj2
Environmental impact assessment is acknowledged as a key element in the 
suite of tools for biodiversity conservation, and its application to activities 
affecting the marine environment has been endorsed in many international 
law instruments, policy statements by governments and international organi-
sations and the decisions of international tribunals.3 For abnj, however, many 
of these instruments and decisions discuss general obligations to conduct eia 
 1 In this chapter, the term “environmental assessment” is used to refer to all facets of measur-
ing the impact of human activities on the environment. This includes the typical process of 
prior environmental impact assessment and extends to through and post activity monitoring 
of environmental impacts. Within those processes the term environmental assessment also 
encompasses the conduct of environmental baseline studies and the measurement of single 
as well as cumulative impacts on marine environments over time. Cross jurisdictional appli-
cation of eia and strategic environmental assessment (sea) of plans, programmes, and pol-
icies likely to impact the marine environment over longer periods and broader geographical 
areas are also included in the term environmental assessment.
 2 Marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj) include both the high seas water column 
and the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area).
 3 These instruments include the regional seas conventions, the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (losc), the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (unfsa) and the Interna-
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rather than specific implementing provisions or underpinning institutional 
infrastructure.
2.1 Global Instruments
2.1.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc)
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc) imposes 
a general obligation on States Parties to assess the potential effects of activ-
ities under their jurisdiction or control that may cause substantial pollution 
of, or significant and harmful changes to, the marine environment. Although 
the general obligation to conduct environmental assessment of activities with 
the potential for significant and harmful impacts on the marine environment 
is well established in both customary and conventional international law, im-
plementation of this obligation for marine areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(abnj)4 is fragmented between different sectors and regions. There is no over-
arching international agreement which develops in more specific terms the 
obligation contained in Article 206 of the losc to assess the potential effects 
of planned activities under States’ jurisdiction or control in abnj. The losc 
obligations are broad in scope extending to all parts of the marine environment 
but there are no detailed methodological or procedural requirements specified 
for environmental assessment in marine and coastal areas. States Parties have 
a duty to publish reports of assessments to “competent international organiza-
tions,” but these organizations are not specified and the timescale for provision 
of reports is not prescribed. Similarly, institutional coverage for abnj under 
the losc is far from comprehensive with no global body having overarching 
responsibility for protection and preservation of the marine environment or 
conservation of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. The Inter-
national Seabed Authority (isa) has comprehensive environmental protection 
powers for seabed mining activities affecting the Area, but this advanced en-
vironmental governance situation for the deep seabed beyond national juris-
diction is not matched by a global institution with comparable environmental 
protection powers for the high seas water column. These general obligations 
to conduct environmental assessment and monitoring under the losc must 
therefore be read in conjunction with the more specific environmental prin-
ciples and procedural provisions which have been developed in international 
environmental law instruments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(cbd) and its eia- associated guidelines.
 4 Marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj) include both the high seas water column 






2.1.2 Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd)
The Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd) establishes a link between the 
fundamental obligation of Contracting Parties to conserve biodiversity in-
cluding marine biodiversity and the conduct of environmental assessment 
and monitoring. Contracting Parties must introduce appropriate procedures 
requiring eia of proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse 
effects on biodiversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects (Arti-
cle 14 (1)(a)). Having identified processes and activities which have or are likely 
to have significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, Contracting Parties are also required to monitor their ef-
fects through sampling and other techniques (Article 7(c)). These obligations 
apply to processes and activities carried out under the jurisdiction or control 
of Contracting Parties in all parts of the marine and terrestrial environment, 
regardless of where their effects occur (Art. 4(b)) The critical importance of 
collaboration between States in minimizing adverse impacts to biodiversity 
in transboundary areas and areas beyond national jurisdiction is emphasized 
in Article 14(1)(c) which requires Contracting Parties to promote reciprocal 
notification, exchange of information and consultation on activities under 
their jurisdiction or control which are likely to significantly affect adversely 
the biological diversity of other States or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. In the case of imminent or grave danger or damage, originating 
under their jurisdiction or control, to biodiversity under the jurisdiction of 
other States or in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, Contracting 
Parties must notify immediately the potentially affected States as well as initi-
ate action to prevent or minimize such danger or damage.
The obligations in the cbd have been elaborated in Voluntary Guidelines on 
Biodiversity- Inclusive Impact Assessment (cbd Guidelines) that emphasize 
the importance of including biodiversity- related criteria in the screening pro-
cess.5 The Guidelines reflect a best practice standard for eia s of activities with 
the potential to significantly affect all aspects of biodiversity, including those 
components situated in abnj. They depend on a detailed level of knowledge 
of species, habitats and ecosystems and their interconnections in a particular 
marine area. A process has also been undertaken in the cbd to define the spe-
cial considerations to be taken into account in eia s of activities with the po-
tential to significantly affect biodiversity in marine and coastal areas, includ-
ing abnj. The Conference of the Parties of the cbd has also been proactive in 
 5 Biodiversity in Impact Assessment. Background Document to Decision viii/ 28 of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity- Inclusive Impact As-
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investigating the scientific and technical aspects of eia for activities in abnj. 
It convened an Expert Workshop on Scientific and Technical Elements of the 
cbd eia Guidelines which focused on abnj in November 2009.6 This high-
lighted some of the governance and practical challenges related to the imple-
mentation of eia for activities in abnj.
It emphasised the practical difficulties associated with conducting eia s 
including:
– The industry proposing the activity and the national flag State jurisdiction 
are often far from the marine area affected;
– The conduct of eia and management, control, monitoring, surveillance and 
follow- up activity were likely to be more costly and may be less effective for 
a given budget; and
– Capacity building needs for eia in abnj would be greater as customs of 
practice are less established, methodologies less mature, and multiple as-
sessment cultures may converge in the same area.7
The complex and fragmentary nature of the law and institutions governing 
abnj were accentuated, including:
– The split legal framework for abnj – high seas (losc Part vii) and deep 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction – the Area (losc Part xi and Part xi 
Implementation Agreement);
– The diverse institutional framework for abnj including States, non- State 
actors and global and regional organizations and the need for cooperation 
between all these actors to conserve biodiversity;
– The fact that stakeholders are harder to define for abnj because communi-
ties do not have immediate proximity to these areas; and
– The variable standards of compliance among states with environmental as-
sessment obligations in international conventions.8
The Workshop’s Report was considered by the tenth Conference of Parties of 
the cbd in 2010 which endorsed the development of voluntary guidelines for 
the consideration of biodiversity in eia s for marine and coastal areas draw-
ing on the guidance from the Workshop.9 Guidelines were then developed 
for all marine and coastal areas rather than simply for abnj emphasising the 
 6 Report of the Expert Workshop on Scientific and Technical Aspects relevant to Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment in Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, unep/ cbd/ ew- eia-
ma/ 2, 20 November 2009, <http:// www.cbd.int/ doc/ ?metting=EWEIAMA- 01>.
 7 Ibid., Annex ii, paras. 10– 14.
 8 Ibid., Annex ii, paras. 7– 9.
 9 Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, unep/ cbd/ cop/ 10/ 27, 20 January 2011, Annex, Decision x/ 29, para. 50, <http:// 










interconnections between ocean ecosystems across jurisdictional boundaries 
and endorsed by the eleventh cop of the cbd in 2012.10 This initiative rep-
resents an important step in defining the special characteristics of eia for ac-
tivities in abnj and provides an initial repository for scientific and technical 
information on eia for all sectors operating in abnj.
2.1.3 unep Goals and Principles of eia (unep Principles)
The 1987 unep Principles represent one of the earliest global elaborations of 
the objectives and fundamental procedures encompassed in eia.11 They pro-
vide an internationally accepted model of the minimum requirements for ef-
fective eia. Principle 1 specifies that an eia should include:
– A description of the proposed activity;
– A description of the potentially affected environment, including specific in-
formation necessary for identifying and assessing the environmental effects 
of the proposed activity;
– A description of the practical alternatives, as appropriate;
– An assessment of the likely or potential environmental impacts of the pro-
posed activity and alternatives, including the direct, indirect, cumulative, 
short- term and long- term effects;
– An identification and description of measures available to mitigate adverse 
environmental impacts of the proposed activity and alternatives, and an as-
sessment of those measures;
– An indication of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties that may be encoun-
tered in compiling the required information; and
– An indication whether the environment of any other state or of abnj are 
likely to be affected by the proposed activity or alternatives.
The general obligation to consult with interested stakeholders on an eia be-
fore a decision is made to proceed with an activity is recognized in Principle 
7 which provides that “… government agencies, members of the public, ex-
perts in relevant disciplines and interested groups should be allowed appro-
priate opportunity to comment on the eia.” For activities affecting the ma-
rine areas of abnj, this immediately raises the question of who qualifies as 
an interested stakeholder particularly for abnj and which global, regional or 
 10 Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, unep/ cbd/ cop/ 11/ 27, 5 December 2012, Annex, Decision xi/ 18, p. 7, 
<http:// www.cbd.int/ cop/ ?11=cop- 11>.
 11 unep, United Nations Environment Programme Goals and Principles of eia (unep 
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national organization is responsible for administering and responding to such 
consultation.
In relation to decisions or actions taken by the proponent following an eia, 
the unep Principles adopt a due diligence approach requiring the proponent 
to fully examine the potential environmental impacts of a particular project 
or activity and give due consideration to the interests of affected parties but 
not imposing a particular decision path on the proponent. Although the unep 
Principles do not extend the proponent’s obligations beyond this due diligence 
approach, it could be argued that if an eia concludes that significant harm is 
likely to marine areas, under the international law duty to prevent transbound-
ary harm set out in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of 
the Rio Declaration and confirmed by the icj in their Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the state conducting such 
an eia would be under a positive obligation to mitigate that harm or refrain 
from the activity.12
2.2 Decisions of International Tribunals
The process of environmental assessment, particularly eia, is one of the means 
by which States can implement a range of international environmental law 
principles. An eia plays a fundamental role in discharging States’ obligations 
to prevent transboundary harm, adopt a precautionary approach and promote 
sustainable development.13 The customary international law status of eia, 
including its marine components, has been discussed in a number of recent 
judgments of the International Court of Justice (icj) and an advisory opinion 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos). In the Gabcikcovo- 
Nagymaros Case the icj considered assessment, notification and consultation, 
effectively the elements of an eia process, to be a necessary step in a State’s 
implementation of the duty to prevent transboundary harm and the concept 
of sustainable development.14 In the Pulp Mills Case, the icj found that:
 12 Declaration of the United Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972 
(1972) 11 ilm 1416; Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, 3 to 14 June 1992, UN Doc A/ conf.151/ 5/ rev.1 (1992) 31 ilm 876; International Court 
of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 
1996, <http:// www.icj- cij.org/ docket/ fi les/ 95/ 7495.pdf phpsessid=244d61421d993dcd-
d51859ee9c657b1b>, 241– 242, para. 29; Neil Craik, The International Law of Environmental 
Impact Assessment (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 67.
 13 Craik, above note 12, 54, 77 and 224.
 14 Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovakia) (1997) icj Rep.  7, para. 141; Alan 
Boyle, “The Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Case:  New Law in Old Bottles” (1997) 8 Yearbook of 









..it may now be considered a requirement under general international 
law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a 
risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse 
impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.15
In the Mox Plant Case, itlos concluded that the United Kingdom had 
breached its obligations under Article 206 of the losc by failing to carry out 
an adequate assessment of the potential impacts of a nuclear fuel reprocess-
ing plant in Cumbria on the marine environment of the Irish Sea.16 The 2011 
advisory opinion of itlos on the “Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area” also 
acknowledged the customary international law status of the obligation to con-
duct eia s for activities with the potential for significant impacts on the marine 
environment, including for abnj, specifically the Area.17
2.3 Regional Instruments
2.3.1 Regional Seas Conventions
There are broad obligations on environmental assessment in most of the unep 
and non- unep regional seas agreements, but only a few regional seas pro-
grams have specific environmental protection responsibilities for abnj areas.18 
Parties to the regional seas conventions are typically responsible for develop-
ing eia guidelines, legislation and processes that prevent or minimize harm-
ful effects on the Convention Area with the assistance of competent global, 
regional and sub- regional organizations. The conventions do not incorporate 
 15 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Case (Argentina/ Uruguay) (Provisional Measures) (2006) 
icj Rep. para. 204.
 16 Mox Plant Case (Provisional Measures) itlos No. 10 (2001), para. 82; Alan Boyle, 
“Environmental Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” 
(2007) 22(3) International Journal for Marine and Coastal Law 377; Marie Cordonnier 
Segger, Marcus Gehring and Andrew Paul Newcombe, Sustainable Development in World 
Investment Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 152.
 17 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and 
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 
1 February 2011, <http:// www.itlos.org/ fileadmin/ itlos/ documents/ cases/ case_ no_ 17/ adv_ 
op_ 010211.pdf>, p. 44, para. 145.
 18 The scope of application of the 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural 
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region (Noumea Convention), the 
1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North- east 
Atlantic (ospar Convention) and the 1995 Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
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screening, scoping and content prescriptions for eia, leaving this responsibil-
ity to the more detailed legislative enactments of their member states. Differ-
ent versions of the duty to notify and consult on eia s with other parties and 
the relevant regional seas organization appear in many of the conventions, but 
most are relatively loose prescriptions urging rather than obligating states to 
disseminate results of eia s and consult with affected parties.
The 1995 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and 
Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention) makes specif-
ic mention of notification and consultation among Contracting Parties where 
activities are likely to have a significant adverse effect on abnj. Article 4(3)(c) 
provides that:
the Contracting Parties shall promote cooperation between and among 
States in environmental impact assessment procedures related to activ-
ities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to have a signif-
icant adverse effect on the marine environment of other States or areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction on the basis of notification, ex-
change of information and consultation.
This provision recognizes the mandatory responsibility of Contracting States 
to protect and preserve the marine environment beyond national jurisdiction 
in their region.
The ospar Commission established to implement the 1992 Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North- east Atlantic (ospar Con-
vention) is moving towards more collaborative arrangements between compe-
tent regional and global authorities for eia and sea of activities, plans, pro-
grammes and policies affecting abnj marine protected areas (mpa s) within 
the convention’s area of responsibility. The ospar Ministerial Meeting in 2010 
established six mpa s in abnj encompassing four seamounts, an area of the 
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction in the southern area of the Char-
lie Gibbs Fracture Zone and an area to the north of the Azores Islands in the 
Atlantic.19 A collective arrangement between ospar and global and regional 
organizations with responsibilities for managing activities such as fisheries, 
deep seabed mining and ships routeing in these mpa s including the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, the International Seabed Authority and 
the International Maritime Organization is in the course of negotiation. Under 
 19 ospar Commission, ospar Network of Marine Protected Areas, <http:www.ospar.org/ con-




this arrangement, joint management plans will be prepared for each of the six 
mpa s including provisions for cooperation on eia s and sea s.20
2.3.2 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Madrid Protocol)
The test applied for screening activities for eia under the Madrid Protocol to 
the Antarctic Treaty is more complex and multi- layered than many other in-
ternational instruments and clearly applies to abnj, although there are signif-
icant exceptions to its application to certain activities. The screening process 
has three levels – the preliminary assessment, initial environmental evaluation 
and comprehensive environmental evaluation.21 A preliminary assessment is 
carried out at the national level for all activities subject to the Protocol with 
less than a minor or transitory impact. If an activity has no more than a minor 
or transitory impact, an initial environmental evaluation must be carried out, 
and if it has more than a minor or transitory impact, a comprehensive environ-
mental evaluation must be carried out. All activities, both governmental and 
non- governmental, in the Antarctic treaty area (south of 60° S latitude) are 
subject to these provisions, except for fishing, sealing, whaling and emergency 
operations as these are covered by other international instruments.22
2.4 Sectoral Frameworks for Environmental Assessment in abnj
The principal sectors of activity in abnj, fishing, shipping, and deep seabed 
mining, have prescribed limited environmental assessment measures for some 
of their activities, however for some newer activities such as bio- prospecting, 
already taking place in abnj, there are no mandatory environmental impact 
assessment instruments or processes.
2.4.1 Fisheries Sector
Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement must assess the impacts of fishing, 
other human activities and environmental factors on target stocks and species 
 20 “Designation and Management of ospar mpa s Beyond National Jurisdiction in the 
North- East Atlantic,” Presentation by Dr.  Henning von Nordheim and Tim Packeiser, 
iucn/ German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation Seminar on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction, 3– 6 December 2011, 
Bonn, Germany.
 21 Madrid Protocol, Article 8(1); K.  Bastmeijer and R.  Roura, “Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Antarctica,” in K.  Bastmeijer and T.  Koivurova, Theory and Practice 
of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2008), 182.
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belonging to the same ecosystem or associated or dependent ecosystems 
and develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact 
of fishing on non- target and associated or dependent species and their envi-
ronment.23 This obligation has been further elaborated in the 2009 fao In-
ternational Guidelines for the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries in the High 
Seas (Deep Sea Fishing Guidelines), which were developed to help states and 
rfmo s implement a call from the United Nations General Assembly (unga) 
to prevent significant adverse impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems or 
not to authorize the bottom fishing activity to proceed (unga Resolution 61/ 
105 paragraphs 80– 91).24 Significant adverse impacts are defined as those that 
compromise ecosystem integrity (i.e., ecosystem structure or function) in a 
manner that:
 (i) impairs the ability of affected populations to repair themselves;
 (ii) degrades the long- term natural productivity of habitats; and
 (iii) causes, on more than a temporary basis, significant loss of species rich-
ness, habitat or community types.25
The Guidelines also specify that impacts should be evaluated individually, in 
combination and cumulatively.26 They call for states to conduct assessments 
of individual bottom fishing activities and to adopt measures to prevent sig-
nificant adverse impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems (vme s). These 
procedures include identifying areas or features where vme s are known or 
likely to occur, identifying the location of fisheries in relation to these areas 
and features, and then developing data collection and research programmes 
to assess the impact of fishing on target and non- target species and their envi-
ronment.27 The Guidelines list the characteristics of vme s that should be sub-
ject to assessments and give examples of potentially vulnerable species groups, 
communities and habitats, as well as features that potentially support them.28
2.4.2 Shipping Sector
In the shipping sector, only a limited number of activities that ships may en-
gage in beyond national jurisdiction, such as dumping of wastes and ocean 
fertilization, are subject to risk and environmental assessment processes. For 
 23 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 5(d) and 6(3)(d).
 24 fao, International Guidelines for the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas, 
(2009), <http:// www.fao.org/ docrep/ 011/ 0816t/ 0816t00.htm>.
 25 Ibid., 4, para. 17.
 26 Ibid.
 27 Ibid., 9– 11.















States Parties to the London Convention, dumping of non- prohibited sub-
stances is only allowed subject to the requirements of prior environmental 
impact assessment, permitting and ongoing monitoring set out in Annex iii 
of the Convention.29 For States Parties to the London Protocol, dumping of 
all waste and other matter is prohibited, except for five listed categories of 
substances the dumping of which is nevertheless subject to the stringent as-
sessment, permitting and ongoing monitoring requirements of Annex 2 of the 
Protocol.30 Any application for a permit to dump these listed substances must 
be accompanied by an assessment of the sea disposal options, including infor-
mation on waste characteristics, conditions at the proposed dump site, fluxes 
and proposed disposal techniques and specifications about the potential ef-
fects on human health, living resources, amenities and other legitimate uses 
of the sea. These assessments can apply to dumping of wastes in marine areas 
beyond national jurisdiction as well as to areas within national jurisdiction.
A statement adopted by the Scientific Groups of the London Convention 
and London Protocol in July 2007 “noted with concern the potential for ocean 
fertilization activities to have negative impacts on the marine environment and 
human health” and recommended that the parties to the London Convention 
and London Protocol consider the issue with a view to its regulation.31 This 
statement was endorsed by the States Parties during their joint annual meeting 
in November 2007 where the parties agreed that while it was the prerogative 
of each state to consider proposals for ocean fertilization projects on a case- 
by- case basis in accordance with the Convention and/ or Protocol, knowledge 
about the effectiveness and potential environmental impacts of open ocean 
fertilization was currently insufficient to justify large scale projects. They also 
agreed that ocean fertilization fell within their regulatory competence and 
that they would “further study this issue from scientific and legal perspectives 
with a view to its regulation.”32
The ongoing discussions in the London Convention/ London Protocol Sci-
entific Groups concerning ocean fertilization prompted the Conference of 
 29 London Convention, Article iv and Annex iii, available online: <http:// www5.imo.org/ 
SharePoint/ blastDataHelper.asp/ data_ id%3D16925/ LC1972.pdf>.
 30 London Protocol. Article 4 and Annex 2, available online: <http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ au/ 
other/ dfat/ treaties/ 2006/ 11.html>.
 31 lc/ lp Scientific Groups, “Statement of Concern Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Ocean 
to Sequester CO2,” Doc. lc- lp.1/ Circ.14, 13 July 2007.
 32 International Maritime Organization, Report of the 29th Consultative Meeting of the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and 2nd Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 1996 
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the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity at their 9th meeting in 
May 2008 to request parties and urge other governments “in accordance with 
the precautionary approach to ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not 
take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such 
activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global transparent and 
effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for those activities; 
with the exception of small scale scientific research within national jurisdic-
tion.”33 An exception was noted in the case of “small scale scientific research 
studies within coastal waters,” which “should only be authorized if justified 
by the need to gather specific scientific data, and should also be subject to 
a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts of the research studies 
on the marine environment, and be strictly controlled, and not be used for 
generating and selling carbon offsets or any other commercial purposes.”34 
An intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean Fertilization was estab-
lished to develop an Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving 
Ocean Fertilization to provide a mechanism for assessing, on a case- by- case 
basis, whether proposals for ocean fertilization activities represent legitimate 
scientific research.35 The draft Assessment Framework36 was reviewed by the 
Scientific Groups in June 2009 and adopted as a work in progress.37 The draft 
was tabled again during an extraordinary session of the Scientific Groups in 
October 201038 where further revisions were made and it was adopted, by con-
sensus, in a non- binding resolution at the October 2010 meeting of the par-
ties.39 The Assessment Framework (af) is described as a “tool … to determine 
if the proposed activity constitutes legitimate scientific research that is not 
contrary to the [lc/ lp] aims.” It sets out a two- stage process involving an ini-
tial assessment and an environmental assessment. The purpose of the initial 
 33 cop 9 Decision xi/ 16 on Biodiversity and Climate Change, (Presented at the Ninth Meeting 
of the States Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (cop 9), Bonn, 19– 30 May 
2008)  Section C, <http:// www.cbd.int/ decisions/ cop9/ ?m=COP- 09&id=11659&lg=0> on 
27 August 2008.
 34 Ibid.
 35 lc.30/ 16, para. 2.3.
 36 lc/ sg- CO2 3/ 5, annex 2.
 37 lc/ sg 32/ 15, paras. 2.18– 2.29.
 38 See Draft Assessment Framework for Scientific research Involving Ocean Fertilization 
Doc lc/ sg/ es.2, 30 July 2010.
 39 32nd Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (London Convention) 
and 5th Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 1996 Protocol thereto (London Protocol) 
















assessment is to determine whether the proposed ocean fertilization activity 
constitutes legitimate scientific research. To qualify as such the proposed ac-
tivity must have “proper scientific attributes,” which means:
 1. The proposed activity should be designed to answer questions that will 
add to the body of scientific knowledge. Proposals should state their ra-
tionale, research goals, scientific hypotheses and methods, scale, timings 
and locations with clear justification for why the expected outcomes 
cannot reasonably be achieved by other methods;
 2. Economic interests should not influence the design, conduct and/ or out-
comes of the proposed activity. There should not be any financial and/ 
or economic gain arising directly from the experiment or its outcomes. 
This should not preclude payment for services rendered in support of the 
experiment of the future financial impacts of patented technology;
 3. The proposed activity should be subject to scientific peer review at ap-
propriate stages in the assessment process. The outcomes of the scien-
tific peer review should be taken into consideration by the Contracting 
Parties. The peer review methodology should be stated and the outcomes 
of the peer review of successful proposals should be made publicly avail-
able together with the details of the project; and
 4. The proponents of the proposed activity should make a commitment to 
publish the results in peer- reviewed scientific publications and include a 
plan in the proposal to make the data and outcomes publicly available in 
a specified time frame.
Proposals that meet these criteria may then proceed to the next stage, the en-
vironmental assessment that includes requirements of risk management and 
monitoring. The environmental assessment stage entails a number of com-
ponents including the problem formulation, a site selection and description, 
an exposure assessment, an effects assessment, risk characterization and risk 
management sections.40 Only after completion of the environmental assess-
ment is a decision made on whether the proposed activity constitutes legiti-
mate scientific research that is not contrary to the aims of the London Conven-
tion or/ London Protocol. If so, the activity is permitted to proceed. In October 
2013, the Contracting Parties to the London Convention and London Proto-
col adopted an amendment to the Protocol which, when it enters into force, 
will make this risk assessment framework mandatory for all specified marine 
 40 Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization, lc 32/ 
15, Annex 6, pp.  5– 19, <http:// ww.imo.org/ SharePoint/ blastDataHelper.asp/ data_ 
id%3D30641/ AssessmentFramework- annex6- LC- 32- 15.pdf>.
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geoengineering activities.41 The only marine geoengineering activity specified 
at this stage is ocean fertilization.
2.4.3 Deep Seabed Mining Sector
Deep seabed mining activities in abnj are subject to a well- developed frame-
work of environmental assessment obligations. An exploration contractor 
must submit an assessment of the potential environmental impacts of pro-
posed activities with an application for approval of a plan of work together with 
a description of proposed measures for the prevention, reduction, and control 
of possible impacts on the marine environment to the International Seabed 
Authority (isa).42 The Recommendations for the Guidance of the Contractors 
for the Assessment of the Possible Environmental Impacts Arising from Explo-
ration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, issued by the Authority’s Legal and 
Technical Commission in revised form in 2010, specify the particular activities 
of exploration contractors that are subject to eia.43 The sponsoring state for 
an exploration contractor is under a due diligence obligation to ensure that an 
exploration contractor fulfils all these obligations.44
3 Challenges to Implementing Environmental Assessment in abnj
The governance structures underpinning environmental assessment in marine 
areas are directly related to the scheme of maritime jurisdiction and different 
maritime zones prescribed in the losc. The ability of states to fulfil this ob-
ligation in abnj is largely dependent on individual flag States supplemented 
 41 Report of the Working Group on the Proposed Amendment to the London Protocol to 
Regulate Placement of Matter for Ocean fertilization and other Marine Geo- engineering 
Activities, lc Doc 35/ wp.3, 17 October 2013; Philomène Verlaan, “Current Legal 
Developments:  London Convention and London Protocol” (2011) 26(1) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 185– 194.
 42 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature 28 July 1994, 33 ilm 1309 
(entered into force 28 July 1996)  (‘Part xi Implementation Agreement’), Annex, para. 7; 
Regulations for Prospecting and Exploration of Polymetallic Nodules (Polymetallic 
Nodule Regulations), <http:// www.isa.org.jm/ files/ documents/ en/ Regs/ pn- en.pdf>, 
Regulation 18(c) and (d).
 43 Recommendations for the Guidance of Contractors for the Assessment of the Possible 
Environmental Impacts Arising from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, 
http:// www.isa.org.jm/ files/ documents/ EN/ 7Sess/ LTC/ isba_ 7ltc_ 1Rev1.pdf, para 10.
 44 itlos Advisory Opinion, above note 17, 43– 44, paras. 141– 143; Polymetallic Nodules 












by the limited collaborative institutions and mechanisms they have estab-
lished for environmental assessment in abnj. Lack of an integrated system 
of environmental governance for abnj presents considerable problems for 
implementing comprehensive environmental assessment processes in these 
vast areas of the ocean. The predominant form of jurisdiction in abnj is flag 
state jurisdiction. For shipping transiting abnj, it falls to individual flag States 
rather than any regional or global body to regulate and enforce the activities 
of their flag vessels including their impacts on the marine environment. This 
results in variable levels of compliance with environmental standards, and no 
auditing of individual flag State performance or sanctioning of sub- standard 
performance. Many of the stages in an environmental impact assessment pro-
cess require coordinating authorities which are conspicuously lacking in the 
fragmentary and disjunctive system of governance applicable to most abnj 
activities. These stages include the initial screening process to select which ac-
tivities are subject to environmental assessment, the scoping process to decide 
the terms of reference for an environmental assessment, the public notifica-
tion and consultation process to engage relevant stakeholders, the post eia 
decision- making phase and the ongoing monitoring of environmental impacts.
4 Rationale and Objectives for Including eia Elements in the 
International Legally Binding Instrument for Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in abnj (ilbi)
The bbnj Working Group which preceded the Intergovernmental Conference 
negotiating the ilbi discussed reasons for including eia as one of the key com-
ponents in any future Implementing Agreement on the Conservation and Sus-
tainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.45 
A key plank of the rationale for including eia elements is to capture activities 
occurring in abnj that are not already subject to sectoral eia processes, in 
effect, to provide a default eia system for activities such as bio- prospecting 
and marine geoengineering. Another reason for including eia elements is to 
provide best practice standards for eia in abnj where scientific knowledge of 
marine biodiversity is still nascent. Developing best practice standards for eia 
in abnj may well entail the incorporation of new elements into the generally 
 45 Letter from the Co- Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open- ended Informal Working Group to study 
issues related to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction to the President of the General Assembly, 30 June 2011, 
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accepted components of the eia process. Rather than perpetuating a situa-
tion where eia is simply a procedural hurdle for the proponents of a particular 
activity, a best practice standard could require a process that is biodiversity 
inclusive, transparent and subject to international scrutiny with associated 
powers to impose conditions in the interest of mitigating adverse impacts on 
the marine environment or to disallow the activity where there is the potential 
for substantial harm to the marine environment.
5 Options for Incorporating eia Elements into the ilbi
Typical components of an eia process include screening, scoping of the terms 
of reference for an eia, public notification and consultation, reporting and 
post- report decisions on whether to impose conditions on the activity or to 
disallow it.46
5.1 Screening
The screening component of an eia process determines whether particular 
activities or projects will be subject to an eia. The threshold of significant 
effects on the environment as the trigger for subjecting activities to eia has 
gained wide acceptance in global and regional instruments as well as nation-
al legislation.47 The Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid 
Protocol) is a notable exception to this generally accepted threshold with the 
screening process involving three levels – the preliminary assessment level, the 
initial environmental evaluation level and the comprehensive environmental 
evaluation level. A preliminary assessment is carried out at the national level 
for all activities subject to the Protocol with less than a minor or transitory 
impact.48 If an activity will have no more than a minor or transitory impact, an 
initial environmental evaluation must be carried out at the national level.49 If 
it has more than a minor or transitory impact, a comprehensive environmental 
evaluation must be carried out and submitted to the Committee on Environ-
mental Protection (cep) of the Madrid Protocol.50 This is a potential option 
for screening thresholds in abnj, at least for activities intended to occur in 
 46 Craik, above note 12, 132.
 47 Ibid., 133.
 48 Madrid Protocol, Annex i, art.1(1).
 49 Ibid., Annex i, arts. 2(1) and 3(1).














sensitive areas of the abnj environment such as identified vulnerable marine 
ecosystems (vme s) and ecologically and biologically significant areas (ebsa s).
In addition to threshold criteria, many eia regimes list activities which will 
automatically be subject to eia s and criteria to assist in determining which 
other activities should be subject to eia s.51 An indicative list of such activi-
ties for abnj would include deep sea fishing, aquaculture, dumping of waste, 
marine geoengineering, offshore hydrocarbon production, bio- prospecting, 
marine scientific research, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, ballast 
water exchange, deep sea tourism expeditions and ocean energy operations. 
Criteria to assist States in determining which other activities should be subject 
to eia s could be modelled on the cbd Voluntary Guidelines for Biodiversity- 
Inclusive eia,52 particularly as the proposed international agreement will re-
late to conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in abnj. These might 
include whether:
– The proposed activity is located in or close to an area of special environ-
mental sensitivity or representative international importance;
– The intended activity would affect the biophysical environment directly or 
indirectly in such a manner that it will increase risks of extinction of geno-
types, cultivars, varieties, populations of species or increase the chance of 
loss of habitat or ecosystems;
– The intended activity would surpass the maximum sustainable yield i.e. the 
carrying capacity of a habitat/ ecosystem or the maximum allowable distur-
bance level of a resource, population or ecosystem; and/ or
– The proposed activity would have particularly complex and potentially ad-
verse effects including those giving rise to serious effects on valued species 
or organisms or those which threaten the existing or potential use of an 
affected area.
5.2 Scoping
Once the need for an eia has been agreed, a scoping process follows that de-
termines the focus, depth and terms of reference for the eia. The fundamen-
tal objective of the scoping process is to identify those issues arising from the 
proposed activity which are most likely to have a significant impact on the 
environment and to describe alternatives that avoid, mitigate, or compensate 
for adverse impacts on the environment. The content of the eia report or 
 51 Craik, above note 12, 134– 135.
 52 Biodiversity in Impact Assessment. Background Document to Decision VIII/ 28 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity- Inclusive Impact 






Mitigating Human Impacts on Marine Biodiversity 185
Environmental Impact Statement (eis) is derived on the basis of these ele-
ments. The scoping stage of eia s for activities in abnj while addressing the 
same issues could also incorporate examination of impacts and alternatives 
which take into account the shared interests of the international community 
such as the long term sustainability of marine resources, continuing marine 
scientific research and the stability of global climate.
5.3 Reporting
The eis which is usually prepared by the proponent of the activity forms the 
basis for subsequent decisions by the relevant authorities on whether an activ-
ity should proceed and whether conditions should be imposed on the activity. 
The potential elements of an eis for proposed activities in abnj could include:
– A description of the proposed activity including its purpose, location, dura-
tion and intensity;
– A description of the initial environmental reference state and a prediction 
of the future environmental reference state in the absence of the proposed 
activity;
– A description of the programme for oceanographic and environmental 
baseline studies that would enable an assessment of the potential environ-
mental impact including but not restricted to the impact on biodiversity of 
the proposed activity;
– A description of the practical alternatives, including the alternative of not 
proceeding and the consequences of those alternatives;
– An assessment of the likely or potential environmental impacts of the pro-
posed activity and alternatives, including the direct, indirect, individual 
and combined, cumulative, short- term and long- term effects of the pro-
posed activity and alternatives in the light of existing and known planned 
activities;
– A description of the expected biophysical changes resulting from proposed 
activities, including a description of ecosystems lying within the range of 
influence of such changes and the spatial and temporal scale of influence 
of each biophysical change, identifying effects or connectivity between eco-
systems, and potential cumulative effects;
– A determination of whether there will be adverse impacts on biodiversity or 
ecosystems affected by the expected biophysical changes in terms of com-
position, structure (spatial and temporal) and key processes highlighting 
any irreversible impacts and irreplaceable loss;
– Identification, in consultation with the scientific and technical advisory 
body to the Conference of the Parties (cop) of the Implementing Agree-
ment of the current and potential ecosystem services provided by the 
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affected ecosystems and determination of the values these represent for 
the international community highlighting any irreversible impacts and 
irreplaceable loss;
– As complete a consideration as possible of effects involving impediments to 
migration, of transboundary effects on migratory species and of impacts on 
migratory patterns or migratory ranges;
– Definition of possible alternatives, including “no net biodiversity loss” or 
“biodiversity restoration” alternatives and location, scale, siting, lay out and 
technology alternatives;
– An assessment in consultation with the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (ipcc) of the likely impacts on global climate of the proposed 
activity, whether positive or negative;
– A description of the methods, data and underlying assumptions used to 
forecast the impacts of the proposed activity;
– An identification and description of measures available to prevent or avoid 
adverse environmental impacts of the proposed activity and alternatives 
and an assessment of those measures;
– A description of the effects of the proposed activity on the conduct of scien-
tific research and on other existing uses and values;
– An identification of whether the proposed activity will affect the propo-
nent’s compliance with its obligations under customary or conventional 
international law;
– An identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties encountered in 
compiling the information required for the eia report; and
– A non- technical summary of the information provided under the previous 
clauses.
5.4 Public Notification and Consultation
The duty to notify and consult with affected parties is an integral component 
of environmental impact processes in both the national and transboundary 
arenas.53 The general obligation to notify and consult, derived from the inter-
national law duty to cooperate and found in a variety of hard and soft law in-
struments, can be adapted to activities in abnj. When information provided as 
part of an eia indicates that the environment of abnj is likely to be significant-
ly affected by a proposed activity, the proponent of the activity being planned 
should notify and consult with potentially affected stakeholders and provide 
them with relevant information. In the abnj context, potential stakeholders 
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could include States, members of the public, international and regional orga-
nizations, inter- governmental and nongovernmental organizations, industry 
representatives and corporate entities. Before a decision is made on whether 
activity proceeds and on what conditions, these stakeholders should be pro-
vided with an opportunity to comment. To assist in this process, States could 
be encouraged to notify other States and competent international organiza-
tions of planned activities under their jurisdiction or control which may have 
a significant effect on marine biodiversity in abnj. There is also the potential 
for a more enhanced role for the regional seas organizations as dissemination 
points and consultation hubs on eia s and as technical advisers on mitigation 
measures.
5.5 Post eis Decision- Making
Under most eia regimes, the obligation on the final decision- maker is one of 
due diligence encompassing a full examination of the potential environmen-
tal impacts of a particular project and due consideration for the interests of 
affected parties.54 The global commons status of biodiversity in abnj calls for 
a more stringent and inclusive standard of decision making on whether an 
activity should be allowed to proceed and on what conditions. This could in-
volve developing a further set of criteria related to the permissible levels of 
impact on marine biodiversity in abnj and a decision- making structure which 
involves a level of international scrutiny over eia s prepared by proponents of 
particular activities.
6 Links between eia Elements and Other Components of the 
International Agreement
The eia components of the ilbi should be consistent with the overarching 
objectives and general principles articulated in the agreement. For example, 
the eia process prescribed in the agreement should be focused on the conser-
vation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in abnj. The institutional 
infrastructure required for the eia process prescribed in the ilbi should utilise 
as far as possible existing global and regional organisations with the relevant 
expertise as well as the institutions of the international agreement itself. For 
example, the Conference of the Parties (cop) of the international agreement 
advised by a Subsidiary Scientific and Technical Body could function as the 






decision- making body for eia s. Its functions would include setting standards 
for best practice eia and reviewing eia s undertaken by sectoral bodies for 
activities in abnj. It could have powers to impose conditions or disallow ac-
tivities based on criteria developed around thresholds for adverse impacts on 
marine biodiversity in abnj. The Subsidiary Scientific and Technical Body and 
the cop could also function as default review and decision- making bodies for 
eia s of new and emerging activities in abnj not covered by existing sectoral 
eia regimes. In addition, the eia screening criteria developed under an inter-
national agreement should take into account any network of mpa s designated 
by the cop of the agreement.
7 Conclusions
The obligation to identify the environmental impacts of human activities and 
to mitigate their adverse effects is equally critical to combating these threats 
to biodiversity in abnj as it is in marine areas under national jurisdiction. 
While legal and institutional frameworks for environmental assessment are 
well established in many countries for marine areas under national jurisdic-
tion, collaborative structures and mechanisms to achieve the same objectives 
in abnj are still fragmentary and underdeveloped. Establishing these gover-
nance structures in abnj is a much more complicated endeavour involving 
multiple stakeholders including states, global and regional organizations, ma-
rine industries and non- governmental organizations focussed on protecting 
the marine environment. The negotiation of an international agreement for 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in abnj offers the 
opportunity to develop best practice standards for a biodiversity- inclusive eia 
for all activities with the potential for adverse impacts on the marine biodiver-
sity of abnj. With appropriate elaboration and adaptation from existing eia 
regimes, it can provide a process for assessing the impacts of previously unex-
amined activities in abnj and new and emerging activities. An eia regime for 
abnj also provides an opportunity for the shared interests of the internation-
al community in conserving and sustainably using marine biodiversity to be 
represented in a transparent and inclusive process which takes into account 
the interests of multiple ocean stakeholders of current and future generations. 
The development of an eia regime for abnj is a fundamental prerequisite for 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity across the whole 
spectrum of abnj activities.
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This chapter examines the rules relating to marine scientific research as they apply to 
marine geoengineering taking place in abnj. It will analyse the regime currently evolv-
ing under the 1996 London Protocol to the 1972 London (Dumping) Convention, which 
has been developed to manage ocean fertilization scientific research in the context of 
the regulation of marine scientific research under the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (unclos). As the Southern Ocean has been the location 
for several ocean fertilization experiments to date, the relevant rules under the 1991 
Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, particularly environmental im-
pact assessments, will also be assessed. This chapter briefly assesses the relationship 
between these regimes and the future Agreement under unclos on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity and concludes that this Agreement— whatever the 
outcome of the negotiations— will not operate as a panacea for managing activities 
in abnj. With respect to geoengineering msr, the potential ‘solution’ to managing its 
risks lies in supporting and implementing the existing regime.
 Keywords
geoengineering – environmental impact assessment – marine scientific research – areas 
beyond national jurisidiction
1 Introduction
Managing and mitigating the impacts of activities taking place beyond the 
jurisdiction of states comprises a significant (but hopefully not intractable) 
challenge for the negotiators of a legally binding agreement under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable 
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use of marine biodiversity.1 While negotiations are far from being concluded, 
delegates have broadly agreed on three tools to manage the impacts of ac-
tivities taking place beyond national jurisdiction:  the application of general 
environmental principles (such as precaution and an ecosystem approach); 
area- based management and the regulation of activities taking place within 
protected areas; and environmental impact assessment.2 All three tools are al-
ready used to a greater or lesser extent under existing instruments currently 
of application to areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj). The most signifi-
cant activities taking place in abnj to date— shipping, fishing and, to a lesser 
extent, mining— are all regulated under existing regimes and are unlikely to 
be significantly impacted by the bbnj Agreement.3 Less common activities, 
on the other hand, may well be subject to controls under the new Agreement.
This chapter explores one such activity, geoengineering scientific research, 
and examines the recent and emerging regime at both the international and 
the regional levels designed to regulate this controversial use of the ocean 
commons. It will focus on the law of the sea as developed under both the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos)4 and the 1996 
Protocol5 to the 1972 London Convention6 as it relates to regulating geoengi-
neering marine scientific research. In particular, this chapter will highlight the 
various underlying tensions associated with managing geoengineering as a sci-
entific research issue. In light of the location of a number of geoengineering 
 1 A Formal preparatory committee to develop a binding instrument was established in 2016 
pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 69/ 292, Development of an international legally 
binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conser-
vation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
A/ res/ 69/ 292 (19 June 2015) and formal negotiations were instituted by General Assembly 
Resolution 72/ 249, International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction Statement of financial implications, A/ res/ 72/ 249 (24 
December 2017). Both available at undocs.org.
 2 At the time of writing a revised draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction is due to be discussed at the fourth negotiating 
session (New York, 23 March– 3 April 2020). See A/ conf.232/ 2020/ 3 (distribued 18 November 
2019) available at: https:// undocs.org/ en/ a/ conf.232/ 2020/ 3 (hereinafter, bbnj March 2020 
Draft Text).
 3 It has been agreed that the bbnj Agreement will not undermine existing instruments al-
though at the time of writing the text of this provision (currently, Article 4) has not been 
agreed. See ibid.
 4 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) 21 (1982) ilm  1261.
 5 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Dumping Convention 36 (1997) ilm  7.
 6 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other 
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experiments in the Southern Ocean, and the fact that this region accounts for 
40 percent of the global uptake of anthropogenic carbon dioxide,7 this paper 
will also examine the controls of scientific research developed under the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty8 and the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.9 
This chapter will critique the efficacy of the evolving regulatory framework for 
geoengineering research and assess its fitness for purpose in light of the risks 
this activity poses. It will conclude with some observations on the relationship 
between the geoengineering msr regime and the bbnj Agreement.
2 Geoengineering and the Oceans
The oceans and the atmosphere are intimately linked through natural process-
es. The oceans have sequestered approximately 25 percent of all anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide since 1750,10 and, without this service, atmospheric concen-
tration of carbon dioxide would be approximately 55ppm higher than current 
observations.11 This is a service with a significant cost, however.12 The upper 
ocean (above 700m) has warmed by an average of between 0.11° and 0.13° C per 
decade between 1971 and 2010, a trend which likely began in the late nineteenth 
century.13 A warmer ocean (in addition to melting ice- shelves and glaciers) has 
resulted in a rise in an average sea level of 0.19m between 1901 and 2010.14 Alter-
ation in ocean salinity levels have led to changes in water circulation and ocean 
biochemistry. The pH level of the oceans has decreased15 and it is estimated 
 7 Peter Landschützer, Nicolas Gruber, F. Alexander Humann et al., ‘The reinvigoration of 
the Southern Ocean carbon sink’ 349 (11 September 2015), Science 1221 – 1224 at 1221.
 8 1959 Antarctic Treaty 402 unts  71.
 9 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection 30 (1991) ilm  1461.
 10 Pierre Friedlingstein, ‘Carbon cycle feedbacks and future climate change’ (2015), 373 
Philosophical Transactions R. Soc 20140421.
 11 Christopher L. Sabine, Richard A. Feely and Nicolas Gruber et al., ‘The Oceanic Sink for 
Anthropogenic CO2’ 305 (16 July 2004), Science 367 at 370.
 12 See generally Edward H. Allison and Hannah R. Bassett, ‘Climate change in the oceans: Human 
impacts and responses’ 350 (13 November 2015), Science 778; Lisa A. Levin and Nadine Le 
Bris, ‘The deep ocean under climate change’ 350 (13 November 2015) Science 766; and Toby 
Tyrrell, ‘Anthropogenic Modification of the oceans’ 369 (2011), Phil. Trans. R. A 887.
 13 M. Rhein et al., ‘Observations: Ocean’ in T.F. Stocker (ed.) et al., Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2013), 257 (here-
inafter, ipcc 5th Assessment Report). See also John M.  Lyman, Simon A.  Good, Victor 
V. Gouretski et al., ‘Robust warming of the global upper ocean’ (2010), 465 Nature 334.
 14 ipcc 5th Assessment Report, above n 4, at 258.



















that ocean acidity could increase 150  percent by 2050.16 Ocean acidification 
constitutes a major threat to calcifying marine organisms, including coral, in 
addition to coastal defences,17 and is likely to prove a particular threat to the 
Arctic Ocean ecosystem.18 More generally however, climate change has already 
affected the distribution and abundance of phytoplankton19 and fish.20
Some scientists and policy- makers however, regard the oceans as a solution 
to, rather than simply a victim of, climate change. By artificially enhancing the 
natural processes whereby carbon dioxide is naturally transferred from the sur-
face to the deep ocean by means of the biological and solubility pumps, scien-
tists have posited that the oceans can be exploited as a climate change mitigation 
measure. The artificial nature of the enhancement characterises this activity as 
‘geoengineering’, which is commonly defined to mean the deliberate, large scale 
manipulation of environmental systems for the purposes of climate change miti-
gation.21 As a technology and indeed a science in its early stages of development, 
it is unsurprising that to date the initial regulatory focus has been on managing 
geoengineering research- related activities.
Geoengineering techniques are designed either to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere or to deflect or reflect solar radiation from the earth. Technolo-
gies aimed at atmospheric carbon dioxide removal (cdr) focus on enhancing 
natural processes that normally perform this function. cdr includes afforesta-
tion or reforestation,22 soil- carbon sequestration,23 the use of CO2 absorbing 
 16 Ibid.
 17 Scott C. Doney et al., ‘Ocean Acidification: A Critical Emerging Problem for the Oceans’ 
(2009), 22 Oceanography 16, at 18.
 18 C.P.D. Brussard, A.A.M. Noordeloos, H. Witte et al., ‘Arctic microbial community dynam-
ics influenced by elevated CO2 levels’ (2013) 10 Biogeosciences 719.
 19 Séverine Alvain, Corinne Le Quéré, Laurent Bopp et al., ‘Rapid climatic driven shifts of 
diatoms at high latitudes’ (2013), 132 Remote Sensing of Environment 195.
 20 M.J. Salinger, ‘A brief introduction to the issue of climate and marine fisheries’ (2013), 119 
Climatic Change 23.
 21 David W.  Keith, ‘Geoengineering the Climate:  History and Prospect’ (2000), 25 Annual 
Review of Energy and the Environment 245, at 247.
 22 See Josep G. Canadell and Michael R. Raupach, ‘Managing Forests for Climate Change 
Mitigation’ (2008) 320 Science 1456; Leonard Ornstein, Igor Aleinov and David Rind, 
‘Irrigated afforestation of the Sahara and Australian Outback to end global warm-
ing’ (2009), 97 Climatic Change 409; Kenneth R. Richards and Carrie Stokes, ‘A Review 
of Forest Carbon Sequestration Cost Strategies:  A Dozen Years of Research’ (2004), 63 
Climatic Change 1; Brent Sohngen, ‘Forestry Carbon Sequestration’ in Bjørn Lomborg, 
Smart Solutions to Climate Change: Comparing Costs and Benefits (cup 2010), 114; Massimo 
Tavoni, Brent Sohngen and Valentina Bosetti, ‘Forestry and the carbon market response to 
stabilize climate’ (2007), 35 Energy Policy 5346.
 23 See Raj K. Shrestha and Rattan Lal, ‘Ecosystem carbon budgeting and soil carbon seques-
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algae on building surfaces24 and even the capture and storage of atmospheric 
CO2 by artificial ‘trees’.25 Solar radiation management (srm) techniques by 
contrast, do not attempt to alter the balance of carbon dioxide between the 
atmosphere, biosphere and hydrosphere but, instead, are designed to offset 
increases in temperature caused by climate change through management of 
solar radiation. Such techniques include urban albedo enhancement,26 ma-
rine cloud brightening27 and whitening the stratosphere.28 Beyond reflecting 
sunlight back into space, the most radical ideas associated with srm seek to 
actually deflect sunlight from the Earth through the placement of strategic 
mirrors between the earth and the sun or in orbit around the earth.29
 24 Eduardo Jacob- Lobes, Carols Henrique Gimenes Scoparo and Telma Teixeira Franco, 
‘Rates of CO2 removal by Aphanothece microscopic Nägeli in tubular photobioreactors’ 
(2008), 47 Chemical Engineering and Processing 1365.
 25 K.S. Lackner, ‘Capture of carbon dioxide from ambient air’ (2009), 176 The European 
Physical Journal, Special Topics 93.
 26 Hashem Akbari, Surabi Menon and Arthur Rosenfeld, ‘Global cooling:  increasing 
world- wide urban albedos to offset CO2’ (2009), 94 Climatic Change 275, at 277 and 
Robert M. Hamwey, ‘Active Amplification of the Terrestrial Albedo to Mitigate Climate 
Change: An Exploratory Study’ (2007), 12 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global 
Change 419.
 27 John Latham et  al., ‘Global temperature stabilization via controlled albedo enhance-
ment of low- level maritime clouds’ (2008), 366 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 3969; Stephen Salter, 
Graham Sortino and John Latham, ‘Sea- going hardware for the cloud albedo method of 
reversing global warming’ (2008), 366 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 3989.
 28 P. J. Crutzen, ‘Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to 
Resolve a Policy Dilemma?’ (2006), 77 Climatic Change 211; Robert E. Dickinson, ‘Climate 
Engineering: A Review of Aerosol Approaches to Changing the Global Energy Balance’ 
(1996), 33 Climatic Change 279; Yu A. Izrael, ‘Field Experiment on Studying Solar Radiation 
Passing through Aerosol Layers’ (2009) 34 Russian Meterology and Hydrology 265; Philip 
J.  Rasch et  al., ‘An overview of geoengineering of climate using stratospheric sulphate 
aerosols’ (2008), 366 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 4007; Alan Robock, Luke Oman and Georgiy 
L. Stenchikov, ‘Regional climate responses to geoengineering with tropical and Arctic SO2 
injections’ (2008), 113 Journal of Geophysical Research D16101; A.F. Tuck, et al., ‘On geoengi-
neering with sulphate aerosols in the tropical upper troposphere and lower stratosphere’ 
(2008), 90 Climatic Change 315.
 29 See Roger Angel, ‘Feasibility of cooling the Earth with a cloud of small spacecraft near 
the inner Legrange point (L1)’ (2006) 103(46), PNAS 17184; James Early, ‘Space- based 
Solar Shield to Offset Greenhouse Effect’ (1989),42 Journal of the British Planetary Society 
567; Takanobu Kosugi, ‘Role of sunshades in space as a climate control option’ (2010) 67 
Acta Astronautica 241; D. J. Lunt et al., ‘ “Sunshade World”: A fully coupled CGM evalua-
tion of the climatic impacts of geoengineering’ (2008) 35 Geophysical Research Letters 
L12710; C.R. McInnes, ‘Space- based geoengineering: challenges and requirements’ (2010), 
224(3) Proceedings of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, Part C: Journal of Mechanical 
Engineering Science 571; Jerome Pearson, John Oldson and Eugene Levin, ‘Earth rings for 













Given the ocean’s role as a natural sink for carbon dioxide, it is unsurprising 
that marine geoengineering has largely focused on cdr rather than srm.30 
The cdr technique that has been subject to greatest scientific and regulatory 
focus to date has been termed ‘ocean fertilization’. This technique, as its no-
menclature implies, seeks to fertilize31 those parts of the ocean— such as the 
Southern Ocean and the Equatorial Pacific— that are relatively unproductive 
owing to a relative dearth of nutrients.32 This is to stimulate biological pro-
ductivity and enhance the ocean’s biological pump whereby carbon dioxide 
is transferred from the surface to the deep ocean by means of phytoplankton 
and sequestered for hundreds if not thousands of years.33 The basic hypothesis 
of ocean fertilization has been proven in that surface levels of carbon diox-
ide are temporarily reduced as a consequence of artificial fertilization with 
iron or other nutrients.34 However, whether ocean fertilization constitutes a 
viable climate change mitigation measure is far from clear. Although thirteen 
official ocean experiments have taken place to date there is no consensus on 
how long the carbon dioxide is sequestered35 and how extensive the fertilized 
 30 It has nevertheless been suggested that the albedo of the ocean’s surface may be enhanced 
through the creation of reflective microbubbles in the sea. See Russell Seitz, ‘Bright 
water: hydrosols, water conservation and climate change’ (2011), 105 Climatic Change 365.
 31 The most commonly suggested fertilizer is iron but other options include volcanic ash, 
phosphate and urea. See Svend Duggen, P. Croot, Ulrike Schacht et al., ‘Subduction zone 
volcanic ash can fertilize the surface ocean and stimulate phytoplankton growth: Evidence 
from biogeochemical experiments and satellite data,’ (2007), 34 Geophysical Research 
Letters, L01612; Richard S.  Lampitt, E.P. Achterberg, T.E. Anderson et  al., ‘Ocean fertil-
ization: a potential means of geoengineering?’ (2008) 366 Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society A, 3,919, 3,923; and Julia Mayo- Ramsay, ‘Environmental, legal and social 
implications of ocean urea fertilization: Sulu Sea example,’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 831.
 32 H. J. W. de Baar and P. W. Boyd, ‘The Role of Iron in Plankton Ecology and Carbon Dioxide 
Transfer of the Global Oceans’ in Roger B. Hansen et al. (eds.) The Changing Ocean Carbon 
Cycle: A Midterm Synthesis of the Joint Global Ocean Flux Study (cup 2000) 61, 107; Robert 
A. Duce and Neil W. Tindale, ‘Atmospheric Transport of Iron and Its Deposition in the 
Ocean’ (1991), 36 Limnology & Oceanography 1715.
 33 John H.  Martin, ‘Glacial- Interglacial CO2 Change:  The Iron Hypothesis,’ (1990), 5 
Paleoceanography 1.  See also, Nicolas Cassar et  al., ‘The Southern Ocean Biological 
Response to Aeolian Iron Deposition,’ (2007), 317 Science 1067 and P.W. Boyd, J. Jickells, 
C.S. Law et al., ‘Mesoscale Iron Enrichment Experiments 1993– 2005: Synthesis and Future 
Directions,’ (2007), 315 Science (2007), 315 612.
 34 See George A.  Wolf, David S.M. Billett, Brian J.  Bett et  al., ‘The effects of Natural Iron 
Fertilization on Deep- Sea Ecology:  The Crozet Plateau, Southern Indian ocean’ (2010), 
6(6) PLoS One e29697 and Philip Williamson, Douglas W.R. Wallace, Cliff Law et  al., 
‘Ocean Fertilization for geoengineering: A review of effectiveness, environmental impacts 
and emerging governance’ (2012), 90 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 475.
 35 S. Blain, ‘Effect of Natural Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the Southern 
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area must be for the technique to constitute a viable climate change mitigation 
measure.36 Moreover, there are concerns as to the unintended consequences 
of artificial fertilization including oxygen depletion and ocean acidification,37 
impacts on the food chain,38 introduction of toxic algae39 and even the exac-
erbation of climate change through the release of greenhouse gases including 
methane and nitrous oxide.40
In addition to the artificial introduction of fertilizer to the oceans to stim-
ulate biological productivity, other geoengineering techniques include the 
artificial transfer of natural fertilizers and nutrients from the deep ocean to 
the surface by means of vertical pipes,41 the storage of carbon dioxide in arti-
ficially created/ enhanced macroalgal forests (including kelp and seaweeds)42 
and even the disposal of baled crop residues in the deep ocean.43 Alterna-
tive options seek to enhance the solubility pump through increasing ocean 
alkalinity by artificially adding limestone powder or soda ash to the oceans, 
a technique known as ‘weathering’.44 A  positive impact of weathering is 
that an increase in ocean alkalinity potentially reduces the effects of ocean 
acidification.45
Polar Southern Ocean Stimulated by Iron Fertilization’ (2000), 407 Nature 695; K. Caldeira 
and P. Duffy, ‘The Role of the Southern Ocean in Uptake and Storage of Anthropogenic 
Carbon Dioxide’ (2000), 287 Science 620.
 36 K. Buesseler et  al., ‘The Effects of Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the 
Southern Ocean’ (2004) 304 Science 417.
 37 Phillip Williamson, Douglas W. R. Wallace, Cliff Law et al., op cit. n. 31, 480– 482. See also 
H. Damon Matthews et al., ‘Sensitivity of ocean acidification to geoengineered climate 
stabilization’ (2009), 36 Geophysical Research Letters L10706 doi: 10.1029/ 2009/ GL037488.
 38 A. Strong, ‘Ocean fertilization: time to move on’ (2009), 461 Nature 347.
 39 Q. Schiermeier, ‘The Oresmen’ (2003), 421 Nature 109, 110.
 40 J. Furhman and D. Capone, ‘Possible Biogeochemical Consequences of Ocean Fertilization’ 
(1991), 36 Limnology & Oceanography 1951; M.  Lawrence, ‘Side- effects of Ocean Iron 
Fertilization’ (2002), 297 Science 1993.
 41 See J. Lovelock and C. Rapley, ‘Ocean pipes could help the Earth to cure itself ’ (2007), 449 
Nature 403; A Yool et al., ‘Low efficiency of nutrient translocation for enhancing oceanic 
uptake of carbon dioxide’ (2009), 114 Journal of Geophysical Research 114.
 42 Antione de Ramon N’Yeurt, David P. Chynoweth, Mark E. Capron et al., ‘Negative carbon 
via Ocean Afforestation’ (2012), 90 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 467.
 43 S. Strand and G. Benford, ‘Ocean Sequestration of Crop Residue Carbon: Recycling Fossil 
Fuel Carbon Back to Deep Sediments’ (2009), 43 Environ. Sci. Technol. 1001.
 44 L.D.D. Harvey, ‘Mitigating the atmospheric CO2 increase and ocean acidification by add-
ing limestone powder to upwelling regions’ (2008), 113 Journal of Geophysical Research 
C04028; Haroon S.  Kheshgi, ‘Sequestering Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide by Increasing 
Ocean Alkalinity’ (1995), 20 Energy 915.
 45 Jennie C.  Stephens and David W.  Keith, ‘Assessing geochemical carbon management’ 





















What is apparent from the scientific literature to date is that all proposed 
techniques are at the research stage with most subject to desk- top trials only. 
The extent to which field trials can and should take place very much depends 
on the freedoms and constraints associated with scientific research at sea as 
well as the ethics of research itself.46
3 Defining Marine Scientific Research
Marine scientific research (msr) is officially designated a freedom of the high 
seas by Article 87(1)(f) of unclos, and Article 238 confirms that “all States, 
irrespective of their geographical location, and competent international orga-
nizations have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the 
rights and duties of other States as provided for in this Convention.” Those 
rights and duties include those set out in Parts vi, xii and xiii of unclos in 
addition to the general duty of ‘due regard’ to the interests of other states.47 
Notably however, unclos fails to define the term ‘marine scientific research’ 
and this omission was deliberate, a definition being deemed “unnecessary” un-
der the 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating Text.48 Nevertheless, during the 
unclos iii negotiations, several definitions of msr were proposed, debated 
and ultimately, rejected. For example, in the 1973 negotiating round, marine 
scientific research was defined to comprise:49
… any fundamental or applied research and related experimental work, 
conducted by States and their juridical and physical persons, as well as 
by international organizations, which does not aim directly at industri-
al exploitation but is designed to obtain knowledge of all aspects of the 
natural processes and phenomena occurring in the ocean space, on the 
seabed and subsoil thereof, which is necessary for the peaceful activi-
ty of States for the further development of navigation and other forms 
of utilization of the sea and also utilization of the airspace above the 
world ocean.
 46 See generally Karen N.  Scott, ‘Engineering and the “Mis- Anthropocene”:  International 
Law, Ethics and Geoengineering’ 29 (2015), Ocean Yearbook 61– 84.
 47 1982 unclos, Article 87(1)(f) and 87(2).
 48 Patricia Birnie, ‘Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific 
Research’ 10 (1995), International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 229, at 242.
 49 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits 
of National Jurisdiction, vol. 8, Subcommittee iii, A/ ac.138/ sc.iii/ L.31 (Bulgaria, Poland, 
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This definition of research expressly included what today is described as ‘pure’ 
and ‘applied’ research but nevertheless excluded research aimed ‘directly at 
industrial exploitation’. The negotiators further broadened this definition the 
following year in their development of draft Article 1:50
(a) Marine Scientific Research is any study or investigation of the marine 
environment and experiments related thereto; (b) Marine Scientific Re-
search is of such a nature as to preclude any clear or precise distinction 
between pure scientific research and industrial or other research con-
ducted with a view to commercial exploitation or military use.
Some states expressed concern over the expansive definition and subsequent 
debates focused on whether research associated with the immediate exploita-
tion of resources should be similarly treated to research designed to increase 
knowledge.51 Later definitions attempted to constrain the definition of scien-
tific research to activities designed to increase humankind’s knowledge. In 
1975, msr was defined as “any study of, or related experimental work in, the 
marine environment that is designed to increase man’s knowledge and is con-
ducted for peaceful purposes”52 or alternatively “… any study and related ex-
perimental work conducted in the marine environment designed to increase 
mankind’s knowledge thereof.”53 This definition was minimally adapted and 
included in the 1976 Informal Single Negotiating Text as “any study or related 
environmental work designed to increase mankind’s knowledge of the marine 
environment.”54 The definition undoubtedly covered pure scientific research 
but was ambiguous as to whether it included applied scientific research.
 50 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. iii 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.v.5), Trinidad and Tobago:  draft articles on 
marine scientific research, Article 1, paras. (a) and (b), p. 252.
 51 UN, Division for Oceans and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea. Marine Scientific 
Research:  A revised guide to the implementation of the relevant provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN New York, 2010) 5.
 52 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. iv (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.v.10), Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft articles on marine 
scientific research, Articles 1 and 2, para. 4.
 53 Ibid., Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Nigeria: draft arts. on marine scientific research, 
Articles 1 and 2.
 54 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea vol. v (United 












As noted above, in 1977, the definition of msr was ultimately omitted alto-
gether from unclos. Nevertheless, Article 240(b) of the Convention requires 
that msr “be conducted with appropriate scientific methods” and the Conven-
tion accords ‘pure’ scientific research a privileged position in the presumption 
that coastal states will normally consent to research carried out in their exclu-
sive economic zones or on their continental shelves where it is for “peaceful 
purposes … in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environ-
ment for the benefit of all mankind.”55 Post- unclos there has, until recently, 
been very little appetite to further develop a working definition of msr. Even 
the International Court of Justice in the 2014 Whaling in the Antarctic Case de-
clined to define scientific research notwithstanding the centrality of the no-
tion to the dispute between Japan, Australia and New Zealand over Japanese 
so- called ‘scientific’ whaling activities.56
By contrast, the organisation to give most consideration to articulating the 
concept of msr is the International Maritime Organisations (imo) through the 
1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention in the context of geoengineering 
itself. As will be discussed below, the parties to the Protocol have agreed to use 
the Protocol to regulate marine geoengineering activities, which is defined for 
the purpose of the Protocol as “a deliberate intervention in the marine environ-
ment to manipulate natural processes, including to counteract anthropogenic 
climate change and/ or its impacts, and that has the potential to result in dele-
terious effects, especially where those effects may be widespread, long lasting 
or severe.”57 Geoengineering activities listed in the new Annex 4 to the Proto-
col are prohibited unless expressly permitted and authorised by a permit.58 
Currently the only permitted activity listed in Annex 4 is ocean fertilization59 
for legitimate scientific research.60 Whilst ‘legitimate scientific research’ is not 
expressly defined in the Protocol, the Risk Assessment Framework, which is 
designed to guide the issue of permits, sets out a non- exhaustive list of the pur-
poses of such research: to better understand the natural processes associated 
 55 1982 unclos, Article 246(3).
 56 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) [2014] icj Rep. 226 
at para. 86.
 57 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention, Article 5bis (not yet in force).
 58 Ibid., Article 6bis (not yet in force).
 59 Ocean fertilization for the purposes of Annex 4 is defined as “any activity undertaken by 
humans with the principal intention of stimulating primary productivity in the oceans. 
Ocean fertilization does not include conventional aquaculture, or mariculture, or the cre-
ation of artificial reefs.” (Annex 4, Article 1(1) (not yet in force).
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with geoengineering; to understand the potential impact of geoengineering on 
the marine environment; and to understand the extent to which geoengineer-
ing may be an effective climate change mitigation measure.61 The Framework, 
which has been incorporated into a new Annex 5 of the Protocol, further sets 
out a range of factors that are integral to how ‘legitimate scientific research’ is 
described for the purpose of the Protocol:62
– the proposed activity is designed to answer questions that will add to sci-
entific knowledge. Proposals should state their rationale, research goals, 
scientific hypotheses and methods, scale, timings, duration and locations 
with clear justification for why the expected outcomes cannot reasonably 
be achieved by other methods.
– the research methodology to be applied should be appropriate and based 
on best available scientific knowledge and technology. The methodology 
should be described in sufficient detail to allow a peer review.
– the proposed activity is subject to scientific peer review at appropriate stag-
es in the assessment process.
– economic interests do not influence the design, conduct and/ or outcomes 
of the proposed activity. There should not be any financial and/ or economic 
gain arising directly from the experiment or its outcomes. This does not pre-
clude payment for services rendered in support of the experiment or future 
financial impacts of patented technology.
– the proponents of the proposed activity make a commitment to publish the 
results in peer reviewed scientific publications and include a plan in the 
proposal to make the data and outcomes publicly available in an appropri-
ate and specified time- frame.
– the proposed activity has the financial resources available before the work 
commences to fulfil the program of work.
This description does not distinguish between pure and applied scientific re-
search per se but it emphasises its purpose, which is to add to scientific knowl-
edge, and stipulates that it must not lead directly to financial or economic gain. 
It emphasises the importance of scientific methods including peer review and 
publication.
 61 Ibid., Annex 5, paragraph 7 (not yet in force).






4 Marine Scientific Research and the 1982 unclos63
As noted above, msr was officially recognised as a freedom of the high seas 
by unclos.64 The Convention establishes a permissive regime regulating msr 
whereby research is permitted subject to a number of broad principles set 
out under the Convention and limited coastal state control. In particular, all 
msr should be conducted for exclusively peaceful purposes, use appropriate 
scientific methods, refrain from unjustifiable interference with other uses of 
the seas65 comply with other provisions of unclos including those designed 
to protect the marine environment,66 to manage the Area,67 and to promote 
cooperation and the dissemination of information and knowledge.68 In light 
of the environmental risks posed by geoengineering activities deliberately de-
signed to manipulate ocean processes and ecosystems, it is the environmental 
constraints under Part xii of the Convention— which, owing to space con-
straints are not discussed in detail in this chapter69— that are of particular 
relevance to geoengineering- related msr, especially in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. However, the relatively high threshold for harm and definition of 
pollution under unclos,70 in practice, limits the impact of these provisions 
on small scale scientific research.
In areas under the jurisdiction of states msr remains under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the coastal state71 although where permission is sought to con-
duct research a coastal state is normally expected to consent to requests to 
carry out research in its eez, particularly where that research is intended to 
“increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of 
all mankind.”72 It is worth noting that consent may nevertheless be withheld 
 63 See generally, Tim Stephens and Donald R Rothwell, ‘Marine Scientific Research’ in 
Donald R. Rothwell, Alex G. Oude Elferink, Karen N. Scott and Tim Stephens (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015), 559.
 64 1982 unclos, Article 87(1)(f) and 238.
 65 Ibid., Article 240.
 66 Ibid., Article 240(d).
 67 Ibid., Article 256.
 68 Ibid., Articles 242 and 244.
 69 See however, Karen N.  Scott, ‘Geoengineering and the Law of the Sea’ in Rosemary 
Rayfuse (ed.), Research Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 451 and Karen N.  Scott, ‘International Law in the 
Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge’ 34 (2013), Michigan Journal 
of International Law 309.
 70 Set out in Article 1(4) of the 1982 unclos.
 71 1982 unclos, Articles 56(1)(b)(ii), 245 and 246.
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where the research involves the introduction of harmful substances into the 
marine environment,73 which arguably would include iron or other nutrients 
associated with ocean fertilization.
Control of geoengineering- related scientific research under unclos is 
therefore relatively light and it is unsurprising that other instruments provide 
direct or indirect regulation at a level that is more robust. Provided those other 
instruments do not create rights and obligations that are incompatible with 
unclos or do not affect the enjoyment of unclos rights by other parties 
to the Convention, those instruments may be applied alongside unclos.74 
Moreover, unclos expressly permits states to conclude agreements modify-
ing unclos provided that such agreements do not affect the application of 
the basic principles under the Convention or the basic rights and obligations 
of states party to unclos.75 The two instruments of primary application to 
geoengineering- related msr in abnj are the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Conven-
tion and the 1991 Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The provisions of both 
instruments are compatible with, and therefore should be applied alongside, 
unclos.
An interesting question is whether ultimately, the provisions of the 1996 Pro-
tocol can actually be applied under unclos itself. Article 210 of unclos regu-
lates dumping at sea and requires that national laws, regulations and measures 
are no less effective than “global rules and standards.”76 It is widely recognised 
that those global rules and standards refer to the 1972 London Convention77 
and unclos currently lacks a mechanism for determining if and at what stage 
the 1996 Protocol replaces the Convention as providing those “global rules and 
standards”. The Protocol thus far is supported by about half the number of 
states which have ratified the 1972 Convention and it would therefore seem 
premature to interpret Article 210(6) as referring to the Protocol rather than to 
the Convention. Moreover, the amendments to the Protocol, which create the 
regime for regulating geoengineering, are not yet in force. More fundamental-
ly, Article 210 specifically refers to “dumping” which is defined in Article 1(5) of 
unclos as the deliberate disposal of waste or other matter at sea and which 
explicitly excludes “placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere 
disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of 
 73 Ibid., Article 245(5)(b).
 74 Ibid., Article 311(2).
 75 Ibid., Article 311(3).
 76 Ibid., Article 210(6).













the Convention.”78 Geoengineering for legitimate scientific purposes is catego-
rised as placement rather than dumping and therefore arguably falls outside 
the scope of Article 210 of unclos. On this basis, it is unclear whether the 
rules and standards relating to geoengineering authorised by the 1996 Protocol 
can be categorised as “global rules and standards” for the purposes of Article 
210 of unclos.
5 Geoengineering msr under the 1996 London Protocol (as 
Amended)
As briefly described above, the 53 parties of the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Lon-
don Convention amended the Protocol in October 2013 in order to create a 
legal basis for the regulation of marine geoengineering.79 The definition of 
geoengineering as set out above80 is broad and arguably expands the aims and 
objectives of the Protocol in that it covers activities that do not constitute the 
abandonment, disposal or placement of matter in the oceans. Nevertheless, 
currently the scope of the regulatory framework for geoengineering is confined 
to activities involving the introduction of matter into the sea. Article 6bis (not 
yet in force) stipulates that Contracting Parties “shall not allow the placement 
of matter into the sea from vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other man- made 
structures at sea for marine geo- engineering activities listed in annex 4, unless 
the listing provides that the activity or the sub- category of an activity may be 
authorised under a permit.”81 The only activity listed in Annex 4 that may be 
authorised subject to a permit is ocean fertilization “constituting legitimate 
scientific research.”82 Both Article 6bis and Annex 4 of the Protocol require 
parties to comply with the detailed Risk Assessment Framework set out in An-
nex 5 of the Protocol.
The Risk Assessment Framework, which was adopted in a non- binding res-
olution in 2010,83 and adapted with minor amendments for inclusion with-
in a new Annex 5 of the Protocol, sets out the most detailed international 
 78 1982 unclos, Article 1(5)(b)(ii).
 79 Resolution lp.4(8) On the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of 
Matter for Ocean Fertilization and other Marine Geoengineering Activities (18 October 2013).
 80 See text at footnote 57.
 81 Article 6bis (1) of the amended Protocol (amendment not yet in force).
 82 Annex 4.1, 1996 Protocol as amended (amendment and Annex not yet in force).
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assessment criteria relating to marine scientific research of any instrument to 
date. The Framework sets out a two- stage process whereby first, the proposed 
activity is assessed in order to ascertain whether it constitutes legitimate sci-
entific research (and thereby complies with the criteria set out in Annex 4 of 
the Protocol) and second, assessed in order to determine that pollution of the 
marine environment is, as far as practicable, prevented or reduced to a mini-
mum. The initial assessment focuses on the nature and purpose of the activity 
with a strong emphasis on scientific method.84 These criteria were discussed 
above in the context of defining the term ‘marine scientific research’.85 Once 
a proposed activity is categorised as legitimate scientific research it is subject 
to a full environmental impact assessment, including an examination of the 
site selected for the experiment and the matter intended to be placed into the 
environment.86 Parties are required to develop an “Impact Hypothesis”, which 
is a statement of the expected consequences of the placement as well as the 
other potential impacts including transboundary effects.87 Factors expressly 
identified for consideration include potential impacts on human health, on 
marine ecosystems, amenities and other uses of the sea as well as cumulative 
impacts.88 Parties must also consider the risks of accidents, economic factors 
and exclusion of future uses.89 The Risk Assessment Framework endorses an 
explicitly precautionary approach90 and requires parties to minimise environ-
mental risks through mitigation, contingency planning91 as well as monitor-
ing.92 Most significantly “if the assessment reveals that adequate information 
is not available to determine the likely effects of the proposed placement ac-
tivity then this activity shall not be considered further.”93 Finally, the Framework 
requires parties to consult and cooperate with other states or international or-
ganisations which may be affected by the research activities.94 Furthermore, 
the Framework establishes a procedure for consultation with national and in-
ternational stakeholders and to consider any advice provided by independent 
international experts or independent international advisory groups.95
 84 1996 London Protocol, Annex 5, paragraphs 4– 9 (not yet in force).
 85 Discussed above in Part 4 of this chapter.
 86 1996 London Protocol, Annex 5, paragraphs 14– 15 (not yet in force).
 87 Ibid., paragraph 16 (not yet in force).
 88 Ibid., paragraph 17 (not yet in force).
 89 Ibid., paragraph 18 (not yet in force).
 90 Ibid., paragraph 20 (not yet in force).
 91 Ibid., paragraphs 20– 22 (not yet in force).
 92 Ibid., paragraphs 23– 25 (not yet in force).
 93 Ibid., paragraph 18 (emphasis added) (not yet in force).
 94 Ibid., paragraph 10 (not yet in force).


























Once the assessment has been completed, its outcome must be reported to 
the Protocol Secretariat and be made publicly available.96 Where a state has 
failed to comply with the conditions of Annexes 4 or 5 of the Protocol, the 
matter may be referred to the Protocol Compliance Group, which was formally 
established in 2007 pursuant to Article 11 of the Protocol.97 The Compliance 
Group has the power to make recommendations to support the state bringing 
its conduct into compliance with the Protocol. Currently, specific procedures 
relating to liability for environmental damage resulting from dumping or in-
cineration at sea have yet to be developed under the Protocol, and it is worth 
noting that Article 15 of the Protocol as it stands refers to liability in respect 
of dumping or incineration at sea and not to other activities such as msr or 
placement.98 General rules of state responsibility in respect of environmental 
damage are of course applicable as a matter of international law.
In summary, the emerging regulatory regime for marine geoengineering 
under the 1996 London Protocol is robust, precautionary and supportive of in-
ternational collaboration and consultation. Nevertheless, its scope is currently 
limited. The amendments to the Protocol are not yet in force (only five states 
have ratified the amendments: Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and the 
United Kingdom) and the Protocol itself currently binds only 53 states. More-
over, notwithstanding the broad definition of geoengineering in the Protocol, 
its scope is presently limited to activities involving the placement of matter on 
or into the marine environment.
6 Geoengineering msr under the 1991 Protocol to the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty
The Southern Ocean provides a promising environment for ocean fertiliza-
tion research and deployment. In light of this, the majority of the experiments 
which have taken place to date have been located in the Southern Ocean.99 
 96 Ibid., paragraph 30 (not yet in force).
 97 See the Report of the 29th Meeting of the 1972 London Convention LC29/ 17, Annex 7.
 98 Article 15 of the 1996 Protocol stipulates that “[i] n accordance with the principles of inter-
national law regarding State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States 
or to any other area of the environment, the Contracting Parties undertake to develop 
procedures regarding liability arising from the dumping or incineration of wastes or other 
matter.”
 99 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Scientific Synthesis Report 
on the Impacts of Ocean Fertilization on Marine Biodiversity (Technical Series No. 










Not an Intractable Challenge: Geoengineering MSR in ABNJ 205
Whilst the Southern Ocean is not governed by a typical regional seas regime, 
the area south of 60° Latitude— which largely comprises abnj— is subject 
to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Ant-
arctic Treaty. Scientific research occupies a privileged position under the 1959 
Treaty,100 but is nevertheless subject to controls under both the Treaty and the 
Protocol relating to cooperation and, most significantly, environmental pro-
tection.101 Much debate has been had over the years as to the extent to which 
the Treaty applies to the marine environment south of 60° Latitude but, not-
withstanding the reservation that “nothing in the present Treaty shall preju-
dice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state 
under international law with regard to the high seas within that area” under 
Article vi of the Treaty, the practice of parties has been to restrict and manage 
those high seas rights, including the rights relating to msr,102 which, it should 
be noted, are not formally defined under the Treaty. To date, all ocean fertil-
ization experiments have taken place north of the Antarctic Treaty area and 
therefore arguably fall outside of the Treaty/ Protocol requirements. However, 
the scope of the 1991 Environmental Protocol extends to not only the Antarctic 
Treaty area but also its “dependent and associated ecosystems”.103 Therefore 
this scope has the potential to include activities outside of the Antarctic Trea-
ty area which may impact directly or indirectly on the Antarctic ecosystem. 
In light of the uncertainties associated with the impacts of ocean fertilization 
and the ostensible purpose of the activity to deliberately alter natural ocean 
ecosystems it is appropriate to consider the application of the 1991 Protocol to 
such research activities.
The protection of the Antarctic environment has emerged as a key objective 
of the Antarctic Treaty system. Article 3(1) of the 1991 Environmental Protocol 
stipulates:
… the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and as-
sociated ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its 
wilderness and aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of 
 100 1959 Antarctic Treaty, Articles ii and iii.
 101 On science under the Treaty see generally Karen N. Scott, ‘Scientific rhetoric and Antarctic 
security’ in Alan D. Hemmings, Donald R. Rothwell and Karen N. Scott (eds.), Antarctic 
Security in the Twenty- First Century (Routledge, 2012), 284.
 102 See Karen N. Scott and David L VanderZwaag, ‘Polar Oceans and the Law of the Sea’ in 
Donald R Rothwell, Alex G. Oude Elferink, Karen N. Scott and Tim Stephens (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (oup 2015), 724 at 741– 742.










scientific research, in particular research essential to the understanding 
of the global environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the 
planning and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.
Planning and environmental impact assessment is the core tool for environ-
mental protection in the Antarctic, and Article 8 of the Protocol requires all 
activities subject to the advance notification requirement as set out in Arti-
cle vii(5) of the Antarctic Treaty— including all expeditions to and within 
Antarctica— to prepare an environmental impact assessment where that ac-
tivity is likely to have a minor or transitory impact on the Antarctic environ-
ment or its dependent and associated ecosystems.
Annex i of the Protocol sets out the environmental impact assessment re-
quirements in detail, distinguishing between activities likely to have only a 
minor or transitory impact and activities likely to have more than a minor or 
transitory impact. In the case of the former, activities must undergo an initial 
environmental evaluation (iee), which requires parties to describe the pro-
posed activity and consider impacts, including cumulative impacts in light of 
existing and known planned activities.104 Parties must consider alternatives 
to the proposed activity105 and, if the activity goes ahead, must put in place 
appropriate contingency and monitoring procedures.106 In contrast to the re-
quirements under the 1996 London Protocol, there is no express obligation to 
consult with other parties or to seek expert advice on the proposed activity. 
Initial environmental evaluations are carried out at the state level and are not 
required to be assessed at the international level by the Committee on Environ-
mental Protection107 or the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (atcm).108 
By contrast, activities likely to have more than a minor or transitory impact 
on the Antarctic environment are subject to a Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Evaluation (cee) and draft cee reports must be made publically available 
and circulated to all parties for discussion at the atcm.109 The range of fac-
tors that must be considered by parties is extensive and includes potential im-
pacts, knowledge gaps and the identification of measures that may minimise 
 104 1991 Environmental Protocol, Annex i, Article 2(1).
 105 Ibid., Article 2(1)(b).
 106 Ibid., Article 2(2).
 107 The Committee on Environmental Protection was established under Article 11 of the 1991 
Environmental Protocol.
 108 The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was established under Article ix of the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty.
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or mitigate impacts or support monitoring.110 Although parties must address 
comments received in relation to a draft cee in the final cee,111 the atcm is 
given no formal power to prevent an activity from taking place or to attach 
conditions to that activity.
In contrast to the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention, the 1991 Environmen-
tal Protocol does not provide for a formal non- compliance mechanism, although 
matters of non- compliance can be raised at the annual Antarctic Treaty Consul-
tative Meeting.112 However, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and 1991 Environmental 
Protocol provide for an international system of inspection, and permit research 
vessels to be inspected within the Antarctic Treaty Area.113 The Protocol has devel-
oped reasonably sophisticated provisions relating to monitoring and contingency 
planning114 and has established a liability regime applicable to operators respon-
sible for environmental damage within the Antarctic Treaty Area.115 The liability 
regime, however, has not yet entered into force.
In summary, the regulatory regime for msr under the 1991 Environmental 
Protocol is environmentally robust and complements the obligations under 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty relating to collaboration and free dissemination of re-
search findings.116 However, the terms “minor” and “transitory” are not defined 
under the Protocol and it is the state concerned which determines whether an 
iee or cee is required in relation to any particular activity. Notably only one 
ocean fertilization experiment has been subject to the iee process.117 More-
over, international oversight and ultimate control of environmental impact 
assessments is limited and the requirements relating to consultation and peer 
review are noticeably weaker than those provided under the 1996 Protocol. 
As a regional regime, the Protocol currently binds only 40 states although its 
provisions, in contrast to the 1996 Protocol, are in force. Its greatest limitation 
however, is its geographical scope, which is confined to south of 60° south Lat-
itude. Although the 1991 Protocol refers on numerous occasions to “dependent 
and associated ecosystems”, and there has been discussion in the past about 
 110 Ibid., Article 3(2).
 111 Ibid., Article 3(6).
 112 1991 Environmental Protocol, Article 13.
 113 1959 Antarctic Treaty, Article vii(1)– (4); 1991 Environmental Protocol, Article 14.
 114 In particular within Annex vi to the Protocol (not yet in force).
 115 1991 Environmental Protocol, Annex vi (not yet in force).
 116 1959 Antarctic Treaty, Articles ii and iii.
 117 An iee was carried out by New Zealand in 1998 in respect of the voyage of the Tangarora 


















extending its remit to include the entire Antarctic ecosystem,118 the practice of 
states thus far has been to confine its regulatory scope to activities taking place 
within the Antarctic Treaty area.
7 Concluding Remarks
Both the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention and the 1991 Environmental 
Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty establish relatively robust regimes designed 
to protect the environment from damaging msr associated with geoengineering. 
Annex 5 of the 1996 Protocol builds on the 1991 Environmental Protocol which, 
until 2013, arguably provided the most precautionary regulatory regime of appli-
cation to msr. However, the Risk Assessment Framework incorporated in Annex 
5 of the 1996 Protocol goes beyond the 1991 Protocol in its provisions relating to 
consultation and its express endorsement of the precautionary approach. Nev-
ertheless, in practical terms both regimes are significantly limited in scope: the 
1991 Protocol applies exclusively to the Antarctic Treaty area and the amendments 
to the 1996 Protocol are not yet in force. More fundamentally however, neither 
regime has attempted to engage with the broader ethical issues associated with 
geoengineering related to scientific research, focusing instead on managing the 
potential environmental impacts of such activities. This is a significant lacuna and 
demonstrates the limitations of both regimes to address the ultimate question 
of whether we should manipulate ocean processes in order to mitigate climate 
change and how we manage the relationship between geoengineering and other 
mitigation measures, including emissions reductions as well as the broader ethi-
cal issues arising from geoengineering.119
It is uncertain at this stage as to whether and to what extent the bbnj Agree-
ment may also apply to geoengineering msr and constitute a ‘potential solution’ 
to some of the gaps and other issues identified above. msr is not defined in the 
draft text although ‘marine technology’ is.120 Much of the text relating to envi-
ronmental impact assessment in the draft due to be debated at the third nego-
tiating session in March 2020 remains in square brackets, and currently there is 
little consensus on important issues such as the threshold for assessment and the 
relationship between the bbnj Agreement and other instruments. The threshold 
 118 See for example, Resolution 1 Enhancement of Environmental Protection up to the Antarctic 
Convergence (17 April 2009).
 119 These issues are explored more fully in Karen N. Scott, op. cit. n. 46.
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for an eia ranges from ‘minor and transitory’,121 which arguably would be trig-
gered by geoengineering msr to ‘substantial pollution’ or ‘significant and harm-
ful changes’122 which would likely not be reached in respect of geoengineering 
for research purposes only. The relationship between the bbnj Agreement and 
existing regimes that provide for eia is similarly uncertain, with options rang-
ing from no eia where one is required by another body to mandating that all 
eia s, including those under other regimes, meet the substantive requirements 
set out in the Agreement.123 The Agreement, like the 1996 London Protocol and 
1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, will not address the ethics of 
geoengineering but, notably, it is proposed that parties to the bbnj Agreement be 
guided by ‘[a] n approach that builds ecosystem resilience to the adverse effects 
of climate change and ocean acidification and restores ecosystem integrity’.124 It 
might be argued that at least some forms of geoengineering research, particularly 
ocean fertilization which increases carbon dioxide levels in the oceans, could be 
regarded as being contrary to this principle.
Nevetheless, what this case study on geoengineering msr demonstrates is 
that the bbnj Agreement is unlikely to be a pancea with respect to managing the 
environmental effects of activities taking place beyond the jurisdiction of states. 
Existing instruments remain important and need to be supported by states and 
by international organisations. With respect to geoengineering msr in abnj, the 
challenge is far from intractable and the most important solution is the ratification 
and, thus, entry into force of the 2013 amendments to the 1996 London Protocol.
 121 bbnj March 2020 Draft Text, op cit. n 2, Art 24.
 122 Ibid.
 123 Ibid., Art 23[4] .
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This chapter raises three questions regarding capacity building and technology trans-
fer in marine science. First the main features of the existing global framework for ca-
pacity building and technology transfer is discussed before addressing lessons that can 
be drawn from on- going programs and experiences and then asking what the impli-
cations of the bbnj process are in this respect. It is concluded that a comprehensive 
framework exists, based on unclos, but that there appears to be scope for improve-
ment when it comes to monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of this frame-
work. Furthermore, a key issue is the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Devel-
opment which will provide a major opportunity for strengthening capacity building 
efforts in marine science and technology. Also, as regards the implications of the bbnj 
for future developments in capacity building, a future agreement would certainly serve 
to complement and extend the global framework for oceans’ governance.
 Keywords
capacity building – marine science – areas beyond national jurisdiction – technology 
transfer – marine genetic resources
1 Introduction
The need for capacity building in ocean science and education has never been 
greater than now. We face two major challenges: On the one hand, oceans are 
under stress from climate change, pollution, overfishing and more (ipcc 2019, 
UN 2015). On the other, the need for food, minerals, transportation and other 
services the oceans provide has never been greater and is set to increase in the 
coming decades (Bogard et al., 2019, Barange et al., 2018). In both cases capacity 
214 Hoel
building1 in marine science and education are critical parts of the answer to 
how these challenges can be addressed.
As documented by the 2017 Global Ocean Science Report (gosr) (Valdes 
2017), the capacity to do ocean science is heavily concentrated in certain coun-
tries and regions in the world. In the UN Secretary- General´s 2019 Report on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea (A/ 74/ 70),2 it is reported that “[g] aps in hu-
man and institutional capacity and a lack of resources still hamper develop-
ing countries from taking full advantage of ocean science. The importance of 
developing human and institutional capacity relating to ocean science cannot, 
therefore, be overstated” (para 50).
This state of affairs is nothing new, and early efforts at capacity building in 
marine science in developing countries dates back at least to the early post- 
World War ii years.3 A number of international instruments pertaining to the 
oceans, such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (unclos) and the 1995 UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement (unfsa), addresses capacity building and transfer of 
technology. Also, a number of UN bodies with mandates in the marine realm, 
such as the International Oceanographic Commission (ioc), the International 
Maritime Organization (imo), the International Seabed Authority (isa), and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) have major programs for capac-
ity building, including in marine science and education. Importantly, prepa-
rations have now started for the UN Decade on Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development (2021– 30), which will be a global focal point in this respect for 
the coming years (ioc 2019, Claudet et al., 2019).
This paper is an attempt at taking an outside look at capacity building in 
marine science and education in general, and to raise some questions to its 
application in the context of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction 
(bbnj) process currently taking place under UN auspices, intended to result 
in another implementation agreement under unclos.4 This is done by ad-
dressing three questions:  1) what are the main features of the existing glob-
al framework for capacity building and technology transfer? 2) What lessons 
can be drawn from on- going programs and experiences? and 3) What are the 
 1 I use the term “capacity building” as interchangeable with “capacity development”.
 2 https:// undocs.org/ en/ A/ RES/ 73/ 124.
 3 Norwegian development aid in fisheries, for example, started in the 1950s.
 4 The two existing implementation agreements are the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Imple-
mentation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ convention_ agreements/ convention_ overview_ part_ 
xi.htm and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ convention_ 
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implications of the bbnj process in this respect? Regarding question 1, only a 
brief overview can be provided within the scope of a book chapter. The same 
goes for question 2, and the intent here is to review a few examples of fruitful 
efforts at capacity building from the ioc and others. When it comes to implica-
tions of the bbnj process (this is written after the third round of negotiations 
and before their conclusion) for capacity building, the idea here is simply to 
raise some questions relating to its possible impact in this realm, not to pro-
vide fixed answers.
In what follows, the term “capacity building and technology transfer” is used 
loosely, taken to include marine science, technology transfer, and education, 
and not necessarily all at one time. The chapter is based on conversations with 
members of bbnj delegations, ioc representatives, colleagues,5 information 
from relevant websites (doalos and ioc in particular), and academic liter-
ature. Notably, the latter turned out to be surprisingly thin – while most as-
pects of the law of the sea has been subject to a vast literature (Nordquist 2012, 
Rothwell et al. 2015), relatively few academic publications appear to address 
capacity building explicitly.
2 The Global Framework for Capacity Building
Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (sdg s) comprise the 
current global political framework for addressing sustainable development 
concerns, including those relating to the oceans.6 sdg 14 “Conserve and sus-
tainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable develop-
ment”, has a specific target for capacity building (14A) where countries are to:
[I] ncrease scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer 
marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceano-
graphic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine 
Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the con-
tribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing coun-
tries, in particular small island developing States and least developed 
countries.7
 5 I am grateful for comments from Kristine Kraabel, Ove Hokstad, and Terje Lobach.
 6 https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org.









unclos8 provides the general framework for the governance of marine sci-
entific research (Churchill and Lowe 1988, Stephens and Rothwell 2015), with 
marine science being one of the freedoms of the high seas on the one hand 
and subject to a qualified consent regime in areas under national jurisdiction 
(un doalos 2010). unclos Part xiii addresses marine scientific research 
and Part xiv deals with development and transfer of marine technology, in-
cluding the development of scientific capacity. Generally, states are to coop-
erate in promoting the development and transfer of marine technology, and 
to promote the development of capacity in developing States with a view to 
accelerate social and economic development (art 266). Measures to achieve 
this, for example by the establishment of technical cooperation, are listed. un-
clos furthermore has provisions on international cooperation (arts 270– 274), 
national and regional marine scientific research centers (arts 275– 277), and co-
operation among international organizations in this regard (un doalos 2010, 
Roach 1996).
The objective of unfsa,9 an implementing agreement to unclos, is to en-
sure the long- term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks. It strengthens the global oceans regime and is 
therefore of great importance for ensuring good governance of fisheries (Bal-
ton 1996, Lodge et al., 2007). The agreement provides an important impetus 
to marine scientific research (Hoel 2017), and Part vii of the agreement deals 
with requirements of developing States, as states shall “give full recognition 
to the special requirements of developing States in relation to conservation 
and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and 
development of fisheries for such stocks” (art 24.1). The agreement addresses 
forms of cooperation (art. 25), including regarding stock assessment and sci-
entific research (25.3b). There is also a provision regarding assistance in im-
plementation of the agreement establishing a special fund to this end and the 
establishment of new organizations for fisheries management (art. 26).
The implementation of this legal framework for the oceans is overseen by 
the UN General Assembly, which adopts annual resolutions on oceans and the 
law of the sea and sustainable fisheries respectively.10 The oceans resolution 
in particular has a major segment on capacity building, and its 2018 iteration 
states in paragraph 9 that the UN General Assembly:
 8 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ convention_ agreements/ texts/ unclos/ closindx.htm.
 9 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ convention_ agreements/ texts/ fish_ stocks_ agreement/ 
CONF164_ 37.htm.
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Emphasizes that capacity- building is essential to ensure that States, espe-
cially developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, … 
are able to implement the Convention, benefit from the sustainable de-
velopment of the oceans and seas and participate fully in the global and 
regional forums on ocean affairs and the law of the sea.11
The statements in the 2018 resolution on oceans and the law of the sea regard-
ing capacity building go on for another 50 or so paragraphs, addressing among 
other things marine scientific research generally (para 16), as well as a number 
of concrete initiatives such as the World Maritime University (para 26)  and 
efforts under the Convention on Biological Diversity (para 28).
Also, the environmental summits in 1992, 2002 and 2012 produced strong 
statements regarding capacity building. The Joint Plan of Implementation 
from the 2002 World Summit of Sustainable Development addresses capac-
ity building in marine scientific research regarding protection of the marine 
environment (para. 32a), as well as in the context of the need to improve the 
scientific understanding and assessment of marine and coastal ecosystems 
as a fundamental basis for sound decision- making (para. 34). There is also a 
specific reference to the need to strengthen the ability of the Intergovernmen-
tal Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, fao, and other relevant international, regional and 
subregional organizations to build national and local capacity in marine sci-
ence and the sustainable management of oceans and their resources (34d).12
The main outcome of the 2012 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro was the “The 
Future We Want” document. In the section on oceans and seas it provided:
We recognize the importance of building the capacity of developing 
countries to be able to benefit from the conservation and sustainable use 
of the oceans and seas and their resources and, in this regard, we empha-
size the need for cooperation in marine scientific research to implement 
the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and the outcomes of the major summits on sustainable development, as 
well as for the transfer of technology, taking into account the Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the 
Transfer of Marine Technology (para 160).13
 11 https:// undocs.org/ en/ A/ RES/ 73/ 124.
 12 http:// enb.iisd.org/ 2002/ wssd/ PlanFinal.pdf.








In sum, a substantial body of legal instruments as well as soft law address-
ing capacity building and technology transfer in the marine realm exists. At 
the international level, this is implemented in a number of organizations and 
programs.
3 On- going Programs and Experiences
In addition to the general paucity of academic literature on capacity building 
in the marine realm, few global overviews exist of on- going efforts in capac-
ity building in marine science. The UN Regular Process for Global Reporting 
and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment has an inventory of 
capacity building activities on its website. While not complete, it nevertheless 
provides information on activities under a number of global organizations and 
regional bodies, as well as activities led by agencies at the country level.14
A significant contribution in respect of providing overview of the field was 
the 2010 meeting of the UN Informal Consultation Process on Oceans and the 
Law of the Sea (unicpolos or icp) which addressed “Capacity- building in 
oceans affairs and the law of the sea, including marine science”. The report 
of the Secretary- General to that meeting contains a comprehensive review of 
needs as well as on- going efforts in capacity building.15 In marine science, iden-
tified capacity building needs include development of skills, infrastructures, 
technology transfer, and access to data. A particular need exists in relation to 
the introduction of new principles for management, such as the precautionary 
approach and ecosystem- based management. Capacity- building initiatives in 
marine science are addressed in about 30 paragraphs in the report, including 
references to unesco/ ioc (see below), the UN Industrial Development Or-
ganization (unido), the Department of Oceans and the Law of the Sea (do-
alos) under the UN Secretary- General, the International Seabed Authority 
(isa), the Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the Marine 
Environment,16 the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao), and the UN En-
vironment Program (unep), as well as regional activities.
The report of the 2010 unicpolos meeting contains additional material 
reflecting upon capacity building for marine science.17 A main conclusion was 
 14 https:// www.un.org/ regularprocess/ capacity- building- reports.
 15 https:// documents- dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N10/ 296/ 54/ PDF/ N1029654.
pdf?OpenElement.
 16 https:// www.un.org/ regularprocess/ .
 17 https:// undocs.org/ A/ 65/ 164. Panel discussions at that meeting addressed: (a) assessing 
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that “… capacity- building was essential to ensure that all States, especially de-
veloping countries, were able to implement the Convention, benefit from the 
sustainable development of the oceans and participate fully in global and re-
gional forums dealing with ocean affairs and the law of the sea.”
The 2019 unicpolos addressed “Ocean Science and the United Nations 
Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development”.18 The Secretary- 
General´s report in preparation for the meeting addresses status and gaps in 
marine science, and measures in advancing ocean science and closing the gaps. 
Among the issues raised at the meeting were an underlining of the importance 
of the coming UN Decade on Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (see 
below), the role of science in achieving the targets under sdg 14, the need for a 
more comprehensive understanding of the oceans to ensure sustainable man-
agement of their resources, the importance of reliable and accessible ocean 
data, and the limited capacity of developing countries to conduct and benefit 
from ocean science.19
The 2021– 2030 UN Decade on Ocean Science for Sustainable Development 
was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 2017.20 The ioc is tasked with 
organizing the planning of the Decade, a process which is now underway, de-
veloping a framework meant to apply across the UN system in the work on 
the 2030 Agenda. The overarching goals of the Decade are to foster scientific 
knowledge and infrastructure for sustainable development and to provide sci-
ence in support of the Sustainable Development Goals.21 The decade sets the 
stage for a substantial effort in a number of areas of marine science, including 
a comprehensive ocean observing system, improved understandings of eco-
systems and their functioning, and capacity building for marine science (Clau-
det et al., 2019).22 There are altogether seven priority areas, including capacity 
science; (b) overview of capacity- building activities/ initiatives in ocean affairs and the 
law of the sea, including marine science and transfer of technology; (c) challenges for 
achieving effective capacity- building in ocean affairs and the law of the sea, including 
marine science and transfer of technology; and (d) new approaches, best practices and 
opportunities for improved capacity- building in ocean affairs and the law of the sea.
 18 The Secretary- General´s report in preparation for the meeting can be found at: https:// 
undocs.org/ a/ 74/ 70.
 19 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ consultative_ process/ CoChair_ summary.pdf.
 20 Para 292– 295 in the 2017 resolution on oceans and the law of the sea, A/ res/ 72/ 73 https:// 
undocs.org/ en/ a/ res/ 72/ 73 “Decides to proclaim the United Nations Decade on Ocean 
Science for Sustainable Development for the 10- year period beginning on 1 January 
2021 …”.
 21 http:// www.unesco.org/ new/ en/ member- states/ single- view/ news/ roadmap_ for_ the_ 
un_ decade_ of_ ocean_ science_ for_ sustainable_ d/ .












development and accelerated technology transfer, training and education, and 
ocean literacy.23
The International Oceanographic Commission (ioc, established 1960)  of 
unesco is the competent international organization regarding marine scien-
tific research. Its purpose is to promote international cooperation to enhance 
our scientific knowledge of the oceans and the resources there.24 It plays a 
critical role in establishing and coordinating international ocean observation 
and monitoring programs and data management initiatives such as the Global 
Ocean Observing System (goos)25 and the International Oceanographic In-
formation and Data Exchange (iode).26 The ioc also has regional commis-
sions for Africa, the Caribbean and the Western Pacific for the implementation 
of ioc programs there.27
The ioc also plays a critical role in the international work on capacity build-
ing in marine science. In 2003 ioc adopted the Criteria and Guidelines for 
the Transfer of Marine Technology, implementing the provisions of Part xiv of 
unclos on development and transfer of marine technology.28
An ioc capacity building strategy was adopted in 2015, with a mission to 
“… undertake relevant actions to assist Member States with developing and 
sustaining the necessary capacity to undertake activities necessary to achieve 
the ioc vision at the national level as well as at the international cooperation 
level.”29 The strategy lists six outputs with associated activities, including de-
velopment of human resources and infrastructure, as well as mechanisms for 
cooperation. A first meeting of a Group of Experts on Capacity Development 
was held in 2018 and included regional subgroups.30
Also, an Ocean Teacher Global Academy (otga) was started in 2015, build-
ing on earlier activities relating to training of ocean data managers and marine 
information managers. The otga aims to develop an international network of 
regionally based training centers.31 The ioc has also engaged in partnerships 
 23 https:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/ 48223/ pf0000265198.
 24 http:// www.unesco.org/ new/ en/ natural- sciences/ ioc- oceans/ .
 25 http:// www.goosocean.org.
 26 https:// www.iode.org.
 27 http:// www.unesco.org/ new/ en/ natural- sciences/ ioc- oceans/ about- us/ ioc- worldwide/ .
 28 https:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/ 48223/ pf0000139193.
 29 http:// www.ioc- cd.org/ index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=8& 
Itemid=104.
 30 http:// www.ioc- cd.org/ index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=152:summary- 
report- of- first- session- ioc- group- of- experts- on- capacity- development- now- available&-
catid=14&Itemid=188.
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with other international bodies such as the Global Environment Facility (gef) 
to promote marine science in Large Marine Ecosystems (lme) off the coasts of 
developing countries.32
Another important UN agency providing capacity building initiatives in 
science is the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (fao), the central glob-
al body for fisheries policy and development.33 The fao has played a leading 
role in capacity development for fisheries for decades, through among other 
means regional programs for the implementation of various aspects of its 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,34 as well as the 2009 Agreement 
on Port State Measures.35 For the latter, the fao is now running a global capac-
ity development program to assist developing countries in implementing the 
agreement.36
Article 12 of the Code deals with fisheries research, laying down a set of 
global norms for how fisheries science is to be developed and implemented. 
A specific provision on fisheries science states that:
States and relevant international organizations should promote and en-
hance the research capacities of developing countries, inter alia, in the 
areas of data collection and analysis, information, science and technol-
ogy, human resource development, and provision of research facilities, 
in order for them to participate effectively in the conservation, manage-
ment and sustainable use of living aquatic resources (art 12.18).
The fao also runs the Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstract database, a pre-
mier reference source for marine scientists worldwide.37
Among the fao activities in support of this, the eaf Nansen program38 is 
perhaps the most significant. Now aiming to strengthen the knowledge base 
 32 The gef hosts an International Waters Learning Exchange & Resource Network which 
aims to provide a global forum for ecosystem- based management. https:// iwlearn.net/ 
marine/ consultative- meetings There are on- going lme projects in a number of regions. 
https:// iwlearn.net/ marine.
 33 http:// www.fao.org/ fisheries/ en/ .
 34 http:// www.fao.org/ 3/ v9878e/ v9878e00.htm.
 35 http:// www.fao.org/ port- state- measures/ en.
 36 http:// www.fao.org/ port- state- measures/ en This is part of a wider effort, the fao Global 
Capacity Development Umbrella Programme, set up in 2016 to strengthen efforts in 
ensuring sustainable food systems. http:// www.fao.org/ port- state- measures/ capacity- 
development/ ongoing- capacity- building- efforts/ en/ .
 37 http:// www.fao.org/ fishery/ asfa/ en.
















for and implementing an ecosystem approach to marine fisheries in develop-
ing countries, the project is a continuation of a long- standing effort (it start-
ed in 1975), now funded by the Norwegian “Fish for Development Program”.39 
A key part of the Nansen program is the research cruises by the research vessel 
R/ V Fridtjof Nansen, which collects data that are the basis for management 
plans and has provided training for hundreds of scientists in countries in Afri-
ca and Asia. Over the years the Nansen cruises has taken place in the waters of 
more than 60 countries, providing data to these countries as well as to regional 
initiatives.
The International Seabed Authority (isa) was established by the Conven-
tion to manage the exploration and exploitation of minerals on the deep sea-
bed in the area beyond national jurisdiction.40 isa has substantial engagement 
in capacity building in scientific and technical matters relating to deep seabed 
mining, providing seminars, training and other activities in this respect.
At the UN in New York, the Department of Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
(doalos) provides assistance to developing states on the implementation of 
various aspects of unclos, including scientific and technical aspects.41
The regional level of cooperation is important to a number of capacity de-
velopment initiatives, as many of the phenomena requiring greater scientific 
understanding and monitoring are regional in their nature. In fisheries, for ex-
ample, this is reflected in the role of regional fisheries management organiza-
tions (rfmo s) (Lodge et al., 2007, Haas et al., 2019). In the North Atlantic, the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ices) is both an insti-
tution for scientific cooperation (since 1902), as well as a mechanism for the 
development and provision of scientific advice to governments as well as to 
regional oceans bodies in that region.42 Viewed in a global context, a particu-
larly important aspect of ices is that it is independent of those countries and 
organizations to whom it provides scientific advice, shielding scientific delib-
erations from political pressures.
In some developing country regions, a number of Large Marine Ecosystem 
projects address challenges relating to marine science with funding from the 
gef. This includes the Benguela Current, the Canary Current, and the Caribbe-
an and North Brazilian Shelf.43
 39 https:// norad.no/ en/ front/ thematic- areas/ climate- change- and- environment/ fish- for- 
development/ .
 40 https:// www.isa.org.jm.
 41 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ TechAsst.htm.
 42 http:// www.ices.dk/ Pages/ default.aspx.
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4 The bbnj Process and Capacity Building
What to make of this in the context of the bbnj negotiations? The bbnj pro-
cess, starting around 2004, was born out of two desires: that of the developing 
countries and the G7 being able to capture a share of the potential wealth that 
marine genetic resources are believed represent on the one hand, and that of 
some developed countries and the ngo community on the other for stronger 
protections of the marine environment – in particular biodiversity. While very 
different in terms of their objectives, these groups found common ground in 
wanting the negotiation of a third implementing agreement under unclos. 
The interested groups eventually succeeding a decade later in the launching of 
the PrepCom44 for what has become the Intergovernmental Conference on an 
internationally binding legal instrument under the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.45
The concept of biodiversity has become increasingly important in the glob-
al oceans discourse, in particular in relation to fisheries (Garcia et al., 2014). 
A critical juncture was the 2011 meeting in the informal, ad hoc working group 
that was debating the issue, where agreement was reached on the scope of 
the eventual negotiation: marine genetic resources, area- based management 
tools, environmental impact assessment, and capacity building and technolo-
gy transfer (doalos).46 The formal negotiations were initiated in 2018, with a 
view to arriving at an agreement in 2020 addressing these four themes.47 As of 
November 2019, three of four mandated negotiation sessions have been con-
ducted, consisting of discussions of these themes based on a president´s “aid to 
negotiations” rather than formal negotiating texts.
A “Revised draft text on an agreement under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine bio-
logical diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction” was issued in November 
2019 as basis for the negotiation meeting to be held in March- April 2020, which 
was postponed due to Covid- 19.48 Compared to the president´s “aid to nego-
tiations” for the second round of negotiations in April 2019, the revised draft 
 44 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ biodiversity/ prepcom.htm.
 45 https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ .
 46 https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ biodiversityworkinggroup/ webpage_ legal_ and_ policy.
pdf and https:// documents- dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N11/ 397/ 64/ PDF/ N1139764.
pdf?OpenElement.
 47 In A/ Res/ 72/ 249 the UN General Assembly decided that an agreement is to be developed 
“as soon as possible” (op1), during four meetings (op3) 2018, 2019 and 2020.













text of November 2019 is considerably more concise, although much language 
remains in brackets.
Part i of the revised text contains general provisions, including definitions, 
objectives and relationship to other instruments. Then the four themes of the 
agreement follow  – marine genetic resources (part ii), area- based manage-
ment tools (part iii), environmental impact assessments (part iv) and capacity 
building and transfer of marine technology (part v). The revised draft text also 
contains provisions on inter alia institutional arrangements (part vi) includ-
ing a Conference of the Parties, a scientific and technical body (or network), a 
secretariat and a clearinghouse mechanism to provide access to information, 
implementation (part viii), and settlement of disputes (part ix).
Part v of the revised draft text on capacity building and transfer of marine 
technology contains six articles running over six pages, in addition to an an-
nex. The objective (article 42) of this part of the agreement is to assist devel-
oping State parties in implementing the agreement, enable participation in 
activities, promote access to technology, increase and share knowledge, and 
develop marine science and technological capacity of states with regard to 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in these areas.
A provision on cooperation in capacity- building and transfer of marine 
technology (article 43) establishes a duty to cooperate and addresses the level 
and form of cooperation and special requirements of developing states. Mo-
dalities for capacity- building and transfer of marine technology are addressed 
in the following paragraphs (articles 44 and 45), as well as in greater detail in 
Annex ii of the draft revised text.
Types of capacity- building and transfer of marine technology (article 46) re-
fer to inter alia sharing data and information, development of relevant infra-
structure, development and strengthening of regulatory frameworks, devel-
opment and strengthening of human resources, and development of research 
programs, including biotech activities.
A final provision (article 47)  reads that capacity- building and technology 
transfer under the agreement should be subject to monitoring and periodic 
review, aiming among other things to address needs and priorities, measure 
performance, and recommend ways forward in implementing the agreement.
The November 2019 revised draft text part vi on institutional arrangements 
also includes an article 49 on a Scientific and Technical Body “to be composed 
of experts”. The body may also draw on “appropriate advice” from other in-
stitutions and expertise, and its main function will be to provide scientific 
and technical advice to the Conference of the Parties. The revised draft text 
lists functions for the Scientific and Technical Body relating to marine ge-
netic resources, area- based management tools, and environmental impact 
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assessments, as well as the transfer of marine technology and implementation 
of capacity- building measures.
5 Discussion
Capacity building in scientific and technical aspects in the context of the bbnj 
process is about the knowledge needed to address the distinct themes of ma-
rine genetic resources, area- based management tools, environmental impact 
assessments, and capacity building itself. These themes represent very differ-
ent areas of marine science with limited overlap, as demonstrated inter alia by 
the workshops held at the United Nations in 2013 to improve the understand-
ing of the issues at hand.49 The themes are very different in a number of ways, 
including scientific constituencies, infrastructure requirements, costs of doing 
science, and commercial potential.
Marine genetic resources are seen as holding considerable commercial po-
tential, although future benefits are decades and billions of dollars away in 
terms of investments required in the scientific and technical work required to 
explore and exploit these resources.50 Aspects of benefit sharing, such as the 
sharing of results of marine scientific research (Yu 2019) or intellectual prop-
erty rights over marine genetic resources, are important issues (Blasiak et al., 
2018). Science relating to area- based management tools is dominated by con-
servation biology (e.g., Stevenson et al., 2019) and also contains a number of 
debates, for example on the effectiveness of such measures (Pendleton et al., 
2017). As regards environmental impact assessments, this is as well a distinct 
area of inquiry (e.g., Wright 2014).
In addition to the scientific dimensions of the themes explicitly stated in 
the negotiation mandate, there are also other concerns calling for additional 
scientific constituencies to contribute to capacity building in marine science 
related to bbnj. This includes concerns such as integrated oceans manage-
ment (Underdal 1980, Hoel and Olsen 2011), cumulative impacts (Hodgson 
and Halpern 2018), connectivity between ecosystems inside and outside areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (Popova et al., 2019), and climate change and its 
impacts on marine ecosystems (Hollowed et al., 2019).
Also, the scientific aspect of capacity building and technology transfer itself 
is one of the four areas of the negotiation mandate and is listed among the 
 49 https:// www.un.org/ depts/ los/ biodiversityworkinggroup/ intersessional_ workshop_ 2013.
htm.







functions that the Scientific and Technical body is to address. As pointed out at 
the outset, the academic literature in this field appears limited, although some 
works exist (e.g., Long 2007, Harden- Davies 2017 and 2018, Minas 2017). A lim-
ited literature on various impacts of a future bbnj agreement is emerging, ad-
dressing for example specific areas such as the Arctic high seas (Balton 2019, 
De Lucia 2017) or specific themes such as diplomacy (Harden- Davies 2018).
The different scientific traditions and disciplines needed to address the 
different functions envisioned for the Scientific and Technical body raise a 
number of questions. Is it really possible to have one body addressing such a 
diverse and complex set of questions in a meaningful way, let alone provide 
scientific advice on them? The revised draft text provides for the establishment 
of subsidiary bodies as well as cooperation with scientific and technical bod-
ies, and this could perhaps go some way to address this concern, but there 
are also questions relating to the size of such a body as well as the no doubt 
substantial costs such an enterprise would incur. It could also be argued that 
one would be better served by regional solutions that are more tailored to the 
needs in different regions of the world, such as the lme programs. The model 
represented by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ices) 
in the North Atlantic also has a lot going for it with its independence from po-
litical entities (governments and regional governmental bodies). This model 
nevertheless provides them with scientific advice and a carefully constructed 
science- policy interface.51
6 Conclusions
The bbnj negotiations are about amending the governance framework for the 
two thirds of the global oceans that are beyond national jurisdiction. At the 
time of writing, three rounds of negotiations have concluded, and several more 
await. It is therefore premature to draw conclusions about how this is going to 
affect efforts at capacity building and technology transfer, but a few observa-
tions can nevertheless be made.
When it comes to devising effective mechanisms for the governance of the 
environment and natural resources, there are no silver bullets or quick fixes 
(Ostrom et  al., 2007). Considerable attention has to be devoted to contexts, 
available technologies, and synergies with existing institutions at global and 
regional levels of governance. Also, considering the two major challenges 
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referenced at the outset— the urgency of conservation on the one hand (UN 
2015) and the need to enhance our utilization of the oceans on the other— it 
can be asked what additional benefits an eventual bbnj outcome will bring. 
In terms of food provision, for example, only about 5% of the world´s fisheries 
are in the abnj (Sala et al., 2019). An agreement could become important for 
the development of products derived from marine genetic resources, but most 
likely not in a near future. Areas inside national jurisdiction are easily accessi-
ble, less remote and hence less costly to engage.
As to the three questions raised at the outset of this chapter, the first related 
to the main features of the current global framework for capacity building and 
technology transfer. A  comprehensive framework exists, based on unclos, 
as well as much recent political attention through Agenda 2030 and the Sus-
tainable Development Goals. There appears however to be scope for improve-
ment when it comes to monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of this 
framework.
The second question concerned what on- going programs and experiences 
there are in capacity building for science that provide relevant lessons for the 
bbnj process. A  substantial number of programs and initiatives exist, most 
prominently in the ioc, but also in a number of other UN bodies. A key issue 
in this respect is the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, 
proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 2017. This will provide a major op-
portunity for strengthening capacity building efforts in marine science and 
technology (Ryabinin et al., 2019). The ioc is currently leading a comprehen-
sive global effort in planning the decade.
As regards the third question, the implications of the bbnj for future de-
velopments in capacity building, a future agreement would serve to com-
plement and extend the global framework for oceans governance. This is 
in itself valuable, demonstrating the importance of this framework and the 
ability of states to improve upon the existing framework in light of new and 
emerging issues. Also, efforts at capacity building in science and technology 
for the areas beyond national jurisdiction are likely to be beneficial also for 
the areas inside national jurisdiction, where the challenges relating to gov-
ernance of oceans and seas are on a different order of magnitude than those 
outside.
A final thought. The focus of most capacity building efforts in science is 
on building infrastructure and developing the capacity for producing and 
utilizing scientific knowledge. However, education and human resource 
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The transfer of marine technology and capacity building are inextricably linked un-
der the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos). The unclos 
framework for the transfer of marine technology includes several elements related to 
scientific research, such as: scientific training; access to research equipment; and shar-
ing information, data and knowledge. These elements are important tools for capacity- 
building to enable a science- based approach to the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (bbnj). However, there are well- known 
gaps and weaknesses in the international framework for implementing the transfer 
of marine technology. Several initiatives are already underway through the Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic Commission of unesco that attempt to close the gap in 
capacity. These initiatives could provide a basis for a bbnj agreement to build on and 
to contribute to the imminent United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustain-
able Development 2021– 2030. This paper examines the unclos framework for ma-
rine technology transfer and the challenges and potential opportunities to enhance 
the implementation of transfer of marine technology in order to build capacity for the 
conservation and sustainable use of bbnj are proposed.
 Keywords
marine scientific research – law of the sea – technology transfer – capacity building – 
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction – high seas
1 Introduction
Science continues to be a critical ingredient in the ongoing development 
of a new international legally binding instrument for the conservation and 
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sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national juris-
diction (bbnj agreement) under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (unclos).1 Scientific investigation has only just begun to unveil the 
full extent of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj). Rapid 
advances in science and technology have revealed new discoveries of species 
and ecosystems in the deep ocean, such as 120,000- year- old hydrothermal 
vents and 4,000- year- old corals.2 Such discoveries of awe- inspiring natural 
wonders capture interest and imagination – from understanding the role of 
marine species in planetary function and stability to considering the possible 
utilisation of biological and genetic resources in research and development.3 
Potential bio- inspired research and development, utilising or mimicking ma-
rine species, include: wound healing using jellyfish collagen; drug development 
using marine sponges; and soft robotics development inspired by seastars.4 
Appreciation of the ecological, scientific, cultural and economic value of bbnj, 
coupled with growing scientific evidence of catastrophic biodiversity loss and 
vulnerability to threats from human activities are driving mounting concerns 
about the conservation and sustainable use of bbnj.5
Marine technology transfer and capacity building form one of the four pillars 
of the bbnj negotiations. Globally, gaps exist in terms of scientific knowledge 
of abnj and technological capabilities to monitor human activities in abnj. 
Furthermore, there are stark discrepancies in regional and national capacity 
 1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/ 249. Resolution adopted by the General As-
sembly. International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction. 72nd Sess, Agenda Item 77. UN doc A/ res/ 72/ 249.
 2 Ludwig et al., 2011, ‘U– Th systematics and 230Th ages of carbonate chimneys at the Lost City 
Hydrothermal Field’, Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta 75(7) 1869– 1888; Ramirez- Llodra, E., 
Brandt, A., Danovaro, R. et al., 2010, ‘Deep, diverse and definitely different: unique attributes 
of the world’s largest ecosystem’, Biogeosciences, 7, 2851– 2899; dosi 2018. Deep Sea Funda-
mentals. Policy Brief September 2018. http:// dosi- project.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2018/ 05/ 
009- Policy- Brief- 3- Deep- sea- Fundamentals- DOSI- V3.pdf.
 3 Snelgrove, P. V. R., 2016, ‘An Ocean of Discovery: Biodiversity Beyond the Census of Marine 
Life’, Planta Med. 82(09/ 10), 790– 799.
 4 See for example Newman, D.  J., 2016, ‘Developing natural product drugs: Supply problems 
and how they have been overcome’, Pharmacology and Therapeutics 162, 1– 9; Pugliano, M., 
Vanbellinghen, X., Schwinte, P., Benkirane- Jessel, N., Keller, L., 2017, ‘Combined Jellyfish Col-
lagen Type II, Human Stem Cells and Tgf- β3 as a Therapeutic Implant for Cartilage Repair’, 
Stem Cell Res Ther 7: 4 doi: 10.4172/ 2157– 7633.1000382.
 5 Merrie, A., Dunn, D. C., Metian, M., Boustany, A. M., Takei, Y., Oude Elferink, A., Ota, Y., Chris-
tensen, V., Halpin P. N., and Osterblom H., 2014, ‘An ocean of surprises – Trends in human 
use, unexpected dynamics and governance challenges in areas beyond national jurisdiction’, 
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to engage in marine scientific research and technological innovation, raising 
concerns about the ability of States to exercise their rights and fulfil their re-
sponsibilities under a future bbnj agreement for example to implement area- 
based management tools and environmental impact assessments and to share 
in the benefits of marine genetic resources of abnj.6
As such, marine science and technology form the cornerstone of the dis-
cussions on capacity building and technology transfer. Other forms of capac-
ity will also be important, such as policy and legal capacity, but the focus of 
this paper is the critical role of technology and scientific capacity in the de-
velopment of the bbnj agreement. First, the existing unclos framework for 
marine technology transfer and the opportunities and challenges for scientific 
and technological capacity building for the bbnj agreement is discussed. Sec-
ond, the past experiences and potential future role of the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission of unesco (ioc) in matters relating to technolo-
gy transfer under the bbnj agreement are considered, using the clearinghouse 
mechanism as an example. Finally, opportunities to strengthen the implemen-
tation of unclos through the bbnj agreement and through initiatives such 
as the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021– 2030) 
are discussed.7
2 Opportunities and Challenges
The unclos framework for the development and transfer of marine technol-
ogy is established in Part xiv. Article 268 sets out the basic objectives of tech-
nology transfer, including:
 a) the acquisition, evaluation and dissemination of marine technological 
knowledge and facilitate access to such information and data;
 b) the development of appropriate marine technology;
 c) the development of the necessary technological infrastructure to facili-
tate the transfer of marine technology;
 d) the development of human resources through training and education of 
nationals of developing States and countries and especially the nationals 
of the least developed among them; and
 6 Broggiato, A., S. Arnaud- Haond, C. Chiarolla, and T. Greiber, 2014, ‘Fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits from the utilization of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion: Bridging the gaps between science and policy’, Marine Policy 49, 176– 185.
 7 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/ 73. Resolution adopted by the General As-







 e) international cooperation, particularly at the regional, subregional and 
bilateral levels.
Based on this description, a very broad range of scientific and technological tools 
could be considered as relevant to technology transfer under the bbnj agree-
ment – ranging from scientific training and education, technological know- how, 
and access to infrastructure and equipment as well data, knowledge and informa-
tion. There are provisions relevant to technology transfer and capacity building 
elsewhere in unclos, including in Part xi (e.g., Article 143), Part xii (e.g., Article 
202), and Part xiii (e.g., Article 244). Throughout, however, there a number of 
weaknesses and ambiguities that can be identified with respect to the unclos 
framework for technology transfer and capacity building.
With the exception of the role for the International Seabed Authority that 
is specified in Part xi, unclos does not provide any detail on the institutional 
mechanisms to deliver on technology transfer and capacity building. Nor does 
Part xiv provide: a financial mechanism to support technology transfer; mo-
dalities to identify technological need or request assistance; practical arrange-
ments for information sharing, training opportunities and access to data; or 
a procedure to monitor the effectiveness of technology transfer programs, to 
strengthen and sustain components of the system and to promote long- term 
adoption. Rather, the measures referred to in Article 269 that are envisaged 
to achieve the basic objectives of technology transfer are heavily reliant on 
international science cooperation. Examples provided include conferences, 
exchanges and joint projects. This absence of implementation mechanisms is 
a concern for many States, given the fact that not all States have access to sci-
ence and technology.8
For the bbnj agreement, scientific knowledge is crucial to make informed 
decisions about the conservation and sustainable use of bbnj, and to enable a 
science- based approach. Biodiversity knowledge is important to designate and 
implement area- based management tools, conduct strategic environmental 
assessments and monitor and evaluate environmental impact assessment. For 
example, genetic tools show that fish populations once thought to be a single 
species are in fact genetically distinct – such findings have strong implications 
for conservation and sustainable use measures. These tools also create oppor-
tunities to understand and potentially harness genetic resources and deliver 
on access and benefit sharing.9
 8 ioc. 2017. Global Ocean Science Report The current status of ocean science around the 
world, L. Valdés et al. (eds.). Paris, unesco.
 9 Harden- Davies, H., Gjerde, K., 2019, ‘Building scientific and technological capacity: a role 
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The accumulation of new findings underscores that much remains to be 
discovered about bbnj. This in turn is driving the development of new tech-
nologies to investigate the dark, deep and distant areas of the global ocean. For 
example, new genetic tools and robotics are being developed to investigate the 
ocean twilight zone, between 200m and approximately 1,000m deep.10 Sub-
mersibles and underwater robotics remain the purview of just a few research 
institutes worldwide – but technological innovation and the burgeoning field 
of open- source software and open- science are driving down costs and lower-
ing the barrier to entry for States to engage in marine scientific research using 
new technologies.
Technology is also critical to monitor human activities, and to inform and 
support compliance measures. One such innovation is the use of the Auto-
matic Identification System by governments, research organisations and civil 
society groups to monitor human activity at sea for applications relevant to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity. For example, ais data 
has been used to address the impacts of anthropogenic noise, anchor scour 
and illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing.11
Public- private partnerships and philanthropic funding are playing a grow-
ing role in developing and transferring technology  – as illustrated by exam-
ples such as the non- profit organisation Global Fishing Watch working with 
research institutes and government agencies in the use of ais data. There is 
a need for business model innovation as much as technological innovation 
to fund the long- term development and deployment of ocean science and 
technology.
Ownership of scientific and technological infrastructure is not a pre- 
requisite for accessing scientific knowledge. Access to data and knowledge 
is possible through decentralized data networks and information nodes. For 
national jurisdiction’, Ocean Yearbook 33(1), 377– 400; Rabone, M., Harden- Davies, H., Col-
lins, J. E., Zajderman, S., Appeltans, W., Droege, G., Brandt, A., Pardo- Lopez, L., Dahlgren, 
T., Glover, A. G. and Horton, T., 2019, ‘Access to marine genetic resources (MGR): Raising 
awareness of best- practice through a new agreement for biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdiction (BBNJ)’, Frontiers in Marine Science. 6 10.3389/ fmars.2019.00520.
 10 See https:// twilightzone.whoi.edu/ accessed 20 September 2019.
 11 Erbe, C., Williams, R., Sandilands, D., Ashe, E., 2014, ‘Identifying Modeled Ship Noise 
Hotspots for Marine Mammals of Canada’s Pacific Region’, PLOS ONE 9(3):  e89820.; 
Kroodsma, D. A., J. Mayorga, T. Hochberg, N. A. Miller, K. Boerder, F. Ferretti, A. Wilson, 
B. Bergman, T. D. White, B. A. Block, P. Woods, B. Sullivan, C. Costello and B. Worm, 2018, 
‘Tracking the global footprint of fisheries’. Science 359(6378): 904– 908.; Davis, A. R., Broad, 
A., Gullett, W., Reveley, J., Steele, C., Schofield, C., 2016, ‘Anchors away? The impacts of 
anchor scour by ocean- going vessels and potential response options’, Marine Policy, 73, 






example, a volume of biodiversity data is available via the Ocean Biogeograph-
ic Information System (obis), which is open- access and free of charge and 
the apparent fishing activity detected using ais is available open- access on the 
website of Global Fishing Watch. Similarly, information and communication 
technology enables access to training opportunities via online courses and dis-
tance learning opportunities. As new technological opportunities develop, the 
importance of coordination and cooperation between the various national, 
regional and global nodes increases.
International science collaboration remains crucial to fund long- term sus-
tained ocean observations, such as the Global Ocean Observing System (goos), 
and to deliver ambitious international programs in pursuit of policy objectives. 
Ocean observations are nationally funded, but coordinated via regional and 
global mechanisms linked under the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com-
mission of unesco (ioc). A clear example of the importance is the ambitious 
United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021– 
2030), currently in the preparation phase, designed to support the attainment 
of Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 14 in particular. Though 
not the only UN agency with a role in marine science and technology transfer, 
the ioc is regarded as the primary competent international organisation for 
marine scientific research and plays a crucial role in coordinating internation-
al ocean science initiatives. In addition to goos and the Decade preparation 
phase, ioc also coordinates other ocean science initiatives, regional ocean 
science cooperation mechanisms, data sharing platforms such as obis, and 
training programs.
3 The ioc
The ioc has played an increasingly central role in the discussions on the topic 
of technology transfer and capacity building in the bbnj negotiations – from 
the preparatory through to the current negotiation phase. As the lead inter-
national organisation for marine scientific research, the ioc also plays a role 
in technology transfer and capacity building, as illustrated by the Criteria and 
Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology,12 and the document pre-
pared by the ioc in response to a request from the African Group during the 
third session of the Preparatory Committee for the development of the bbnj 
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agreement.13 The clearinghouse mechanism has been one of the key discus-
sion areas in which the ioc has been engaged.
Although there is no single definition or vision for the clearinghouse mech-
anism as yet under the bbnj agreement, a broad concept was laid out in the 
ioc cgtmt for a clearinghouse mechanism which, in essence, facilitates the 
sharing of information, access to expertise and promotes cooperation and co-
ordination. It could also be considered to entail a proactive human element 
that actively facilitates connections between people and projects.14 It is of par-
ticular interest in the context of the bbnj negotiations given the gaps regard-
ing access to information and opportunity, and the strong interest in a mecha-
nism to improve the transfer of marine technology under the bbnj agreement.
There are a series of initiatives under ioc that perform functions that could 
be drawn upon for the bbnj instrument. For example:
– Ocean Teacher Global Academy is a globally coordinated network of train-
ing and other capacity development mechanisms;
– Ocean Expert shares information about individuals, events, projects and 
profiles;
– Ocean Best Practices advances and promotes best practices and qual-
ity in ocean observations and data and is linked to the digital repository 
‘Ocean Docs’;
– Ocean Data and Information System links data centres; and the
– Ocean Biogeographic Information System harvests and integrates biodiver-
sity and related ecosystem data from more than 2900 databases all over the 
world and trains scientists in data management and analysis.
Furthermore, the regional hubs of the ioc provide a pre- existing institutional 
coordination mechanism for ocean science and technology transfer programs, 
such as the Regional Training and Research Centres of ioc westpac. How-
ever, the full potential role of ioc will be dependent on resources, something 
that has hindered the ioc in the past.15 As noted in the intervention delivered 
 13 ioc. 2017. Ad hoc Report of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (ioc) of 
unesco to the 4th Session of the Preparatory Committee on Marine Biological Diversity 
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (bbnj Prepcom) (New  York, 10– 21 July 2017), 
ioc Strategy on Activities in Relation to Capacity Development and Transfer of Marine 
Technology. ioc/ inf – 1347. Paris, unesco.
 14 ioc. 2018. ioc Group of Experts on Capacity Development. First Session, Paris, 21– 23 
March 2018. ioc/ ge- cd- i/ 3. Agenda Item 4.6. 63– 65.
 15 H. Harden- Davies, 2016, ‘Marine Science and technology transfer:  Can the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission advance governance of biodiversity 








by the ioc to the third session of the intergovernmental conference for the 
development of the bbnj instrument:
All these systems currently operate on limited resources and a largely vol-
untary basis. Further operationalization will require resources and ioc is 
working on resource requirement identification.16
The bbnj negotiations provide an important forum to discuss the potential op-
portunities and challenges of strengthening the legal, institutional and policy 
framework for technology transfer and building scientific capacity. The expe-
riences of the ioc offer important guidance and lessons learned. Given that 
there are initiatives underway, yet still a sense that implementation must be 
strengthened, there is an apparent need to diagnose the problem behind gaps 
in technology transfer and capacity building. This is particularly timely given 
the opportunity provided by the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development to put a new paradigm of capacity building into practice and 
promote the implementation of the bbnj instrument.
4 Conclusion
The technological tools of equipment, training materials and data access can 
be considered as a triple bottom line of scientific capacity building. However, 
the usefulness of these tools is largely dependent on scientific and technolog-
ical capacity, and access to data and knowledge needs to be coupled with ca-
pacity development. The existing framework for the transfer of marine tech-
nology faces several challenges and gaps in implementation mechanisms that 
could be addressed by the bbnj instrument. The experiences of the ioc in 
implementing the Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technol-
ogy can usefully inform the discussions on opportunities and challenges for 
the bbnj agreement, including with regard to the clearinghouse mechanism. 
Making the most of opportunities requires knowledge of the capacity needs of 
States in addition to a procedure to monitor change.
 16 Statement delivered by ioc- unesco on Monday 26 August 2019. Third session of the 
intergovernmental conference for the development of a new international legally bind-
ing instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. Agenda Item 6: Consideration of the subject matter referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of General Assembly resolution. Informal Working Group on capacity- building and 
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 chapter 13
Beholding the Emerging Biodiversity Agreement 
through a Looking Glass




Many developing countries do not have adequate scientific capability to benefit from 
the sustainable development of the ocean or to implement their international legal 
obligations under the Convention and related instruments. In light of this shortcom-
ing, the chapter seeks to address fundamental questions pertaining to the adoption of 
new normative obligations in the bbnj Agreement on education and training in ma-
rine scientific research (msr), including the codification of gender- sensitive norms. 
The chapter concludes that the Agreement has the potential to be a game- changer on 
capacity- building if it results in the following: the establishment of a robust institu-
tional setting for decision- making supported by the proposed clearing- house mecha-
nism; codifies the requirements of undertaking a regular ‘needs assessment’; provides 
a solid legal plinth for gender equality and the empowerment of women scientists; and 
most importantly of all establishes a mandatory and sustainable funding stream for 
capacity- building. Furthermore, the negotiators should bring about transformational 
change in the law of the sea by addressing these issues directly at the final session of 
the intergovernmental conference.
 Keywords
intergovernmental conference – capacity- building – biodiversity – gender equality – 
inequalities – language – law of the sea – marine scientific research – United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea –  women
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1 Introduction
The world is fighting a global pandemic associated with the relentless spread of 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.1 The multiple causes of the 
pandemic are manifest with compelling and longstanding evidence pointing 
towards a confluence of factors including the rapid growth of urbanisation, air 
travel and the unsustainable exploitation of the natural environment, among oth-
ers.2 As we witness the fragility of human existence and the dire consequences of 
uninformed encroachment into nature, it is perhaps pertinent to recall how Lewis 
Carroll used a looking glass as a literary device in one of his celebrated novels to 
show an irrational world characterised by strange behaviour and unexpected out-
comes.3 Similarly, if we hold a mirror to the world that exists around us today then 
it also evident that the natural and societal environments are not as they should 
be or could be, mainly due again to a whole range of anthropogenic phenomena 
that are leading to the mass extinction of biodiversity including catastrophic loss-
es of species and entire ecosystems in the world’s largest repository, the ocean en-
vironment.4 This escalating state of affairs is also putting the collective wellbeing 
of humanity and future generations at risk.5
The transnational responses of governments to the loss of biodiversity ap-
pear fragmented with just a handful of multilateral processes underway to 
safeguard community interests in the protection and preservation of the glob-
al environment.6 Crucially however they include protracted efforts at the Unit-
ed Nations (UN) to negotiate a new legal instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (bbnj).7 
 1 Editorial, ‘COVID- 19: learning from experience’ 395(10229) The Lancet, March 28, 2020.
 2 N. Madhav, B. Oppenheim, M. Gallivan, P. Mulembakani, E. Rubin, and N. Wolfe, ‘Pandem-
ics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation’ in D. Jamison, H. Gelband, S. Horton, et al., Disease Con-
trol Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty 3rd Ed., (Washington DC: World Bank, 
2017), Chapter 17.
 3 L. Carroll, Through the Looking- Glass, and What Alice Found There, 5th Ed (Oxford Compan-
ion to English Literature: 1986).
 4 UN Environment (2019). Global Environment Outlook – geo- 6: Healthy Planet, Healthy Peo-
ple. Nairobi. doi 10.1017/ 9781108627146.
 5 Ibid.
 6 See conservation related efforts pursuant to the following:  unga ‘Transforming Our 
World:  The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ UN Doc A/ res/ 70/ 1 (21 October 
2015); Paris Agreement 2015 (into force 4 November 2016) fccc/ cp/ 2015/ 10/ Add.1.
 7 UN, Revised draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas be-
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At one level, the latter negotiations represent a rare chink of light on the rela-
tively pedantic world of international law- making as it applies to the ocean. On 
another level, they also present a once in a generation opportunity for transfor-
mational change in the law of the sea through the codification of innovative 
provisions in the so- called ‘bbnj Agreement’ (hereinafter the Agreement) on 
capacity- building and marine scientific research (msr), including the codifica-
tion of gender- sensitive norms for the first time in a law of the sea treaty.
2 Fundamental Questions
In framing the case supporting the inclusion of new normative obligations in 
the Agreement on such issues, perhaps it is best to start out by noting that state 
practice over the past four decades demonstrates that the provisions on msr 
set forth in the Convention have served the interests of developed countries in 
the international community very well,8 by- and- large it must be said, through 
the facilitation of scientific inquiry into ocean processes and resources that 
is multi- faceted and in many instances transnational in substance, scope 
and geographical application.9 Despite the vital role that science plays in the 
management of ocean activities, it is also increasingly apparent that many 
developing countries, especially Small Island Developing States (sids) and 
bbnj processes up the time of writing; see inter alia: D Freestone (ed), Conserving Biodiversity 
in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (Brill/ Nijhoff 2019). On the preparatory phase of the 
negotiations, see: R. Long, J. Brincat, ‘Negotiating a New Biodiversity Instrument at the Unit-
ed Nations: A European Union Perspective on the Preparatory Phase’ in M. Nordquist, J. N. 
Moore, R Long, Cooperation and Engagement in the South China Sea And Asia Pacific Region 
(Leiden/ Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2019) 443– 468; R Long and M Rodríguez‐Chaves, ‘Anatomy of 
a New International Instrument for Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction: First Impres-
sions of the Preparatory Process’ (2015) 6 Environment Liability 214.
 8 See inter alia:  S. Rosenne, A.Yankov, M.  Nordquist et  al., United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 1991) Vol. iv, 429– 657; K. Bartnstein, S. Hamamaton in A. Proelss (ed), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea:  A Commentary (Beck, Hart and Nomos 2017)  1605– 1761; 
M. Gorina- Ysern, Marine Scientific Research (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, 2003); 
F.H. Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research, The Operation and Status of Research Vessels and 
Other Platforms in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/ Boston, 2005); 
United Nations, Guide for the Implementation of the Relevant Provisions of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 









Least Developing Countries (ldc s), do not have adequate scientific capabil-
ity to benefit from the sustainable development of the ocean or to implement 
their international legal obligations under the Convention and related instru-
ments.10 Indeed without enhanced access to scientific knowledge and skills, 
it is difficult to see how these countries can reap the benefits that are to be 
derived from sustainable uses of biodiversity or more pressingly through tak-
ing appropriate action to redress the existentialist dangers posed to their very 
existence by environmental damage and marine resource depletion.11 Further-
more, these failings are compounded by the barriers that impede women sci-
entists from participating in msr and from equal representation at all levels in 
public and private spheres concerned with the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity both within and beyond national jurisdiction. Again, this 
failing is most acute in relation to women scientists working in the global- 
south and in some of the world’s poorest countries.
In light of the aforementioned shortcomings, the paper touches upon three 
fundamental questions, namely: (1) Is the law of the sea adequate to the task of 
capacity- building for bbnj under existing international agreements; (2) What 
considerations are driving the adoption of new normative obligations in the 
Agreement on education and training in msr, including the codification of 
gender- sensitive norms?, and following on from this; (3) Do the intergovern-
mental negotiations at the UN present an opportunity for a paradigm shift that 
will enhance the scientific capabilities of developing States, particularly those 
of sids and the ldc s?
3 Gender Rights: Research and Advocacy at the World Maritime 
University
At the outset, it ought to be noted that the discussion in this chapter is informed 
by the success of the capacity- building mission of the World Maritime Univer-
sity (wmu) over the past 37 years including the delivery of specialised post- 
graduate offerings in maritime and ocean affairs to students from developing 
 10 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on oceans and 
the law of the sea’. UN Doc A/ 65/ 69 (2010); unga Preparatory process of the United 
Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 
14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
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countries.12 In addition, the chapter is shaped by the work of the University on 
the empowerment of women in the maritime sector.13 This work extends to a 
specialist research and capacity- building programme underway at the wmu- 
Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute (goi) on the empowerment of women scien-
tists for the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021– 
2030).14 Supported by the Department of Fisheries and Ocean of Canada, the 
latter programme has its origin in Canadian G7 initiatives aimed at tackling 
gender inequality at a global level.15 In launching the research programme and 
by way of highlighting some of the inequalities that needed to be tackled, the 
Hydrographer General of Canada, Dr. Genvieve Béchard, drew attention to the 
poor gender balance in the organisations of the member states that contribute 
to the work of the International Hydrographic Organization (iho), with only 
five national hydrographic organisations led by women and none in develop-
ing countries.16
In order to explore how best to break down barriers that impede women in 
scientific careers, the first strand of the research programme explores the role 
of gender equality and the empowerment of women in the conduct of ocean 
science and the delivery of advisory services by the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ices). The ices is made- up of a community in ex-
cess of 6,000 marine scientists working in public and private settings including 
 12 R. Long, ‘The World Maritime University  – Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute:  A New 
Institute in a Unique University’ 50(2019) Ocean Development and International Law 
225– 234.
 13 M. Kitada, ‘Advancing ‘Good Practices’ that Promote Gender Equality in the Maritime 
Sector’ in I.  Papanicolopulu (ed.) Gender and the Law of the Sea (Leiden/ Boston:  Brill/ 
Nijhoff, 2019) 302- 317.
 14 Sponsored by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada. See: press release: Launch 
of Recruitment for Ph.D. Scholarship and Post- Doctoral Fellowship Programme  – 
Empowering Women for the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development, 31 May 2019. Available at: https:// wmu.se/ news/ launch- recruitment- phd- 
scholarship- and- post- doctoral- fellowship- programme- empowering- women.
 15 Canadian were subsequently picked- up by the French G7 Presidency in 2019 and led 
to the establishment of G7 Gender Equality Advisory Council. See Biarritz Partnership, 
Recommendations of the Gender Equality Advisory Council for advancing gender equal-
ity and the empowerment of girls and women and Call to Action. Available at: https:// 
www.elysee.fr/ admin/ upload/ default/ 0001/ 05/ cfb1e2ba2b9aa09c1660f1b6df2cabb-
c815eecc2.pdf.
 16 Australia, Canada, Croatia, Denmark and Norway. See Report Third Conference on the 
Empowerment of Women in the Maritime Community, available at:  https:// safety-
4sea.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 09/ WMU- Third- WMU- International- Womens- 












universities.17 This element also entails a study of gender equality in the ocean 
and freshwater science communities of Kenya, as well as women empower-
ments efforts undertaken within the framework of the Nairobi Convention 
for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Eastern African Region.18 This is complemented by a sec-
ond tangential thread of inquiry that entails an analysis of gender equality in 
the regulatory and ocean governance systems organisations that depend upon 
and deliver ocean science, with a particular focus on: the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (fao), the International Seabed Authority (isa), the Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic Commission of unesco (ioc- unesco); as well as 
non- governmental organizations involved in the bbnj negotiation process at 
the UN.19 One of the programme outputs is the design of an action plan on 
the empowerment of women within ocean science organisations and science 
dependent ocean governance systems that can be applied globally throughout 
the UN Decade of Ocean Science.20
In parallel with the aforementioned programme, researchers at the goi are 
engaging in extra- mural advocacy initiatives at intergovernmental conferences 
and technical workshops hosted by UN system bodies including most notably 
at the penultimate session of the intergovernmental conference (igc) on the 
conservation and sustainable use of bbnj.21 These advocacy opportunities 
 17 ices has 20 member nations:  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. Affiliate insti-
tutes with observer status are located in the following: Australia, Chile, Greece, Peru, and 
South Africa. Worldwide Fund for Nature and Birdlife International have formal observer 
status at meetings of ices.
 18 Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, 21 June 1985, into force 30 May 
1996, 91 rgdip 1122, (1993) unep Register 228, amended 31 March 2010 (not in force); 
1985 Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the East African 
Region, into force 30 May 1996, 985 ielmt 47.
 19 See:  https:// wmu.se/ docs/ phd- scholarship- and- post- doctoral- fellowship- programme- 
empowering- women- united- nations- decade.
 20 Ibid.
 21 The initiatives also include, inter alia:  the inaugural meeting of the Commonwealth 
Action Group on Ocean Observation, Ottawa, Canada, 30 May 2019, the ioc General 
Assembly Meeting 2019, Side Event hosted by the Government of Canada on Empowering 
Women through the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, Paris, 
France, 27 June 2019; Governing Science at Sea: The Legal Framework for Marine Scientific 
Research, Korea Institute Ocean science and Technology (kiost), Berkeley Law, Law of 
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have been used to draw attention to the importance of including gender sen-
sitive norms in the Agreement and extended to co- hosting a side event on 
this subject with Ireland and Palau at the third session of the igc in Septem-
ber 2019.22 Surprisingly, this was the first side event on capacity- building and 
gender- sensitive norms since the intergovernmental dialogue on the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity commenced over 15  years ago.23 
The event was well attended by negotiators and included a keynote address 
by the President of the World Maritime University, along with contributions 
from: the Secretary- General of the International Seabed Authority; the gender 
focal point scientist of the ioc- unesco; the Director of Legal and External 
Affairs at the International Maritime Organization: as well as commentaries 
from senior diplomatic representatives of the Pacific sids, the Caribbean sids 
and Indonesia.24 Many participants voiced their concerns about the impor-
tance of moving from words to action in the international law- making process 
through the codification of new normative obligations on capacity- building, 
marine scientific research and the empowerment of women in the Agreement. 
The case and opportunity for doing so are reviewed below.
4 Language Matters
Building capacity or developing capacity in msr:  which is it? The answer 
to this question is not self- evident and in delving forth, it is therefore nec-
essary to drill down on the meaning of some key terms used in this paper, 
North Atlantic Ocean, UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021- 
2030), Halifax, Canada, 7- 10 January 2020; the isa International Workshop on Capacity 
Development, Resources and Needs Assessment, Kingston, Jamaica, 10- 12 February 2020.
 22 See: https:// wmu.se/ news/ capacity- building- gender- empowerment- and- bbnj- agreement.
 23 One can compare and contrast the progressive evolution of gender equality and women’s 
empowerment initiatives at a range of international bodies since the 1980s including at 
iucn, see: Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy: Mainstreaming Gender- 
responsiveness within the iucn Programme of Work Approved by the iucn Council at its 
95th Meeting, iucn C/ 95/ 8, October 2018, available at: https:// www.iucn.org/ sites/ dev/ 
files/ annex_ 9_ to_ c_ 95_ 8_ iucn_ gender_ equality_ and_ womens_ empowerment_ policy.pdf. 
On women and international treaty law, see, H. Charlesworth, ‘Women’ in S. Chesterman, 
D.  Malone, and S.  Villalpando (Ed.) Oxford Handbook of UN Treaties (Oxford:  oup, 
2019) 249- 265.
 24 R. Long and Z. Sun (eds.), Workshop Report: Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Towards the Development of a Balanced, Effective and Universal International Agreement 









specifically:  ‘capacity- building’, ‘capacity- development’, ‘marine scientific re-
search’ and ‘gender equality’.
Starting out with the penultimate term first, the Convention for well docu-
mented reasons does not attempt to define what constitutes msr, or any other 
form of scientific research for that matter.25 The Convention nonetheless has 
extensive provisions on msr as well as references to ‘survey activities’, ‘prospect-
ing’ and ‘exploration and exploitation’ in relation to seabed mining.26 Moreover, 
despite science going to very heart of a dispute between Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan, the International Court of Justice did not offer a general definition of 
‘scientific research’, or find it necessary to do so in rendering its judgment in the 
Antarctic Whaling case.27 From a law of the sea viewpoint, the meaning of msr 
thus remains open textured and can be viewed as a general term to describe activ-
ities undertaken in the marine environment that expand scientific knowledge of 
the ocean and its processes.28
Similarly to the absence of clarity on what constitutes msr, the terms 
‘capacity- building’ and ‘capacity- development’ are not terms of art under the 
Convention or related instruments.29 The architects of the Convention did 
however use a formulation of words to describe measures that are aimed at 
providing technical assistance to developing States in a range of provisions ad-
dressing living resources, the Area, the marine environment, and marine scien-
tific research.30 Thus, for example, in the context of the provisions on the devel-
opment and transfer of marine science and technology, Article 266 (2) refers to 
States, particularly developing States, which may ‘need and request technical 
assistance in regard to the exploration, exploitation, conservation and man-
agement of marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, msr and other activities in the marine environment compatible 
 25 R. Long, ‘Regulating Marine Scientific Research in the European Union:  It Takes more 
than Two to Tango’ in M. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, F. Soons, and H. Kim (eds.) The Law Of 
The Sea Convention:  U.S. Accession And Globalisation (Leiden/ Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012) 427- 4 at 440- 491.
 26 Parts ii, iii, xi, xii, Annex iii, as well as in the 1994 Agreement relating to the 
Implementation of Part xi, along with the mining code.
 27 The Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia V.  Japan:  New Zealand intervening) 2014 i.c.j. 
General List No. 148 (March 31) at paras. 73-  86.
 28 A. Roach, R.  Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3ed. (Leiden/ Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff, 
2012) 414.
 29 Article 266, Convention. See K.  Bartnstein, ‘Development and Transfer of Marine 
Technology’ in Proelss (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:  A 
Commentary (Beck, Hart and Nomos 2017) 1765.













Beholding the Emerging Biodiversity Agreement 249
with the Convention’.31 The objective of technical assistance in this instance is 
the acceleration of the ‘social and economic development of States’,32 a goal 
reflective of the debate on the establishment of a New Economic Order at the 
Third United Nations Conference (unclos iii).33
Outside of the domain of the law of the sea treaties, the use of the terms 
‘capacity- building’ and ‘capacity development’ are all pervasive in UN docu-
ments, reports and instruments, particularly those emanating from the UN 
General Assembly.34 The precise meaning of the terms is frequently difficult 
to discern, particularly so when they are used interchangeably in the specialist 
literature. That aside, the two terms are considered to have different connota-
tions in different contexts.35 The undp ‘Practice Note on Capacity Develop-
ment’ for instance draws a number of distinctions regarding the two terms in 
that it provides that:  ‘capacity development commonly refers to the process 
of creating and building capacities and their (subsequent) use, management 
and retention. This process is driven from the inside and starts from existing 
national capacity assets’.36 The Note goes on to state that ‘capacity building’ 
refers on the other hand to a ‘process that supports only the initial stages of 
building or creating capacities and alludes to an assumption that there are no 
existing capacities to start from’.37
At what point does the initial capacity- building activities transform into 
the longer- term capacity- development? In answering this question, it is il-
lustrative to note that the International Seabed Authority (isa) considers its 
initial training activities after the coming into force of the 1994 Implemen-
tation Agreement as capacity- building initiatives.38 Similar to the approach 
 31 Article 266(2), Convention.
 32 Article 266(2), Convention.
 33 See Recital 5, Preamble, Convention, as well as commentary by K. Bartnstein, in A Proelss 
(ed.), note 8, 1765.
 34 For example, there are 13 references to capacity- building in unga resolution adopted 25 
September 2015: A/ res/ 70/ 1 – Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development including a specific call in Goal 17.9 for enhanced “international support 
for implementing effective and targeted capacity- building in developing countries to sup-
port national plans to implement all the sdg s, including through North- South, South- 
South and triangular cooperation.”
 35 undp, undp Practice Note: Capacity Development (New York, undp, 2008) at 5. Available 




 38 Secretariat of the isa, Review of Capacity- Building Programmes and Initiatives 


















advocated by the undp Practice Note on the subject, it considers the term 
capacity- development as a more accurate description of future training pro-
grammes and initiatives that will be undertaken by the Authority.39 Indeed, 
the strategic plan of the isa uses the term capacity- development to describe 
the technical training mission and mandate of the Authority for the period 
2019– 2023.40 The trend of using the term ‘capacity development’ is also evi-
dent in the ioc- unesco publications on the Decade of Ocean Science, which 
aims to build global scientific capacity to achieve the objectives of the 2030 
Agenda.41
In contrast to the approach adopted by ioc- unesco, the draft text of the 
Agreement does not refer to capacity development but addresses comprehen-
sively ‘capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology’ in the same set 
of provisions (Part v, Articles 42– 45), thereby presenting them as complemen-
tary activities that go hand- in- hand.42 Although these provisions are highly 
prescriptive and reviewed further below, suffice to note here that the draft text 
does not define expressly the meaning of the term ‘capacity- building’, nor does 
it allude to the possibility of the latter evolving into ‘capacity- development’ at 
some future point during the course of implementation of the Agreement.43 
 39 Ibid.
 40 isa, Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority relating to the 
strategic plan of the Authority for the period 2019−2023ISBA/ 24/ A/ 10, 27 July 2018. 
Available at: https:// ran- s3.s3.amazonaws.com/ isa.org.jm/ s3fs- public/ files/ documents/ 
isba24_ a10- en.pdf.
 41 ioc- unesco Draft Implementation Plan, Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development (Paris:  ioc- unesco, 18 March 2020)  17- 20. Available at:  file:// / Users/ rl/ 
Downloads/ Implementation_ Plan_ Zero_ Draft_ March_ 2020%20(1).pdf.
 42 The United States is a longstanding and well- versed opponent to the transfer of technol-
ogy provisions in Parts xiii and xiv of the Convention. The wisdom of this conjunctive 
approach linking capacity- building with the transfer of technology may yet prove to be a 
bridge- too- far in attracting US support for the putative Agreement. See Jon M. Van Dyke, 
David L. Teichmann (1984) ‘Transfer of seabed mining technology: A stumbling block to 
U.S. ratification of the law of the sea convention?’, Ocean Development and International 
Law, 13:4, 427- 455, doi: 10.1080/ 00908328409545736.
 43 The group of Core Latin American States (clams) submitted a definition in a proposal 
on capacity building on the 20 February 2020, which defines the term as meaning: ‘any 
activity intended to enable or improve academic, professional and technical training; 
the exchange of knowledge and skills; access to physical infrastructure; institutional 
strengthening; communication between relevant actors; the exchange of scientific infor-
mation, technological development and innovation; and raising awareness through 
public information and basic knowledge about marine biodiversity in areas outside of 
national jurisdiction’. This proposed definition draws from the concepts included in the 
ioc Capacity Development Strategy 2015- 2021, available at:  https:// www.un.org/ bbnj/ 
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Indeed, a practical perspective would suggest that a combination of the two 
would be more appropriate to the task at hand, that is to say initial and ongoing 
capacity- building and capacity- development, which may be a more beneficial 
avenue to improve the effectiveness of the Agreement in the fullness of time.
Finally, although the discussion is primarily concerned about inequalities 
among men and women pursuing marine scientific careers, it ought to be not-
ed that the term ‘gender’ refers to a range of identities, which may not corre-
spond to the binary characterisation of a person as male or female.44 For the 
purpose of the chapter, gender equality is understood to mean that a person’s 
rights and opportunities is not dependent on this characterisation but is about 
realising full human potential, human rights and social justice. According to 
UN Women:
Gender Equality means that the rights, responsibilities and opportunities 
of individuals will not depend on whether they are born male or female. 
Equality does not mean “the same as”  – promotion of gender equality 
does not mean than women and men will become the same. Equality be-
tween women and men has both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect. 
The quantitative aspect refers to the desire to achieve equitable represen-
tation of women – increasing balance and parity, while the qualitative as-
pect refers to achieving equitable influence on establishing development 
priorities and outcomes for women and men. Equality involves ensuring 
that the perceptions, interests, needs and priorities of women and men 
(which can be very different because of the differing roles and responsi-
bilities of women and men) will be given equal weight in planning and 
decision- making.45
In essence, gender equality and the empowerment of women scientists neces-
sitates engaging with all of humankind to meet the challenges encountered in 
ocean science and the law of the sea on the conservation and sustainable use 
of bbnj.46
 44 J. Archer, and B.  Lloyd, Sex and Gender, 2ed., (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
 45 UN Women, Important Concepts Underlying Gender Mainstreaming (New York: UN, 2001). 
Available at: https:// www.un.org/ womenwatch/ osagi/ pdf/ factsheet2.pdf.
 46 G. Goettsche- Wanli, ‘Gender and the Law of the Sea:  a Global Perspective’ in 









5 Is the Law of the Sea Adequate to the Task of Capacity- Building?
Bearing in mind that the Agreement is an implementation instrument under 
the Convention, one can ask if existing provisions in the parent treaty are ade-
quate to the task of capacity- building for bbnj? There are over two dozen refer-
ences in the Convention to providing technical assistance to developing States 
in various forms.47 The Convention does not however identify which States 
qualify for such assistance, although various categories of States have been 
discussed during the course of the bbnj processes including least- developed 
countries, landlocked developing countries, geographically disadvantaged 
States, sids, coastal African States and developing middle- income countries.48
Briefly stated, the technical assistance articles in the Convention can be 
grouped into four sets of the provisions addressing: seabed mining;49 the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment;50 marine scientific re-
search;51 and development and transfer of marine technology.52 Many of the 
provisions are hortatory in nature and characterised by inherent weaknesses 
and ambiguities regarding the obligations that they impose on States Parties 
and other entities. For instance, apart from acknowledging that msr is a free-
dom of the high seas,53 there is little guidance on how research, prospecting 
and exploring of the International Seabed Area (the Area) are to distinguished 
in practice, bearing in mind that each of these activities are subject to differ-
ent requirements under Annex iii of the Convention, the 1994 Implementa-
tion Agreement, and the mining code.54 That said, Annex iii is unique in the 
law of the sea and has a rare strength in that it sets down an express obliga-
tion on mining contractors to provide practical programmes for the training 
of the personnel of the isa and developing States.55 Moreover, States Parties 
are compelled as a general rule under the 1994 Implementation Agreement 
to promote international technical and scientific cooperation with regard 
to activities in the Area.56 This obligation is further elaborated upon in the 
 47 Op. cit. K. Bartnstein, in A. Proelss (ed.), note 8, 1765.
 48 Article 7(b), Agreement.
 49 Articles 144, 274, Convention.
 50 Articles 202, 203, Convention.
 51 Article 266, Convention.
 52 Article 266, Convention.
 53 Article 87, Convention.
 54 R. Churchill, V.  Lowe, The Law of the Sea 3rd Ed., (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1999) at 404.
 55 Article 15, Annex iii, Convention.
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prospecting and exploration code for seabed mining, which provide that the 
training programmes must be drawn up and paid for by the contractor, work-
ing in cooperation with the Authority and the sponsoring State or States.57 The 
legally- binding nature of the training obligations was also highlighted in the 
first Advisory Opinion handed down by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of it-
los, which noted that the legal responsibilities of States Parties with respect 
to activities in the Area included ensuring that developing States received the 
necessary assistance including training.58
A number of general points can be made about the other provisions in the 
Convention on technical assistance. First, the provisions on the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment in Part xii are less compelling than 
those on seabed mining and very much couched in the language of promoting 
technical assistance programmes to aid developing States.59 Crucially, they do 
not provide a solid legal basis for mandatory and legally binding obligations 
in relation to the delivery of capacity building resources or expertise to devel-
oping States. That said, the provisions in Part xii are premised on assistance 
having been provided directly or through the good offices of international or-
ganizations and extend to training, equipment, the development of facilities 
for research, monitoring, educational and other programmes.60 In addition, 
appropriate assistance must be provided for pollution incidents and for the 
preparation of environmental assessments. In relation to pollution incidents, 
developing States are to be granted preference by international organizations 
in relation to financial support and technical assistance.61
Second, on a broader geographical scale, technical training programmes 
and initiatives for developing States on a voluntary basis are implicit in the 
provisions on living resources, as well as the rights of land- locked States and 
geographically disadvantaged States.62
 57 See, for example, Regulation 3.i(a), Regulation 29, Section 8 of Annex iv, Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt- rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area, isba/ 18/ 
A/ 11, 22 October 2012.
 58 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect 
to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] itlos Rep 10 (Seabed Mining Advisory 
Opinion), para. 163.
 59 Article 202, Convention.
 60 Article 202(a), Convention.
 61 Article 202(a), Convention.
 62 Article 70, 72(2), Convention. See, K.  Bartnstein, S.  Hamamaton in A.  Proelss (ed.), 















Third, the negotiators at unclos iii were aware of the importance of 
capacity- building for msr and adopted a resolution on the development of 
national marine science, technology and ocean service infrastructures, which 
called for the promotion of programmes of scientific, educational, technical 
and other assistance to developing States for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of ma-
rine pollution.63 Indeed, the success of the provisions on msr (Part xiii) and 
the transfer of marine technology (Part xiv) is almost entirely contingent 
upon the voluntary implementation of the resolution in practice by developed 
States Parties. Viewed in this light, the Agreement represents an opportunity to 
redress the shortcomings of the Convention in providing viable mechanisms 
for capacity building.
Fourth, the provisions on technical assistance and training in the Conven-
tion are complemented by other schemes in international law and ocean sci-
ence.64 They include a broad suite of initiatives implemented by unep in fur-
therance of its Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans, which apply to 
abnj of the North East Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean and Southern Ocean 
(Antarctic) and are undertaken by Regional Coordination Units and Regional 
Activity Centres. Likewise, regional capacity- building is a cornerstone of fish-
eries management training programmes with several tailored initiatives deliv-
ered by the five tuna rfmo s and the eight deep- sea rfmo s. The International 
Maritime Organization has its own technical assistance programme valued at 
about 14 million usd per annum, which is funded from a variety of sources in-
cluding the Global Environment Facility, the European Union and the Norwe-
gian Agency for Development and Cooperation.65 Specialised post- graduate 
education for students from developing countries is delivered by the World 
Maritime University in Sweden and by the imo International Maritime Law 
Institute in Malta.66
 63 Appended to the Final Act of the Conference as Annex vi.
 64 There is an excellent summary of complementary initiatives in UN Doc A/ 65/ 69 (2010), 
op. cit. note 10. Also, Biliana Cicin- Sain (et al.), ‘Policy Brief on Capacity Development as 
a Key Aspect of a New International Agreement on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National 
Jurisdiction (bbnj)’, August 2018. Available at:  http:// www.fao.org/ fileadmin/ user_ 
upload/ common_ oceans/ docs/ policy- brief- on- bbnj- capacity- development- aug- 2018.pdf.
 65 imo, Annual report on the technical cooperation activities implemented under the 
Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme during 2018, TC 69/ 3(a), 18 April 2019. 
Available at: http:// www.imo.org/ en/ OurWork/ TechnicalCooperation/ ITCP/ Documents/ 
TC%2069- 3(a)%20- %20Annual%20Report%20for%202018.pdf.
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All- in all, capacity- building under the Convention and related instruments 
falls well short of what is required to meet the needs of developing States in 
relation to the scientific aspects of decision- making on the conservation and 
sustainable use of bbnj.67 With the benefit of hindsight, it is also evident that 
the piecemeal approach and the lack of a strong thematic cross- cutting strand 
on technical assistance has undermined the effectiveness of the Convention 
as a capacity- building instrument over the past four decades.68 Moreover, the 
msr provisions in the Convention are dated in so far as they are primarily con-
cerned with ship- based research and and refecting the era when they were 
negotiated say little if anything about the application of satellite technologies, 
autonomous sensors, as well as the use of artificial intelligence tools to the task 
of ocean observation and the sampling of biodiversity for scientific and other 
purposes.69 Many of the latter tools do not require ocean scientists to spend 
long stints at sea and offer pathways to careers that are more amenable to sci-
entists with family responsibilities.70
Outside of the domain of the seabed mining provisions, the absence of 
mandatory funding mechanisms and dedicated financial resources must also 
be viewed as major failings that completely undermine the practical utility 
of the capacity- building obligations that arise under the Convention.71 These 
shortcomings are compounded by the absence of a legal basis for intergovern-
mental coordination on capacity- building pertaining to marine research in-
cluding genetic research, along with undertaking the science associated with 
the establishment of mpa s and the conduct of eia s.72 Furthermore, although 
25 years have passed since the coming into force of the Convention, no com-
prehensive assessment has been undertaken at a global level of the msr needs 
of developing States.73 This requirement is ever more pressing with the First 
 67 UN Doc A/ 65/ 69 (2010), op. cit. note 10. Also, Biliana Cicin- Sain (et al.) op. cit. note 64.
 68 Ibid.
 69 See inter alia:  R. Long, “A European Law Perspective:  Science, Technology and New 
Challenges to Ocean Law” in H. Scheiber, J. Kraska (eds.), Science, Technology, And New 
Challenges To Modern Ocean Law, (Leiden/ Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015) 65- 123; J. Kraska, 
Y.  Kil- Park (ed.), Emerging Technology and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming).
 70 See section 6.4 infra.
 71 See section 7.4 infra.
 72 UN Doc A/ 65/ 69 (2010), op. cit. note 10, paras 161- 181. The report in footnote 212 mentions 
two initiatives undertaken by the imo, the ‘Global Programme on Integration of Women 
in the Maritime Sector’, and the establishment of regional associations for women in the 
maritime sector.
















Global Integrated Marine Assessment (the Assessment) drawing attention to 
major gaps in the msr capacity of developing States, particularly in relation to 
the human skills and knowledge that can be applied in decisions concerning 
the conservation and sustainable use of bbnj.74 Specifically, the Assessment 
identified needs in taxonomy, genetics, as well as bio- physical and chemical 
research on the ocean environment, along with a number of related fields and 
skills.75 The Assessment is largely silent on the gender bias in ocean science 
but makes detailed reference to the importance of gender considerations in 
fisheries and aquaculture industries.76 Without quantifying the scale of the 
improvement, the Assessment does however allude to an ever- increasing num-
ber of women in technical, scientific and managerial careers in the latter two 
sectors.77
The weaknesses in the law of the sea on capacity- building can be partly 
explained by the negotiation period of the Convention itself, which is a trea-
ty child of the 1970s. An obvious lacuna stems from the absence of express 
normative obligations on gender balance and the empowerment of women.78 
The supposedly gender- neutral norms set out in the Convention have been 
questioned on the basis that they perpetuate inequalities in the law of the sea 
institutions, particularly the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea and 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as well as in capacity- 
building programmes and more generally in relation to careers in the maritime 
domain, including within the sphere of msr.79 Clearly, the law of the sea as 
currently constituted is not adequate to the task of building- capacity in msr 
or to advancing gender sensitive norms for the purpose of implementing the 
objectives of the Agreement.
 74 United Nations, The First Integrated Marine Assessment (Cambridge University Press 
2016), Chapter 53, 923- 933. See discussion of clearing- house mechanism infra.
 75 Ibid., 924.
 76 Ibid. There are for instance 32 references to gender in the chapter on the social and 
economic aspects of sea- based food and fisheries, see especially pp 34- 35. Available 
at:  https:// www.cambridge.org/ core/ services/ aop- cambridge- core/ content/ view/ 
C0FF1CAEC3D80892309BFBEC6A69364D/ 9781108186148c15_ p229- 238_ CBO.pdf/ 
social_ and_ economic_ aspects_ of_ seabased_ food_ and_ fisheries.pdf.
 77 Ibid.
 78 R. Long (unpublished paper), ‘Gender and the Law of the Sea Convention: Is it All about 
Buoys?’ delivered at an international conference, Exploring the human element of the 
oceans: the gender implications of the law of the sea, School of Law, University of Milano- 
Bicocca, 25 May 2017.
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6 Considerations Driving the Codification of New Norms
The scientific and policy considerations underpinning the law of the sea are 
continuously changing in response to new uses and pressures on the ocean en-
vironment, along with technological and economic developments, with some 
of the greatest changes occurring since the conclusion of the Convention in 
1982. Four of the dynamics that are at play and that should have a bearing on 
the outcome of the bbnj negotiations are briefly enumerated below.
6.1 Reinforcing a Crucial Nexus: Science, Law and Capacity- Building
Our knowledge of the ocean is extremely limited, particularly so in relation 
to bbnj.80 The capacity building provisions of the Agreement must therefore 
aim to strengthen the vital nexus that links the scientific and legal dimensions 
of the law of the sea. The importance of reinforcing this link cannot be under-
stated as it is central to ensuring the conservation and sustainable use of the 
ocean, as well as to the stable and peaceful public order of maritime affairs. At 
a very practical level, many decisions in ocean governance need to be based on 
the best available science and empirical evidence derived from pure and ap-
plied msr.81 Within various ocean governance settings, scientists commonly 
bear the heavy burden of providing advice to decision- makers relating to the 
design and implementation of sector specific policies that apply both within 
and beyond national jurisdiction.82 They also partake in and inform the work 
undertaken by intergovernmental organizations and regional seas and fisher-
ies management bodies, including their efforts to manage living resources sus-
tainably, to map the oceans for navigation and other purposes, to address the 
adverse impacts of climate change, and to ensure food security in the ldc s.83 
This work is frequently supported by the expert services of specialist regional 
 80 United Nations, The First Integrated Marine Assessment (Cambridge University Press 
2016) 8, 936. Also see, T. Webb et al., ‘Biodiversity’s big wet secret: The global distribution 
of marine biological records reveals chronic under- exploration of the deep pelagic ocean’ 
(2010) 5 PLoS One, e10223.
 81 Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, 3 Ed., (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2019)  432- 450. See also, in this volume, L.  Mayer and J.A. Roach, ‘The Quest to 
Completely Map the World’s Oceans in Support of Understanding Marine Biodiversity 
and the Regulatory Barriers we Have Created’.
 82 On the science policy nexus, see for example, unga Res 72/ 72, paras 54– 58. Also, D.F. 
Boesch, ‘The role of science in ocean governance’, 31 (1999) Ecological Economics 189– 198.
 83 For instance, the International Maritime Organization, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (fao), the International Seabed Authority (isa), the Intergovernmental 












scientific bodies, such as the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea (ices) and the North Pacific Marine Science Organization (pices),84 
which are mandated with collecting and exchanging scientific information, 
along with providing scientific advice concerning the planning and managing 
of offshore activities including activities that impinges upon the environmen-
tal status of bbnj.85
The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity under the Agreement 
must therefore be viewed first and foremost as a scientific challenge that needs 
to be resolved on the basis of the data and knowledge derived from msr. With-
out appropriate scientific training and access to deep science capabilities, sci-
entists from developing countries including women scientists will be curtailed 
in contributing to the institutional arrangements established by the Agree-
ment, especially the proposed Scientific and Technical Body.86 Furthermore, 
as pointed out previously, the capacity gap in msr between developed coun-
tries and developing countries will continue to broaden with notable regional 
disparities regarding the resources and know- how available to scientists in the 
global- south.87 Indeed, unless the link between science and law are strength-
ened and operationalised for developing States, it is difficult to see how they 
will derive tangible benefits from the Agreement. This explains why capacity- 
building is viewed by many negotiators attending the bbnj intergovernmen-
tal conference as a cross- thematic strand of the negotiations, closely linked to 
the functioning of the clearing- house mechanism, as well as a key enabler for 
the successful implementation of the three substantive elements of the draft 
treaty pertaining to mgr s and benefit sharing, abmt s including mpa s, and 
eia s.88 Looking to the future, the results of msr will be crucial to improved 
understanding of the functioning of high seas ecosystems and the successful 
 84 Convention for The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ices), 652 unts 
237; Convention for a North Pacific Marine Science Organization (pices) 207 unts 189, 
Amendment May 20, 1987.
 85 Statement of Anne Christine Brusendorff on behalf of International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ices) at igc 3.  Available at:  https:// www.ices.dk/ news- and- 
events/ Documents/ Press%20Room/ Areas%20Beyond%20National%20Juristiction.pdf.
 86 C. Salpin, V.  Onwuasoanya, M.  Bourrel, and A.  Swaddling, (2016). ‘Marine scientific 
research in Pacific Small Island Developing States’, (2016) 95 Marine Policy 363- 371.
 87 Op. cit. note 8.
 88 UN, Statement by the President at the closing of the third session, and the report of the 
Informal working group on capacity- building and the transfer of marine technology 
A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 10*, 13 September 2019, 17/ 23- 19- 23, especially the discussion on the 
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implementation of the Agreement.89 The draft treaty thus presents an excep-
tional opportunity to strengthen the international framework for deep- ocean 
science and to enhance the functional cooperation between States, as well 
as public and private bodies, including cooperation on the implementation 
of capacity- building programmes to meet the special needs of the ldc s and 
sids. The framework for transnational cooperation will be further bolstered 
by capacity development activities undertaken pursuant to the UN Decade of 
Ocean Science and to implement obligations arising under the 2030 Agenda.90
6.2 Mitigating Environmental Risk and Enhancing Ocean Resilience
At the heart of the Agreement are procedural and spatial management tools 
embedded in the provisions on eia and abmt s, which can be applied in mit-
igating environmental risk and to enhancing ocean resilience. They are also 
linked to capacity- building provisions in the Agreement that can help close 
the skills- gap in developing countries that are needed to design effective 
strategies that build resilience in ecological systems that provide essential 
services, as well as in addressing the factors that degrade biodiversity, both 
within and beyond national jurisdiction.91 The scale of the capacity- building 
tasks is daunting because anthropogenic impacts on biodiversity are placing 
new demands on the msr resources and scientific needs of both developed 
and developing States.92 At the same time, there is a preponderance of evi-
dence showing funding for ocean science remains at best ‘modest’ in general 
terms but is totally inadequate in meeting the needs of developing States.93 
This failing is compounded by the regional disparity in the geographical dis-
tribution, educational opportunities and resources that are available to ocean 
scientists in the ldc s and sid s, particularly so when compared to developed 
countries.94 The shortage in resources is most acute in relation to deep- ocean 
research vessels and the specialist equipment that is needed to evaluate envi-
ronmental risk and to implement strategies at national and regional levels that 
 89 A. Rogers, U. Sumaila, S. Hussain, and C. Baulcomb, The High Seas and Us: Understanding 
the Value of High Seas Ecosystems (Oxford: Global Ocean Commission, 2014).
 90 ioc- unesco Draft Implementation Plan, Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development (Paris: ioc- unesco, 18 March 2020) at 19.
 91 United Nations, The First Integrated Marine Assessment, op. cit. note 74 and UN Doc. A/ 70/ 
112 at 13/ 60.
 92 Ibid., and ioc- unesco, Global Science Report 2017.
 93 ioc- unesco, Global Science Report 2017, at 27.















build ecological resilience.95 Moreover, there are several other imperatives 
that need to be taken into consideration with several international reports 
pointing out that policy responses and regulatory action are not progressing 
sufficiently well to arrest the widespread decline of biodiversity in both the 
terrestrial and ocean environments.96 The ‘Intergovernmental Science- Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Report 2019’ ranks capacity- 
building and cross- sector cooperation as two of the principal interventions to 
redress the alarming deterioration of nature.97 A similar finding is evident in 
the ipcc ‘Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate’ 
(srocc), which states with high confidence that ‘changes in the ocean have 
impacted marine ecosystems and ecosystem services with regionally diverse 
outcomes, challenging their governance’.98 The srocc points out that ‘peo-
ple with the highest exposure and vulnerability are often those with lowest 
capacity to respond’.99 For this reason, the report recommends investment in 
education and capacity building at various levels and scales to reduce risk and 
enhance resilience.100 Women in particular are disproportionately affected 
by environmental risks and according to the European Institute for Gender 
Equality (eige) are not taken into account in many decisions concerning re-
covery and adaptation strategies.101
The inclusion of appropriate norms on capacity- building and gender equal-
ity in the Agreement can help redress these shortcomings by ensuring ocean 
science is transformative in orientation and by establishing mechanisms to 
improve the uptake and use of science by future States Parities, including ldc s 
and and sids. By doing so, the Agreement will contribute to one of the core 
objectives of the Decade of Ocean Science, which is to ‘distribute [scientif-
ic] capacity across the globe, across generations, and across genders and thus 
 95 Ibid., on the nationality and availability of research vessels for deep ocean science, 
at 66- 73.
 96 Intergovernmental Science- Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, The 
Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Bonn: ipbes Report 
2019), available at: https:// ipbes.net/ global- assessment.
 97 ipbes Report 2019, ‘Summary for Policy Makers’, D2 Five main interventions at 17. 
Available at:  https:// ipbes.net/ sites/ default/ files/ 2020- 02/ ipbes_ global_ assessment_ 
report_ summary_ for_ policymakers_ en.pdf.
 98 ipcc, 2019:  Summary for Policymakers. In:  ipcc Special Report on the Ocean and 
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, at spm- 17, available at: https:// report.ipcc.ch/ srocc/ 
pdf/ SROCC_ FinalDraft_ FullReport.pdf.
 99 Ibid., at spm- 34.
 100 Ibid., at 40- 41.
 101 eige, ‘Gender in Environment and Climate Change’, (Luxembourg: eige, 2016) available 
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reverse asymmetry in knowledge, skills and access to technology’.102 Ultimate-
ly, this approach will facilitate the participation and education of scientists 
from ldc s and sids in the design and implementation of decisions that miti-
gate environmental risk and build resilience of bbnj.
6.3 Implementing Sustainability and Blue Economic Objectives
The wider sustainability and blue growth agendas are increasingly informing 
all aspects of the law of the sea.103 The 2030 Agenda is universal and speaks 
to the needs of both developing and developed countries across a broad spec-
trum of thematic areas that are of critical importance to wellbeing of human-
kind and the future of the planet.104 The Agreement must therefore be viewed 
through the prism of the 2030 Agenda and how it can contribute to the at-
tainments of its 17 indivisible and interlinked sdg s.105 In particular, the msr, 
capacity- building and gender provisions therein have the potential to make a 
substantial contribution to the realisation of the sdg s on learning opportuni-
ties (sdg 4), gender equality (sdg 5), sustainable economic growth (sdg 8), 
climate action (Goal 13)  and oceans (sdg 14). They will also add significant 
weight to the attainment of Target 14A of sdg 14, which sets down an obliga-
tion to increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and the trans-
fer of marine technology.106 The Agreement when it comes into force will be 
the very embodiment of Target 14.C, which aims to enhance the conservation 
and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing interna-
tional law as reflected in the Convention.107 In doing so, it will bolster interna-
tional efforts on the attainment of the sdg s by using science, education and 
gender empowerment as drivers for sustainable development, contributing at 
 102 ioc- unesco ‘Draft Implementation Plan’, Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable 
Development (Paris: ioc- unesco, 18 March 2020) at 17.
 103 M. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, R. Long (eds.), The Marine Environment and UN Sustainable 
Development Goal 14: Life Below Water (Leiden/ Boston, Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018).
 104 M. Robinson in F.  Dodds, D.  Donoghue and J.  Roesch, Negotiating the Sustainable 
Development Goals:  A Transformational Agenda for an Insecure World (London/ 
New  York:  Routledge, 2017)  at xv, cited by R.  Long, M.  Chaves- Rodriguez, “Bridging 
the Water, Oceans and Climate Change Goals under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development” in M. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, R. Long (eds.) The Marine Environment And 
UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Leiden/ Boston, Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018) 83- 110.
 105 UN Resolution 70/ 1. Transforming our world:  the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, A/ res/ 70/ 1, 21 October 2015. See inter alia: M.  Nordquist, J.  N. Moore, 
R. Long (eds.) The Marine Environment and United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 
14: Life Below Water (Leiden/ Boston, Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018).
















the same time to the realisation of the strategic objectives of the Decade of 
Ocean Science.108 According to ioc- unesco, the projected gains from the de-
livery of these objectives in the context of the sdg s are manifold and extend 
in theory to the following:
..the ocean has the potential to supply up to six times more food that it 
does today (SDG2 – zero hunger). New technologies in renewable energy 
or carbon storage could increase the capacity of the ocean to mitigate 
the worst effects of climate change (SDG7 – affordable and clean energy; 
SDG13  – climate action). New knowledge and tools for coastal nature- 
based solutions could increase the adaptive capacity of hundreds of mil-
lions of the most vulnerable people (SDG3 – good health and wellbeing; 
SDG10 – reduced inequalities).109
Instructively, political leaders in developing countries are increasingly aware 
of the significance of education and gender empowerment, ranking them as 
top priorities under the 2030 Agenda.110 This ranking is unsurprising and ac-
cords very much with the finding of a World Bank report that investment in ed-
ucational systems not only enhances employment but also pays a substantial 
dividend by fostering institutional capacity, social cohesion and human well-
being, especially in sids.111 Indeed according to the World Bank, the absence of 
capacity, skills and financial resources impede sid s and ldc s from pursuing ‘a 
low- carbon and resource- efficient path to economic growth and development 
designed to enhance livelihoods for the poor, create employment opportuni-
ties, and reduce poverty’.112 Following on from this, the inclusion of capacity 
 108 ioc- unesco Revised Roadmap Appendix 2: Paris 8 June 2018, p 35.
 109 Ibid., at 2- 3.
 110 Despite international efforts to raise awareness of the symbiosis that ought to exist 
between ocean science and sustainable development, the attainment of Goal 14 related 
targets is not a political priority in many developing countries, according to one major 
survey of leaders in low- and middle- income countries undertaken by at a social science 
laboratory at William and Mary University. See, AidData’s 2017  ‘Listening to Leaders 
Survey’. Nearly 3,500 leaders working in 22 different areas of development policy shared 
their views via AidData’s 2017 Survey. Available at:  https:// www.aiddata.org/ data/ 
the- 2017- listening- to- leaders- survey- aggregate- dataset.
 111 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘The Potential of the 
Blue Economy:  Increasing Long- term Benefits of the Sustainable Use of Marine 
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building in msr and gender norms in the Agreement should not be viewed 
solely as objectives in themselves but if formulated skilfully and constructively, 
can also make a vital contribution to the implementation of a broad swathe 
of sdg s, as well as generating the right conditions for sustainable economic 
growth of countries dependent on the ocean environment and on the sustain-
able use of marine resources.113
6.4 Mainstreaming Gender Equality and Empowering Women
The UN Secretary- General identifies gender equality and the empowerment of 
women as one of greatest human rights challenges faced by the world today.114 
Human rights consideration are also increasingly pervasive in the law of the 
sea with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea stating unequivo-
cally that ‘considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they 
apply in other areas of international law’.115 In practice, however, the law of the 
sea is male law to its very core.116 There is nothing unusual in this as interna-
tional law has been slow to engage with gendered dynamics outside of the field 
of human rights and international criminal law.117 Hence, an important aspect 
of the Agreement is its potential to advance equality between women and men 
in international law of the sea. This in turn will bring this body of law into 
line with a discrete and delicate strand of UN treaty law on the elimination of 
gender discrimination more generally through the medium of authoritative 
prescription.118
The reasons for pursuing a gendered approach are many including marshal-
ling of the widest pool possible of scientific and technical experts to under-
take the many tasks associated with the conservation and sustainable use of 
 113 On the potential of mgr s to contribute to blue economic development, see J.  Collins, 
Report of the Workshop “Marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion:  bridging policy, law, science and research and development” (Brussels:  European 
commission, 2019). Available at:  https:// op.europa.eu/ en/ publication- detail/ - / publica-
tion/ aca8c05f- c875- 11e9- 9d01- 01aa75ed71a1/ language- en/ format- PDF/ source- 104428893.
 114 UN Secretary- General António Guterres, Remarks, 8 February 2020. Available at: https:// 
www.un.org/ sg/ en/ content/ sg/ speeches/ 2020- 02- 08/ remarks- high- level- meeting- 
gender- equality- and- womens- empowerment.
 115 itlos, mv Saiga (No. 2)(Saint Vincent And The Grenadines V. Guinea) case, (1999) 38 ilm 
1355 at para. 155.
 116 I. Papanicolopulu (ed.) Gender and the Law of the Sea (Leiden/ Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2019).
 117 C. MacKinnion, ‘Creating International Law:  Gender as Leading Edge’, (2013) 36(1) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 105- 122.
 118 H. Charlesworth, ‘Women’ in S. Chesterman, D. Malone, and S. Villalpando (eds.) Oxford 















biodiversity.119 Education, training and capacity- building are vital pathways to 
improving gender equality and the empowerment of women scientists under 
the Agreement. There is considerable amount of work to be done in this re-
gard with undp estimating that the number of women graduates in science, 
engineering and technology and mathematics is less than 15 per cent of the 
total number of third- level university graduates in most countries.120 Further-
more, there is longstanding evidence that ‘women are still under- represented 
in many research fields, generally receive lower salaries, are less likely to have 
full- time contracts and have fewer opportunities to gain influential positions 
than their male colleagues’.121
The case supporting the inclusion of specific provisions that empower 
women scientists in the Agreement is a compelling one because women are 
underrepresented in ocean science, particularly in the specialist fields related 
to ocean technology and engineering.122 The data is incomplete but indicates 
that the total number of women scientists amounted to 38 per cent of the total 
cohort of ocean scientists in 2013.123 One should exercise considerable care 
with this figure, as there is significant disparity within ocean regions such as 
the North Pacific Ocean,124 as well as in countries such as Mauritania where 
women comprise four per cent of the total cohort of ocean scientists.125 Fur-
thermore, the ioc Report notes that there were fewer women in senior profes-
sional roles or management positions, a finding that is common in other scien-
tific disciplines.126 Overall, the findings presented by the Global Ocean Science 
Report reflect the well- established patterns of bias that limit women’s choices, 
opportunities and active participation in science careers more commonly.127
 119 See statement of ioc- unesco, See ioc- unesco, Ad Hoc Report of the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (ioc) of unesco to bbnj PrepCom- 
4, at 8 and 29. Available at:  https:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ biodiversityworkinggroup/ 
IOCreportforBBNJPrepCom- FINAL.PDF.
 120 Cited in undp, 2020 Human Development Perspectives. Tackling Social Norms: A game 
changer for gender inequalities (New York: undp, 2020).
 121 S. Palermo, E. Giuffra, V. Arzenton, M. Bucchi ‘Gender and science’, 2008;9(6) EMBO Rep. 
494– 495. Available at https:// www.embopress.org/ doi/ pdf/ 10.1038/ embor.2008.82.
 122 ioc- unesco, Global Ocean Science Report, 2017. Available at http:// unesco.org/ gosr.
 123 Ibid. The relatively high cohort of women scientists, reported by ioc at 38 per cent, 
appears to be derived from data on the number of women attending international con-
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Against this background, there is thus a corresponding need to improve the 
representation of women scientists in the various categories of ocean science, 
as well as in the geographical distribution of scientists across the world in-
cluding most notably in the ldc s and sids. This will entail the adoption and 
strengthening of policies and laws that actively further the empowerment of 
women and girls in ocean science. A timely step in the right direction, can be 
undertaken under the mantle of the Agreement, if its provisions ensure the full 
and equal participation of women in all capacity- building initiatives, educa-
tion and employment opportunities, as well as all decision- making processes 
pertaining to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The reasons 
for doing so are self- evident in so far as gender equality and the empowerment 
of women will bring in fresh perspectives and thereby increase the innovative 
capacity of ocean science. Furthermore, according to unesco, gender equali-
ty in science in general, encourages the search for new solutions and expands 
the scope of research and development. A similar approach under the Agree-
ment that actively promotes gender balance will help attain many sdg s under 
the 2030 Agenda and at the same time ensure that gender equality and the 
empowerment of women scientists are realisable objectives of the UN Decade 
of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development.128
7 New Agreement, New Paradigm
Capacity- building and technology transfer is one for the four substantive top-
ics in the Agreement package that was agreed at the United Nations in 2011 and 
has since been subject to extensive deliberations at the Preparatory Commit-
tee (2015– 2017),129 as well as at three sessions of the Intergovernmental Con-
ference (2018– 2019).130 As mentioned above, the inclusion of comprehensive 
and enfranchising provisions on capacity- building are a prerequisite to a suc-
cessful outcome to the negotiations.131 A valid question therefore is how far the 
Agreement will codify new normative obligations on capacity- building, msr 
and the empowerment of women. The answer to the question is very much 
contingent upon the provisions that the plenipotentiaries agree upon during 
the final session(s) of the igc. Although it is not possible to draw any definitive 
conclusions while the negotiations are ongoing, the contours of what can be 
 128 ioc- unesco, Decade of Ocean Science Draft Implementation Plan, at 17- 18.
 129 Op. cit. note 7.
 130 Ibid.











achieved are evident from a brief perusal of the various options canvassed in 
Part v of the draft text prepared by the President for the negotiators at igc 4, 
along with additional elements addressed in Part i on use of terms, Part vi on 
the clearing- house mechanism, Part vii on financial resources, and Part viii 
on Implementation and Compliance.132 At the time of writing four general 
points can be made about the draft provisions.
7.1 Narrow Objectives and a Dearth of Ambition
The capacity- building objectives are relatively narrow and focused primarily 
on the twin- goals of aiding future States Parties in implementing their obli-
gations under the Agreement and in providing them with the wherewithal 
to benefit from activities thereunder.133 Other objectives relate to increasing 
and sharing knowledge on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiver-
sity.134 One of the most contentious aspects relate to the building and sharing 
of expertise on the collection, access and use of mgrs in situ, ex situ and dig-
ital sequence information, which will require innovative technical solutions 
if they are to be realised in practice.135 The objectives also aim to empower 
developing States to undertake the tasks associated with the area- based man-
agement tools and environmental impact assessment and strategic environ-
mental assessment, thereby linking the capacity- building provisions with the 
three other substantive parts of the Agreement. There was general recognition 
at previous sessions of the intergovernmental conference of the importance 
of the cross- thematic and relatively wide scope of the capacity- building pro-
visions.136 There is no reference however in the draft text to the wider sustain-
ability or climate change related goals of capacity- building, which illustrates a 
dearth of ambition on the part of the negotiators and a disconnect with global 
environmental, sustainability and climate agendas. Similarly, gender equali-
ty and the empowerment of women scientists are not presented as goals in 
themselves or as central tenets of the capacity- building or other provisions in 
the Agreement. Furthermore, the need for improving such capacity is all the 
more evident when it is considered that the implementation of the Agreement 
 132 Op. cit. note 7.
 133 Article 42(a) and (b), Agreement.
 134 Article 42(d), Agreement.
 135 Article 42(f)(i)- (iv), Agreement. In relation to the innovative solutions that are required, 
see chapter in this volume by Marcel Jaspers, ‘Mare Geneticum – Building Blocks Towards 
a Pragmatic Solution for abs in abnj’.
 136 Article 42(f)(v)(vi), Agreement. See Annex to the statement of the President of the 
Conference, Third Session, 19- 30 August 2019, UN A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 5, available at: https:// 
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will place a heavy responsibility on flag States, many of whom are Least De-
veloped Countries and do not have the means or know- how to discharge their 
new found obligations in relation to deep ocean biodiversity.
7.2 Enhanced Cooperation, New Institutional Settings, and a Clearing- 
House Mechanism
Similar to other law of the sea instruments pertaining to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment and in line with the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals,137 there is considerable emphasis on inter-
national cooperation as the very foundation of the obligations placed on fu-
ture States Parties to the Agreement.138 A novel aspect of the draft text is that it 
provides a legal basis for partnerships with the private sector, civil society and 
the holders of traditional knowledge.139 The monitoring and review provisions 
are focused on reviewing the needs and gaps in capacity- building, along with 
measuring performance and making recommendations on how developing 
countries can fulfil their obligations under the Agreement.140 The process is 
intended to be inclusive and one of the options canvassed by the draft text is 
a voluntary reporting requirement for States Parties.141 A major development 
relates to the establishment of a new institutional setting for international 
decision- making on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity includ-
ing a possible role for the cop in establishing a subsidiary- body for capacity- 
building and a clearing- house mechanism.142 One of the options envisaged is 
that the latter will operate as an open- access digital platform for the sharing of 
information and benefits, along with matching capacity- building needs with 
respect to each of the substantive parts of the Agreement.143 The institutional 
provisions extend to the establishment of a Scientific and Technical Body/ Net-
work mandated with functions set out in the Agreement.144
 137 Article 197, Convention; mox Plant (Ireland v.  United Kingdom) Provisional Measures, 
Order of 3 December 2001, itlos Reports 2001, para. 82; ‘Case concerning Land 
Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor’ (Malaysia v.  Singapore), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, itlos Reports; 2003, para. 92; Request 
for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub- Regional Fisheries Commission (srfc), 
Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015, itlos Reports 2015, para. 140.
 138 Articles 2,6, 43, Agreement.
 139 Article 43(2), Agreement.
 140 Article 47, Agreement.
 141 Article 47(5), Agreement.
 142 Articles 48, 49 and 51, Agreement.
 143 Article 51, Agreement.



















7.3 Participatory, Cross- Cutting and Gender Responsive
The issue of gender equality has arisen in the bbnj negotiation almost by de-
fault if not somewhat surreptitiously. More specifically, promoting the role and 
participation of women was raised by the President of the Preparatory Com-
mittee in a non- paper to delegations on the elements of the draft text of the 
Agreement and identified as one principle and approach that ought to guide 
capacity- building and transfer of marine technology.145 Although this option 
was not subsequently presented in the report of the Preparatory Committee to 
the United Nations General Assembly,146 it was addressed by the intergovern-
mental conference at the third session and crucially there are two references to 
gender in the provisions on capacity- building (Part v) and in the institutional 
arrangements (Part vi) in the draft text prepared by the President for negotia-
tion at the fourth and final session of the conference.147
From the perspective of providing a legal plinth for the training and ed-
ucation of women scientists, the first reference requires capacity- building 
to be ‘participatory, cross- cutting and gender responsive’, as well as meeting 
the needs and priorities of developing States.148 Two of the options put for-
ward is that the needs of States Parties may be assessed on the basis of self- 
assessment or facilitated through a process established by the Conference of 
the Parties.149 Various types of capacity- building are enumerated in the draft 
text, as well as in Annex ii, with the option of a role for the cop in developing 
the draft list further.150 There are also provisions on the periodic monitoring 
and review of capacity- building.151 The second reference to gender relates to 
the composition of the proposed Scientific and Technical Body and the need to 
reflect multidisciplinary expertise, gender balance and equitable geographical 
representation.152
Despite the absence of ambition alluded to previously, both references to 
gender if adopted will represent nonetheless remarkable milestones in the 
 145 The non- paper provided a reference document to assist delegations in their consideration 
of the issues addressed by the Preparatory Committee. Available at: https:// www.un.org/ 
Depts/ los/ biodiversity/ prepcom_ files/ Chairs_ streamlined_ non- paper_ to_ delegations.
pdf.
 146 UN Doc. A/ ac.287/ 2017/ pc.4/ 2, 17 July 2017.
 147 Article 44(3) and 49(2), Agreement.
 148 Article 44(3), Agreement.
 149 Article 44(4), Agreement.
 150 Article 46, Agreement.
 151 Article 47, Agreement.
 152 Article 49(2), Agreement. Reference is also made in the draft provision to expertise in 
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progressive development of the law of the sea so far as they acknowledge the 
importance of gender norms as essential elements in both capacity- building 
and in the composition of the institutional bodies established by the Agree-
ment. The references do however fall well short of acknowledging gender 
equality as a fundamental human right or indeed the important role that the 
empowerment of women can play in achieving human capability, as well as in 
implementing the sdg s.153 This shortcoming could for instance be redressed 
by making reference to gender equality and the empowerment of women sci-
entists in cross- cutting provisions on principles and approaches that inform 
all other aspects of the Agreement,154 thereby providing a solid legal plinth for 
the future implementation of gender equality objectives into concrete action 
and policy decisions. Similarly, a strong case can be made for the inclusion 
in Annex ii of specific types of targeted gender training including education 
on gender mainstreaming for the appropriate science and governance bodies 
involved in the conservation and sustainable use of bbnj. There is little doubt 
that the needs assessment and periodic review provisions have the potential 
to close longstanding lacunae highlighted in various science reports includ-
ing by ioc- unesco in the Global Marine Science Report.155 However, there 
was no agreement at the third session of the intergovernmental conference as 
to whether the monitoring and review should be voluntary or mandatory,156 
or indeed should such processes extend to the review of the gender empow-
erment performance of the various programmes and initiatives undertaken 
pursuant to the new Agreement. This could prove to be crucial because the 
response of many developing States to the advancement of gender norms by 
the Agreement may well be shaped in many instances by socio- economic and 
cultural considerations.157
7.4 Financial Resources
Although capacity- building is an essential element of the Agreement, the op-
tions set out in the text leave open a number of important issues regarding 
the modalities for doing so including whether they should be on a mandatory 
or voluntary basis.158 This goes to the very crux of addressing a fundamental 
 153 Op. cit. section 6.4.
 154 Article 5, Agreement.
 155 Op. cit. section 6.3.
 156 A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 5, 17/ 22.
 157 S. Jayachandran, ‘The Roots of Gender Inequality in Developing Countries’, (2015) 7(1) 
Annual Review of Economics 63- 88.















weakness in the Convention, as highlighted previously. The Agreement does 
however table a range of funding options on capacity- building and again can-
vases both voluntary and mandatory options including public- private partner-
ships for supporting the institutions and also to assist developing States in the 
implementation of the Agreement.159 Similar to the Convention, the draft text 
envisages that developing States parties shall be granted preference in the al-
location of funds and technical assistance by international organizations.160 
Some of the options is the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for the pur-
pose of funding participation of developing country participants in bodies un-
der the agreement,161 as well as a special fund to be used for a capacity- building 
project and to assist developing States Parties in among other matters with the 
implementation of the Agreement.162 The Global Environment Facility and 
the Green Climate Fund, along with payments tied to access and use of mgr s 
are also mentioned as possible funding mechanisms.163 Pointedly, delegations 
attending the third session expressed divergent views on the establishment 
of a special fund and on the role of a future Conference of the Parties in the 
allocation of funding.164 As perhaps expected, there were strong calls from 
the developing countries at the session for mandatory funding for capacity 
building, which can be contrasted with the less enamoured views on manda-
tory funding mechanisms espoused by the delegations representing developed 
countries including the European Union. There was no discussion of possible 
pathways to engage with private sector and investment communities by link-
ing for instance the finance provisions in the Agreement with new normative 
developments such as the UN’s ‘Principles of Responsible Investment’ or the 
EU’s ‘Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles’.165 Indeed, it is difficult 
to see how the Agreement will effectively bolster sustainability or growth if it 
lacks business practicality and appropriate funding mechanisms, especially for 
capacity- building.
 159 Article 52(2), Agreement.
 160 Article 52(3), Agreement.
 161 Article 52(4), Agreement.
 162 Article 52(5), Agreement.
 163 Article 52(5) bis(e), Agreement.
 164 unga, Statement by the President of the conference at the closing of the third session, 
UN doc. A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 10*, 13 September 2019.
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8 Carpe Diem
The answers to the first two questions posed at the start of this paper are relative-
ly easy. That is to say the Convention and related instruments are not adequate 
to the task of capacity- building to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of 
bbnj.166 Moreover, there is a multiplicity of considerations driving the codifica-
tion of new normative obligations in the Agreement on education and training 
in msr including gender sensitive norms.167 Key considerations are the need to 
strengthen the capacity and pool of scientists in developing States available to do 
science and to make informed decisions on the conservation and the sustainable 
use of bbnj, as well as the pressing imperatives of creating regulatory and insti-
tutional mechanisms for greater integration and coordination of msr.168 Apart 
from the future Agreement, the policy and regulatory frameworks for doing so 
include the 2030 Agenda, the Decade for Ocean Science, the Global Ocean As-
sessment, the Paris Agreement, among many others instruments and processes.
Following on from this, a far more difficult question relates to the intergov-
ernmental negotiations at the United Nations and whether it will result in a 
paradigm shift that enhances the scientific capabilities of developing States, 
particularly those of sids and the ldc s. The answer is not clear because it 
often appears at the bbnj negotiations over the past 15  years that there are 
always equally strong but diametrically opposing points of view about every-
thing including the putative provisions in the Agreement on capacity- building. 
Notably, there is no underlying provision in the Agreement concerning the ap-
plication of capacity- building as an engine for ensuring more equitable uses of 
the ocean, or pointing towards why mutual benefit exists and can be derived 
by various ocean users, or how best to regulate modern technologies and es-
pecially those used by the public and private sectors. There appears however 
to be considerable consensus among the negotiators that the challenges faced 
in managing the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity can only be 
tackled by undertaking and applying the results of msr. There is also general 
agreement that the science and public policy contexts for capacity- building 
has changed and is changing, with a large number of delegations supporting a 
fundamental shift from the voluntary and piecemeal approach to more robust 
and mandatory provisions on capacity- building in the Agreement.169
 166 Op. cit. section 5 supra.
 167 Op. cit. Section 6 supra.
 168 K. Kraabel, ‘Institutional arrangements in a bbnj treaty: Implications for Arctic marine 
science’, Marine Policy, available online 9 January 2020.











As the international community approaches the end of the bbnj negoti-
ations it is tempting to paraphrase Greta Thunberg advice to global leaders 
in relation to human induced climate change that in order to solve a crisis, 
one needs to treat it as a crisis.170 Similarly, the bbnj negotiators can respond 
to the crisis in deep- ocean biodiversity by adopting and ensuring the entry 
into force of an effective legal instrument as soon as possible. The capacity 
development provisions therein will be essential to ensuring its universal ac-
ceptance by future States Parties, particularly those from developing countries. 
Moreover, many involved in the negotiations are acutely aware that the Agree-
ment has the potential to be a game- changer on capacity- building if it results 
in the following: establishes a robust institutional setting for decision- making 
supported by the proposed clearing- house mechanism; codifies the require-
ments of undertaking a regular ‘needs assessment’; provides a solid legal plinth 
for gender equality and the empowerment of women scientists; and most im-
portantly of all establishes a mandatory and sustainable funding stream for 
capacity- building.171 By doing so, the Agreement will also reflect four closely 
inter- related normative themes, namely: the obligation placed on States and 
others to cooperate; the concept of interdependence, that is to say that the 
strong should help the weak; and the principles of conservation and sustain-
able use of biodiversity.172 Time is undoubtedly of the essence and there is no 
reason to wait. The plenipotentiaries should seize the opportunity at igc 4 to 
bring about transformative change in the law of the sea on capacity- building, 
msr and gender equality.
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 170 G. Thunberg, Address to UN Climate Change Conference, Katowice, Poland, 15 December 
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 chapter 14
A Few Words on the “Cross- Cutting Issue”—The 
Relationship between a bbnj Convention and 
Existing, Relevant Instruments and Frameworks 
and Relevant Global, Regional and Sectoral Bodies
Ted L. McDorman
 Abstract
Since the 1980s the architecture of international ocean governance has rested on the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (los Convention) and a large number of the 
regional and global sectoral treaties most of which were contemplated in the los Con-
vention. One of the central challenges in the negotiation of a bbnj Convention is the 
“architectural fit” of a bbnj Convention with the existing treaty- based law of the sea 
governance framework.
The primary focus of this presentation is on several selected legal relationship is-
sues: the relationship of a bbnj Convention with the los Convention, which has sev-
eral aspects including the activities by a coastal State in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
over the resources in the continental shelf beyond 200nm; and the relationships issues 
that may/ will arise from area- based management measures and existing treaty- based 
governance bodies such as regional fisheries management organizations (rfmo s) and 
the various imo Conventions. Here the mantra is that a bbnj Convention will not “un-
dermine” existing instruments and frameworks.
 Keywords
marine biological diversity – areas beyond national jurisdiction – treaty negotiations – 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – area- based management – regional 
fisheries management organizations – international treaties
274 McDorman
i Introduction*
In 2004, pursuant to the annual United Nations General Assembly Oceans Res-
olution, the Ad Hoc Open- ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues re-
lating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity 
Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction was created.1 Its first meeting came in 
2006. Thus began the process that led first to the July 2015 UN General As-
sembly Resolution directing States to “develop an international legally binding 
instrument … on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction”2 referred to herein as the bbnj 
Convention and then to the 24 December 2017 General Assembly Resolution 
deciding that an intergovernmental conference be convened to complete a 
bbnj Convention.3 The first session of the intergovernmental conference took 
place in September 2018,4 the second in March- April 20195 and the third is 
scheduled for August 2019.
The first report of the Ad Hoc Open- ended Informal Working Group in 
2006 noted:
The cross- cutting nature of marine biological diversity, as well as the ex-
istence of numerous, and often competing, legal frameworks and bodies, 
* This paper was prepared and presented prior to the release of the “Draft text on an Agree-
ment under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and 
Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” “Note 
by the President,” A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6, 17 May 2019 and prior to the Third session (August 
2019) of the Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding Instrument 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sus-
tainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. However, 
some reference is made in the paper to the May 2019 Draft Convention.
 1 UN General Assembly Resolution, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” A/ res/ 59/ 24, 4 February 
2005, (adopted 17 November 2014), para. 73. [THE CORRECT YEAR IS 2004.]
 2 UN General Assembly Resolution, “Development of an Internationally Legally Binding In-
strument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” A/ 
res/ 69/ 292, 6 July 2015, (adopted 19 June 2015), para. 1.
 3 UN General Assembly Resolution, “International Legally Binding Instrument under the Unit-
ed Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” A/ Res/ 72/ 249, 19 January 
2018, (adopted 24 December 2017).
 4 See: “Statement by the President of the Conference at the Closing of the First Session,” A/ 
conf.232/ 2018/ 7, 20 September 2018.
 5 See: “Statement by the President of the Conference at the Closing of the Second Session,” A/ 
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lead numerous delegations to stress the importance of improving coor-
dination and cooperation among international organizations as well as 
among sectors and regimes. …6
It was also noted that: “most delegations re- emphasized that the Convention 
(on the Law of the Sea) provided the legal framework for the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction.”7
The point of this walk down memory lane is simply to point out, that, as the 
architecture of international ocean governance rests on the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (los Convention)8 and a large number of the regional and 
global sectoral treaties, many of which were contemplated in the los Conven-
tion, one of the central challenges in the negotiation of a bbnj Convention has 
always been the “architectural fit” of a bbnj Convention within the existing 
treaty- based law of the sea governance framework.
It is generally accepted that a bbnj Convention will be an implementing 
agreement of the los Convention in the same legal manner as the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement9 and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of 
Part xi of the los Convention.10
It is also generally accepted, as stated in both the 2015 General Assembly 
Resolution11 and the 2017 Resolution,12 that a bbnj Convention “should not 
undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional, and sectoral bodies.”
While these two generally accepted understandings deal with different sub-
jects they are often grouped together as being a so- called “cross- cutting ele-
ment” – the relationship between a bbnj Convention and the “United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and other instruments and frameworks and 
relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.”
 6 “Report of the Ad Hoc Open- ended Informal Working Group to Study the Issues relating 
to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of 
National Jurisdiction,” A/ 61/ 65, 20 March 2006, para. 53.
 7 Ibid., para. 22.
 8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
 9 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3.
 10 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1836 u.n.t.s.  3.
 11 Resolution, 69/ 292, supra note 2, para. 3.















The modest intention of this contribution is to say a few words respecting 
the “cross- cutting” issue of the “relationship of the los Convention on the Law 
of the Sea and other instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional 
and sectoral bodies” with a potential bbnj Convention.
This approach is primarily that of a technical international lawyer seeking 
to understand how various treaties may be affected or interact with a potential 
bbnj Convention.
ii Background on Relationships between International Treaties13
International law and practice provide little assistance respecting the abstract 
question of the relationship between treaties with similar content, mandates 
or goals.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties14 provides an answer to the 
narrow question of precedence in the situation where treaty provisions can 
be said to conflict. First, Article 30 directs that where there is a conflict in or 
between two treaties and the parties to the treaties are the same, the more 
recently concluded convention prevails.15 Second, where there is a conflict in 
two treaties and one State is a party to both and another State is a party only 
to one of the treaties, then it is the treaty that is common to both States that 
prevails.16 The above provisions of the Vienna Convention are residual rules 
that only come into play where the treaties in collision are silent.17
Treaties often contain relationship clauses, sometimes called conflict or sav-
ings clauses, which seek to provide how treaties and/ or provisions with similar 
subject matter interrelate. Such clauses:
 13 This section is drawn, with modification, from T. L. McDorman, “A Note on the Potential 
Conflicting Treaty Rights and Obligations between the IMO’s Polar Code and Article 
234 of the Law of the Sea Convention,” in Suzanne Lalonde and T.L. McDorman, eds., 
International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Boston/ Leiden:  Brill/ Nijhoff, 2015), 
pp.146– 148.
 14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
 15 Ibid. Articles 30(3) and (4)(a).
 16 Ibid., Article 30(4). More generally on these two provisions in the Vienna Convention, 
see: Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Leiden:  Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), at pp.  395– 411 and Jan Klabbers, “Beyond the Vienna 
Convention:  Conflicting Treaty Provisions” in Enzo Cannizzaro, ed., The Law of 
Treaties: Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 192– 205.
 17 See Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester: 
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are meant to avoid that treaties covering similar or at least partially over-
lapping subject matters contradict each other. Therefore, their primary 
objective is the safeguarding of a general coherence of international law.18
Obviously, such a clause is of limited effect where there is only one of the con-
flicting treaties common to both States. Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention 
provides that: When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be 
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provision of that 
treaty shall prevail.
As suggested by these provisions, a direct legal question regarding the rela-
tionship of treaties only arises where there is a conflict of obligations or rights 
in two treaties. It is understood that treaties are to be read so as to be in harmo-
ny and, to the extent possible, to avoid conflicts. What constitutes a conflict be-
tween treaties is not precisely clear.19 At its narrowest, a conflict exists between 
treaty provisions when “one obligation cannot be fulfilled without necessarily 
violating the other.”20 This view has been challenged as being “too restrictive,” 
since “States are not only concerned when a State cannot abide by two treaties 
but also where one treaty frustrates the goals of another treaty.”21 There are 
other ways of understanding when treaties are in conflict.22
iii The Relationship between a bbnj Convention and the los 
Convention
As noted above, the 2015 and 2017 General Assembly Resolutions direct that 
a bbnj Convention is to be “under” the los Convention,23 which means that 
a bbnj Convention is to be an “implementation” of the relevant parts of the 
1982 los Convention in the same manner as the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement24 
 18 Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin: 
Springer, 2003), at p. 121.
 19 Christopher J.  Borgen, “Treaty Conflicts and Normative Fragmentation” in Duncan 
B.  Hollis, ed., The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
p. 455, notes that “there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a conflict.”
 20 Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 18, at p. 6 and Seyed Ali Sadat- Akhavi, Methods of Resolving 
Conflicts between Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), at p. 5.
 21 Borgen, supra note 19, at p. 455.
 22 See: Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 18, at pp. 6– 12.
 23 Resolution, 69/ 29, supra note 2, para. 1 and Resolution 72/ 249, supra note 3, para. 1.

















and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the los 
Convention.25
Article 4 of the Fish Stocks Agreement provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and du-
ties of States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpret-
ed and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with the 
Convention.
Not surprisingly, the above wording was copied in the Report of the Preparato-
ry Committee elements of a bbnj Convention26 and in the Draft Text of a bbnj 
Agreement (May 2019), prepared by the President of the bbnj Conference.27
The clear intention of the wording is that the rights, jurisdiction and duties 
set out in the los Convention are to be unaffected by the contents of a bbnj 
Convention which, in the vernacular of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, means that as between States a party to both the los Convention and 
a bbnj Convention, should a conflict of rights, duties or responsibilities arise, 
the los Convention prevails over a bbnj Convention.
For practical purposes, more important may be the second sentence: “The 
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a man-
ner consistent with the Convention.” This directs States, courts and tribunals 
that are involved in the interpretation or application of a bbnj Convention, 
to interpret and apply a bbnj Convention “in a manner consistent with” the 
los Convention. Essentially, in this context, the interpretation of wording pro-
vision can be said to add an extra element, one that is binding on the State 
parties and courts and tribunals that have jurisdiction to resolve disputes re-
garding the interpretation or application of a bbnj Convention.
If the provisions above are replicated as is or as in substance in a bbnj Con-
vention, such a provision can be understood as a non- interference provision 
or, perhaps more properly, as a coordination provision, as the wording would 
 25 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi, supra note 10.
 26 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Preparatory Committee established under 
General Assembly Resolution 69/ 292:  Development of an Internationally Legally 
Binding Instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdiction,” A/ ac.287/ 2017/ pc.4/ 2, 31 July 2017, at p. 8.
 27 “Draft Text on an Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas 
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act as a limitation on both the geographic and material scope and application 
of a bbnj Convention.
One area where this can be seen as being of particular sensitivity for many 
States is regarding the rights and duties of a coastal State respecting the min-
eral resources (and sedentary species) in the continental shelf beyond 200 M 
over which the coastal State has exclusive rights.28 While the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity in the water column above the 
continental shelf of a State beyond 200 M is expected to be within the geo-
graphic and material scope of a bbnj Convention, the Report of the Preparato-
ry Committee29 and the President of the bbnj Conference May 2019 Draft Text 
of a bbnj Convention indicate that the rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State 
regarding the shelf area beyond 200 M “shall be respected.”30
A relationship clause constructed consistent with that envisioned above re-
inforces and protects the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State to conduct 
activities on the shelf irrespective of the content of a bbnj Convention. Having 
said this, a legally stronger and broader provision would be: “Nothing in this 
Convention shall interfere directly or indirectly with the rights and jurisdiction 
of a coastal State regarding the shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles.”
Not explicitly noted in the Report of the Preparatory Committee or in the 
President of the bbnj Conference May 2019 Draft Text of a bbnj Convention 
is the relationship that is to exist between the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement and 
the 1994 Part xi Agreement and a bbnj Convention. Both of these Agreements 
deal specifically and primarily with resources located within areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. In the case of the Part xi Agreement it is the mineral 
resources that are subject to the “Common Heritage of Mankind.”31 In the case 
of the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement, the resources are fisheries subject to the 
freedom to fish with the 1995 Agreement having led to a proliferation of region-
al fisheries management organizations (rfmo s) which manage the stocks of 
selected fisheries on the high seas.
None of the above deals with a central dividing point in the bbnj discussions, 
(again well- articulated in the 2006 First ad hoc Working Group Report): Are 
marine genetic resources subject to the los Convention freedom of the high 
seas regime with open access and freedom of marine scientific research? Or, 
are marine genetic resources covered by the Common Heritage wording of the 
 28 los Convention, supra note 8, Part vi.
 29 “Report of the Preparatory Committee,” supra note 26, at p. 8.
 30 bbnj Conference President, May 2019, Draft Text, supra note 27, Article 4(2).










los Convention such that there is no open access or freedom of the high seas 
or marine scientific research respecting marine genetic resources?
[A] number of delegations stated that, in accordance with their under-
standing of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, access to 
genetic resources in the deep seabed beyond areas of national jurisdic-
tion should be, in principle, like the mineral resources in the Area, sub-
ject to the sharing of benefits based on consideration of equity.32
Referring to the legal status of genetic resources, a view was expressed 
that any measures taken in areas beyond national jurisdiction must be 
consistent with international law, including freedom of navigation and 
of marine scientific research. Some delegations stated that the resources 
were covered by the regime of the high seas, under part vii of the Con-
vention. They argued that there was no legal gap with respect to living 
resources in the areas beyond national jurisdiction and that freedoms 
of the high seas were applicable to activities relating to marine genetic 
resources.33
iv The Relationship between a bbnj Convention and “Existing 
Relevant Instruments and Frameworks and Relevant Global, 
Regional and Sectoral Bodies”
1 Introduction
As noted above, “the Relationship between a bbnj Convention and Existing 
Relevant Instruments and Frameworks and Relevant Global, Regional and Sec-
toral Bodies” is a “cross- cutting” issue in the bbnj Convention negotiations.
As part of the Preparatory Committee process two lists of treaties that either 
specifically have as their geographical scope areas beyond national jurisdiction 
or that deal with issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of ma-
rine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction were created. The lists 
contain over 60 instruments.34
There are two sets of sectoral treaties that obviously may be impacted di-
rectly or indirectly by a bbnj Convention as regards area- based management 
 32 “Report of the Ad Hoc Open- ended Informal Working Group, March 2006, supra note 6, 
para. 29.
 33 Ibid., at para. 30.
 34 U.N. Division of Oceans and the Law of the Sea (doalos), “Indicative List of Regional 
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measures. These are the treaties that create the rfmo s and the treaties ad-
opted through the International Maritime Organization (imo). The rfmo s 
have as their geographic scope areas of the high seas and focus on the sus-
tainable management of the various fish stocks under their mandates and 
are not mandated to take into account or deal with the larger scope of the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. The imo Conventions primarily deal with vessel stan-
dards that apply wherever a commercial vessel is operating, including on 
the high seas.
As a generality, the relative clarity of the relationship between the los 
Convention and the bbnj Convention is missing as regards the relationship 
between a bbnj Convention and the “existing relevant legal instruments and 
frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.”
2 “Undermine”
As already noted, the 2015 and 2017 General Assembly Resolutions state that a 
bbnj Convention “should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments 
and frameworks and relevant global, regional, and sectoral bodies.” As Cather-
ine Blanchard has noted: “the wording of the not undermining clause comes 
from recommendations of the Working Group, and the drafting history of these 
recommendations is very indicative of the political nature that surrounded the 
adoption of the clause.”35
The Report of the Preparatory Committee indicated that a bbnj Conven-
tion “… should be interpreted and applied in a manner which would not un-
dermine” existing legal instruments and frameworks.36 This wording may be 
seen as recognizing the legal primacy of the existing structures (for example, 
rfmo s) that deal directly or indirectly with the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction. Other word-
ing in the Report of the Preparatory Committee dealing specifically with area- 
based management tools (including marine protected areas) referred to “the 
importance of enhanced cooperation and coordination between legal instru-
ments … without prejudice to their respective mandates.”37
 35 Catherine Blanchard, “Could ‘Not Undermining’ Undermine the BBNJ Process: Possible 
Interpretations of the Relationship between the ‘Not Undermining’ Clause and the 
Upcoming Legally Binding Instrument on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction,” paper at the Law of the Sea Interest 
Group of the European Society of International Law, in Naples, September 2017.
 36 “Report of the Preparatory Committee,” supra note 26, at p. 9.









The above is captured in Article 4(3) of the President of the bbnj Confer-
ence May 2019 Draft Text of a bbnj Convention:
This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that [re-
spects the competences of and] does not undermine [existing] relevant 
legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sec-
toral bodies and that promotes coherence and coordination with those 
instruments, frameworks and bodies, provided that they are supportive 
of and do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and this 
Agreement.38
An expansive understanding of the term “undermine” could act as a significant 
limitation on the scope and application of a bbnj Convention but would avoid 
or prevent undue interference by a bbnj Convention with the existing global, 
regional and sectoral bodies. The opposite result occurs if “undermine” is un-
derstood in a narrow sense.
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention directs one to interpret treaty text by 
looking at “ordinary meaning.”39 The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that 
to undermine something is to make something weaker or less effective. This 
suggests a narrow approach such that it gives a bbnj Convention opportuni-
ties to add to “existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional, and sectoral bodies.” Others have undertaken more detailed 
studies of interpreting the “undermine” wording.40
3 Legal Relationship
The legal relationship between a bbnj Convention and those “Existing Rele-
vant Instruments and Frameworks and Relevant Global, Regional and Sectoral 
Bodies” that are treaties will depend primarily on the inclusion and wording of 
legal obligations on States in a bbnj Convention. As pointed out above, only 
where there is a conflict of treaty rights and obligations is there a question of 
the legal relationship.
 38 bbnj Conference President, May 2019, Draft Text, supra note 27, Article 4(3).
 39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 14, Article 31(1).
 40 See: Blanchard, supra note 35; Zoe Scallion, “The Art of ‘not Undermining’: Possibilities 
within Existing Architecture to Improve Environmental Protection in Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdiction,” (2018), 75 ICES Journal of Marine Science 405– 416; A.  Friedman, 
“Beyond ‘Not Undermining’:  Possibilities for Global Cooperation to Improve 
Environmental Protection in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Comment,” (2019), 76 
ICES Journal of Marine Science 452– 456; and Vito De Lucia, “Reflecting on the Meaning of 
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At least concerning area- based management measures, there does appear 
that there will be direct obligations on States party to a bbnj Convention that 
can be said to conflict with, for example, measures adopted by rfmo s or with 
any of the obligations in the imo Conventions. It is apparent that most of the 
output of a bbnj Convention on area- based management measures will be 
accomplished through a Conference of the Parties (cop) with the bbnj Con-
vention wording providing guidance, direction and principles.
cop s in multilateral environmental agreements (mea s) do not have the 
authority to adopt legally- binding measures or direct other bodies to adopt 
measures.41 This is the case as regards the much- admired Convention on Bi-
ological Diversity,42 for example, where the cop adopts “decisions” but such 
decisions are not legally binding on the State Parties to the cbd. That this legal 
nicety is often over- looked by commentators and cbd participants alike does 
not change the legal situation.
The result of the above regarding the legal- relationship question is that the 
“Existing Relevant Instruments and Frameworks and Relevant Global, Region-
al and Sectoral Bodies” that are treaty- based and contain treaty- based obliga-
tions and rights (such as under rfmo s and the imo Conventions) are treaty 
rights and obligations that will be legally unaffected by a bbnj Convention, in 
particular, unaffected by decisions that may emanate from a bbnj cop.
v Conclusion
After 13+ years of heavy fog, the outlines of a possible bbnj Convention are be-
ginning to emerge. It is the case, however, that with respect to the “deal- breaker 
issues” a dense fog remains concerning access to marine genetic resources.
The wording that a bbnj Convention is not to “undermine existing rele-
vant instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral 
bodies,” has been acceptably ambiguous (foggy) for high- level discussion 
and agreement. It is highly likely that “not to undermine” will continue to be 
 41 See: Annecoos Wiersema, “The New International Law- Makers? Conferences of the Parties 
to Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2009), 31 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 231, at pp. 286– 287 whose conclusion summarizes that: “cop activity does not create 
new stand- alone law. … Using conventional approaches for determining the sources of 
international law … cop activity would rarely be classified as hard international law.” The 
author argues that such conventional approaches “fail to capture this activity’s tight rela-
tionship with the underlying treaty obligations of the parties.”







acceptably ambiguous and will appear in a bbnj Convention (assuming one is 
completed).
Based on precedent, a bbnj cop will not have the scope or authority to 
adopt measures that are legally binding on States and, therefore, will not su-
persede directly or affect indirectly legal obligations or rights that arise from 
regional or global sectoral treaties.
Pragmatically, one hopes that the bbnj Convention will enhance coordi-
nation of global and regional governance of biodiversity beyond national ju-
risdiction while avoiding interference with intergovernmental regional and 
sectoral bodies.
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Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction and 
the Limits of the Commons
Spatial and Functional Complexities
Joanna Mossop and Clive Schofield
 Abstract
This paper addresses spatial and functional complexities relating to biodiversity be-
yond national jurisdiction against the context of negotiations towards an international 
legally binding instrument on its conservation and sustainable use. A number of un-
certainties are highlighted in relation to the extent of the maritime zones of coastal 
States and therefore the spatial scope of the Commons. These uncertainties include 
instability in coasts and therefore baselines from which maritime claims are predom-
inantly measured, particularly in an era of sea level rise; excessive maritime claims to 
baselines and from islands, maritime disputes and the incomplete delineation of con-
tinental shelf limits seawards of 200 nautical miles from the coast. The issues raised by 
horizontal and vertical ecological connectivity are also explored. Potential options to 
deal with these challenges are then discussed.
 Keywords
Biodiversity  – areas beyond national jurisdiction  – commons  – maritime claims  – 
baselines – maritime zones – sea level rise – maritime disputes – continental shelf 
limits – adjacency – connectivity – due regard
1 Introduction
As negotiations proceed for a new international legally binding instrument 
(ilbi) for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ar-
eas beyond national jurisdiction (bbnj), it is becoming clear that a number 
of spatial and functional complexities exist that underpin and should inform 
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the issues under discussion.1 This chapter addresses two particular challenges. 
First, what the geographic and material scope of the agreement is with respect 
to activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj). This geographic defi-
nition, while seemingly straightforward, is in fact far from being so. This paper 
sets out some of the reasons why the spatial extent of abnj may be difficult to 
determine. Second, the vertical and horizontal ecological connectivity of the 
oceans means that management of activities in abnj without factoring in such 
connectivity will give rise to legal and practical issues in the future.
The continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (M) provides particular chal-
lenges in creating a coherent legal framework for abnj. First, the fact that many of 
the proposed outer limits to continental shelf areas seawards of 200 M have yet to 
be considered by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs), 
leads to horizontal uncertainties in relation to the determination of the spatial 
scope of abnj. Maritime disputes and excessive maritime claims also serve to 
complicate the jurisdictional picture. Second, because the parts of the continen-
tal shelf that extend beyond the limits of the eez lie beneath the high seas, vertical 
connectivity issues arise in the layering and interactions between the legal juris-
diction of the coastal State with the bbnj framework, especially where ecosystems 
transcend the divide between areas within national jurisdiction (awnj) and abnj.
What emerges is a complex layering of overlapping maritime zones in the 
context of an ocean characterised by horizontal and vertical connectivity be-
tween activities, zones, layers and ecosystems. This chapter first sets out the 
spatial uncertainties that may impact the extent of the abnj, including shift-
ing baselines against the context of sea level rise, excessive maritime claims 
and disputes as well as issues concerning the delineation of the outer limits of 
the continental shelf. The chapter then considers what legal principles could 
be included in the ilbi to reflect horizontal and vertical connectivity. It also 
recommends that the ilbi include provisions that specifically respond to some 
of the complexities we have identified.
2 Spatial Uncertainties
As noted above the ilbi applies to activities in abnj. This begs the question, 
what are the limits of abnj?2 The answer to this question is, in turn, dependant 
 1 This chapter was written after the third session of the Intergovernmental Conference and 
refers to documents and negotiations up to that date.
 2 This section of the paper is adapted from part of an earlier paper. For greater detail see, 
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on the limits of national jurisdiction. There are a number of reasons why un-
certainty exists regarding the limits of national jurisdiction and therefore the 
spatial extent of abnj. These include issues related to: the instability of coast-
lines and therefore the baselines from which maritime claims are generally 
measured, especially in a period characterised by rising sea levels; the lack of 
certainty in the delineation of maritime limits as a result excessive maritime 
claims and maritime disputes; the slow progress in the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf seawards of 200 M eez limits; and uncertainties 
about entitlements to maritime zones generated by small and/ or sparsely or 
uninhabited insular features.
2.1 Changing Baselines
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc)3 provides 
for zones of maritime jurisdiction with the outer limits of maritime zones 
being generally defined by distance measurements from baselines along 
the coast. In particular, the limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone 
and exclusive economic zone (eez) are all defined by reference to distance 
measurements. That is, to maximum distances of 12 M,4 24 M5 and 200 M6 
respectively.7
Baselines are therefore fundamental to the delineation of the outer limits of 
national jurisdiction. More specifically, outer limits are generally constructed 
through the “envelope of arcs” method.8 Consequently, it is the most seaward, 
critical basepoints along the baseline that are essential to delineating outer 
limits to national jurisdiction rather than a coastal State’s baseline as a whole.
Currents:  Examining How We Govern Ocean Commons, (Leiden/ Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff/ 
Brill, 2020).
 3 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 unts 3, opened for sig-
nature 10 December 1982, Montego Bay, Jamaica, entered into force 16 November 1994. Also 
available at:  <http:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ convention_ agreements/ convention_ overview_ 
convention.htm> [hereinafter ‘losc’ or ‘the Convention’].
 4 Ibid., arts. 3 and 4.
 5 Ibid., art. 33.
 6 Ibid., art. 57.
 7 The delineation of the outer edge of the continental shelf where it exceeds a distance of 
200 M from baselines along the coast is a more complex task that does not rely on distance 
measurements from baselines alone (see below). Nonetheless, distance measurements from 
baselines, notably the 200 and 350 M limits, remain essential to the delineation of outer 
continental shelf limits. losc, art. 76.
 8 C.M. Carleton and C.H. Schofield, ‘Developments in the Technical Determination of Mari-
time Space: Charts, Datums, Baselines, Maritime Zones and Limits’, 3(3) Maritime Briefing 
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The predominant type of baselines provided for under the losc are “nor-
mal” baselines that are coincident with “the low- water line along the coast as 
marked on large- scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”9 These 
are what can be termed the coastal State’s “default” baselines in that they do 
not require express declaration.
As normal baselines coincide with the low- water line along the coast, they 
are dependent on the stability of coasts. However, it has long been recognised 
that coasts are inherently dynamic land/ sea features which can both advance 
offshore through deposition or accretion of material or, alternatively, retreat 
to landwards as a result of coastal inundation and erosion. Consequently, the 
traditional view has been that normal baselines can change location or “ambu-
late” over time.10 It follows that if the basepoints from which the outer limits 
of maritime claims are measured alter in position, then the maritime juris-
dictional limits measured from them will also change.11 Where the baseline 
advances the outer limits of the maritime claims measured from that base-
line will expand seawards. Conversely, where the normal baseline recedes the 
coastal State may lose jurisdiction over maritime areas as the outer limits of 
their maritime zones are pulled back.
With respect to abnj, changes in the extent of this area will only occur if the 
critical basepoints controlling the 200 M limits of eez claims are impacted. In 
this context it is important to note that relatively few basepoints control 200 M 
as compared, for example, with the number of basepoints required to generate 
12 M territorial sea limits.
Coastal and therefore normal baseline instability is, however, likely to be 
exacerbated by global sea level rise.12 This is particularly the case in light of 
 9 losc, art. 5.
 10 International Law Association, Report of the International Law Association Committee 
on International Law and Sea Level Rise (2019) <https:// www.researchgate.net/ publica-
tion/ 330938568_ International_ Law_ and_ Sea_ Level_ Rise_ Report_ of_ the_ International_ 
Law_ Association_ Committee_ on_ International_ Law_ and_ Sea_ Level_ Rise> (accessed 26 
November 2019). Also of note in this context is that the ila Committee on Baselines under 
the International Law of the Sea concluded that normal baselines are ambulatory. See, 
C.G. Lathrop, J.A. Roach and D.R. Rothwell (eds), Baselines under the International Law 
of the Sea: Reports of the International Law Association Committee on Baselines under the 
International Law of the Sea, Brill Research Perspectives on the Law of the Sea, (Leiden/ 
Boston: Brill, 2019), at 58.
 11 M.W. Reed, Shore and Sea Boundaries:  The Development of International Maritime 
Boundary Principles through United States Practice, Volume 3 (Washington, DC, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2000), 
p. 185.
 12 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) in its Fifth Assessment Report 
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the anticipated pace and scale of sea level rise as well as evidence that the 
rate of sea level rise is accelerating. Consequently, contractions in the scope 
of awnj, and corresponding increases in the scope of abnj, cannot be ruled 
out. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) found in 
its 2019 “Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate” 
that global mean sea level rise in the period 2006– 2015 has been two and a half 
times the rate for the period 1901– 1990, a rate of sea level rise stated with high 
confidence to be “unprecedented over the last century.”13 The counterpoint to 
this is that there are emerging efforts on the part of some States to fix mari-
time baselines, limits and boundaries in order to circumvent the contraction 
of national claims to maritime jurisdiction and thereby also to fix the extent of 
abnj.14 These developments suggest that some progressive interpretation of 
the baseline provisions of the losc is underway.
2.2 Excessive Baseline Claims
It can also be observed that many coastal States consider all or part of their 
coastlines to be geographically complex enough to create systems of straight 
baselines. Article 7(1) of the losc provides that straight baselines should only 
be applied in localities “where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or 
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.” Article 
7 of the losc thus allows States to depart from the application of the normal 
baseline and measure maritime jurisdictional zones from straight baselines 
drawn along selected parts of their coastlines.15 However, this exception to the 
0.52– 0.98 under its representative concentration pathways (rcp) 8.5 scenario which 
envisages continued very high greenhouse gas emissions and a resulting increase in global 
mean temperature likely to exceed 2˚C. See, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(ipcc), ‘Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis’, Contribution of Working Group 
i, Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, 
and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 1139– 1140, available online: <http:// 
www.climatechange2013.org/ images/ report/ WG1AR5_ ALL_ FINAL.pdf>.
 13 ipcc, ‘Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate’, approved 
at its 51st Session held from 20– 23 September 2019, available on the ipcc website at 
<https:// www.ipcc.ch/ srocc/ home/ >.
 14 Notably on the part of Pacific Islands States. See, D. Freestone and C.H. Schofield, ‘Islands 
Awash Amidst Rising Seas?: Sea Level Rise and Insular Status under the Law of the Sea’, 34 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2019, 391, at 404– 408; and, D. Freestone 
and C.H. Schofield, ‘Republic of the Marshall Islands – 2016 Maritime Zones Declaration 
Act: Drawing lines in the sea’, 31 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2016, 
720. See also R. Frost et al., ‘Redrawing the map of the Pacific’, 95 Marine Policy, 2018, 302.
 15 See J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, (2 








290 Mossop and Schofield
general rule of normal baselines along the coast was intended to deal with par-
ticularly complex coastal geography where the configuration of the coastline 
is such that using “highly irregular”16 normal baselines would result in similarly 
irregular maritime limits.17
Unfortunately, Article 7 of the losc provides no objective tests by which 
to ascertain whether a particular stretch of coastline is deeply enough or fre-
quently enough indented to warrant the application of straight baselines or, 
alternatively, whether a fringe of islands is numerous enough or close enough 
to the coast to justify the use of straight baselines.18
Consequently, many States have interpreted Article 7 in a very flexible and 
arguably excessive manner which serves not only to capture or enclose overly 
large marine spaces as internal waters and simultaneously advance the coastal 
State’s starting point for measuring its maritime claims.19 Of note here is that 
the icj, in its decision in the Qatar/ Bahrain Case, stated unequivocally that 
the method of straight baselines in accordance with Article 7 of losc “must 
be applied restrictively”.20 Moreover, any system of straight baselines or other 
types of straight line baseline21 still needs to be connected back to the low- wa-
ter line.22 Indeed, the United Nations Group of Technical Experts on Baselines 
concluded that a “straight baseline system must be closed” such that, “whether 
the baselines are drawn along the coast of an island or of the mainland, the 
system must start and finish on or above the low water line” and that where 
 16 International Hydrographic Organization (iho) and the International Association of 
Geodesy (iag) Manual on Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (talos Manual), Special 
Publication No.51, (Monaco: International Hydrographic Bureau, 2014),  chapters 4 and 6.
 17 United Nations, Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (New York: Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea, United Nations, 1989).
 18 While the United States has published its own guidelines on the proper application of 
Article 7, these guidelines are not binding on other States. See, United States Department 
of State, ‘Developing Standard Guidelines for Evaluating Straight Baselines’, Limits in 
the Seas, No.106, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs, 31 August 1987). See also, J.A. Roach and R.W. Smith, ‘Straight 
Baselines: The Need for a Universally Applied Norm’, 31 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, 2000, 47; International Law Association, Baselines under the International 
Law of the Sea: Final Report (2018).
 19 See Prescott and Schofield, supra n 15, 139– 166.
 20 Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar/ Bahrain), Merits, Judgment (2001) ICJ Reports 40, 103.
 21 Such as river or bay closing lines or archipelagic baselines. See, losc, arts. 9, 10 and 47 
respectively.
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straight baselines were drawn connecting a fringe of islands, “all the interme-
diate basepoints must be located on or above the low water line.”23 As a result, 
straight line types of baselines are not immune to changing location of normal 
baselines.
Where excessive baseline claims are made, uncertainty is added to the true 
scope of the abnj. However, unless such apparently excessive baseline claims 
are challenged by other States, there is a risk that the outer limits of maritime 
claims delineated from them may end up defining the spatial extent of abnj 
by default.24
2.3 Incomplete Delineation of Outer Continental Shelf Limits
The losc provides coastal States with sovereign rights over the eez out to 
a distance of 200 M from the coast, beyond which lie the high seas.25 These 
rights relate to both the water column and the underlying seabed and subsoil, 
regardless of whether the continental margin actually extends that distance 
offshore, unless overlapping claims with neighbouring States exist.26
Where coastal States are positioned on broad continental margins, however, 
they are able to assert rights over those parts of the continental shelf beyond 
the 200 M eez limit forming part of their natural prolongation. These areas of 
continental shelf beyond the 200 M limit are sometimes referred to as the ‘out-
er’ or ‘extended’ continental shelf and are overlain by parts of the high seas.27 
Beyond the outer limits to the continental shelf, the deep seabed is referred to 
as “the Area”; exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the Area 
is under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority (isa).28
 23 See United Nations, Baselines, supra n 18, at 23.
 24 It can be observed, however, that many excessive baseline claims are subject to inter-
national protest, especially on the part of the United States through its Freedom of 
Navigation (fon) program. These protests are made to ensure that the United States 
maintains maritime mobility and to prevent the United States from acquiescing or tacitly 
accepting legal positions with which it disagrees. See, J.A. Roach and R.W. Smith, Excessive 
Maritime Claims, (3 ed., Leiden/ Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), at 6– 9 and 
72– 130.
 25 losc, arts. 56– 57, 76(1) and 86.
 26 The coastal State’s rights over the continental shelf within 200 M of the coast are, how-
ever, governed in accordance with Part vi (dealing with the continental shelf) of the 
Convention rather than Part v (dealing with the eez).
 27 losc, art. 76(1). It can be observed that neither of the terms ‘outer’ or ‘extended’ conti-
nental shelf appears in the losc or is generally accepted – indeed tribunals have empha-
sised that the continental shelf is a single entity rather than an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ shelf. 
Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago, Award (2006) xxvii riaa 147, para. 213.
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Article 76 of the losc goes on to lay down a complex series of formulae 
through which the coastal State can establish its rights to the outer edge of 
its continental shelf areas seaward of the 200 M limit. Essentially, article 76 
provides two formulae according to which coastal States can establishment 
existence of a continental margin beyond the 200 M limit,29 together with two 
maximum constraints or ‘cut- off ’ lines.30
To establish the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M, coastal 
States need to make a submission of information to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs),31 a body established under the losc 
comprised of technical experts. In order to make these calculations, and thus 
establish entitlement to outer continental shelf areas in accordance with Arti-
cle 76, a coastal State is required to gather information related to the morphol-
ogy of its continental margin and its geological characteristics as well as bathy-
metric information relating to water depth. Additionally, geodetically robust 
distance measurements are necessary to determine, for example, the location 
of 200 M and 350 M limit lines. Although complex, the fundamental point here 
is that Article 76 of losc, through the clcs, delivers a definable outer limit 
to the continental shelf claims of coastal States  – something that has been 
referred to as “the real achievement” of Article 76 of the losc.32
The clcs will consider all the information and other material submitted by 
coastal States in proposing the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 
200 M.33 The clcs, however, lacks the mandate to consider any submission 
in which a land or maritime dispute exists,34 unless prior consent has been 
given by the States that are parties to such a dispute.35 Since these submissions 
cannot be considered by the clcs, the coastal States involved are precluded 
from delineating the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 M with 
certainty.
 29 The two entitlement formulae are the ‘Gardiner Line’, based on reference to depth or 
thickness of sedimentary rocks overlying the continental crust, or the ‘Hedberg Line’ con-
sisting of 60 M from the foot of the continental slope. See, losc, art. 76 (4)(a)(i and ii).
 30 Either a distance of 350 M from relevant baselines or 100 M from the 2,500 metre depth 
isobath. See, losc, art. 76(5).
 31 losc, art. 76(8).
 32 See T. McDorman, ‘The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A 
technical body in a political world’, 17 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
2002, 301– 324, at 307.
 33 losc, Annex ii, Art. 3.
 34 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, clcs/ 40/ 
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The existence of overlapping maritime claims, including to areas of conti-
nental shelf seawards of 200 M, therefore creates uncertainty over the location 
of the awnj/ abnj divide and thus ambiguity over the scope of abnj. A further 
source of doubt over the spatial extent of abnj is caused by the fact that the 
clcs has a very substantial backlog of submissions to address. At the time of 
writing submissions to the clcs encompassed in excess of 37km2 million,36 
with less than one third of the 84 full submissions made to the clcs having 
received recommendations from the Commission.37
2.4 Excessive Claims from Islands
A further type of excessive maritime claims that can impact on the extent of 
abnj concerns claims to eez and continental shelf rights from insular fea-
tures which may, in fact, be more appropriately categorised as “rocks” within 
the meaning of article 121(3) of the losc, which therefore “shall have no ex-
clusive economic zone or continental shelf.”38 In general, coastal States have 
tended to advance broad maritime claims from often small, remote and un-
inhabited insular features. Such expansive maritime claims based on seem-
ingly insignificant islands have been difficult to critique with conviction in 
light of the ambiguity in article 121(3) that the term “rock” only applies to 
islands “which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their 
own.”39
The first international judicial interpretation of article 121(3) featured in the 
arbitral award in the 2016 case brought by the Philippines against China under 
 36 Robert van de Poll, personal communication.
 37 For a list of all submissions and recommendations, see the clcs website at <http:// www.
un.org/ Depts/ los/ clcs_ new/ clcs_ home.htm>.
 38 losc, art. 121(3).
 39 Ibid. The interpretation of Article 121 has led to substantial scholarly debate among law 
of the sea scholars. See, for example, J.I. Charney, ‘Rocks that cannot sustain human hab-
itation’, American Journal of International Law, 93, 4 (1999): 863– 78; A.G. Oude Elferink, 
‘Clarifying Article 121 (3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The limits set by the nature 
of international legal processes’, Boundary and Security Bulletin, Vol.6, no.2 (Summer 
1998): 58– 68.; B. Kwaitkowska and A.H.A. Soons, ‘Entitlement to maritime areas of rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’, Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, xxi (1990):  139– 81; Prescott and Schofield, supra n 19, 
at 73– 79; J.M. Van Dyke, J.  Morgan and J.  Gurish, ‘The exclusive economic zone of the 
northwestern Hawaiian Islands:  when do uninhabited islands generate an EEZ?’, San 
Diego Law Review, 25, 3 (1988): 425– 494; and J.M. Van Dyke and R.A. Brooks, ‘Uninhabited 
islands:  their impact on the ownership of the oceans’ resources’, Ocean Development 
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the losc.40 In its Award, the Tribunal set a high bar for island to generate eez 
and continental shelf rights. In particular, the Tribunal ruled that:
– the assessment of a feature should be based on its “natural capacity” to sus-
tain human habitation “without external additions or modifications intend-
ed to increase its capacity” to do so;41
– “[t] he mere presence of a small number of persons on a feature does not 
constitute permanent or habitual residence there and does not equate to 
habitation”;42 and
– the capacity of an insular feature to generate eez rights depends on capac-
ity to sustain either “a stable community of people”43 or economic activity 
that “must be oriented around the feature itself and not focused solely on 
the waters or seabed of the surrounding territorial sea” and not dependent 
on outside resources or purely extractive in nature are capable of generating 
extended maritime claims.44
In establishing this high standard for fully entitled islands the Tribunal referred 
to the history of the Convention to reach the conclusion that Article 121(3) was 
included in the Convention as a “counterpoint” to the introduction of the eez, 
serving to prevent the expansion in maritime rights provided by the eez “from 
going too far” by disabling tiny features from:
unfairly and inequitably generating enormous entitlements to maritime 
space that would serve not to benefit the local population, but to award 
windfall to the (potentially distant) State to have maintained a claim to 
such a feature.45
Of particular note for the present discussion, on the basis of the travaux 
préparatoires, the Tribunal determined that Article 121(3) is a “provision of 
limitation” with:
 40 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted 
under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between 
the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, Award, 12 July 2016, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca), pca Case No. 2013– 19, available at, <https:// pca- 
cpa.org, at https:// pcacases.com/ web/ view/ 7> (hereinafter, the South China Sea Award). 
It should be noted that the second author of this Chapter served as an independent 
expert witness in this case.
 41 Ibid., para. 541.
 42 Ibid., para. 489.
 43 Ibid., para. 542.
 44 Ibid., para. 543.
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the object and purpose of preventing encroachment on the internation-
al seabed reserved for the common heritage of mankind and of avoid-
ing the inequitable distribution of maritime spaces under national 
jurisdiction.46
This ruling is clearly at odds with the aforementioned maximalist tendency in 
State practice towards claiming continental shelf and eez rights from small, 
remote and sparsely or uninhabited features which tends to substantially re-
duce the spatial extent of abnj. Following the ruling, questions have been 
raised about the implications for other small features from which large mar-
itime claims have been made.47 These uncertainties are likely to give rise to 
questions about which areas of ocean are subject to coastal State jurisdiction, 
or to the ilbi.
3 Functional Connectivities and Complexities
A growing body of scientific research is demonstrating the ecological connec-
tivity of the oceans. It is now clear that areas within awnj and abnj are eco-
logically linked in multiple ways which can be both active and passive in char-
acter.48 Active connectivity involves self- propulsion by the species involved, 
for instance the long- distance migrations of sea birds, sea turtles, sharks and 
marine fish such as tuna. In contrast, passive connectivity is predominantly 
driven by ocean currents. Both active and passive modes of connectivity tran-
scend awnj and abnj.
Ecological connectivity is not in itself a problem, but the ocean is divided 
for legal purposes into jurisdictional zones in which there are different legal 
principles, and states have different rights and responsibilities. Challenges 
arise where activities in one area have an impact on marine ecosystems that 
straddle multiple legal zones, limits and boundaries. This limits the ability to 
 46 Ibid., para. 535.
 47 For example see, ‘Regime of Islands in the Aftermath of the South China Sea Arbitration’ 
112 Proceedings of the 112th Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, 2018, 3.
 48 E. Popova, et al., ‘Ecological Connectivity between the Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 
and Coastal Waters:  Safeguarding Interests of Coastal Communities in Developing 
Countries’ 104 Marine Policy, 2019, 90; D.C. Dunn, et  al., ‘Adjacency:  How legal prece-
dent, ecological connectivity, and Traditional Knowledge inform our understanding 
of proximity’, Policy brief, Nereus Program (2017). https:// nereusprogram.org/ reports/ 
policy- brief- adjacency- how- legal- precedent- ecological- connectivity- and- traditional- 
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manage activities coherently, something that the First Global Integrated Ma-
rine Assessment indicated was necessary to improve the ocean environment.49
3.1 Horizontal Connectivity
Horizontal interaction or connectivity issues can occur when species migrate 
through more than one maritime zone. Coastal States will have jurisdiction 
over such species when they are in their eez or territorial sea, but beyond 
the eez the freedom of high seas applies, and the species may or may not be 
subject to fishing regulated by a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
(rfmo). The losc contains obligations on States to cooperate in the case of 
straddling or highly migratory fish species, although this was considered to be 
insufficient to respond to the practical problems in achieving cooperation.50 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (unfsa)51 was negotiated to resolve some of 
the coordination difficulties arising from managing fish stocks in such a situa-
tion. However, the challenges in conserving and sustainably using marine bio-
diversity go well beyond a single sector. Migratory species can be impacted by 
a wide range of other activities including shipping, deep seabed mining, and 
pollution, among others. Other horizontal connectivity problems arise from 
the fact that a vulnerable or important marine ecosystem may be dependent 
on juvenile replenishment from another ocean feature that could be in a differ-
ent maritime zone. Efforts to protect the ecosystem, for example by establish-
ing mpa s, may be undermined if the connected areas are not also protected.52 
Hence there is an effort to create a framework in the ilbi for networks of ma-
rine protected areas in abnj.
Some coastal States have emphasised the problems they see arising for areas 
within their jurisdiction if activities on the high seas are not regulated effec-
tively. For example, Pacific Small Island Developing States (psids) have inter-
vened repeatedly during the PrepCom and igc s, pointing out the dependence 
 49 Summary of the first global integrated marine assessment (22 July 2015) UN Doc A/ 70/ 112, 
para. 40; R.D. Long, A. Charles and R.L. Stephenson, ‘Key Principles of Marine Ecosystem- 
based Management’, 57 Marine Policy, 2015, 53.
 50 losc, arts. 63, 64, and 116. See, e.g., E. Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks:  The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries’, 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law, 1994, 255.
 51 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 ilm 1542 
(1995); 2167 unts 88.
 52 See, for example, K.I. Pendoley et al., ‘Protected Species Use of a Coastal Marine Migratory 
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that they have on migratory species that travel through the high seas and their 
coastal waters. Small island, but often “large ocean”, developing States are par-
ticularly dependent on the health of the oceans not only in terms of access 
to marine resources for food security, but also in economic terms as a critical 
source of revenue and to support livelihoods as well as in cultural terms.53 For 
example, the value accruing to Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa) 
members54 from the tuna species, which migrate far beyond national juris-
dictional limits, in 2018 has been estimated at US$3.05 billion,55 making it the 
dominant development opportunity and source of government revenue for 
many of these States.56
In contrast, other coastal States have expressed concern that measures tak-
en on the high seas not impede their rights to explore and exploit the resources 
of awnj. During the negotiations there has, for example, been resistance to the 
idea that the provisions on environmental impact assessment (eia) for activ-
ities in abnj might affect the process for eia for activities in awnj – despite 
the fact that an obligation to undertake eia s in awnj exists in both customary 
international law and article 206 of the losc. Similarly, coastal States are keen 
to ensure that the presence of an mpa in adjacent areas of the high seas would 
not undermine their rights in their eez.
3.2 Vertical Connectivity
Vertical connectivity is a particularly complex problem in the bbnj context. 
Within national jurisdiction, coastal States have jurisdiction over many activ-
ities that impact marine biodiversity, especially fisheries and the exploitation 
of non- living resources. Up to 200 M eez limits coastal States can generally 
exercise control over the impacts on marine biodiversity from activities within 
their eez and continental shelf. Beyond 200 M, if a coastal State has an outer 
or extended continental shelf, the regime of the high seas applies to the super-
jacent water column. Article 77(1) of the losc provides that coastal States have 
 53 J.E. Hay, ‘Small Island Developing States:  Coastal Systems, Global Change and 
Sustainability’, 8 Sustainability Science, 2013, 309, at 318.
 54 Pacific forum Fisheries Agency Members comprise:  Australia, the Cook Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.
 55 Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Community (2019) Value of wcpfc- ca Tuna 
Fisheries 2019.
 56 For example, it has been estimated that revenues derived from tuna species accounted 
for over 60 per cent of the public budget for Kiribati in 2012. See, World Bank, Pacific 
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sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting its resources. These include the:
living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms 
which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-
bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or subsoil.57
Complex questions arise in the context of bbnj as to how the definition of sed-
entary species will apply to the collection of marine genetic resources (mgrs ) 
at or near the seabed above a State’s continental shelf that lies under high 
seas.58 Vertical connectivity problems arise because ecosystems found in plac-
es such as hydrothermal vents and seamounts do not fall neatly into categories 
of sedentary or non- sedentary species. For example, the microbes at hydro-
thermal vents can be found in the seabed, circulating in the water column or 
in symbiosis with other creatures including tube worms.59 The problem in ap-
plying the sedentary species definition to mgrs  has received limited attention 
in the bbnj discussions, despite the fact that most delegations now accept that 
a single legal framework should apply to mgr s in the high seas and Area.60
In addition to having sole rights to exploit the resources of the seabed, 
coastal States also have a range of obligations in relation to the preservation of 
the marine environment. Environmental impacts on benthic ecosystems can 
arise from activities conducted under the jurisdiction of the coastal State (such 
as mining or fishing for sedentary species) as well as from activities under the 
high seas regime (such as bottom fishing and dumping from vessels). One issue 
that has not received much attention is the fact that, because activities on the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M are essentially conducted in and adjacent to 
the high seas, all such activities are inherently undertaken in a transboundary 
context. Customary international environmental law principles including the 
 57 losc, art. 77(4).
 58 See e.g., C.H. Allen, ‘Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden:  International Law Issues 
in Deep- Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management’, 13 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review, 2000, 563; J.  Mossop, ‘The Relationship between the 
Continental Shelf Regime and a New International Instrument for Protecting Marine 
Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’, 75 ICES Journal of Marine Science, 
2018, 444.
 59 Allen, supra n 58, at 627.
 60 J. Mossop, ‘Towards a Practical Approach to Regulating Marine Genetic Resources’ 8 ESIL 
Reflections, 2019, https:// esil- sedi.eu/ esil- reflection- towards- a- practical- approach- to- 
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obligation to prevent significant harm to commons areas and the obligation 
to conduct environmental impact assessments61 are particularly relevant for 
activities in proximity to a continental shelf.62
3.3 Coastal State Interests, Adjacency, and the ilbi Negotiations
As discussed, coastal States have two interests in relation to the extended con-
tinental shelf:  a need to ensure that they can exercise their sovereign rights 
to explore and exploit the living and non- living resources of the shelf; and a 
responsibility to protect and preserve the marine environment in the vicinity 
of the continental shelf and beyond.
These connectivity problems have led to an argument by some that coastal 
States should have a greater level of influence in relation to measures to pro-
tect the marine environment in areas of the high seas adjacent to their mari-
time zones. A group of authors have argued in a policy brief that coastal States 
seeking to ensure protection of marine biodiversity in adjacent abnj areas 
should be given special responsibilities due to ecological connectivity.63 The 
Policy Brief states:
… so long as adjacent States can prove that their management measures 
conserve marine biodiversity within or beyond their national jurisdic-
tion, the over- arching conservation mandate of unclos would support 
granting to those States greater influence over management of those 
abnj resources to which they lie adjacent. Under this approach, those 
qualified adjacent States would be allocated the primary responsibility to 
coordinate with existing sectoral and regional organizations to become 
the leading architects of new regional conservation agreements.64
This Policy Brief, as well as interventions along similar lines by small island 
developing States in the Preparatory Committee, has created a debate about 
the appropriate legal principles that apply to the intersection between coastal 
States rights and duties, and those applicable in abnj. In the President’s “Aid 
to Negotiations” issued prior to the second meeting of the intergovernmental 
 61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] icj Reports 266, 
para. 148; Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion [2011] itlos Rep 10, paras. 116 and 148.
 62 J. Mossop, The Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles:  Rights and Responsibilities 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 106.
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conference (IGC2), a long list of possible general principles and approaches 
were included, based on contributions made during IGC1.65 At the very end 
of the list was option (v), “take into account adjacency”.66 Adjacency was also 
included as an option for principles in the substantive parts including mgr s, 
area- based management tools (abmt s) and eia s. One difficulty was that there 
was no clear explanation of what “adjacency” meant, meaning that many del-
egates assumed that the goal was to give additional rights or responsibilities to 
coastal States in adjacent areas of the high seas. This did not receive enthusias-
tic endorsement by many delegations in the igc.
The use of adjacency changed in the draft text issued by the President prior 
to IGC3.67 Adjacency no longer appeared in a section on general principles 
and approaches, nor as a principle or approach under the separate parts. In-
stead, references to “adjacent coastal States” featured in specific aspects of the 
draft text.
Key mentions of coastal State interests in the draft text included the 
following:
– The introductory segment included a statement that the rights of coastal 
States “shall be respected in accordance with the Convention”.68
– Where mgr s from abnj are also found in awnj, activities with respect to 
those resources shall be conducted with “due regard” for the rights and le-
gitimate interests of any coastal State under the jurisdiction of which such 
resources are found.69
– If mgr s are accessed in abnj that may result in utilisation of mgr s in awnj, 
either prior consent or prior notification and consultation with the coastal 
State is required.70
– For abmts, measures adopted under the ilbi should not “undermine the 
effectiveness of measures adopted by coastal States in adjacent areas with-
in national jurisdiction and shall have due regard for the rights, duties and 
 65 For discussion of the different principles raised in the Preparatory Committee, see 
A. Oude Elferink, ‘Coastal States and MPAs in ABNJ: Ensuring Consistency with the LOSC’, 
33 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2018, 437, at 439.
 66 United Nations, President’s Aid to Negotiations (3 December 2018) UN Doc A/ conf.232/ 
2019/ 1* at 8.
 67 United Nations, Draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (17 May 2019) UN Doc A/ conf.232/ 2019/ 6 (hereinafter ‘draft 
text’).
 68 Draft text, art. 4(2).
 69 Draft text, art. 9(2).
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legitimate interests of all States”. Consultations would be required with 
coastal States.71
– Where an abmt is established in abnj but that area subsequently falls un-
der the jurisdiction of the coastal State, the abmt must be amended.72
– Proposals for abmt s must outline the impact on coastal States and any con-
sultations with them.73 In addition, coastal States will be among the parties 
included in consultations under the ilbi processes.74
– eia s should take into account possible impacts on transboundary areas in-
cluding adjacent coastal States.75
– Adjacent coastal States should be included in consultation on eia s.76
Not all of these proposals received support in the discussions at IGC3, but it 
is possible to make a few observations. First, the idea of adjacency proposed 
by the Policy Brief does not appear to have prevailed in the draft text. One 
attempt to partially revive this concept can be seen by a psids proposal that 
the views and comments of coastal States should be given particular regard if 
an abmt affects high seas pockets surrounded by awnj.77 Second, States are 
clearly beginning to work through the consequences for coastal States in some 
circumstances. However, many of the issues identified above are either not ad-
dressed, or addressed inadequately. Third, there is still a lack of clarity about 
the general legal principle that should govern the interaction between coastal 
States’ rights and the rights of other States.
4 Potential Options
4.1 Use of Principles
Although the draft text appears to be moving towards setting out specific ref-
erences to coastal States in respect of elements of the treaty, it is still likely to 
be important for the ilbi to set out general principles on how the relationship 
between areas under coastal State jurisdiction and abnj will be managed. Not 
every scenario can be covered with specific provisions.
 71 Draft text, art. 15(5).
 72 Draft text, art. 15(6).
 73 Draft text, art. 17(4).
 74 Draft text, art. 18(2).
 75 Draft text, art. 26.
 76 Draft text, art. 34.
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“Due regard” is often considered an organising principle of the losc. How-
ever, the losc does not generally require “due regard” for coastal States when 
considering the intersection between rights on the high seas and for coastal 
States. Article 87 provides that the freedoms of the high seas must be exercised 
by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise 
of high seas freedoms and for the rights with respect to activities in the Area, 
but does not mention coastal States. The freedom of fishing is “subject to the 
rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States regarding straddling 
and highly migratory stocks”.78 Article 78(2) requires coastal States not to in-
fringe or unjustifiably interfere with the rights and freedoms of other States 
when exercising their rights over the continental shelf.79 The clearest example 
of the losc requiring due regard when exercising rights in abnj towards a 
coastal State is in article 142(1), which requires activities in the Area with re-
spect to transboundary deposits to be undertaken with due regard to the rights 
and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction such 
deposits lie.
Arguably, “due regard” is the appropriate general principle that should be 
applied in the bbnj context.80 Some authors have suggested that it has general 
applicability to the intersection of rights in the losc. For example, Oxman ar-
gued that due regard is an organising principle in the law of the sea generally.81 
Treves has suggested that due regard reflects:
a broader customary law rule necessarily implied in the need to ensure 
coexistence between the customary freedoms of the high seas, the rights 
in the Area and the rights of coastal States in the eez and on the conti-
nental shelf.82
 78 losc, art. 116.
 79 This has been equated with “due regard”. See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius 
v. United Kingdom), Award, (2015) xxxi riaa 359, para. 540. For a contrasting view see 
Mossop (2016), supra n 62, at 186.
 80 Oude Elferink, supra n 65, at 447. The argument is further explored in Joanna Mossop and 
Clive Schofield, ‘Adjacency and due regard: The role of coastal States in the BBNJ Treaty’, 
Marine Policy, 2020, https:// doi.org/ 10.1016/ j.marpol.2020.103877.
 81 B.H. Oxman, ‘The Principle of Due Regard’ in itlos, The Contribution of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the Rule of Law 1996– 2016, (Leiden, Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018) 
p. 108, at 112.
 82 T. Treves, ‘ “Due regard” Obligations under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: The Laying of Cables and Activities in the Area’, 34 International Journal of Marine 
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Although “due regard” appears open- ended and somewhat vague, judicial in-
terpretation has given some content to the concept, albeit in bilateral exam-
ples of due regard. The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (itlos) 
in the Bay of Bengal case was of the view that where two States owe due regard 
to one another, discharge of the obligation may involve the conclusion of spe-
cific agreements or the establishment of cooperative arrangements.83 In the 
Chagos mpa arbitration, the Tribunal found that the conduct necessary to ful-
fil due regard obligations in article 56(2) will depend on the rights held, their 
importance, the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature and impor-
tance of the proposed activities and the availability of alternative approaches. 
Consultation will normally be required with the rights- holding State.84 How-
ever, despite these judicial statements, there are aspects of the relationship be-
tween States that the ilbi will need to more explicitly elucidated rather than 
rely on a general principle.85
The formulation in draft article 4(2) does not apply due regard. Instead, the 
“rights and jurisdiction of coastal States … shall be respected.” One reading of 
this drafting is to give preference to coastal State rights over interests in abnj. 
In cases where the coastal States’ rights might be intruded upon, respecting 
those rights might imply a limitation on the actions that can be taken in abnj. 
This would be an unnecessary and undesirable move away from the balancing 
approach represented by a due regard obligation.
4.2 Managing Spatial and Functional Complexities in Practice
We argue that specific provision can be made in the ilbi to deal with some of 
the issues identified earlier in this chapter.
4.2.1 Uncertain Boundaries
First, there is the question how to provide for uncertainties over maritime lim-
its and boundaries, notably the outer limits of the continental shelf. In many 
cases, the law of the sea has provided for such uncertainties  – for example, 
by indicating that  States should make “every effort to enter provisional ar-
rangements of a practical nature” pending an agreement on eez or continen-
tal shelf boundaries.86 In the context of the ilbi, a number of draft provisions 
call for consultations or notifications for adjacent coastal States. As explained, 
 83 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
Bengal (Bangladesh/ Myanmar), Judgment, [2012] itlos Reports 4, para. 476.
 84 Chagos mpa, supra n 79, para. 519.
 85 Oude Elferink, supra n 65, at 465.
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there are different reasons why it may be difficult to identify the coastal State. 
It could be decided, for example, that where a State has submitted informa-
tion about the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but no 
recommendation has been received by the clcs, that the outer limits provi-
sionally identified by the coastal State be treated as the interim boundary be-
tween its jurisdiction and abnj. Where there is an overlapping claim where 
more than one State claims entitlement to a part of a continental shelf, the 
combined submissions could be used to determine the interim outer limits.
In relation to identifying which State is the coastal State that should be con-
sulted, an assumption could be built into the ilbi that both (or all) claimant 
States are deemed the coastal State for the purposes of consultation. This may 
prove politically sensitive, but it must be remembered that under a principle 
of due regard, one coastal State’s opposition to a proposal in abnj would not 
override other interests.
The issue with identifying the coastal State for the purpose of the exploita-
tion of mgr s close to the continental shelf beyond 200 M is much more com-
plicated. The need for provisions dealing with uncertainty over the identity of 
the coastal State will depend in part on the content of the rights allocated to 
coastal States under the ilbi. For example, in draft article 10(5), a coastal State 
may have the right to consent to exploitation of mgr s that are found both in 
awnj and abnj. While the prospect of this option making it into the final ilbi 
is remote, this sort of provision makes the identity of the coastal State quite 
important. If there are any monetary benefits to be derived for coastal States, a 
more creative form of dealing with the dispute would have to be devised such 
as a trust arrangement until claims are settled.
4.2.2 The Continental Shelf and abnj
In light of the problems raised about applying the definition of sedentary spe-
cies to mgr s, in an ideal world the ilbi would define what this means and 
how it will apply. One option might be to seek to redefine the concept of “sed-
entary species” for an mgr regime. This might involve stating that coastal State 
rights to living resources do not apply to mgr s, which would create a more 
coherent legal framework. Another option could involve giving expanded 
rights to the coastal State to mgr s found in seabed ecosystems in return for 
additional responsibilities for environmental protection.87 However, it must 
be acknowledged that both of these options will be politically hard to achieve. 
Unfortunately, it is highly likely that this issue will not be resolved in the ilbi. 
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However, there may be scope for the issue to be taken up in the future by the 
Conference of the Parties.
Another issue is whether there should be a requirement for compatibility 
between measures adopted in the high seas and under national jurisdiction. 
Oude Elferink has argued persuasively that such a concept is unlikely to be 
accepted on the basis that there is no reason to expect this would lead to better 
environmental outcomes.88
5 Conclusion
As in any negotiation towards an international treaty, not all potential issues 
can be resolved in the final treaty text. This may be because there is an irrecon-
cilable difference of opinion, leading to deliberate ambiguity or omission from 
the text altogether. In the case of the ilbi, there is significant time pressure on 
the negotiations, with the General Assembly only authorising four meetings in 
Resolution 72/ 249. This does not mean that there may not be more sessions of 
the igc, only that the process of extending the conference is not clear at the 
time of writing. Therefore, States have been keen to try to conclude the treaty 
by the fourth session. If this is the case, then the finer details of how the rights 
of coastal States will intersect with the ilbi may be considered expendable. 
This is especially true since there is considerable debate about the core ele-
ments of the treaty.
Nevertheless, at a bare minimum, the ilbi would be well- served if States 
agreed on the use of the principle of due regard to govern the relationship with 
coastal States, rather than an approach of “respecting” coastal State rights. The 
latter formulation leans too far in the direction of coastal State interests over-
riding interests in the high seas to be consistent with the losc.
This paper has highlighted a number of spatial and functional complexi-
ties and uncertainties. Unfortunately, the zonal approach to managing ocean 
activities arguably has many disadvantages and tends to inhibit the adoption 
of sound ecosystem- based management across large ocean spaces, notwith-
standing some laudable efforts towards transboundary cooperation in ocean 
governance. It would be helpful if the ilbi could assist in avoiding ambiguities 
at the intersection of abnj and awnj. However, if this is not possible, it is po-
tentially a matter that could be addressed through dispute settlement under 
the ilbi.
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Non- Arctic States’ Role in the High North: 




The new geo- political landscape of the Arctic today is a significant departure from 
the great power politics that existed in the region during the Cold War era. Apart from 
traditional Arctic States, more and more international organizations and non- Arctic 
states are showing an increased interest in this region. This paper explores the growing 
interests of the three East Asia States, China, Japan, and South Korea, among a select-
ed group of non- Arctic states in the Arctic and examines the nature of their interests 
and motivations in maintaining their involvement and presence in the region. Promot-
ing cooperation is a common policy of these three Asian stakeholders to participate 
in Arctic governance. China’s approach to Arctic cooperation is elaborated in details 
which will be crucial to the country’s relationship with other stakeholders in the years 
to come.
 Keywords
Arctic  – geo- political  – China  – Japan  – South Korea  – Arctic States  – non- Arctic 
States – policy – governance – Arctic Council – resource development – polar research 
 – cooperation – scientific research – shipping
1 Introduction
During the Cold War, the Arctic was a security flashpoint between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R.  with nuclear submarines from the United States and 
the Soviet Union patrolling deep below the polar ice of the Arctic Ocean and 
bombers airborne over the region. Today, the Arctic may be disassociated from 
great power politics, but new geo- political realities are taking shape out of 
the melting Arctic. Even though the Arctic is often described as a region of 
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cooperation, opportunities for greater tensions may also increase as interests 
among the great powers in this arena continue to rise. Russia has reopened 
some of its abandoned military installations during the Soviet era and placed 
new facilities and airfields in its northern territory. It has also established a 
string of seaports along its northern coastline. The United States tends to 
frame the growing Sino- Russian partnership in hard- power terms and is mak-
ing a dramatic policy shift from the previous administration which saw climate 
change as the clear and present danger to Arctic security.
Against the background of such developments, major powers from outside 
the region, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan, and 
South Korea and India are taking special interest in many aspects of the Arc-
tic that focus on scientific research, shipping, and resource development. This 
chapter explores the growing interests of China, Japan, South Korea in the Arc-
tic and examines the nature of their interests and motivations in wanting to 
maintain involvement and a presence in the region. Promoting cooperation 
is a common policy of these three Asian stakeholders to participate in Arctic 
governance. China’s approach to Arctic cooperation is elaborated in details 
which will be crucial to the country’s relationship with other stakeholders in 
the years to come.
2 Presence of China, Japan, and South Korea in the Arctic
The interests of these states range from participating in Arctic governance and 
accessing potential resources to exploiting shipping opportunities and under-
taking polar research.
2.1 Governance
Seeking observer status in the Arctic Council is regarded by these three East 
Asian countries as an important step to ensuring their involvement in deter-
mining the course of the future of the Arctic region that they perceive will 
have an impact on their economic interests and global environmental con-
cerns. As a maritime State, Japan has for a long time shown interest in the 
developments in the Arctic region, including its participation as an observer at 
the Ottawa Conference in 1996 that launched the establishment of the Arctic 
Council from the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (aeps) framework. 
The government of Japan has since expressed interest in gaining greater access 
to discussions and negotiations on the Arctic. Japan could benefit heavily from 
the opening of the Northwest Passage, which would establish a route circum-
venting the Suez Canal and shorten transit times between Asia and Europe by 
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40  percent.1 The government of Japan submitted its application in 2009 for 
observer status in the Arctic Council.2
With a growing reputation of having an edge in shipbuilding and engineering, 
South Korea sees the thawing Arctic as an opportunity to have a stake on “future 
sea routes to ensure stable energy supplies and liven up its shipbuilding, logis-
tics and trading industries.”3 A South Korean delegation visited Norway in August 
2009 with an aim to garner support from Norway for South Korea’s entry as an 
observer to the Arctic Council. “Being an observer of the Arctic Council will help 
us enter the discussion among the Arctic nations over preservation and develop-
ment of the area. That will also help our government brainstorm policies on de-
velopment of marine transportation,” a ministry official told The Korea Times.4 In 
August and September 2012, South Korea’s then- president Lee Myung- bak’s visit 
to Greenland and Norway reflected the country’s anticipation of economic op-
portunities in the Arctic, placing emphasis on the importance “to forge a future- 
oriented partnership aimed at tackling climate change and environment- friendly 
development and preservation of the Arctic.”5 An economic cooperation agree-
ment signed with Norway is viewed by South Korea as gaining support from this 
Arctic State to back Seoul’s bid for permanent observer status.
China views the Arctic Council as an important body for governance and 
cooperation. Compared with an ad hoc status, a “permanent” observer status 
is perceived to be more than symbolic and “better positions non- Arctic states 
to participate in the governance of the Arctic region.”6 According to Linda Ja-
kobson and Peng Jingchao, China has an unspoken concern that it will not be a 
desired attendee at some point in the future and its aspiration for observers to 
attain more influence in the Arctic Council will be not achieved.7 Since 2007, 
 1 Bennett, Mia, “Japan applies for Arctic Council observer status,” at http:// arctic.foreign-
policyblogs.com/ 2009/ 04/ 20/ japan- applies- for- arctic- council- observer- status/ .
 2 Ibid.
 3 Shin Hyon- hee, 2012. “S. Korea seeks bigger role in Arctic.” The Korea Herald, http:// www.
asianewsnet.net/ home/ news.php?id=30743.
 4 Kim Se- jeong, “Korea Wants to Join in Arctic Projects, August 24, 2009,” at The Korea 
Times, http:// www.koreatimes.co.kr/ www/ news/ special/ 2009/ 04/ 176_ 29902.html.
 5 An Myungok, 2012. Korea Net. http:// www.korea.net/ NewsFocus/ Policies/ view? 
articleId=102568.
 6 Aldo Chircop, “The Emergence of China as a Polar- Capable State,” Canadian Naval Review 
7, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 13.
 7 Lijun Lan, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting between the Swedish 
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers” (statement, Stockholm, November 
6, 2012), Arctic Council, https:// arctic- council.org/ images/ PDF_ attachments/ Observer_ 
DMM_ 2012/ ACOBSDMMSE01_ Stockholm_ 2012_ Observer_ Meeting_ Statement_ Ambas-
sador_ Lan_ Lijun_ China.pdf. Statement made to the Arctic Council Observer and Ad- hoc 
















China has participated as an ad hoc observer at the Arctic Council meetings, 
which has allowed it to gain a better understanding of the Council’s work. It 
has also officially expressed its intentions to become a permanent observer to 
the Arctic Council since 2008. Compared with Japan and South Korea, Chi-
na’s expression of interest in the region continues to receive most attention in 
political, media and academic circles. Much of this arises from the perceived 
concern over the impact a vast- resource hungry economy such as China will 
have on the Arctic where new maritime routes for trade could potentially be 
charted and when accessibility of potential resources such as hydrocarbons 
and minerals become economically viable for exploitation. Together with Ja-
pan and South Korea, China was granted observer status in the Arctic Council 
in May 2013.
2.2 Shipping
China, Japan, and South Korea see the melting Arctic Ocean as a unique op-
portunity for international trade and potential access to resources. China pos-
sesses the Xuelong (Snow Dragon) icebreaker which was originally built in 
Ukraine in 1993 and converted from an Arctic cargo ship to a polar research 
and re- supply vessel by Hudong- Zhonghua Shipbuilding of Shanghai by the 
mid- 90s. It was then extensively upgraded in 2007 and 2013. Jointly designed 
by the Finland- based Aker Arctic Technology Inc., the Chinese Arctic and Ant-
arctic Administration (caa), and the Polar Research Institute of China (pric), 
a second Chinese polar icebreaker named mv Xuelong 2, slightly smaller but 
more capable than Xuelong, entered service in July 2019.8 Some Chinese ship-
yards such as the Shanghai Shipyard and Hudong- Zhonghua Shipbuilding Co. 
Ltd. are already building ice- class ships of their own.9
South Korea is interested in the economic benefit of Arctic shipping, as it 
hosts the largest ship building yards in the world. Samsung Heavy Industries 
has developed a double- acting vessel that has the same open sea characteris-
tics as other ships in its class combined with the breaking capacity of an ice-
breaker, cutting through up to 1.5 metres of ice. South Korean industry (and, 
incidentally, its subsidiaries in Finland) thus has a vested economic interest in 
the development of a trans- Arctic shipping route and industry.10 South Korea’s 
 8 “Icebreaker Xuelong 2 joins service on China national maritime day.” Global Times. 11 July 
2019. Retrieved 11 July 2019.
 9 Sakhuja, “The Polar Code and Arctic Navigation,” 809.
 10 Heather Exner- Pirot, “What Route for Arctic Shipping?” 25 March 2011, at http:// 
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Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it pos-
sible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the Pacific. It is working on making 
these two- headed tankers capable of carrying natural gas that has been cooled 
into liquid to Asian markets.11
With the same interests of shipping as its neighbour China, Japan also calls 
for joining hands with the United States and other Arctic States in ongoing 
multilateral efforts to create a new shipping regime in the Arctic Ocean. Japan 
believes that as a result of receding sea ice, caused by global warming, the Arc-
tic is expected to open up for global shipping in the future. This will present 
strategic options for Japan’s industry in light of shorter shipping routes from 
Japan to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. Yoichi Fujiwara, a spokesman for the Jap-
anese Embassy in Ottawa said: “we are interested in environmental programs, 
and transportation or passage through the Arctic area, and development of 
resources in the Arctic Circle.”12
2.3 Resource Development
The forecast by the International Energy Outlook 2011 published by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration suggests that the world energy consump-
tion will grow by 53 percent from 2008 to 2035. It points to Asia’s rapidly grow-
ing economies that will be the primary drivers of increasing global energy 
demand. Chinese companies, some with close government ties, are invest-
ing heavily across the Arctic. China is deepening its Arctic presence through 
resource- oriented investments and the development of ports. It is in the pro-
cess of diversifying its energy resources by investing in both Russia’s Yamal liq-
uid natural gas (lng) complex and Norway’s oil and gas fields. These sources 
not only provide China with an alternative supply of oil and gas but also help 
China gain experience in developing Arctic infrastructure and technology, 
which will eventually allow it to control the routes through which its imports 
travel. For similar reasons, China is now seeking to make oil and gas invest-
ments in Alaska, Canada, and Norway, as well as investments in the mineral 
industries and ports of many Northern European Arctic States.13
 11 Lauren Krugel, the Canadian Press, “Chinese interest in Arctic riches heating up: Calgary 
political scientist (Arctic- Natural- Gas),” February 25, 2008, at http:// www.david- kilgour.
com/ 2008/ Feb_ 27_ 2008_ 09.htm.
 12 Bryn Weese, “Japan latest non- Arctic country to claim stake in North Pole,” Toronto Sun, 
September 3, 2010, at http:// www.torontosun.com/ news/ canada/ 2010/ 09/ 03/ 15241971.
html.
 13 Sherri Goodman and Elisabeth Freese, “China’s Ready to Cash In on a Melting Arctic,” 
Foreign Policy, May 1, 2018, at https:// foreignpolicy.com/ 2018/ 05/ 01/ chinas- ready- to- cash- 









Japan is already involved in Russian oil and gas projects in the country’s east 
and the Arctic. In September 2019, Japan’s Mitsui & Co. and the state- backed 
Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (jogmec) signed a protocol 
with Russia’s Novatek gas producer on investing in the Arctic lng 2 project.14 
Japan’s government and its state- owned oil group have emerged as leading 
contenders for a stake in Rosneft’s $157bn Arctic project. As of December 2019, 
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and jogmec were said to 
be the primary parties considered for investment into the Vostok oil develop-
ment. Participating in the project will help Japan diversify its energy supply 
away from the Middle East, from where it currently imports almost 90 per cent 
of its oil.15
2.4 Polar Research
China maintains an active polar research program, in which it is intensifying 
research in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions. In 2004, China opened its 
first Arctic scientific research station, Huang He Zhan (Yellow River Station) 
at Ny- Ålesund in Svalbard, Norway. Furthermore, with Xuelong, the world’s 
largest non- nuclear icebreaker, China has embarked on several Arctic research 
expeditions. These activities are part of China’s larger polar scientific research 
efforts, which have resulted in more than twenty expeditions being sent to the 
Arctic and Antarctic since 1984. Viewing itself as a “near Arctic state,” China 
perceives the environmental changes and economic development happening 
in the Arctic to have “a significant impact on [its] climate, ecological environ-
ment, agricultural production as well as social and economic development.”16 
The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (caa) is the national author-
ity that organizes, coordinates, and supervises Chinese Arctic and Antarctic 
expeditions. The Polar Research Institute of China (pric) was founded in 1989 
and coordinates national polar research. pric provides logistics for Chinese 
National Arctic/ Antarctic Research Expeditions (chinare). pric is also in 
charge of running and managing the M/ V Xuelong, the Great Wall and Zhong-
shan Antarctic stations.
 14 James Brown, “Japanese Investment in Russia Floundering Despite Arctic Energy Deal,” 
The Moscow Times, October 16, 2019, at https:// www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2019/ 10/ 16/ 
japanese- investment- floundering- despite- arctic- energy- deal- a67754.
 15 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “Japan lines up Russian Arctic oil investment,” Financial Times, 
December 11, 2019, at https:// www.ft.com/ content/ df288d08- 1c14- 11ea- 9186- 7348c2f183af.
 16 Arctic Council, http:// www.arctic- council.org/ index.php/ en/ about/ documents/ cate-
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In Japan, scientists have been involved in Arctic research since the 1950s, 
but it was not until 1990 that Arctic research became institutionalized under 
the aegis of the Arctic Environment Research Center (aerc). aerc was es-
tablished within the National Institute of Polar Research (nipr) in June 1990 
and reorganized in April 2004. The center aims to cooperate with researchers 
at universities and other research institutes as a central aspect of the orga-
nization of Japanese Arctic and Antarctic research. The center is responsible 
for the management and the administration of the Japanese research station 
at Ny- Ålesund, and in charge of the collection of Arctic information and data 
and publishes the Arctic Research Directory.17 Other institutions engaged 
in Arctic research in Japan include the Japan Agency for Marine‐Earth Sci-
ence and Technology ( jamstec), the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
( jaxa), and universities such as Hokkaido University, Tokyo University of 
Marine Science, and Kitami Institute of Technology. Japan’s Arctic research 
focuses on understanding the mechanism of warming amplification in the 
Arctic, understanding the Arctic system for global climate and future change, 
evaluation of the effects of Arctic change on weather in Japan, marine eco-
systems and fisheries, prediction of sea ice distribution and effects upon Arc-
tic sea routes.18
South Korea’s polar research history began in 1987 with the Polar Research 
Center of the Ocean Research Institute which was set up as part of an Ant-
arctic station construction program. Since then, it has expanded from a mere 
Polar Research Laboratory to a Polar Research Institute, a subsidiary research 
unit of the Korea Ocean Research Institute. The Korea Polar Research Institute 
is now an international polar research institute operating the King Sejong Sta-
tion in Antarctica and the Dasan Station in the Arctic. South Korea actively 
participates in several relevant international organizations such as the Antarc-
tic Treaty Consultative Parties (atcp), the Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
Research (scar) and the International Arctic Science Committee (iasc), and 
became recognized internationally by publishing research achievements in 
prominent international journals. Since 2002, South Korea has run the Arc-
tic research station Dasan at Ny- Ålesund, conducting research on climate and 
marine species ecology.
 17 http:// www- arctic.nipr.ac.jp/ .
 18 Kazuyuki Shiraishi, 2012. Japanese National Activity in the Arctic Science http:// faro- arctic.






3 Relationship among the Three East Asia States in the Arctic
China, Japan, and South Korea were granted observer status in the Arctic 
Council at the same time in May 2013. Most literatures relevant to these three 
countries focus substantially on why they are interested in the Arctic, with less 
attention on the important role that Asian states play in Arctic affairs. Major 
drivers of Arctic environmental problems originate from outside of the region, 
which means that the most important Arctic environmental institutions are 
not regional but global. “Asian states are among the definite stakeholders in 
these institutions, combining high scores on power, legitimacy and urgency.”19
Asian stakeholders, through raising their participation and ownership in 
knowledge- building and recommendation work, may contribute much to the 
Arctic Council for better governance of the activities affecting the Arctic.
Such involvement in knowledge- building might promote the regulato-
ry dynamics within broader international institutions crucial to Arctic 
governance, as well as encouraging collaboration in mutually beneficial 
capacity enhancement.20
China, Japan, and South Korea, as non- Arctic countries, advocate their inter-
ests by actively participating in international and regional cooperation mech-
anisms and taking advantage of the speaking rights within the various orga-
nizations.21 Internationally, the three countries participate at the globalized 
international systems level applicable to the Arctic region, such as the Unit-
ed Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), and international legal 
documents developed by the imo, such as the Guidelines for Ships Operat-
ing in Arctic Ice- covered Waters.22 On the regional level, they participate in 
multilateral and bilateral agreements and institutional arrangements between 
countries, such as the Arctic Council. They are able to understand the latest de-
velopments in Arctic affairs and gain insights regarding topics of their concern 
 19 Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 
(November 18, 2014), 770– 783, https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 09700161.2014.952946, 778.
 20 Ibid., 780.
 21 W. Li, “Research on the Cooperative Approaches of China, Japan and South Korea in the 
Arctic,” Polar Strategies, 6 (June 2012), in Chinese, 28.
 22 Jian Yang, Leiv Lunde, “Introduction:  Nordic Perspectives on Asia’s Arctic Interests,” in 
Leiv Lunde, Yang Jian, Iselin Stensdal (eds.), Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (World 
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through the Arctic Council. In addition, they could share the latest technolo-
gies and learn how to deal with related issues through participation in the var-
ious working groups and project meetings within the Arctic Council.23 On the 
discussion about reforming Arctic governance, “China, Japan, and South Korea 
can strengthen exchanges and cooperation with member states, observers and 
relevant international organizations within the organizational framework of 
the Arctic Council.”24
China, South Korea, and Japan believe that the development of the Arctic 
should be orchestrated between the efforts of all interested countries that have 
an urgent need for relevant financial, economic and technological opportuni-
ties.25 From a sectoral perspective, China, South Korea, and Japan are actively 
pursuing scientific, economic, and political activities for the development of 
the Arctic, seeking to increase their roles in the Arctic Council. They are aiming 
to ensure an increasing presence in the Arctic in the form of scientific expe-
ditions, cargo transportation, fisheries, mining, and education, among others. 
They are similarly interested in information about the deposits of strategic 
natural resources in the Arctic and their development, as well as prospects of 
operation of the sea routes, ice- breaker construction, and the situation in the 
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples of the North.26
South Korea is generally welcomed by Arctic States, as the country can 
offer necessary equipment for developing northern economies, investments 
for resource extraction, and a growing market for exports. It is the trust that 
the member States of the Arctic Council place in South Korea on a bilater-
al level that is driving the rising profile of the country in Arctic affairs, with 
the hope of receiving help in research and development in their northern 
regions. South Korea has also demonstrated its sincerity as an Arctic stake-
holder by becoming the first Asian country to develop an integrated “master 
plan” for its regional activities that lays out political, commercial and scientif-
ic goals.27 The plan spans from 2013 to 2017 and aims to increase international 
cooperation to explore and promote Arctic business (shipping, fishing, and 
 23 Ibid.
 24 W. Li and Wu, D., 2010, “Analysis of the Relationship Between Major East Asian Countries 
and the Developing Arctic Council,” International Outlook 6, in Chinese, 91.
 25 Valeriy P. Zhuravel, “China, Republic of Korea and Japan in the Arctic: politics, economy, 
security,” Arctic and North 24, (2016), http:// www.arcticandnorth.ru/ upload/ iblock/ 278/ 
09_ zhuravel.pdf, 125.
 26 Ibid.
 27 Mia M.  Bennett, “The Maritime Tiger:  Exploring South Korea’s Interests and Role” 













shipbuilding), and expand Arctic research.28 South Korea sees involvement 
in the Arctic as an opportunity to strengthen its shipbuilding industry, pro-
mote new trade routes, and find new sources of energy imports. South Korea 
has had a central research agency called the Korean Polar Research Institute 
since 1987, which focuses on Arctic governance, policy, research, and industry. 
South Korea also has a lot to gain from shorter shipping routes. Furthermore, 
it has also been ramping up its Arctic research and diplomatic activities in 
recent years.
Japan has a long history of Antarctic research: its National Institute of Po-
lar Research launched its first Antarctic mission in 1956, and Japan launched 
a new icebreaker in 2008. It was not until recently that Japan shifted focus 
towards the Arctic, when its resource dependency reignited industry interest 
in Arctic shipping lanes. Though a bit slower than its Asian counterparts in 
showing interest in the Arctic, Tokyo has been steadily increasing its Arctic 
programs in an effort to catch up. Japan published its interim Arctic policy in 
2008, and adopted the final version in 2015, seeking to increase research and 
to explore strategic opportunities, specifically the Northern Sea Route. Given 
Japan’s proximity to the Bering Strait, it aims to gain from increased traffic at its 
ports and from the potential to become a central hub in Asia.29
China’s Arctic policy is more upbeat on Arctic shipping options, subsuming 
them under the larger Belt and Road Initiative as a “Polar Silk Road.” Howev-
er, the Chinese shipping industry’s actual advancements into the region have 
been increasingly cautious over time.30 Heavily reliant on trade, China is home 
to 7 out of the 10 busiest ports in the world. When the Arctic routes are pass-
able, they are on average 40 percent quicker than traditional routes such as the 
Panama or Suez Canals, representing a reduction of a week in sailing time, or 
an estimated savings of US$ 600,000 per vessel per trip.31 China has reported-
ly planned to have 5 to 15 percent of its container traffic on Arctic routes by 
 28 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian 
Naval Review 12, no.  2 (2016), http:// www.navalreview.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ public/ 
Vol12num2/ Vol12num2art8.pdf, 38.
 29 Ibid.
 30 Arild Moe and Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping:  Policies, 
Interests and Footprints on Governance,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 10, 2019, 
24– 52, 43.
 31 Linda Jakobson and Seong- Hyon Lee, “The North East Asian States’ Interests and Possible 










Non-Arctic States’ Role in the High North 319
2020.32 Given that Arctic States have direct control of the Arctic trade routes, 
China wants to be able to observe talks that affect these routes.33
Some argue that shipping and shipbuilding are not the most powerful driv-
ers of the Arctic aspirations pursued by these East Asian countries as many 
hold.34 “Arctic maritime transport is viewed with rising caution at governmen-
tal as well as industry levels in these countries.”35
Reflected particularly in Japanese and Korean policy documents and indus-
try statements, the evaluation on maritime business opportunities is prudent. 
The significance of shipping and shipbuilding for Asian engagement in the 
Arctic has also been conditioned by bureaucratic structures in each country 
and their proximity to industry associations and fluctuations in the relevant 
markets. Each nation’s ministry of foreign affairs, the Cabinet Office in Japan’s 
case, have played important roles in the aggregation of comprehensive Arc-
tic policies. The Ministry for Oceans and Fisheries has been the main driver 
in South Korea which also has responsibility for shipping and polar research. 
Deep involvement of the government offices closest to shipping and shipbuild-
ing (characteristic of policy development in Korea and Japan) implies that 
elaboration of goals, priorities, and specific projects build on sector expertise is 
sensitive to not only opportunities, but also political or economic constraints.36 
In China and South Korea, where Arctic policies convey the clearest emphasis 
on economic use, the shipping industries have been financially overstretched 
in recent years, and thus are less prepared to commit themselves to heavy in-
vestments where the expected returns are potentially high, but uncertain and 
still far in the future. For all three countries, rising attention to Arctic devel-
opments as well as broader aspirations of playing visible roles in global gover-
nance mean that maritime transport projects involving this region are assessed 
with considerable interest, but we find nothing to indicate that they will be 
pursued unless the expected returns equal or exceed those of other options.37
 32 Hugh Stephens, “The Opening of the Northern Sea Routes: The Implications for Global 
Shipping and for Canada’s Relations with Asia,” SPP Research Papers, The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Vol. 9, No. 19 (May 2016), 4.
 33 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian 
Naval Review 12, no.  2 (2016), http:// www.navalreview.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ public/ 
Vol12num2/ Vol12num2art8.pdf, 38.
 34 Arild Moe and Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping:  Policies, 
Interests and Footprints on Governance,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 10, 
2019, 43.
 35 Ibid.















China, Japan, and Korea also emphasize both their contributions to scientif-
ic investigations in the Arctic and the relevance of their capital and technology 
for regional economic development.38 China’s Arctic Policy White Paper, for in-
stance, reinforces the scientific factor by referencing its own prominence in global 
governance and international affairs. The three states underscore that they fully 
respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of coastal States. None of them has 
explicitly challenged the controversial unilateral shipping regulations that Can-
ada and Russia have established for ice- covered waters adjacent to their coasts. 
At regional and global levels too, the Asian states have maintained relatively low 
profiles, specifically in shipping- oriented activities under the Arctic Council and 
in the negotiations of a legally binding Polar Code under the International Mari-
time Organization.39
Recently, there has been increasing collaboration among these three East 
Asian states on their polar goals. The first South Korean scientist to go to the Arctic 
was on board a Chinese research vessel, and a Japanese scientist traveled with the 
South Korean icebreaker Araon.40 South Korea and China signed a Memorandum 
of Agreement in 2008 to collaborate on polar research. Japan did not enter into 
formal agreements with China at that time, but in April 2016, Japan, China, and 
South Korea held their first high- level collaboration talks on the Arctic in Seoul.41 
The three states agreed to work together to increase scientific research on the Arc-
tic and help each other further their Arctic interests, which marks the first time 
these three countries have officially collaborated on the Arctic.42
China, Japan, and South Korea jointly initiated and play an important role 
in the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences, which has become the only regional 
scientific cooperative organization in Asia. The three countries play an import-
ant role in this organization. China actively advocated for the Pacific Arctic 
Group to be set up at the Arctic Science Summit Week. The working group 
has become a significant channel for the three countries to make an impact 
in the field of Arctic research. Starting in 2011, the Korea Maritime Institute43 
 38 Ibid.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian 
Naval Review 12, no.  2 (2016), http:// www.navalreview.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ public/ 
Vol12num2/ Vol12num2art8.pdf, 38.
 41 “China, Japan, rok agree to strengthen research cooperation on Arctic,” Xinhuanet, June 
9, 2018, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/ english/ 2018- 06/ 09/ c_ 137240638.htm.
 42 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” above 
note 40, 38.
 43 More information about Korea Maritime Institute can be found at www.kmi.re.kr 
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has been the main financier and host of the ‘North Pacific Arctic Conference’ 
in Hawaii, discussing Arctic governance matters in an attempt to become an 
advocate for Arctic affairs among countries outside the region.44
During high- level talks at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo in 2017, Japan, Chi-
na, and South Korea agreed to conduct a joint study to assess pollution and 
climate impacts in the Arctic, wrapping up their latest talks on how to develop 
the region. The agreement on joint scientific research and exploration comes 
amid increased global attention on navigation and resource development in 
the Arctic Ocean.45 Under the agreement, the three countries will collect basic 
data, including on the levels of marine pollution in the Arctic Ocean, to ensure 
the environment is protected during development work and can predict the 
best timing for navigation in the Arctic Ocean. “It is indispensable for the in-
ternational community to ensure the protection and preservation of the fragile 
marine environment of the Arctic Ocean, and to maintain peace, stability and 
constructive cooperation based on a rule- based maritime order,” according to 
the joint statement issued after the talks.46
4 Arctic States’ Approach to Cooperation in the Arctic
The gradual disappearance of Arctic sea ice raises challenges to sovereignty 
and security issues, some of which are increasingly evident in the evolving re-
lationships between the eight Arctic States and non- Arctic states, such as Chi-
na, Japan, South Korea, and India. In the same vein, there is a strong and practi-
cal need to strengthen international cooperation on Arctic matters, especially 
in the face of growing global attention on melting Arctic sea ice. Cooperation 
between Arctic and non- Arctic states have continued to develop on a num-
ber of levels, either bilaterally or within the existing frameworks of regional 
forums and international organizations, and on issues of scientific research, 
environmental protection, and sustainable development.
At the third Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland in 2015, Zhang 
Ming, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, delivered a keynote speech titled 
 44 Leiv Lunde, Yang Jian, Iselin Stensdal (eds.), Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (World 
Scientific Publishing, 2016), 243.
 45 “Japan, China and South Korea ok joint study on Artic Development,” Japan Times online, 
June 9, 2017, https:// www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/ 2017/ 06/ 09/ national/ science- health/ 










“China in the Arctic: Practices and Policies.”47 The following year, Gao Feng, 
China’s chief negotiator for climate change, gave another speech about China’s 
view on Arctic cooperation at the fourth Arctic Circle Assembly.48 Further-
more, Xu Hong, head of the Department of Legal Affairs in China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, talked about China’s view on Arctic economic development at 
the sixth International Meeting of Representatives of Arctic Council Member 
States, Observer States, and Foreign Scientific Community, which was host-
ed by the Russian Federation between August 29 and September 2 of 2016.49 
These speeches, which often focus on “cooperation,” display an emerging Chi-
nese Arctic policy that is well reflected in the China Arctic Policy White Paper.
Recognizing and respecting each other’s rights constitutes the legal basis 
for cooperation between Arctic and non- Arctic states. In accordance with the 
unclos and other relevant international legal frameworks, Arctic States have 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic region, 
while non- Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. 
To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non- Arctic states should, 
first and foremost, proceed from the basis of recognizing and respecting each 
other’s rights under international law.
Second, mutual understanding and trust provide a political guarantee for 
cooperation between Arctic and non- Arctic states. Arctic States, with a larger 
stake in Arctic- related issues, argue that they should play a more important 
role in Arctic affairs than non- Arctic countries. In the meantime, given the 
trans- regional implications of certain Arctic issues, non- Arctic states that fall 
under such influence also argue that they have legitimate interests in Arctic- 
related issues. With their interests intertwined, there is no doubt that both 
Arctic and non- Arctic states will play increasingly significant roles in Arc-
tic affairs. To enhance cooperation, Arctic and non- Arctic states should, on 
the basis of respecting each other’s rights, strengthen their communication, 
improve mutual understanding, foster trust, and seek areas of converging 
interests.
Third, addressing trans- regional issues through joint research endeavors 
represents a major field of cooperation between Arctic and non- Arctic states. 
 47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Vice Foreign Minister 
Zhang Ming Attends the Third Arctic Circle Assembly and Delivers a Keynote Speech,” 
October 17, 2015, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_ eng/ wjbxw/ t1307440.shtml.
 48 Arctic Circle, Videos from the 2016 Assembly, at http:// www.arcticcircle.org/ assemblies/ 
2016/ videos.
 49 Liu Nengye, “China’s Emerging Arctic Policy,” The Diplomat, December 14, 2016, http:// 
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Enhanced cooperation in scientific research will enable Arctic and non- Arctic 
states to view trans- regional issues from a wider perspective, send a more 
comprehensive message to the international scientific community, and facil-
itate the settlement of relevant issues. This model of cooperation has already 
yielded sound results in addressing issues such as climate change and Arctic 
shipping. The issue for Arctic Council members now is how to involve non- 
Arctic states at the early stages of relevant research endeavors and in- depth 
discussions.
Arctic and non- Arctic states have different rights, interests and specific 
concerns with regards to Arctic- related issues. However, peace, stability and 
sustainable development in the Arctic serves the common interests of both 
Arctic and non- Arctic states. It is crucial for the Arctic and non- Arctic States 
to intersect and share these different rights, interests and concerns. Mutually 
beneficial cooperative partnerships which promote and enhance these inter-
ests will surely be the most appropriate way forward in a region of growing 
global importance. For instance, Arctic resources require enormous foreign 
investment to develop; China, which is flush with capital, is well positioned 
to facilitate this investment. In turn, Chinese leaders hope that Arctic States 
will be inclined to back Chinese interests in the region. China’s strategy of 
scientific diplomacy, participation in Arctic institutions, and resource di-
plomacy has proved fairly successful, enabling China to acquire peacefully 
a (limited) say in Arctic affairs.50 China is acquiring various technologies 
that are essential for building upon new economic opportunities in the Arc-
tic. China is building ice- strengthened bulk carriers and tankers capable of 
commercial Arctic navigation as well as planes that can fly in harsh polar 
weather conditions. Arctic shipping will not only benefit such countries 
whose economies heavily depend on international trade and shipping (e.g., 
China, Japan, South Korea), but also serves the interests of Arctic States as 
well. Martin Breum points out that, spurred by climate change and hopes of 
funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, “the governments of Norway 
and Finland are breathing new life into a vision of an Arctic Corridor from 
Asia to the European mainland.”51
 50 Shiloh Rainwater, “Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications,” Naval 
War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 2, Article 7, 62– 82, 73.
 51 Martin Breum, “How Angry Birds and prospects of Chinese funding power visions of the 
shortest- ever route from China to Europe,” Arctic Today, March 13, 2018, https:// www.arct-







5 China’s Approach to Cooperation in the Arctic
“Cooperation” is an effective means for China’s participation in Arctic affairs, 
and “respect” is the key basis for China’s participation. A  “win- win result” is 
the value pursuit of China’s participation in Arctic affairs, which carries on 
the message that all stakeholders should pursue mutual benefits and common 
progress in all fields of activities. “Such cooperation should ensure that the 
benefits are shared by both Arctic and non- Arctic states as well as by non- state 
entities and should accommodate the interests of local residents including the 
indigenous people.”52
5.1 “Cooperation” with Arctic States
In 2012, China and Iceland signed the Framework Agreement on Arctic Coop-
eration, which was the first intergovernmental agreement on Arctic issues be-
tween China and an Arctic State. The China- Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory 
formally opened on October 18, 2018, in the northern part of Iceland.53 The 
observatory and the land of Karholl are owned by the Icelandic non- profit or-
ganization “Arctic Observatory.” The Polar Research Institute of China (pric) 
leases the land for the operations of the observatory. On April 8, 2018, China 
and Finland signed an agreement to establish a joint research center for Arc-
tic space observation and data sharing service in Sodankyla, which is located 
in north Finland’s Lapland.54 The center will enhance cooperation on cryo-
sphere research with the use of satellites, which will provide information from 
the Arctic region for use in climate research, environmental monitoring, and 
operational activities (such as navigation in the Arctic Ocean). The coopera-
tion between Norway and China on climate monitoring and predictions in the 
Arctic will be increased and carried out on the platform of the Nansen- Zhu 
International Research Center (nsc), jointly established by China and Norway 
in 2003.55 A climate research seminar was attended by Chinese and Norwe-
gian scientists in Beijing April 16– 17, 2018. At that seminar, they decided that 
they will conduct more research on how Arctic climate change influences the 
 52 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full text:  China’s Arctic Policy,” 
January 26, 2018, http:// english.www.gov.cn/ archive/ white_ paper/ 2018/ 01/ 26/ content_ 
281476026660336.htm.
 53 See https:// karholl.is/ en/ .
 54 “China, Finland to Enhance Arctic Research Cooperation,” China Academy of Sciences, 
October 31, 2018, http:// english.cas.cn/ Special_ Reports/ Belt_ of_ Science_ Road_ for_ 
Cooperation/ Technology_ Cooperation/ 201810/ t20181029_ 200564.shtml.
 55 “China, Norway to boost cooperation in Arctic climate research,” Xinhuanet, April 19, 2018, 
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climates of Europe and Asia. They will also develop a prediction system for ex-
treme weather and secondary disasters. China’s Ministry of Natural Resources 
held the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai from May 10 to 11, 2019.56 The 
forum discussed the importance of developing broader international coopera-
tion in areas such as climate change.
On June 5, 2019, China and Russia signed a joint statement vowing to 
strengthen contemporary global strategic stability and promote the coopera-
tion between the two countries in the Arctic area, mainly by expanding ship-
ping routes and cooperating in the development of infrastructure construc-
tion, resource exploitation, tourism, environmental protection, and scientific 
expeditions.57 In 2019, China and Russia launched a scientific cooperation pro-
gram in the Arctic through an agreement that documents the development of 
bilateral cooperation between the Pilot National Laboratory for Marine Sci-
ence and Technology (qnmlm) and the P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (io ras); the agreement is targeted at 
Arctic research and the preservation of its indigenous natural resources.58
5.2 Cooperation with International Institutions
On October 3, 2018, ten parties (including Canada, China, Denmark, Iceland, 
Japan, Norway, Russia, Korea, the United States, and EU) signed an agreement 
to prevent unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean.59 This agreement 
is the first to use a legally binding, precautionary approach to protect an area 
from commercial fishing before fishing has begun in the area. Under the agree-
ment, the Parties commit to not initiate commercial fishing in the central Arc-
tic Ocean until there is more knowledge about the fish stocks in the area. As 
part of the agreement, the Parties will establish a joint scientific research and 
 56 Nannan Lundin, “Arctic, climate change and science diplomacy,” Offices of Science and 
Innovation, May 22, 2019. https:// sweden- science- innovation.blog/ china/ arctic- climate- 
change- and- science- diplomacy/ .
 57 “zhong hua ren min gong he guo hee luo si lian bang guan yu fa zhan xin shi dai quan mian 
zhan lüe xie zuo huo ban guan xi de lian he sheng ming (quan wen) [Joint Statement 
of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Development of a 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era (full text)],” Xinhua News Agency, 
June 6, 2019, https:// www.chinanews.com/ gn/ 2019/ 06- 06/ 8857473.shtml.
 58 “China and Russia Launch Scientific Cooperation in Arctic,” Cision PR Newswire, April 16, 
2019, https:// www.prnewswire.com/ news- releases/ china- and- russia- launch- scientific- 
cooperation- in- arctic- 300832682.html.
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monitoring program to improve understanding of the area’s ecosystems and 
determine if fish stocks can be sustainably harvested.
The China- Nordic Research Center (cnarc) was established in Shanghai on 
December 10, 2013 by ten member institutes (four Chinese and six Nordic).60 
cnarc’s research themes include Arctic climate change and its impacts, re-
sources, shipping and economic cooperation, and Arctic policymaking and 
legislation. Since 2013, cnarc has held an annual Symposium which covers 
topics on: Human Activity and Environmental Change, North meets East, Arc-
tic Synergies: Policies and Best Practices, the Sustainable Arctic, Trans- regional 
cooperation in the Arctic Development and Protection, Integrated Ocean 
Management in the Arctic, Arctic Fisheries, the Polar Silk Road, and Sustain-
able Development Practices.
5.3 Cooperation with Non- Arctic States
China is having trilateral High- Level Dialogue on the Cold Affairs with Japan 
and South Korea.61 The dialogue initiated in 2011 during the Japan- China- 
South Korea Summit by South Korea’s motion. The dialogue seeks to build 
mutual understanding through consistent communication among the three 
countries regarding the Arctic region. As the observers of the Arctic Council, 
the three countries also communicate the outcomes of their dialogue to the 
Arctic Council. The first dialogue took place in Seoul in 2016; the second took 
place in Tokyo in 2017; and the third took place in Shanghai in 2018. During 
the latest trilateral dialogue, which took place on June 26, 2019 in Pusan, the 
three countries agreed to further negotiate for and promote a “free and open 
rule of the sea” in the Arctic in regard to the rule of law, freedom of navigation, 
openness, and transparency.6263 The three countries also agreed to further dis-
cuss data sharing and collaboration in scientific research on the Arctic region. 
Finally, the three countries also seek to further discuss creating a rule- based 
 60 “Background,” China- Nordic Arctic Research Center, https:// www.cnarc.info/ organization.
 61 The People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “di san lun zhong ri han bei 
ji shi wu gao ji bie dui hua lian he sheng ming [Joint Statement of the Third Round of 
China- Japan- Korea High- level Dialogue on Arctic Affairs],” June 8, 2018, https:// www.
fmprc.gov.cn/ web/ wjb_ 673085/ zzjg_ 673183/ tyfls_ 674667/ xwlb_ 674669/ t1567101.shtml.
 62 “di si lun han zhong ri bei ji shi wu gao ji bie dui hua jiang zai fu shan ju xing [The 
Fourth Round of High- level Dialogue on Korean, Chinese and Japanese Arctic Affairs 
will be held in Busan],” Yonhap News Agency, June 24, 2019, https:// cn.yna.co.kr/ view/ 
ACK20190624006300881.
 63 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dai 4- kai Hokkyoku ni kansuru nitchūkan haireberu 
taiwa [Japan- China- rok High Level Dialogue on the 4th Arctic],” June 2, 2019, https:// 
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economic environment in the Arctic region. China has also engaged separately 
with the United Kingdom and France regarding bilateral dialogues on the law 
of the sea and polar issues.
6 Other Actors’ Perception about China
The United States is worried about China’s increasing cooperation with the 
Arctic countries in regard to economic development and scientific research. 
Triggered by China’s involvement in Greenland, U.S. President Donald Trump 
has, with varying degrees of seriousness, repeatedly expressed interest in buy-
ing the autonomous Danish territory.64 China Communications Construction 
Company’s (cccc) bid for Greenland’s airport construction projects in 2018 
triggered a huge reaction from the United States, since Greenland is strate-
gically important for the U.S.  military and its ballistic missile early warning 
system. Under U.S. pressure, Greenland decided to pick Denmark over Beijing 
for financing the planned projects.65 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ex-
pressed concerns over China’s participation in Arctic affairs and suggested that 
China’s participation could transform the Arctic Ocean into a new South China 
Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims.66
While Russia turned to China for potential investments and technology 
partnerships, the pivot to Asia was seen as a potential boost for development 
of the Russian Far East and Urals region.67 Against a background of strained 
relations with the West, China is viewed as Russia’s primary source for capital 
to develop the Arctic. Although both China and Russia have strong interests 
in strengthening cooperation over energy resources and minerals— and more 
broadly over trade and investment flows— in general, there has been much 
skepticism as to the extent to which Russia welcomes the non- Arctic states, 
 64 Vivian Salama, et  al., “President Trump Eyes a New Real- Estate Purchase:  Greenland,” 
Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2019, https:// www.wsj.com/ articles/ trump- eyes- a-  
new- real- estate- purchase- greenland- 11565904223.
 65 Jacob Gronholt- Pedersen and Stella Qiu, “China withdraws bid for Greenland airport 
projects:  Sermitsiaq newspaper,” Reuters, June 4, 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/ arti-
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sermitsiaq- newspaper- idUSKCN1T5191.
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and China in particular, in the Arctic region. Pervasive mistrust is rooted in 
historical grievances and strategic cultural differences. There are growing con-
cerns, particularly on the Russian side, about the long- term implications of the 
ongoing shift in relative power.68
In the midst of a bruising dispute with China, Canada has sided with Beijing 
over Washington on the Arctic, dispatching a senior parliamentarian to Shang-
hai to express support for co- operation in the high latitudes. Liberal mp An-
drew Leslie told a forum on May 10, 2019, that “Canada welcomes opportunity 
for further productive cooperation with China” and suggested that “the whole 
idea is to engage in dialogue … we can work cooperatively.”69
The former president of Iceland, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, who is also the 
current chairman of the Arctic Circle, suggested that it is worth remembering 
that China, along with South Korea and Japan, are surpassing even the Arctic 
States in Arctic science and research, and that Asia is now playing a greater 
economic and diplomatic role in Arctic affairs “than any of us could have pre-
dicted five years ago. That is the new model of the Arctic reality— that not only 
China, but Asia has arrived in the Arctic, big time.”70 The Swedish government 
seeks to develop an innovative, multidisciplinary, and globally coordinated po-
lar research process.71 One of its ambitions is to introduce this research process 
into its international cooperation with new partners, including China. Sweden 
is also very positive about Iceland’s cooperation with China. The Swedish gov-
ernment described the introduction of geothermal energy into China’s clean 
energy transformation as a “standard setter” for geothermal energy develop-
ment in China’s future energy system.
Given its geographic proximity to the two countries, Japan is concerned, from 
a security perspective, with China’s energy cooperation with Russia. Japan has 
been seeking to cooperate with Russia in order to balance the potential threat 
posed by the Sino- Russian cooperation in the Arctic region.72 Moreover, Japan 
is also concerned with China’s approach to the other Arctic nations. Analysis 
from the Japn Marime Self- Defence Force ( jmsdf) expressed concern over the 
 68 Ibid.
 69 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Agreeing on the Arctic: Amid dispute, Canada sides with China 
over the U.S. and how to manage the North,” The Globe and Mail, May 10, 2019, https:// 
www.theglobeandmail.com/ world/ article- agreeing- on- the- arctic- why- canada- sides- 
with- china- over- the- us- on/ .
 70 Ibid.
 71 Lundin, “Arctic, climate change.”
 72 “Roshia no seiiki `Hokkyoku- kai’ ni Chūgoku ga shokushu nichiro bōei kyōryoku ni kat-
suro [China’s reach in Russian sanctuary Arctic Ocean],” The Sankei News, November 15, 
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China- Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory and its potential implications for Chi-
na’s scientific cooperation with the Arctic countries in 2018.73 On economic 
cooperation, however, Japan is joining with China’s initiatives to participate 
in the development of the Arctic. Together with Finland, Russia, and Norway, 
Japan joined China’s polar fiber link project, which will see a 10,000- kilometer 
fiber- optic cable network that connects Europe and Asia.74 The Japanese gov-
ernment keeps a close watch on China’s cooperation with the Nordic countries 
(e.g., Iceland) and believes that China’s main interests in the Arctic include the 
exploration and exploitation of Arctic resources, development of a commer-
cial shipping route in the Arctic region, and enhanced global security.75 Yet, 
the Japanese government still holds positive views on China’s participation 
in international cooperation in the Arctic and, in its Arctic report, puts more 
emphasis on China’s principles of mutual respect, cooperation, win- win, and 
sustainability.
7 Future of Arctic Cooperation
A basic question has been raised: with the shift in the international security ar-
chitecture, will the Arctic in the future continue to be a region generally char-
acterized by cooperation and low tensions, as it was during the post- Cold War 
era, or instead become a region characterized by competition and increased 
tensions, as it was during the Cold War?76 Some hold the view that this shift 
poses a potential challenge to the tradition of cooperation, low tensions, peace-
ful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law that has character-
ized the approach used by the Arctic States, particularly since the founding of 
 73 “Chūgoku no Hokkyoku- kai shinshutsu to kenen jikō— Chūgoku kokusan saihyō- sen, 
setsuryū 2- gō shinsui o ki ni kangaeru [China’s Arctic Ocean Expansion and Concerns- 
Considering the Launch of Snow Dragon No. 2],” September 28, 2018, https:// www.mod.
go.jp/ msdf/ navcol/ SSG/ topics- column/ col- 122.html.
 74 Ting Shi, “10,000 Kilometers of Fiber- Optic Cable Show China’s Interest in Warming 
Arctic,” Bloomberg, December 13, 2017, https:// www.bloomberg.com/ news/ articles/ 2017- 
12- 13/ undersea- cable- project- shows- china- s- interest- in- warming- arctic; Thomas Nilsen, 
“Major step towards a Europe- Asia Arctic cable link,” The Barents Observer, June 6, 2019, 
https:// thebarentsobserver.com/ en/ industry- and- energy/ 2019/ 06/ mou- signed- set- 
arctic- telecom- cable- company.
 75 http:// www.mext.go.jp/ b_ menu/ shingi/ gijyutu/ gijyutu5/ siryo/ _ _ icsFiles/ afieldfile/ 2018/ 
09/ 14/ 1409210_ 003.pdf.
 76 United States of America, Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: 












the Arctic Council in 1996, for managing Arctic issues.77 In this regard, some 
observers argue that “the Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders should at-
tempt to maintain the region’s tradition of cooperation and low tensions, and 
work to prevent the competition and tensions that have emerged in Europe, 
Asia, and elsewhere in recent years from crossing over into the Arctic.”78 They 
point to the experience of Arctic States and other Arctic stakeholders that have 
achieved success in promoting cooperation on a range of issues, which have 
served as a useful model for other parts of the world to follow.79 Nevertheless, 
the Arctic has no way to staying fully isolated from the competition and ten-
sions that have arisen in other parts of the world.
 77 See, for example, Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation 
May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and 
Alexandria Hall, “The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment,” 
RAND Europe (2018), 18; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “As Arctic Waters Open, Nations Plant Their 
Flags,” Navy Times, April 8, 2018; James Stavridis, “Avoiding a Cold War in the High North,” 
Bloomberg, May 4, 2018; Kristina Spohr, “The Race to Conquer the Arctic— the World’s 
Final Frontier,” New Statesman, March 12, 2018.
 78 Ibid., “Changes in the Arctic,” 53.
 79 See, for example, Kevin McGwin, “More Military Activity May Spoil the Arctic’s 
Atmosphere of Collaboration, Warns a Danish Report,” Arctic Today, December 6, 2018; 
Hsin Hsuan Sun, “Arctic Council Sells Itself As a Model for International Cooperation at 
the UN,” Arctic Today, July 23, 2018; John Grady, “Panel: Cooperation, Not Conflict Key to 
Future of the Arctic,” USNI News, April 9, 2018; Levon Sevunts, “Arctic Nations Develop 
Coast Guard Co- operation,” Barents Observer, March 13, 2018; Doug Tsuruoka, “Despite 
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Round Two for Arctic Fishing?
David Dubay
 Abstract
In 2017, the Arctic Five— the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark— 
along with China, Japan, Iceland, and the European Union agreed to a moratorium 
on commercial fishing in the central Artic Ocean (cao). The resulting Central Arctic 
Ocean Fishing Agreement (caofa) is intended to restrict unregulated fishing on the 
high seas of the Arctic Ocean and provide scientists time to study whether any fish 
populations present would support a commercial fishery. Over thirty years ago, over-
fishing in another area of the Arctic, a spot in the Bering Sea known as the “Donut 
Hole,” led to the collapse of its valuable pollack fishery. By 1994, six nations (the United 
States, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and Poland) had signed the Central Bering 
Sea Pollack Agreement, which banned further fishing until the science of the region’s 
fisheries was better understood. Unfortunately, that agreement came too late and the 
Donut Hole’s pollack fishery never recovered. Taking action to protect any fisheries 
resources present in the cao before fishing begins is an admirable first step. This paper 
examines some of the issues that will help determine whether the caofa is ultimately 
successful in its goal of protecting fisheries resources.
 Keywords
Arctic – fisheries – Arctic Ocean – Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement – United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement – regional fisheries management organizations – illegal 
fishing – overfishing
1 Introduction
The sea ice is melting in the central Arctic Ocean (cao), which brings not only 
the possibility of fishing to this area, but also the complex issues regarding 
the conservation and management of fisheries resources. Fish populations in 
the rest of the world’s oceans have been declining for decades due to overfish-
ing and illegal, unregulated and unreported (iuu) fishing, problems the Arctic 
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Ocean avoided when it was frozen. Today, with significant sections of the Arc-
tic Ocean navigable during the summer months, along with ice- free summers 
predicted for the near future, government leaders, scientists and scholars have 
become increasingly concerned about the impacts that more people and ves-
sel traffic in the Arctic will have on the environment. One major concern is that 
the improved access and navigability resulting from the declining sea ice will 
lead to a race by distant- water fishing fleets to plunder Arctic fisheries resourc-
es. In response, the United States led an international effort to protect fish 
populations from unregulated fishing on the high seas portion of the Arctic 
Ocean, efforts that culminated in the Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement 
(caofa) in 2018. On 1 October 2018, the Arctic Five, the group of five Arctic 
littoral States (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia), along 
with five other states: China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, and the EU, which 
control large, distant- water fishing fleets, agreed to a 16- year moratorium on 
commercial fishing on the high seas portion of the cao. The caofa’s ban on 
commercial fishing is intended to provide scientists time to study the cao’s 
ecosystems and evaluate whether this area supports any exploitable fisheries 
before any commercial fishing begins.
Whether the caofa will ultimately be deemed a success remains to be seen, 
as any results will most likely not be known for years, if not decades. First, the 
agreement requires the ratification of all of the ten parties before it enters into 
force, and although not complete, the ratification process is well underway 
and provides hope that the agreement will soon go into effect.1 Even after the 
caofa enters into force, scientists may ultimately determine that no commer-
cially viable fish populations exist in the cao. However, there are reasons to 
be optimistic, as early signs point in the direction of fish moving farther north 
into the Arctic Ocean as its waters grow warmer. Finally, the caofa requires 
development of conservation and management measures and the creation of 
a regional fisheries management organization (rfmo) before commercial fish-
ing begins.
2 Background
The caofa was, in part, motivated by the collapse of the pollack fishery 
in the high seas portion of the Bering Sea, a spot referred to as the “Donut 
 1 As of October 30, 2019, South Korea was the sixth country to have completed ratification after 
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Hole.” Overfishing during the 1980s and 1990s led to a cataclysmic collapse 
of this once vibrant pollack fishery and other valuable fisheries in that area. 
By 1994, the United States, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and Poland 
agreed to ban fishing in the area. The Central Bering Sea Pollack Agreement 
was intended to prevent fishing until the science of the fisheries in this 
region was better understood. Tragically, the pollack fishery in the central 
Bering Sea never recovered.2 It is important to note however that although 
the collapse of the central Bering Sea incident may have been in the minds 
of the proponents of the caofa, the two situations are very dissimilar. The 
Central Bering Sea Pollack Agreement was motivated by an imminent fish-
ery collapse, whereas the caofa sets out to protect fisheries that have not 
yet even been identified.
The Arctic Ocean, a semi- enclosed sea and the world’s smallest ocean, cov-
ers approximately five million square miles on top of the world. It is bounded 
by the five Arctic littoral States of the United States Russia, Canada, the Repub-
lic of Denmark (through Greenland), and Norway. The central Arctic Ocean 
extends beyond the eez s of the Arctic Five and covers 2.8 million square miles. 
The Arctic region is warming at twice the rate as the rest of our planet. As a re-
sult, portions of the Arctic Ocean that once were ice- covered are now ice- free 
during the summer months. Approximately 40% of the cao is now navigable 
for at least part of the year.
The United States’ efforts to protect the cao began over a decade ago, 
when Congress in 2008 directed that the United States “initiate interna-
tional discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negoti-
ate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in 
the Arctic Ocean.”3 The declaration provided that “the United States should 
support international efforts to halt expansion of commercial fishing ac-
tivities in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean.”4 Starting in 2009, the United 
States closed its eez north of the Bering Strait to commercial fishing until 
sufficient information is available to enable a sustainable commercial fish-
ery to proceed.5
 2 For an eye opening description of the facts of the case, see Bailey, K. M. 2011. An empty donut 
hole: the great collapse of a North American fishery. Ecology and Society 16(2): 28. url: http:// 
www.ecologyandsociety.org/ vol16/ iss2/ art28/ .
 3 Public Law 110– 243, 122 stat. 1569– 1571 (June 3, 2008).
 4 Id., sec 4.










In 2015, the Arctic Five issued a joint declaration stating the group’s inten-
tion to prevent unregulated fishing in the cao.6 In the declaration, the five 
Arctic littoral States resolved only to authorize commercial fishing by their ves-
sels in the cao after an international regulatory regime was in place. The dec-
laration included an intention to form a joint scientific undertaking to study 
the region’s ecosystems and a call for other interested states to participate 
in broadening the efforts to protect the cao beyond the efforts of the Arctic 
Five. Discussion between the signatories to the caofa took place in 2017 and 
2018. The caofa was finalized towards the end of 2018 and the agreement was 
signed on October 1, 2018.
The intent of the caofa is to prevent unregulated fishing on the high 
seas portion of the cao. Unregulated fishing generally refers to fishing in 
waters not covered by a conservation and management regime or vessels 
fishing in waters covered by an rfmo but not complying with rfmo re-
quirements because they are not members. Unregulated fishing on the high 
seas results in the exploitation of many fish species when states harvest 
fish without any limitation and is part of the larger problem of iuu fish-
ing. Illegal fishing, i.e., fishing in another state’s eez or fishing in an rfmo 
management area in violation of the rfmo’s regulations defeats a coastal 
State’s or rfmo’s legitimate management and conservation interests, de-
pleting valuable fish stocks. Unreported fishing occurs when catches are 
not reported accurately to authorities in contravention of either state or 
national requirements. Unreported fishing interferes with the proper func-
tioning of fishery management. Along with overfishing that occurs under 
existing regulatory regimes, iuu fishing significantly depletes fish popula-
tions, some of which are already below sustainable levels and may even be 
in danger of collapse. iuu fishing, much like international piracy, has gone 
from a regional concern to a global security threat. iuu fishing is support-
ed by transnational criminal organizations and has been linked to a whole 
host of other maritime crimes, including drug trafficking, human slavery, 
piracy,7 and terrorism.
The three main “hard law” legal instruments that govern international fish-
ing are the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos, 
 6 U.S. Department of State, “Arctic Nations Sign Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in 
the Central Arctic Ocean,” Media Note, July 15, 2015 <https:// 2009– 2017.state.gov/ r/ pa/ prs/ 
ps/ 2015/ 07/ 244969.htm> (Last accessed November 22, 2019.)
 7 A study of piracy incidents found states that experienced declining fish production were 
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Law of the Sea, or los),8 the 1993 fao Compliance Agreement,9 and the 1995 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.10
unclos was crafted as the codification of the international law for regulat-
ing the use of the world’s oceans. One of its key provisions was to allow states 
to declare an Exclusive Economic Zone or eez up to 200 nautical miles from 
its baseline. An eez is a zone where a state has the jurisdiction and authority 
to explore and exploit the natural resources present from the top of the wa-
ter column all the way to the seabed. One of these natural resources is fish. 
Beyond a nation’s eez, all states have the freedom to fish subject to the other 
international obligations and agreements.11
unclos has specific provisions to protect shared stocks, both straddling 
stocks (fish that occur along the dividing line between two states’ eez s and 
fish that occur along the border of a state’s eez and the high seas) and high-
ly migratory stocks (fish that migrate long distances crossing international 
boundaries). For highly migratory species, “[t] he coastal State and other States 
whose nationals fish in the region for the highly migratory species listed in 
Annex i shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organi-
zations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of 
optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the exclusive economic zone.”12 For straddling stocks, coastal States 
and states that fish for such stocks in an adjacent zone are required to, either 
directly or through appropriate sub- regional or regional organizations, agree 
on conservation measures for the stocks in adjacent areas. Without this provi-
sion, states would be free to undermine a coastal State’s conservation measures 
by fishing just on the other side of the boundary line.13
 8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [here-
inafter unclos] Despite the fact that the United States was a key proponent and leader 
of the Law of the Sea Conference, the U.S.  has not yet ratified the treaty despite calls 
from nearly every corner of the world and within the United States to do so. Nonetheless, 
the United States treats almost all the treaty’s provisions, including the articles governing 
fisheries, as reflecting customary international law.
 9 fao Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Manage-
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.
 10 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks [hereinafter fsa].
 11 There are a handful of other important international agreements, including the 1989 UN 
Driftnet Moratorium, the 1993 un fao Compliance Agreement, and the 2009 Port State 
Measures Agreement that are beyond the scope of this paper.
 12 unclos, ibid., Art. 64(1).













The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (fsa) expands on unclos’s protections 
for straddling and highly migratory stocks. The fsa requires states to cooper-
ate either through regional or subregional fisheries organizations or directly, 
to conserve straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.14 Where there is no 
rfmo, states are directed to cooperate to establish an organization or reach 
other agreement for the management of a straddling and highly migratory fish 
stock.15 Further, the fsa mandates that States meet their duty to cooperate by 
becoming members of such an organization or participate in such an arrange-
ment, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures es-
tablished by such organization or arrangement.16 Only states that are members 
of the relevant regional or sub- regional fisheries organization or agree to apply 
the measures established by the organization shall be entitled to fish for those 
resources.17
Beyond straddling stocks and highly migratory species, unclos provides 
that states have an overarching obligation to cooperate in the management 
and conservation of marine living resources.18 Actions taken are required to be 
based on the best scientific evidence available with the aim of maintaining fish 
populations and dependent species or restoring stocks above the level where 
reproduction becomes seriously threatened.19
The third major international fisheries agreement, the un fao Compliance 
Agreement, was designed to ensure that vessels are authorized by flag States 
before they can fish on the high seas and to prevent the reflagging of violators, 
a common problem in international fisheries.
3 Issues
The caofa raises a number of issues that may present challenges for the par-
ties to the agreement if commercially viable fish populations are found in 
the Arctic or if a non- party starts fishing in the cao during the term of the 
agreement. The most important issue is that the agreement could create in-
stability in the region if a non- party starts fishing in the cao. A second issue is 
the interaction of the agreement with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, a treaty 
 14 fsa, ibid. Art. 8(1).
 15 Id. at Art. 8(5).
 16 Id. at, Art. 8(3).
 17 Id. at Art. 8(4).
 18 unclos, id., Art. 117.
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which also deals with new and evolving fishers as well as rfmo requirements. 
Further, if an rfmo is eventually negotiated for the cao, how will the parties 
to the agreement solve some of the recurrent organization and management 
issues that have negatively affected the performance of other rfmo s? Lastly, 
the future of fishing in the cao will be greatly affected by ecosystem changes 
and human fishing activity in the world’s other oceans.
Might we see a showdown over Arctic fishing over a state that is not a party 
to the caofa conducting unregulated fishing in the cao during the morato-
rium? Whether non- parties to the Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement 
would be compelled to act in accordance with the moratorium20 is unclear. 
At the outset, an international agreement cannot bind a party state that has 
not consented. Further, the right to fish is one of the high seas’ freedoms and 
unclos does not expressly obligate a flag State to comply with conservation 
and management measures established by an rfmo. Practically speaking, de-
manding that a non- party comply with a total ban on fishing where there are 
harvestable quantities of fish appears unreasonable. A non- party to the caofa 
that is a signatory to the fsa would be obligated to take actions consistent 
with the agreement with regards to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, 
if the caofa is interpreted as an rfmo. A non- signatory to the fsa would at 
least have a duty to cooperate in the conservation and management of living 
marine sources, a duty under unclos that is also considered customary in-
ternational law. In the Bering Sea Donut Hole case, a failure of the parties to 
agree led to the spectacular collapse of the area’s pollack fishery. The same 
situation could still occur in the central Arctic Ocean. A state could continue to 
fish while arguing that its actions are in line with applicable conservation and 
management measures. A coastal State might argue that such fishing is illegal 
while the fishing state could argue that its activities are simply unregulated, 
but not illegal. However, both illegal fishing and unregulated fishing deplete 
fisheries resources and a party to the caofa may strongly object to a non- party 
fishing in the coa. A conflict over fishing would go against the caofa’s propo-
nents’ aims to resolve resource issues peaceably.
At the outset, the question should be asked whether any provisions of the 
unfsa conflict with those of the caofa.21 The caofa does not supersede the 
 20 The agreement does not prohibit exploratory fishing on the basis of sound scientific 
research.
 21 The caofa is not strictly illusory due to its broader subject matter, i.e., the unfsa deals 
with the subject of shared stocks, specifically, straddling and migratory fish stocks, 
while the caofa applies more broadly to fish, defined as “species of fish, mollusks and 







unfsa as it expressly states that “[t] he parties recognize that they are and 
will continue to be bound by their obligations under the relevant provisions 
of international law, including those reflected in the Convention and the 1995 
Agreement [i.e., unfsa].”22 In fact, many of the unfsa’s provisions appear to 
directly override those of the caofa. In order to step around these conflicts, 
the caofa could be viewed as a provisional agreement under the unfsa or 
a new or exploratory fishery in order to fulfill the objectives and the spirit of 
both agreements despite the caofa’s broader subject matter of all fish, as op-
posed to the unfsa’s limit to straddling stocks and migratory species, as dis-
cussed more fully below.
It is interesting to note that nine of the ten parties to the caofa have rati-
fied unclos, with the United States having signed the Convention but not yet 
ratified it. In addition, nine of the ten parties have ratified the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. China, the lone holdout, has signed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
but not ratified it. Further, six of the ten parties (The United States, Canada, 
Norway, Japan, South Korea and the European Union) have ratified the fao 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.
Under the unfsa, the mandate for coastal States and flag States of fishing 
vessels is clear: to be entitled to access high seas straddling or migratory fish-
ery resources, states must either join the competent rfmo or agree to apply 
the conservation and management measures established by the rfmo.23 The 
unfsa applies broadly to the conduct of fishing and does not distinguish be-
tween exploratory fishing and fishing conducted for scientific research.24 If an 
rfmo with competence over the relevant straddling or migratory fish stocks 
does not exist, states under the unfsa have an obligation to cooperate in the 
establishment of an rfmo.25 The flag State for fishing vessels has an obligation 
to apply the conservation measures of the rfmo and ensure that such vessels 
do not engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of such mea-
sures.26 The nine caofa parties that are parties to the unfsa are bound under 
international law to follow these provisions. China, although it has not ratified 
the unfsa, has signed the agreement and thus is obligated not to engage in 
 22 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 
October 1, 2018 [caofa].
 23 fsa, ibid., Art. 8(3).
 24 The unfsa includes provisions for new and exploratory fisheries but does not distinguish 
between different purposes for fishing, e.g., exploratory fishing or scientific research.
 25 fsa, id., Art. 8(5).
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any activity that would undermine the unfsa’s objectives. In the absence of 
the caofa, the relevant coastal States and flag States for fishing vessels would 
be required to establish an rfmo before fishing in the coa.27
The caofa places a moratorium on commercial fishing but includes spe-
cific provisions for exploratory fishing and scientific research, which will be 
necessary to determine the existence of any commercially viable fish stocks in 
the cao. For new or exploratory fisheries, the unfsa provides that
[s] tates shall adopt as soon as possible cautious conservation and man-
agement measures, including, inter alia, catch limits and effort limits. 
Such measures shall remain in force until there are sufficient data to allow 
assessment of the impact of the fisheries on the long- term sustainability 
of the stocks, whereupon conservation and management measures based 
on that assessment shall be implemented. The latter measures shall, if 
appropriate, allow for the gradual development of the fisheries.28
The caofa requires the establishment of conservation and management mea-
sures for exploratory fishing within three years.29 Parties are authorized to car-
ry out scientific research involving the catching of fish provided the activities 
do not undermine preventions of unregulated commercial and exploratory 
fishing and the protection of healthy marine ecosystems.30
At least one commentator has opined that the caofa could be viewed as 
an rfmo under Article 1 (1)(d) of the unfsa.31 Under Article 1 (1)(d), “arrange-
ment” means a cooperative mechanism established in accordance with the 
Convention [unclos] and this Agreement [unfsa] by two or more States for 
the purpose, inter alia, of establishing conservation and management mea-
sures in a subregion or region for one or more straddling fish stocks or highly 
migratory fish stocks.”32 However, the caofa expressly states that “it is pre-
mature at this point to establish any additional regional or subregional fish-
eries management organizations or arrangements for the high seas portion of 
 27 Id. at Art 8(5).
 28 Id. at Art. 6(6).
 29 caofa at Art. 5(1.d.).
 30 Id. at Art. 4.
 31 V. Schatz et al., “The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the 
Central Arctic Ocean: A Primer,” ejil: Talk!, October 26, 2018, https:// www.ejiltalk.org/ 
the- 2018- agreement- to- prevent- unregulated- high- seas- fisheries- in- the- central- arctic- 
ocean- a- primer/ .















the Arctic Ocean,” which makes the argument that the caofa constitutes an 
rfmo tenuous. Although the caofa was not executed under the authority of 
the unfsa, i.e., the caofa only recites that the parties recall the provision of 
the unfsa. Thus, the caofa could be viewed as a “provisional arrangement” 
under Article 7(5) in accordance with the requirements for new and explor-
atory fishing, iaw Art. 6(6), discussed above. Per Article 7(5), pending agree-
ment on compatible conservation and management measures, the States con-
cerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort 
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. If the caofa is 
not a provisional arrangement under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, then the 
discovery of fish in the coa by a non- party might trigger negotiations for an 
agreement to create an rfmo outside the caofa, perhaps undercutting the 
caofa’s relevance and/ or effectiveness.
The downside, if and when commercial fishing starts, is that the effective-
ness of any resulting regional fisheries management organization (rfmo) will 
face the same challenges as other rmfo’s face regarding compliance and en-
forcement that make overfishing and iuu fishing difficult to stop in the rest of 
the world’s oceans. Although the signatories to the caofa include many of the 
countries with large, distant water fishing fleets, many other such countries are 
not signatories. Under international law, the agreement is not binding on non- 
parties. Even so, international law obligates states to cooperate in the conser-
vation and management of living marine resources and many states are parties 
to international instruments that protect fish. In spite of this, many states fail 
to carry out their obligations. How to get coastal States, flag States, and port 
States to comply with their international legal obligations for the protection 
and conservation of living marine resources, including fisheries, is one of the 
enduring problems of international fisheries law.
The interconnectedness of the world’s oceans and their ecosystems means 
that activities and events in other parts of the world’s oceans will have an effect 
on the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean as a result of the melting sea ice now provides 
a shortcut from Asia to North America and Europe for a portion of the summer 
months. But change has come slow to the Arctic so far. Shipping companies 
will begin to pursue greater use of the Arctic Ocean when they determine it’s 
advantageous from a bottom- line business perspective or navigating via the 
Arctic presents some other improvement such as increased safety or improved 
logistics. They may make the move to the Arctic if there are availability issues 
or other impediments to using existing shipping routes. Increased ship traffic 
is already beginning to impact the Arctic environment and the effects of more 
traffic are only going to increase in the future. Declining fish production in oth-
er parts of the world has resulted in fishing fleets moving to more productive 
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fishing grounds— sometimes thousands of miles away— and a doubling of 
fishing effort. If there are fish in the Arctic, fishing vessel will eventually seek 
them out. The existing international fisheries regime has done a poor job of 
protecting the world’s fish stocks. As events affect states’ use of the world’s 
shipping lanes and fishing grounds, it is just human nature that people will 
look for alternatives, and the warming Arctic will gradually be a more attrac-
tive option over time. Protecting the Arctic and its fish means ensuring that 
free access and safety for the other shipping lanes and straits of the world re-
main protected. Fisheries resources around the globe also need better protec-
tion or distant water fleets will have greater incentives to follow the fish to the 
Arctic. If they do, the Arctic’s pristine environment could be in jeopardy from 
increased use and resource exploitation.33
4 Conclusion
The Arctic Ocean’s sea ice is melting and opening access to this previously fro-
zen body of water. Arctic States are concerned about exerting their sovereignty 
as well as taking advantage of the potential shipping, energy and fishing op-
portunities that this developing situation in the north presents. For protecting 
any fisheries in the cao, the caofa is an admirable step, but there are other 
perhaps even more pressing issues. More ships will bring more environmen-
tal impacts and raise the risk of an oil spill. Energy development projects will 
bring their own risks to fisheries as the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez 
incidents have tragically shown us. Efforts to develop the Arctic in a sustain-
able, safe and environmentally sound manner, one that protects fish, are only 
half the puzzle. Decisions outside the Arctic (not cooperation and governance 
within) will shape the types and amounts of activity in the Arctic, including 
those regarding fishing and the protection of living marine resources.
 33 See, United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook (April 2009). Fish are already 
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